Funding development infrastructure without leverage: A risk‐sharing alternative using innovative sukuk structures

Muslim countries of the developing world suffer indebtedness resulting mostly from funding development infrastructure. Faced with a dire need for development infrastructure but with inadequate resources to fund them domestically, these governments often resort to foreign borrowing. As neither foreign banks nor international debt markets would allow for the debt to be in home currency, the funding is invariably denominated in foreign currency. For the borrowing country, in addition to currency exposure such borrowing increases the country's leverage and economic vulnerability. As these countries typically have a narrow economic base with heavy reliance on commodity exports, they are susceptible to the vagaries of commodity price fluctuation. Leverage increases the amplitude of the economy's fluctuation, resulting if not in outright crisis, then, at least in financial distress and depreciating home currency. As a result, when the foreign currency funded project comes on stream, it is burdened with huge accumulated debt which in many cases makes the project unmanageable without further government help through subsidy of operating costs. This further stresses already stretched government budgets and perpetuates indebtedness. This cycle of borrowing, leverage and vulnerability can be broken by innovative use of sukuk. The problem with debt financing is that the servicing requirements are independent of the underlying project's risk or cash flows. This paper presents two sukuk structures based on the risk sharing principles of Islamic finance. Sukuk that have returns linked to the nation's gross domestic product growth if the funded project is non‐revenue generating and linked to earnings of the project if it is revenue generating can avoid the problems above. The pay‐off profile, estimated cost of funds and returns to investors of these sukuk are discussed. When designed in small denomination, such sukuk can enhance financial inclusion, help build domestic capital markets and enable the financing of development without stressing government budgets.     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.     

Argentina's Currency Board Collapse: Weak Policy or Bad Luck?

Two basic views can be discerned in post‐mortems of Argentina's currency board: (1) that weak fiscal policy was fundamentally to blame, and (2) that the peso had become too severely overvalued for the peg to survive. This paper evaluates the evidence for these rival interpretations. The real effective exchange rate index did not indicate massive overvaluation, but this index does not capture the effects on the equilibrium rate of the ‘sudden stop’ in capital flows to emerging markets after 1998. It also understates the amount of adjustment required for Argentina to reach the equilibrium rate, because neighbour countries’ dollar exchange rates were held up by Argentina's overvaluation, as is indicated by their depreciation in 2002. Argentina was particularly vulnerable to the sudden stop because of the extreme volatility of its portfolio inflows. Fiscal policy simulations suggest that, even with a substantially improved primary balance from 1994 onwards, loss of investor confidence would still have triggered unsustainable debt dynamics once the recession began to bite after 1998. The stagnation of output and prices in Argentina created a yawning gap between the interest rate on debt and the rate of growth of nominal GDP. Had the currency been floated in, say, 1995, the real devaluation of the peso would still have pushed up the debt/GDP ratio, but higher output would have left greater scope for addressing this by running a sizeable primary surplus. Moreover, the more gradual depreciation under floating might have allowed the economy to adjust to higher debt service payments without resort to default. The IMF has criticised itself for not pressing for tighter fiscal policy in the 1990s. A more fundamental criticism would be that it was seduced by the bipolar model into complacency about adjustment to real shocks and forgetting the teachings of optimum currency area theory.     

Currency risk and microcredit interest rates

Foreign currency debt provides additional access to capital and offers funds in favorable and flexible terms to microfinance institutions (MFIs). Yet, we find that the use of foreign currency debt, on average, leads to higher microcredit interest rates. We also find that MFIs operating in countries with pegged exchange rate regimes and profit MFIs are better able to mitigate foreign currency risk. The results of the paper suggest that local currency debt is a better option for MFIs if the goal is to provide microcredit at lower interest rates.     

The effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the prices and volume of international trade

By specifying a model of differential risk-bearing by import demand and export supply sides of the market for traded goods, the theoretical impact of exchange risk on both equilibrium prices and quantities is analyzed. For several empirical cases of 1965–1975 U.S. and German trade it is found that exchange rate uncertainty has had a significant impact on prices but no significant effect on the volume of trade. These price effects support previous survey results on the currency denomination of export contracts, namely that with the exception of some U.S. imports, most trade is largely denominated in the exporter's currency.     

Currency composition of reserves,trade invoicing and currency movements

This article analyses the relationships among the unit of account and means of exchange functions of an international currency, on the one hand, and its store of value in official use, on the other hand. Historical evidence links the currency composition of reserves to currency movements. The currency composition of reserves is strongly related in the cross-section to both currency movements and the currency denomination of trade. Data limitations make it hard to distinguish these two factors. A panel analysis of 5 countries from central and Eastern Europe shows that both trade invoicing and currency movements drive changing official reserve composition. Implications are suggested for the prospects for the renminbi enlarging its current small portion of official foreign exchange reserves.     

Currency depreciations, financial transfers, and firm heterogeneity

The present paper investigates five episodes of currency collapse from the perspective of non-financial firms operating in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. We focus on two aspects: wealth and income transfers from borrowing firms to lenders and firm heterogeneity. At the firm level, we find that the currency collapses are preceded and associated with sharply rising financial transfers from firms to lenders. The debt and income structure is central in explaining the asymmetric firm dynamics. Most affected are firms with high levels of unhedged foreign-currency debt. At the country level, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico display three contrasting examples. Argentina has a large currency mismatch, Brazil balances the currency denomination of debt and income (natural hedge), and Mexico occupies an intermediate position.     

Foreign exchange market liberalization and the international diversification of borrowing by Italian firms

In this article we try to assess the relative importance of real and financial determinants in firm's foreign currency borrowing by extending a model earlier developed by Kawai. We use this framework to examine the behavior of Italian firms during the 1980s. The financial components of firm's decisions are studied by means of a repeated mean-variance portfolio model based on ex ante expectation. We show that (a) the invoice currencies seem to be a good indicator of firm's real exchange risk; and (b) even at times of capital controls, corporate debt policy was affected by financial variables. The latter will become increasingly important as European financial integration moves on.     

Financial dollarization and debt deflation under a currency board

In the late currency board years, Argentina faced a real exchange rate adjustment through price deflation amidst growing devaluation expectations. Using a firm-level panel database to analyze the incidence of these factors on the currency composition of private debt and on firms’ performance, we find that widespread debt dollarization showed no relationship with the firms’ production mix or the ever-changing probability of a nominal devaluation. While relative price changes favored export-oriented firms with the expected impact on sales, earnings and investment, increases in devaluation expectations elicited only a marginal differential response in investment from more financially dollarized firms. Our findings provide support to two criticisms faced by the Argentine currency board in recent years, namely, that by fueling beliefs in an implicit guarantee it stimulated across-the-board debt dollarization and that it could not fully isolate the economy from real shocks, as the feared balance sheet effect was replaced by a gradual but equally deleterious debt deflation effect.     

Understanding Brazilian companies' foreign exchange exposure

The paper analyzes the exchange rate exposure of a sample of non-financial Brazilian companies from 1999 to 2009. The results confirm the importance of using nonlinear models to address companies' exchange rate exposure. The results indicate that when compared to the linear model commonly used in literature, the nonlinear model leads to an increase in the number of firms exposed to exchange rate fluctuations, which allows a more accurate analysis of the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the value of firms. In addition, the paper shows that exporters and companies that hold foreign currency denominated debt are more likely to be exposed to exchange rate fluctuations and that the nonlinearity of companies' foreign exchange exposure is associated with the use of foreign currency derivatives.     

