Group-lending: Sequential financing,lender monitoring and joint liability

We develop a simple model of group-lending based on peer monitoring and moral hazard. We find that, in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring, group-lending schemes may involve under-monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects. Moreover, under certain parameter configurations, group-lending schemes involving either sequential financing, or a combination of lender monitoring and joint liability are feasible. In fact, group-lending schemes with sequential financing may succeed even in the absence of joint liability, though the repayment rate will be lower. In the absence of joint liability, however, group-lending with lender monitoring is unlikely to be feasible.     

Hurdle models of repayment behaviour in personal loan contracts

This paper proposes a hurdle model of repayment behaviour in loans with fixed instalments. Using information on previous and current contracts, the approach yields a model of customer behaviour, useful, for example, in assessing the impact of determinants of default, a natural concern for credit and behavioural scoring. Under plausible assumptions, a debtor in each period faces a number of missed payments, which depends on his previous repayment decisions; meanwhile, as most debtors are expected to meet financial obligations, the number of missed payments is bound to display excess zeros, with reference to a single-part law. Each sequence of missed payments is modelled by using the binomial thinning, a conceptual tool that allows for dependence between integers by defining the support of consecutive counts. Under suitable assumptions on heterogeneity, the model can be produced under a random effects approach, leading to a two-part panel data model, estimable by quasi-maximum likelihood. The proposed approach is illustrated using a panel data set on personal loans granted by a Portuguese bank.     

Progressive Lending in Microfinance—What about the Farmers?

Dynamic incentives have become a common measure in microfinance institutions (MFI) to counteract the risk of default and to strengthen the borrower's identification with his micro‐lender. This article focuses on progressive lending over the course of the bank–borrower relationship. As the agricultural sector is increasingly important for Azerbaijan's economy, this study differentiates between the lending policies faced by farmers and non‐farmers, and matches the findings with the repayment performances of both client groups. By means of a rich data set spanning from 2007 through 2012 provided by an MFI in Azerbaijan, it can be demonstrated that farmers face a higher degree of loan volume rationing that cannot be justified by our findings on repayment performances. Moreover, we find that repeated borrowing increases the default probabilities of both client groups. In conclusion, we deduce that the MFI and borrowers could benefit from reconsidering the current lending policies.     

Are debt repayment incentives undermined by foreign aid?

This paper investigates the effects of inflows of foreign aid on the debt repayment behavior of developing countries. The paper first delineates the overall incentives to committing to timely debt repayment in a war of attrition-type model. A set of panel estimates including 93 developing countries shows that foreign aid is strongly negatively associated with repayment incentives. The findings pertain to both total debt service and service on publically guaranteed debt. A set of conditional estimates suggest that the main findings generalize to the majority of developing countries.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

INTEREST RATES IN GROUP LENDING: A BEHAVIOURAL INVESTIGATION

Abstract.  Microfinance institutions (MFIs) serve more than 5 million households in developing countries. A crucial variable for MFI schemes is the interest rate to be charged from borrowers. This paper studies the behavioural impacts of the repayment burden on repayment performance. In a laboratory experiment, we vary the amount a borrower group has to repay and study how this affects free-riding behaviour. We can identify two counteracting effects: a higher repayment burden intensifies the incentives to free-ride as shirking saves more money. On the other hand, high-interest loans are less tolerant towards defaulters, which exerts a disciplining effect.     

The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information

We utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes. A Guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it. One year later, we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender. This pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market. Our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender, and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game. The credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones, increasing economic differentiation.     

Remittances and rural credit markets: Evidence from Senegal

This study investigates the relationship between remittances and credit markets in Senegal, focusing on rural areas where financial constraints are more challenging. Using a household fixed effects model, the findings show that remittances and credit markets are complements; namely, the receipt of remittances is positively associated with the likelihood of having a loan in a household. This means that migrants can increase the reliability of their family members and close relatives back home through their remittances, insuring them vis‐à‐vis lenders for their credit contracts. They are the collateral or the “element of trust” in the credit contract between the borrower and the lender, representing a potential alternative in case of non‐repayment. This result is robust to alternative models and various robustness tests mitigating the potential endogeneity of remittances. A detailed analysis also shows that the relationship between remittances and credit markets is mainly driven by loans taken for consumption and food, in particular, as well as loans provided by informal institutions.     

Do bad borrowers hurt good borrowers? A model of biased banking competition

Portuguese Economic Journal - This paper explores a two-bank model in which, first, one bank correctly estimates the probability of low-quality loan repayment while the other overestimates it, and...     

Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

The paper considers a principal–agent relationship between a borrower and lender based on a model from Bowles (Microeconomics: behavior, institutions, & evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003). It expands the model by incorporating borrower collateral as an exogenous variable to partly assuage lender concerns about excessive risk, and a theory of lender deception is then developed. Deception is posited as a costly activity that effectively makes fraud undetectable and extracts the borrower’s economic rent arising from moral hazard despite the presence of third-party enforcement and borrower collateral. We identify under what conditions a lender may have sufficient incentives for employing deception and to what extent they would employ it. The likelihood of, and outcomes from, deception are compared between monopoly lenders those in competitive markets. The model suggests that competitive lenders have more incentive to deceive than a monopoly lender facing the same borrower.     

Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion

This paper analyzes a government's incentives to provide financial assistance to a public bank which is hit by a liquidity shock. We show that discretionary decisions about emergency liquidity assistance result in either excessively small or excessively large liquidity injections in a wide variety of circumstances. Also, adding a lender of last resort does not generally ensure a socially optimal policy. However, optimal rules exist that align the preferences of the government and/or a lender of last resort with social preferences by either subsidizing or taxing liquidity aid.     

