Implications of Shifting Retail Market Shares for Loan Monitoring in a Dominant‐Bank Model

This study utilizes a dominant‐bank model to investigate whether an increase in retail loan and deposit‐market concentration increases the incentives for both dominant and fringe banks to monitor their loans and thereby improve the quality of their loan portfolios. It shows that the effects on banks' incentives to engage in monitoring aimed at eliminating loan default losses in response to increased concentration of retail market shares of loans and deposits depend critically on whether the banks' asset and liability choices are interdependent. When the asset and liability decisions of both dominant and fringe banks are independent, a shift in market shares in favor of the dominant bank generates a straightforward increase in the incentives of all banks to monitor their loans. Under portfolio interdependence, the effects on monitoring outcomes at dominant banks and at banks within the competitive fringe depend on more complicated configurations of parameters. This fact helps explain mixed empirical evidence on the relationships between bank competition and measures of bank risk and soundness.     

银行与企业信用贷款博弈分析

本文以企业和银行的不完全信息动态博弈为基础，针对信用贷款过程以及当事人的策略和行动，重点分析了贷款和还款两个阶段的银行和企业的博弈策略。在对贷款过程进行一定的约简假设基础上，构建信贷博弈模型并对其进行求解，得出不同条件下企业和银行的最优策略选择。本文在计算银行和借款企业的支付成本时突出考虑了机会成本，摒弃了其它模型中的模糊数据成分，使得模型能够得到更为直观的结果。     

Financial intermediation and endogenous risk in the banking sector

The paper revisits the impact of uncertainty on the decision problem of a bank. The bank extends risky loans to private investors and sells deposits to savers at fixed rates. The uncertainty under which deposit/loan-portfolios are chosen by banks is endogenized through an information system that conveys public signals about the return distribution of bank loans. Transparency in the banking sector is defined in terms of the reliability of these signals. We find that higher transparency always raises expected bank profits, but may lead to a higher or lower expected loan volume. Moreover, higher transparency may reduce economic welfare.     

The effect of lender and loan type on a borrowing firm’s equity return

Past empirical studies appear to support the idea that banks and finance companies do not differ in their ability to resolve adverse selection problems associated with issuing new debt. In this article, we find there is a difference. More specifically, using an event study we find larger abnormal returns for secured loan disclosures to lower quality borrowers when the lender is a finance company versus a bank. This suggests the market views finance companies as more effective than banks in evaluating/monitoring lower quality borrowers obtaining secured loans. We posit this is due to finance companies’ greater expertise in this type of lending, resulting from specialization. Our findings extend the literature on how lender identity can influence signals about firm value from loan disclosures. Our results also support recent findings that positive abnormal returns to borrowing firms may not be a general feature across the loan population, but may be restricted to smaller, lower quality borrowers. Finally, we are the first to provide evidence that the market takes loan type into account, not just lender and borrower type, when considering the information embedded in loan disclosures.     

DEPOSITOR DISCIPLINE, REGULATORY CONTROL, AND A BANKING CRISIS: A STUDY OF INDIAN URBAN COOPERATIVE BANKS

ABSTRACT ** :  Urban Cooperative banks in India (UCBs) play an important role in mobilizing resources from lower and middle-income groups and in providing direct finance to small entrepreneurs and traders. Motivated by previous empirical work on depositor disciplining behaviour, this paper examines whether depositors punish weak UCBs by withdrawing deposits during and after a banking crisis. In addition, the paper investigates the impact of tightened prudential standards imposed by the Indian central bank (RBI) on the ratio of investments to loan assets and on the rate of growth of loans. Our sample of 45 UCBs is partitioned into strong and weak banks and subjected to econometric testing. Our analysis reveals that a banking crisis is associated with a contraction in deposits across the sample. However, weak banks appear to be disciplined by depositors during election years. We also find weak support for the contention that banks reduced loans when faced with intensified regulatory scrutiny in the aftermath of a crisis.     

The effect of economic policy uncertainty on bank valuations

This article examines how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects bank valuations. Using a large sample of banks over a long period, we find that EPU has a negative effect on bank valuations. One explanation for this result is that EPU reduces bank loan growth, and lower loan growth then leads to lower bank valuations. Consistent with this explanation, we find that the negative effect of EPU is more pronounced for banks with a higher ratio of loans to total assets.     

