Credit mismatch and breakdown

This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.     

Trade, Entry Barriers, and Home Market Effects

This paper re‐examines the relationship between entry barriers and home market effects and departs from recent work by using returns to scale as a direct measure of entry barriers as opposed to relying on the level of product differentiation as an indirect proxy for barriers to entry. In contrast to earlier work, results of this study do not indicate a significant relationship between home market effects and entry barriers. In addition, examination of trade costs reveals the importance of these costs in the numéraire sector. These two observations are consistent with the theoretical prediction that home market effects are insignificant in the presence of symmetric trade costs across sectors. Consequently, a more direct measure of barriers to entry and an explicit consideration of trade costs indicate that the link between home market effects and barriers to entry is not as strong as predicted by previous work.     

High profit equilibria in directed search models

We consider a model of directed search where the sellers are allowed to post mechanisms with entry fees. Regardless of the number of buyers and sellers, the sellers are able to extract all the surplus of the buyers by introducing entry fees and making price schedules positively sloped in the number of buyers arriving to their shops. This is in contrast to results that are achieved for large markets under the assumption that sellers cannot influence the utility of any particular buyer (market utility assumption), in which case buyers obtain strictly positive rents. If there is a bound on the prices or on the entry fees that can be charged, then the equilibrium with full rent extraction does not exist any more, and the market utility assumption is restored for large markets.     

COMMITMENT AND COSTLY SIGNALING IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS

I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segmenting the market to alleviate information frictions. Seemingly irrelevant but incentive compatible listing fees are implementable provided that the market is not already sufficiently active.     

Entry and industry evolution: the UK car industry, 1958—83

This paper models entry and the subsequent changes in market structure in three segments of the UK car industry, 1958–83. The entry equation emerges from a dynamic optimization model which allows for the costs of acquiring market share. The model is used to explore the hypothesis that the market penetration of entrants in this industry was facilitated by a post-entry advertising war which the incumbent firms lost. The basic hypothesis under examination is that advertising both facilitates and restricts entry, but that it does so in a way that varies systematically over time. The data are consistent with this view, showing that high advertising shares readily translate into high market shares, but that the escalation of industry advertising caused by entry can make high advertising entry strategies increasingly costly over time.     

Search costs and efficiency: Do unemployed workers search enough?

Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the Dutch labor market. In our model, the wage distribution, job search intensities, and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. Given the distribution of search intensities (which we directly observe), we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non-market time; these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold-up problem, while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent-seeking behavior. Our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare-improving.     

Determinants of firm start-up size in the Brazilian industry: an empirical investigation

The article investigates the determinants of newly created industrial establishments in Brazil in 1997 taking as reference explanatory variables referring to market structure and industry dynamics, stronger effects are detected for larger firms. Minimum efficient scale, industry size, industry growth and turbulence display the expected positive effects on firm size, but the intensity of those are more pronounced for larger firms. The suboptimal scale variable, on the other hand, exhibits a counterintuitive positive effect and perhaps other types of barriers to entry that are not related to scale aspects may be important in the Brazilian case.     

REGULATIONS AND STRATEGY: EVIDENCE ON ADVERTISING

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firms’ advertising spending among the population of local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the hybrid rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have a negative relationship with advertising spending. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes has had a positive and significant impact on firms’ advertising spending. These results highlight the importance of incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to be market oriented and strive for superior performance.     

What factors inspire the high entry flow in Taiwan's manufacturing industries–A count entry model approach

Why is the entry flow of the manufacturing sector extremely high in Taiwan, and does it contribute to the prevailing entrepreneurship? This article aims to explore what factors inspire potential entrants to go into an industry. Based on a theoretical formulation of the Poisson probability entry model, a count data model is employed to investigate the determinants of entry flows. The empirical results reveal that traditional entry barriers indeed lower the entry flow. The entry incentives, including price cost margin and industry growth, play a lesser role at attracting new firms, while alternatively the market size acts as a better proxy of an entry incentive in explaining entry flows. Incumbents’ responses to entry, R&;D and advertising intensity are found to be associated with a significant negative impact on entry flows. This article also finds that there is a higher bound of covariate of entry, about 10%, that can be attributed to the immeasurable personality of entrepreneurs–entrepreneurship.

Rather be the chicken's beak than be the cow's behind. 1 ¹?This proverb explains in terms the concept of choosing jobs as how one would like to be a leader of a small firm rather than an employee in a large enterprise.

The trade that might cause life hazard will be dealt, while the trade that might cause a loss will not be dealt.

Two traditional Chinese proverbs     

Coaching,Counseling, Case‐Working: Do They Help the Older Unemployed Out of Benefit Receipt and Back Into the Labor Market?

Intensified counseling, job search assistance and related policies have been found to be effective for labor market integration of the unemployed by a large number of studies, but the evidence for older and hard‐to‐place unemployed is more mixed. In this paper, we present key results for a large‐scale active labor market program directed at the older unemployed in Germany. To identify the treatment effects, we exploit regional variation in program participation. We use a combination of different evaluation estimators to check the sensitivity of the results to selection, substitution and local labor market effects. We find positive effects of the program in the range of 5–10 percentage points on integration into unsubsidized employment. However, there are also substantial lock‐in effects, such that program participants have a higher probability of remaining on public welfare benefit receipt for up to 1 year after commencing the program.     

