企业文化对知识型员工组织承诺影响的研究

为了探讨提高知识型员工组织承诺的有效路径,文章针对现有研究中的一些不足,提出了不同企业文化导向对知识型员工感情承诺及继续承诺影响的研究框架,从理论上探讨了员工导向文化与任务导向文化如何对知识型员工组织承诺产生影响,以期为企业提高知识型员工的组织承诺提供理论指导.     

基于组织承诺理论的新生代知识型员工管理策略

新生代知识型员工以其良好的知识创造能力和开拓创新能力逐渐成为企业发展的宝贵资源。然而,近年来新生代知识型员工的离职率不断攀升,利用传统管理理论有效管理新生代知识型员工正在面临困境。文章基于组织承诺理论的新视角,结合新生代知识型员工的特点,提出了新生代知识型员工的管理策略。     

中小企业员工职业承诺现状及影响因素研究

随着经济全球化与知识经济时代的到来,中小企业面临着缺乏知识型人才、员工流动频繁等越来越严峻的局面.因此,从提高员工的职业承诺角度来提高员工的职业忠诚度,是探索留住核心员工、改善人力资源管理的新视角.本文采用问卷调查法收集了一些相关数据,对职业承诺的影响因素进行了分析,得出主要影响因素并提出对策,期望为从组织管理的角度提升企业员工的职业承诺提供指导.     

家庭支持型主管行为对女性知识型员工情感承诺的影响机制研究

本文依据社会交换理论与边界理论,基于263位女性知识型员工的问卷调查资料,采用层次分析、Bootstrap法等方法,探讨了工作家庭平衡在家庭支持型主管行为(FSSB)与情感承诺间的传导机制,分析了边界弹性意愿的调节作用。实证结果表明：FSSB对女性知识型员工的情感承诺有显著的正向影响;工作家庭促进在FSSB影响女性知识型员工情感承诺的过程中起中介作用;女性知识型员工边界弹性意愿正向调节了FSSB通过工作家庭促进影响情感承诺的中介作用。本文的研究结论能为企业留住女性知识型员工并有效地发挥其作用提供有益启示。     

企业履行社会责任对员工工作满意度的影响——组织情感承诺为中介变量

很少有学者研究企业履行社会责任对员工行为的影响。本文通过对广州市及其周边地区的银行业知识型员工进行随机抽样调查,得到有效样本225份,运用结构方程建模,探讨了企业社会责任、员工工作满意度与组织情感承诺三者之间的影响关系。研究结果显示,企业对员工的责任,对员工工作满意度有显著的正向影响,并通过组织情感承诺起到部分中介作用;企业对社区的责任,对员工工作满意度没有显著性的正向影响;企业对顾客的责任,对员工工作满意度有显著的正向影响,并通过组织情感承诺的完全中介作用。最后,本文结合有关理论与实际对结果进行讨论,并得出相应的管理启示。     

知识型员工组织承诺与离职倾向关系的实证研究

以知识型员工为研究对象,探讨组织承诺与离职倾向的关系。通过实证分析得出组织承诺与离职倾向存在负相关关系,其中理想承诺和情感承诺对离职倾向有较强的预测作用。最后,根据分析结果提出可供企业借鉴的管理措施。     

博弈视角:员工组织承诺的构建

文章的研究立足于员工组织承诺形成的过程,提出员工组织承诺的形成过程是员工与组织之间以及员工与员工之间博弈的过程．员工的连续承诺、规范承诺和感情承诺的最终形成是多次博彝的结果．并对这一博弈过程进行的分析论证。由此,在员工组织承诺形成的过程中,企业是能够以构建单个员工连续承诺为基础、逐步形成整体员工的规范承诺、最终形成员工的感情承诺,以此脉络来构建员工组织承诺．在不同的员工组织承诺形成阶段有的放矢,采取不同的策略将有利于提高承诺度。     

社会化因素对员工规范承诺的影响

本文以489名员工为样本,利用结构等式模型研究了文化社会化因素和组织社会化对员工的规范承诺的影响。结果表明,组织社会化、集体主义、对不确定性的规避以及交换意识对规范承诺都有显著的影响。     

基于博弈分析的组织承诺的构建

组织承诺作为企业与员工之间一个重要的隐性契约对企业具有非常重要的作用。而员工组织承诺的形成却有着较为复杂的影响因素和过程。本文从博弈的新视角入手,分析了以单个员工的连续承诺为基础、逐步形成整体员工的规范承诺、最终形成员工的情感承诺,从而达成组织承诺的构建。     

基于博弈分析的组织承诺的构建

组织承诺作为企业与员工之间一个重要的隐性契约对企业具有非常重要的作用.而员工组织承诺的形成却有着较为复杂的影响因素和过程.本文从博弈的新视角入手,分析了以单个员工的连续承诺为基础、逐步形成整体员工的规范承诺、最终形成员工的情感承诺,从而达成组织承诺的构建.     