Lending conditions in EU: The role of credit demand and supply

We analyse the bank lending activity after the financial crisis and focus on bank-specific supply factors. Using a rich microeconomic dataset from Bankscope and macroeconomic shocks data, we employ OLS and 2SLS fixed effects models with banking controls, macroeconomic shocks and institutional quality. The banks’ loan-rate spreads increased despite the recent policy of low interest rates and quantitative easing. We use the bank asset quality as instruments to capture exogenous changes in loan supply. The empirical evidence shows that loan-rate spread and through this the supply of loans is negatively affected by a low asset quality and capital ratios.     

The dynamic of bank lending channel: Basel regulatory constraint

This article analyzes the impact of monetary policy on bank behavior under the Basel I regulatory framework using a dynamic model with monopolistic competition. There are two main objectives. First, we theoretically predict the dynamic model of bank lending channels under the Basel I regulatory constraint. Second, we empirically analyze the situation in Malaysia by using panel data on 23 commercial banks in the period of 1999 to 2007 by using General Method of Moments. The empirical results show that market rates on loans and policy rates are important influences on average rates of banks' loans. This has an implication that Malaysian banks have the power to set their own prices on loans as they are influenced by the change in the market rate and policy rate. We also have proven that the previous period of spread risk weighted loans and securities is statistically significant and correlated with the average loan rate, whereas risk weighted securities is also statistically significant and correlated with the average time deposit rate in both periods. This shows that the role of risk-weighted assets under the Basel I is important in influencing the optimal rates on loans and time deposits.     

Shocks to bank capital: evidence from UK banks at home and away

This article assesses how shocks to bank capital may influence a bank's portfolio behaviour using novel evidence from a UK bank panel data set from a period that predates the recent financial crisis. Focusing on the behaviour of bank loans, we extract the dynamic response of a bank to innovations in its capital and in its regulatory capital buffer. We find that innovations in a bank's capital in this (precrisis) sample period were coupled with a loan response that lasted up to 3 years. The international presence of UK banks allows us to identify a specific driver of capital shocks in our data, independent of bank lending to UK residents. Specifically, we use write-offs on loans to nonresidents to instrument bank capital's impact on UK resident lending. A fall in capital brought about a significant drop in lending in particular, to Private Nonfinancial Corporations (PNFC). In contrast, household lending increased when capital fell, which may indicate that, in this precrisis period, banks substituted into less risky assets when capital was short.     

Collateralized Lending by Indian Banks: Some Explanations and Policy Implications

This paper draws a parallel between the extent of unsecured lending that a bank does and the screening effort extended by the bank. Since unsecured lending requires screening on the part of the bank, higher the percentage of unsecured loans in total loans, higher is likely to be the screening effort while processing loan applications. Using panel data relating to banks in India, we find that on an average a higher extent of screening effort or unsecured loans is likely to be provided by banks that are large, have low level of non-performing assets, and are in the private sector. Further, persistence in the extent of unsecured lending seems to suggest that any change in unsecured lending/ screening effort is likely to be rather slow.

     

准备金政策新框架与内需结构调整

因存款准备金制度软化、存款准备金减少带来了货币政策低效或无效的局面。通过中央银行对商业银行的资产各项贷款征收法定准备金,构建了一个准备金政策新框架,可用来分析货币政策的需求结构效应,以实现针对性地调节总需求结构。并且,实行贷款准备金政策可以消减存款准备金的制度缺陷、重建准备金制度的威力、强化货币政策的效果。     

Labour unions and global bank loan market

This article attempts to collect a data set of labour unions in global 500 biggest banks and investigate whether labour unions of banks influence the designing of bank loan contracts. We use global syndicate loan market to examine this issue. For simplicity, banks with and without labour unions are referred to as ‘unionized banks’ and ‘nonunionized banks’, respectively. We find that unionized banks tend to loosen their lending standard in the bank loan contract: unionized banks are more likely to charge lower loan spread and favourable nonprice terms compared with nonunionized banks. Hence, our results support that unionized banks tend to lend more loans to reduce the negative effect of labour unions.     

机构投资者持股和企业银行借款关系研究

近年来,机构投资者在中国资本市场蓬勃发展。通过分析机构投资者持股变化对公司治理的影响,可以发现机构投资者持股和企业新增银行借款比例呈倒U型关系:机构投资者持股比例的增加有助于企业获得银行借款,但当机构投资者持股达到一定比例后,机构投资者持股的增加又会抑制企业银行借款的增加。机构投资者持股对于企业获取银行借款的影响依赖于持股比例的变化。     

Banking Competition,Risk and Regulation*

In a dynamic framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, while taking into account regulatory requirements. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade‐off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per‐period profits, and deterioration in the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behaviour. It is shown that risk‐adjusted regulation is effective. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though issuing equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.     