Retraining the Unemployed in a Model of Equilibrium Employment

An equilibrium model of search and matching is developed to analyse the effects of retraining the unemployed on the market for skilled (or semi-skilled) workers. Versions of the model with free entry of vacancies and fixed numbers of jobs are considered. The latter environment exhibits multiple equilibria. While subsidized training (and enforced participation) is justified on employment grounds, it cannot be justified on efficiency grounds. Policies that, ceteris paribus , lower unemployment, also reduce the incentive to train. When such policies are introduced to a training economy, training may cease and unemployment can rise.     

Productivity drivers of infrastructure companies: Network industries utilizing economies of scale in the digital era

What drives the productivity dynamics of infrastructure companies? Using a panel of firms in 14 countries, we study total factor productivity (TFP) enhancers of utility and network services companies. We find that moving TFP closer to the technological frontier drives productivity growth at higher speeds in Asian countries than in European countries. We also find that financial leverage exerts a positive effect on TFP growth for larger infrastructure firms and that more financially developed countries utilize economies of scale through better use of financial resources. Large utility and transportation companies display a higher rate of TFP growth, indicating that a competition policy to encourage M&As would be prudent for the utility/transportation sectors to maximize economies of scale. In contrast, we find diseconomies of scale for energy companies in some countries. Moreover, young network firms improve TFP growth faster than their peers in countries with fewer product market regulations. Therefore, policies should remove entry barriers while facilitating the departure of old and low-productivity firms from network markets. Finally, policymakers should offer well-targeted fiscal incentives for intangible investments to boost TFP because the accumulation of intangible assets such as digital technology promotes more scale economies through network effects.     

航空公司的管制和放松管制之争

对航空公司实施经济管制的两个主要理由是垄断势力的威胁和破坏性的竞争。不存在规模经济、进入和退出壁垒小、可竞争性理论可适用于民航运输市场是支持放松航空公司管制的三个理论支柱,但它们不断受到许多研究者的质疑。然而来自经济现实的证据表明,放松管制在机票价格、服务质量、生产效率等方面改善了产业绩效。     

开放条件下中国轿车产业的外资进入与市场结构研究

外资进入提高了国内轿车市场的竞争程度,降低了市场集中度,促进了市场规模的扩张和产品的差异化,同时也降低了产品价格,带来了消费者福利的提高;改善了我国轿车产业的组织结构,很多企业已经达到了工厂最小最优规模经济水平,生产成本大幅下降;外资进入从资本规模、技术、产品差异、规模经济等几个方面提高了国内资本的进入壁垒;政府与跨国公司共同主导的产业发展模式亟待改变.     

Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game

When there are too many potential competitors available to exploit a new market opportunity, the risk of multiple entry may discourage entry. This paper employs a contest to coordinate entry and compares the outcome with the mixed-strategy approach. Expected profit per firm decreases with potential competition and welfare eventually decreases with potential competition for many contest designs. The contest outcome is welfare superior to the mixed-strategy outcome when entry costs are high but the situation is reversed when entry costs are low. The contest model is consistent with certain empirical evidence on investment rivalry.     

Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages

This paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for Yellow Pages. I estimate three simultaneous equations: consumer demand for usage of a directory, advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher's first-order condition (derived from profit-maximizing behaviour). Estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising, implying a network effect. I find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus. As an application, I consider whether the market benefits from monopoly (which takes advantage of network effects) or oligopoly (which reduces market power). I find that a more competitive market is preferable.     

Geographical dispersion of consumer search behaviour

This article investigates whether consumer search behaviour differs across zip codes within the U.S. As an application, daily gasoline price data covering virtually all gas stations within the U.S. are employed to estimate the distribution of search costs in each zip code. The results show that there are significant differences across zip codes regarding the expected number of searches achieved before consumers purchase gasoline. In order to have a systematic explanation, such differences are further connected to geographic, demographic, and economic conditions of the zip codes in a secondary analysis. The corresponding results imply several strategies for gas stations in order to maximize profits/markups; suggestions follow for policy makers and regulators to reduce redistributive effects of information barriers across locations.     

Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets

Conventionally, rent-seeking activities have been considered to deteriorate social welfare and to distort resource allocation. This paper examines whether rent-seeking behavior can improve social welfare by focusing on the welfare effects of firms’ competitive lobbying efforts when governments can impose market entry regulation against foreign firms. We demonstrate that competitive lobbying efforts can improve social welfare when such lobbying efforts are directed to reduce market entry barriers. In addition, social welfare can be maximized when the government shows the maximum sensitivity to the foreign firm's political contributions while maintaining competitive market structure. Moreover, it is shown that the dominant strategy for a domestic firm is to allocate more resources to R&D sectors while it is optimal for foreign firms is to exert more efforts in lobbying to reduce the market entry barriers when a government makes political economic approach in market entry regulations.     

Payment networks in a search model of money

In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory which gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to have access to a central data base that keeps track of payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central data base and to produce when they have access to this arrangement. We study policies that can relax these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a ‘no-surcharge’ rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with the model of Cavalcanti and Wallace.     

QUALITY CHOICE AND MARKET STRUCTURE: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF NURSING HOME OLIGOPOLIES

This article develops a dynamic model of entry and exit to analyze quality choice and oligopoly market structure in the nursing home industry. I find significant heterogeneity in the competitive effects across market structures: Firms of similar quality levels compete more strongly than dissimilar firms. Sunken entry costs are extremely large, and quality adjustment behavior is governed by significant fixed adjustment costs. A proposal to eliminate low‐quality nursing homes is found to cause a large supply‐side shortage, and another proposal to lower entry costs has offered a perverse incentive to provide low quality of care.