组织承诺组合与员工建言行为关系的实证研究

承诺组合的方法突破了以往组织承诺研究以单个成分为中心、孤立分析其前因后果的思路,开始以整体观的视角思考各成分的交互作用。本文以建言作为结果变量,通过对组织承诺三基础构成的八个承诺组合进行均值比较,证实了情感承诺是产生建言行为最主要的正面驱动力量。另外,对于持续承诺和规范承诺而言,承诺的背景很重要:持续承诺在一般情况下对员工建言行为具有负向影响,但在低情感—低规范背景下,只有高持续承诺才能引起较高的建言行为;而规范承诺在一般情况下对员工建言行为具有正向影响,但在低情感—高持续背景下,高规范承诺反而会降低建言行为的产生。     

论战略承诺管理

在战略管理中,战略承诺被人们广泛应用。但由于战略承诺管理没有形成较完整的理论体系,人们在认识和应用中存在误区。对企业管理人员来说,明晰的战略承诺管理模式对做出有效的战略承诺是至关重要的。构造了战略承诺过程管理模式,并提出了战略承诺管理应遵循的原则。     

The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline

Summary. This note explores the consequences of a player's freedom of choice over his degree of commitment for the bargaining outcome. In particular, we modify the nonstationary structure of Fershtman and Seidmann (1993)'s bargaining by allowing one player to possess imperfect commitments where the degree of commitment is chosen prior to the negotiation stage. We show that a player optimally chooses an intermediate degree of irrevocability provided the costs of increasing the degree of commitment are small enough. In this case, not only an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment is effective.Received: 18 July 2002, Revised: 20 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78.Part of this work was written while I was visiting the IAE-CSIC and the University of Essex, whose hospitalities are gratefully acknowledged. This paper has benefited from comments of seminar participants at the University of Essex, 56th European Econometric Society Meeting, 16th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Lausanne and the XXVI Symposium of Economic Analysis in Barcelona. I thank Vicent Calabuig and Gonzalo Olcina for very helpful comments. I am especially indebted t o Clara Ponsatí and an anonymous referee for some very detailed comments which lead to substantial improvement of the paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Generalitat Valenciana under a postdoctoral grant.     

Distorted Input Ratios in Vertical Relationships*

A project leader sources an input from a supporter and combines it with an input produced in-house. The leader has private information about the project's cost environment. We show that if the leader can commit to the in-house input level, the input ratio is distorted upward when the in-house input is not too costly – the in-house input is produced in excess and thus partly wasted. By contrast, without the leader's commitment to the in-house input level, the input ratio is distorted downward when the in-house input is sufficiently costly – the outsourced input is produced in excess and thus partly wasted.     

信息、承诺与激励——理解中国农业生产激励变迁中的国家角色

平均化的分配方式和退出权的剥夺导致人民公社内部的作物生产激励不足。但由国家管制政策引起的作物生产激励问题经常被研究者所忽略。文章发展了信息分权基础上的国家承诺分析框架,由于工业化目标,国家通过建立人民公社以降低治理成本,其中,人民公社承担了收集、处理作物种植信息并提取相应农业剩余的职能,从而导致人民公社面临严重的外部激励问题。20世纪70年代末期,财政困境促使国家放松对农业部门的组织化治理,允许以家户为单位的作物生产方法。这事实上放松了对作物生产的信息控制,由信息分权引起的国家承诺具有可信性,有效地增加了农民权利的安全性及其生产激励,构成农业部门生产效率改善的重要源泉。     

组织承诺理论的研究进展及对高校教师管理工作的启示

近年来,关于组织承诺的研究成为了组织行为学研究的一个热点,学者们从组织承诺的含义和结构等方面进行了深入研究。在高等教育领域,教师的组织承诺是联结教师与学校的心理纽带,是增强组织凝聚力的重要指标,影响着学校整体绩效水平。因此,高校管理者要善于激发教师的内在动机,提高其组织承诺程度;要善于协助教师制定科学合理的目标;要帮助教师完善职业生涯规划,提高其职业发展能力;要注意重点培养教师高水平的情感承诺。     

A paradigm of our own

This essay confronts the problem of voice in feminist economic discourse. The author reinscribes feminist economic theory in the essay tradition of feminist literary production to highlight the potential contribution of poetic imagination to a feminist revisioning of economics.     

Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly

This paper characterizes linear Markov-perfect equilibrium in a duopolistic environment where firms engage in dynamic price competition. Firms have constant (but potentially different) marginal costs and produce differentiated products. We show that, for the case of linear demand, dynamically stable Markov-perfect equilibrium prices are strictly higher than one-shot Nash equilibrium prices, but lower than fully collusive (monopoly) prices. We provide closed-form solutions for the Markov-perfect equilibrium prices which, in principle, can be estimated given data on firm demand and costs. Our results suggest that static two-stage models of price commitment are on reasonably solid ground in that they might be viewed as a reduced form for more complicated dynamic models.     

Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring

We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information.     

Adverse selection,commitment and exhaustible resource taxation

This paper studies the contractual relationship between a government and a firm in charge of the extraction of an exhaustible resource. Governments design taxation scheme to capture resource rent and they usually propose contracts with limited duration and possess less information on resources than the extractive firms do. This article investigates how information asymmetry on costs and an inability to commit to long-term contracts affect tax revenue and the extraction path. This study gives several unconventional results. First, when information asymmetry exists, the inability to commit does not necessarily lower tax revenues. Second, under asymmetric information without commitment, an efficient firm may produce during the first period more or less than under symmetric information. Hence, the inability to commit has an ambiguous effect on the exhaustion date. Third, the modified Hotelling's rule is such that an increase in the discount factor does not necessarily reduce the first-period extraction.