Performance of Thailand banks after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis

The performance of commercial banks and government-owned specialized banks in Thailand is estimated after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Commercial banks exhibit increasing returns to scale, whereas government-owned specialized banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale, implying further increases in bank size and market concentration in the commercial bank sector but not for government specialized banks. Cost inefficiency varies by bank and is a function of the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total loans, equity to total assets and liquid assets to total assets, as well as the number of branches. On average, banks with fewer NPLs, that are well capitalized and with adequate liquidity are efficient. Thus, stricter rules to regulate credit risk management and ensure capital and liquidity adequacy would enhance efficiency in the banking sector. Although estimated input substitutability appears to be low, labour and loanable fund are substitutes. However, labour and physical capital as well as physical and loanable funds are complements in commercial banks. All the three inputs of labour, physical capital and loanable funds are substitutes for the government specialized banks.     

Meltdown Iceland: Lessons on the World Financial Crisis from a Small Bankrupt Island

The paper reports that no statistically significant empirical relationship can be shown between total bank credit and the US broad money supply in the period after 1995. It argues that the growing prevalence of non-bank deposits in the form of mutual money market funds and asset securitization are the main culprits for this result. Prior to financial liberalization, the connection between total bank credit and broad money supply was simple enough: new bank deposits were created when banks made loans and were extinguished when loans were paid back. In banks' consolidated balance sheet, total deposits made up total liabilities and were basically equal to the broad money supply. However, in the age of financial liberalization not all deposits bank loans created returned as deposits, whether in banks or non-banks, as deposits could be swapped for non-deposit liabilities without a corresponding draw down on the asset side. Moreover, loans could be extinguished in banks' balance sheets through asset securitization.     

Bank profitability and macroeconomic conditions: Are business models different?

The paper investigates the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the profitability of EU banks by testing for differential effects according to the business model. We group banks into three business models using a hierarchical cluster analysis and find that using clusters based on the share of assets invested in loans reveals heterogeneity in the sensitivity of bank profitability to economic growth across business models. Our main result is that GDP growth, credit growth, and the risk-free yield curve influence profitability as expected, but we also find that the effect of GDP growth is only significant for banks that have a high and medium share of assets invested in loans, and not for banks that hold large portfolios of securities. This difference depends on the impact of growth on asset write downs, especially those on loans and, to a lesser extent, on revenues. The results suggest that studies relating bank profitability to macroeconomic conditions should take the heterogeneity of business models into account.     

Collateral rehypothecation,safe asset scarcity,and unconventional monetary policy

We build a mark-to-market model where commercial banks can enlarge their balance sheets, repledging the available collateral several times to exchange liquidity through the interbank market. In bad times, the fall of risky asset price disrupts the length of the repledging chain due to the increase of the haircut and the decrease of external assets' value. In such a scenario, the central bank can intervene implementing unconventional monetary policies by purchasing a fraction of the banking system's external assets, both safe treasury bonds, and risky asset-backed securities, to inject liquidity. Our results show that a quantitative easing policy that purchases only safe assets is highly ineffective in restoring the intermediation activity to the pre-crisis level due to its inability to sustain the risky asset price and the repledging chain of collateral. Instead, focusing on risky assets only, the monetary authority can sustain risky asset prices, avoiding the freezing of the money market.     

Bubbles and Crises

In recent financial crises a bubble, in which asset prices rise, is followed by a collapse and widespread default. Bubbles are caused by agency relationships in the banking sector. Investors use money borrowed from banks to invest in risky assets, which are relatively attractive because investors can avoid losses in low payoff states by defaulting on the loan. This risk shifting leads investors to bid up the asset prices. Risk can originate in both the real and financial sectors. Financial fragility occurs when positive credit expansion is insufficient to prevent a crisis.     

Financial infrastructure and house prices

We argue that banks operating in a local market possess better information about the local housing market than do nonlocal banks. Possessing this information may influence their willingness to grant loans to house buyers and the specifics of the loan terms, which in turn may affect house prices because credit facilitation makes the housing market more efficient. Using a panel data set covering a period from 1993 to 2007 and involving 274 municipalities in Sweden, we establish a positive causal influence of local bank presence on local house prices. There are significant spatial and spillover effects, that is, banks in a municipality affect the housing markets in neighbouring municipalities, although to a lesser extent than in their own municipality. Similar results are obtained through a gravity model. The results are robust over time and municipality size.