关键词——太阳能

2030年太阳能电价将降至每千千瓦时100美元 国际能源署（IEA）有关太阳能分析师9月1日指出，预期到了2030年太阳能电力售价将下滑至每千千瓦时100美元，这可能会让太阳能在2060年之后成为全球主要的电力来源。据研究机构估计显示，目前最有效率的太阳能发电站每千千瓦时的电费为172美元，而利用弧型集热槽（parabolic trough）、储存技术发电的太阳热能发电站每千千瓦时的电费则为267美元。     

市场是电力资源优化配置的选择——与西北电网公司副总经理尹正民谈电力交易

4月26日，西北电网电力交易大厅正式启用。通过公开竞价，西北电网公司与隶属于不同发电集团的7家发电企业签订了西北送华中4亿千瓦时电量的交易合同。     

电力市场竞价上网与管理体系

按照国家经贸委、国家电力公司的总体部署,黑龙江省电力有限公司,于1999年7月,进行了竞价上网的试点工作,2000年7月,对发电侧市场竞价规则进行了重新修订,同年8月正式开始了按日分时竞价运营,初步形成了黑龙江省电力市场运营基本框架和主体竞争格局.     

发电侧电力市场构想

电力市场以发电商、输配电商、电力用户以及市场和系统的操作机构为主体。其特点是：主体之间的交易是通过电网这个市场载体而完成的。由于电力是无任何替代品的商品,电力生产发供用不可分割一次完成,发电企业与用户的交易必须通过电网进行,这就构成了电力行业的市场具有自然垄断属性。如何在这个自然垄断行业的发电侧引入竞争机制,建立发电侧竞争市场,是电力市场研究的重大课题和首要任务。 　　一、发电侧电力市场的基本结构 　　“厂网分开,竞价上网”的思路,确定了发电侧市场的基本结构 :市场的主体为若干个发电商和单一的电网经…     

浙江电力市场成员自律管理的实践与体会

浙江省是我国首批“厂网分开，竞价上网，建立竞争性发电市场”试点省市之一。自２０００年１月１日正式投入试运营以来，系统运行稳定，市场交易状况良好，竞价范围逐步扩大，合约电量比例逐步减少，竞价力度从１５％增大到２０％。在全省用电量连续两年保持在１４％以上高速增长的用电形势下，通过市场竞价，平均上网电价与不竞价相比仍然明显下降，取得了良好的经济效益，得到了中央领导和中外专家的好评与肯定。浙江发电市场的稳定发展，是因为得到了各级领导的关心和支持，也得益于浙江经济的繁荣和快速增长。同时浙江有一套严密、科学…     

火电厂低成本运营的途径

企业作为以赢利为目的的社会组织，需要时刻追求以最小的投入获得最大的产出这一生存目标。邹县发电厂为了适应电力改革和发展的需要，努力争取在电力市场竞争中取得主动，对企业的低成本运营进行了积极的探索，较好地保障了各项成本目标计划的顺利完成。2001年，全厂完成发电量135．59607亿千瓦时，创历史最高水平；实现产值353347万元，完成承包利润12．09亿元，高出年计划7．09个百分点，资产负债率为52．37％，资产收益率16．5％；完成供电标准煤耗率334．95克／千瓦时，较去年同期降低了7．17克／千瓦时；扣除燃煤价格上涨因素，发电单位成本比预算降低3．57元／千千瓦时；多种产业完成总收入1．39亿元，创历史新高。     

浙江发电市场试点改革进展纵横谈

当２０００年新千年钟声敲响的时刻 ,浙江电网发电市场正式宣布进入试运行。这标志着浙江电业开始了打破垄断 ,引入竞争 ,建立竞争性电力市场改革的新阶段。１９９８年７月 ,浙江电网“网厂分开 ,建立发电市场”的改革试点工作正式启动 ,经过一年多的努力 ,改革工作取得了阶段性成果 ,为浙江电网发电市场的“开市运行”作了必要的准备。网厂分开的进程“网厂分开”就是让各类发电企业按《公司法》的要求改制、改组成为自主经营的实体 ,与电网经营企业真正分开管理 ,由电网公司统一收购各独立发电企业上网电力。“网厂分开”现阶段是经营管理…     

新一代电力市场技术支持系统

实施厂网分开,重组发电和电网企业;实行竞价上网,建立电力市场运行规则和政府监督体系,是电力体制改革的主要任务之一。在建立竞争、开放的电力市场过程中,必将对技术支持系统提出全新的要求。本文介绍了电力市场技术支持系统的发展概况和新一代电力市场技术支持系统的框架及设计思路,可供广大读者参考。     