政策性负担与长期预算软约束

经济学家们很早就注意到了政策性负担对预算软约束的影响,然而现有的有关政策性负担的理论模型主要集中讨论政策性负担与企业补贴的关系,但企业补贴并不等于预算软约束。为此,本文首先建立了一个简单的三阶段动态博弈模型,在该框架下我们可以准确地定义预算软约束问题,并分析政策性负担对预算软约束的影响。然后,我们利用重复博弈的思想将本文的基本模型动态化,建立了长期预算软约束的基本理论框架,这在现有的预算软约束文献中是不多见的,有助于更加全面地考察影响政策性负担、预算软约束和道德风险问题的各种因素。本文的主要结论是,政策性负担是导致企业出现预算软约束问题的重要根源之一,但如果政府和企业之间的博弈可以重复进行,预算软约束问题能够得到有效缓解。     

An econometric analysis of choice of mortgage design in the United Kingdom

The research seks to better understand the choice of mortgage design by households in the United Kingdom. Family Expenditures Survey data is used to test the various hypotheses on the determinants of the choice between an endowment and a repayment mortgage. A bivariate probit model with sample selection is estimated to detect any likely selectivity bias arising out of tenure choice. The theoretical modelling reflects the behaviour of liquidity constrained households comparing comparative periodic mortgage costs and households concerned with the oppurtunity cost of equity in a property. Actual choices appear to reflect the impact of nominal interest rates, income and cash flow considerations. There is little direct evidence that the choice of mortgage repayment vehicle is motivated by portfolio design. There is some tentative evidence of supply side pressure on endowment mortgage take up.     

Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan

Using data from a survey of 160 urban borrowing groups of the Microfund for Women in Jordan, we investigate the effect of screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing groups' repayment behavior as an indirect test of different theoretical models. The dependent variable used captures the intensity of default measured by the total number of days of late repayment after each due date, allowing us to use count data models with cluster standard errors. As theory predicts, our empirical analysis suggests that peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties reduce delinquency. The paper uncovers interesting evidence about the role of social ties and religion. Most notably, in an area where religion contributes to attitudes and beliefs of individuals, we find that religiosity improves repayment performance.     

Financing microfinance institutions: subsidies or deposit mobilisation

According to conventional wisdom, dependence on subsidies cannot achieve the double bottom lines of microfinance institutions (MFIs): outreach and financial sustainability. The application of market-based principles to microfinancing, such as deposit mobilisation, has been long suggested as an answer to this problem. This paper documents the following findings regarding this issue. First, deposit mobilisation crowds out subsidies. Second, subsidies and deposit mobilisation reduce microcredit interest rates and allow MFIs to reach poorer borrowers. Third, subsidies and deposit mobilisation worsen financial sustainability. Fourth, subsidies reduce repayment rates, while deposit mobilisation has no impact on repayment. Overall, the results suggest that neither subsidies nor deposit mobilisation solve the traditional problem of trade-off between outreach and financial sustainability.     

SCREENING AS A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELINQUENCY,RENEGOTIATION, AND BANKRUPTCY

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her endowment, and a lender uses random contracts to screen different types of borrowers. In equilibrium, some borrowers choose not to repay and thus become delinquent. The lender renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delinquency leads to bankruptcy. Applied to mortgage restructuring, our mechanism generates amplification of house‐price shocks through foreclosure spillovers. We also show that government intervention aimed at limiting foreclosures may have unintended consequences.     

What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy,Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?

This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour.     

Behind the black box: a survey of real-world investment appraisal approaches

This paper assesses business investment appraisal techniques and expectations formation. The paper begins with a comparative analysis of the links between fixed asset investment theories and real world investment appraisal techniques, focusing on the underlying assumptions about rationality and expectations. In the empirical sections, these ideas are tested via an analysis of business behaviour based upon survey evidence from a sample of Cambridgeshire manufacturing firms. The statistical analysis focuses on hypothesis testing, ordered probit estimations and simulations. The evidence presented reveals that whilst conventional production function analysis does provide some explanatory power in describing the objective determinants of firm investment activity, subjective and behavioural factors are also important.The author is grateful to Geoff Harcourt, Philip Arestis and an anonymous referee for their encouraging advice and suggestions.     

The impact of public ownership in the lending sector

We examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector, which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit. Such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects. For instance, it can increase lender profit. Furthermore, borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers’ projects. In addition, there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare.     

Estimated annual and lifetime labor productivity in the United States, 2016: implications for economic evaluations

Abstract

Background: Human-capital based lifetime productivity estimates are frequently used in cost-of-illness (COI) analyses and, less commonly, in cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs). Previous US estimates assumed that labor productivity and real earnings both grow by 1% per year.

Objectives: This study presents estimates of annual and lifetime productivity for 2016 using data from the American Community Survey, the American Time Use Survey, and the Current Population Survey, and with varying assumptions about real earnings growth.

Methods: The sum of market productivity (gross annual personal labor earnings adjusted for employer-paid benefits) and the imputed value of non-market time spent in household, caring, and volunteer services was estimated. The present value of lifetime productivity at various ages was calculated for synthetic cohorts using annual productivity estimates, life tables, discount rates, and assumptions about future earnings growth rates.

Results: Mean annual productivity was $57,324 for US adults in 2016, including $36,935 in market and $20,389 in non-market productivity. Lifetime productivity at birth, using a 3% discount rate, is roughly $1.5 million if earnings grow by 1% per year and $1.2 million if future earnings growth averages 0.5% per year.

Conclusions: Inclusion of avoidable productivity losses in societal-perspective CEAs of health interventions is recommended in new US cost-effectiveness guidelines. However, estimates vary depending on whether analysts choose to estimate total productivity or just market productivity, and on assumptions made about growth in future productivity and earnings.