竞价上网试点的成果与问题

1998年，国务院国办法146号文件明确指出：推进厂网分开，引入竞争机制，竞价上网，建立规范有序的电力市场。为稳妥起见，国家要求上海、浙江、山东作为第一批试点单位，率先开始“厂网分开，竞价上网”的改革，东北三省则紧随其后。六个试点电网依据本地区的实际情况，学习和借鉴国外经验，本着稳妥试行、逐步完善的思路和原则，通过三年的筹备和试运行，取得了不同程度的阶段性成果。     

电力市场初期发电企业的竞价策略

随着国家电力体制改革的不断深入，电力市场建设的逐步推进，“竞价上网”已成为当前发电企业面临的重要课题。结合发电企业的实际和竞价上网的工作要求，探讨电力市场初期发电企业的竞价策略，并通过东北电力市场的案例来验证该策略的有效性是本文的重点。[编者按]     

如何看电网企业由盈转亏

在2003年国家电网公司的预算盘子里,陡然间冒出了6个亏损企业,亏损面将近1/4,预计亏损额8.4亿元。华中电网有3个亏损单位,刚好是其中的一半。2002年还是盈利的湖北、河南、四川,2003年再怎么细算账也还是一个亏损的结局,华中电网也以1.6亿元的净亏损成为国家电网公司系统第一亏损大户,这个不争的事实在系统内外引起了不小的振动。企业亏损总归不是件好事,电网公司亏损更加不是件小事!如何理性地看待电网经营企业的由盈转亏?首先,绝不能忽略这是一个十分重要的财务信号。说它重要,是基于它的警示作用,基于它的深远影响。亏损,意味着这些企业…     

发电企业:成本中心与利润中心

随着电力体制改革的深化和发展,众多的发电企业历经资产重组和厂网分开,相继步入电力市场.如何通过这场历史性的变革,让发电企业能动地参与竞价上网,进而成为一个最活跃的经济实体,是每个发电企业的领导和员工普遍关注的问题之一.     

Unions and Firm Profits

This study examines the effect of unionization on manufacturing firm profits, extending earlier research by combining industry-level and firm-level measures of unionization. Using several profit measures, we find that quasi-rents from firm investments in intangible assets are a relatively greater source of union profit effects than product market concentration and that union profit effects occur largely in the first 10 percent of firm coverage, suggesting spillover effects on nonunion employees.     

Profits and "contestability": state-by-state evidence from banking markets

Contestability in local banking markets is tested using a structure-performance (S-P) model. OLS and TSLS tests using a 38 state sample of 5,396 banks in 1,474 markets reveal a positive concentration-profitability relationship. This implies that local banking markets are not contestable. However, tests for each state separately show that the S-P relationship exists only in approximately one-fifth of states. F-tests indicate that using a national pooled sample is inappropriate. The results suggest that market structure, including entry conditions, affect performance, consequently the theory of potential competition is more relevant than contestability theory. However, generalizations may be inaccurate.     

Prices,Profits, and Preference Dependence

We develop a new approach to discrete choice demand for differentiated products, using copulas to separate the marginal distribution of consumer values for product varieties from their dependence relationship, and apply it to the issue of how preference dependence affects market outcomes in symmetric multiproduct industries. We show that greater dependence lowers prices and profits under certain conditions, suggesting that preference dependence is a distinct indicator of product differentiation. We also find new sufficient conditions for the symmetric multiproduct monopoly and the symmetric single‐product oligopoly prices to be above or below the single‐product monopoly price.     

Determinants of Entry and Profits in Local Banking Markets

This paper estimates a two equation model of market entry and profits, utilizing data on entry into over 2,000 banking markets over the period 1977--88. The entry equations measure whether entry depends on incumbent firms' profits and other market attributes that reflect the long-term attractiveness of markets for entry. Market profits, assumed to follow a partial-adjustment process, are affected by entry directly and indirectly through market structure. The model also corrects for an unavoidable source of error in market-level profits for the banking industry. The estimates suggest that a competitive process is at work in banking markets that limits the ability of supra-normal profits to persist. Entry is more likely in markets that have high profits, consistent with previous empirical results that market structure adjusts more quickly when profits are supra-normal. Population and population growth are also strong determinants of entry. Entry, in turn, reduces profits in rural markets.     

Testing the Competitive Environment and the Persistence of Profits Hypotheses

In the present paper I examine Brozen's (1970, 1971a, b, c, 1982) Competitive Environment Hypothesis and Mueller's (1977) Persistence of Profits Hypothesis in the Greek manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1984. The analysis reveals a positive (market power) association between past and current price-cost margins, although a considerable scrambling in the ranks of price-cost margins takes place over time. A high concentration and high barriers to entry sub-sample of markets examined, showed a general reduction in concentration, barriers to entry and a mobility in price-cost margins ranks, indicating that disciplinary competitive forces are also at work within manufacturing markets.