The macroeconomic role of currency reserve accumulation in emerging markets—The Asian experience

The impact of currency reserve accumulation is controversially discussed since reserve accumulation potentially destabilises the international financial system and causes crises due to higher systemic risk. The main aim of this paper is to put the macroeconomic role of currency reserve accumulation for four Asian economies under closer scrutiny. The key question is whether accumulating currency reserves is beneficial from a long‐run perspective. Based on a vector error correction approach, we start by analysing long‐run steady‐state relationships between currency reserves, exchange rates against the US dollar, real GDP and interest rates. Our findings show that cumulated currency reserve shocks significantly affect real GDP . A likely explanation for our finding is that accumulation of reserves has supported growth through providing liquidity and supporting the development of the financial sector for the economies under observation.     

Local currency systemic risk

Emerging country governments increasingly issue local currency denominated bonds and foreign investors have been increasing their holdings of these assets. By issuing debt denominated in local currency, emerging country governments eliminate exchange rate risk. The growing stock of local currency government debt in the financial portfolios of foreign investors increases their diversification and exposure to fast growing economies. In this paper, we highlight some of the risks associated to this recent trend. First, we adopt the CoV aR risk-measure to estimate the vulnerability of individual countries to systemic risk in the market for local currency government debt. Second, we show that our country-level estimates of vulnerability increase with the share of local currency debt held by foreign investors. A version of the old adage “When New York sneezes, London catches a cold,” used often to describe the relationship between the stock markets in these two cities, still applies between individual emerging countries and the aggregate market for local currency government debt.     

Twin dollarization and exchange rate policy

This paper develops a small open economy general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities to study twin dollarization in East Asian economies, a phenomenon where firms borrow in US dollars and also set export prices in US dollars. In this model, we endogenize both the currency of liability denomination and the currency of export pricing. We show that a key factor that affects firms' dollarization decisions is exchange rate policy. Twin dollarization is an optimal strategy for all firms when exchange rate flexibility is limited, which implies that a fixed exchange rate regime may lead to an equilibrium with twin dollarization. Furthermore, we find that twin dollarization can reduce the welfare loss caused by the fixed exchange rate regime, as it helps to cushion the economy against domestic nominal risk.     

Capital Structure Across Industries

The purpose of this article is to examine the capital structure across different industries for companies quoted on a stock exchange and headquartered in the United States. The paper demonstrates significant difference in the capital structure depending on the industry where the company operates. The debt ratio sensitivities to the explanatory variables differ significantly between the five industries studied. Almost every significant coefficient obtained in our regressions is in accordance with capital structure theory and other studies. Debt ratio is negatively related to profitability, growth, and age, while asset structure and company size are positively related. However, the debt ratio of the 50 largest companies in the sample is negatively related to company size, which gives support to a currency hedging hypothesis.     

Who Can Adjust to the Euro?

This study estimates potential exchange rate variation among 26 European countries during 1992–1998, as a proxy for the potential magnitude of adjustment they face to euro‐block membership, using the instrumental variable (IV) method, applying least squares cross‐section regression analysis based on optimal currency area theory. A currency union among Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia is found to entail a relatively light burden of adjustment for its members. The current membership of other countries in the euro‐block is potentially very demanding on their societies in the long term. This study also compares currency boards and independent central banks as alternative monetary frameworks for disinflation policies. Based on a pooled time‐series, cross‐section dataset of the same countries and years currency boards are found to be more effective in reducing inflation in all countries except Belgium. Balancing EMU's credibility gains against its adjustment costs, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain seem like unstable members of the euro‐block. For all new EU member states except the Czech Republic, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia the advice is to stay out of the euro‐block until their economies are liberalised and flexible enough to withstand major adjustments, and their societal interest groups supportive enough of these adjustments.     

Discounting in International Markets and the Face Value Effect: A Double‐ Edged Sword?

Consumer response to price is often subjective and prone to systematic perceptual biases, such as the “face value” effect, whereby consumer perceptions of willingness to pay are systematically biased by the nominal value of a new currency. That is, prices presented in higher denomination currencies are perceived to be more expensive and prices presented in lower denomination currencies are perceived to be less expensive. The results from two separate experiments suggest that for high‐price products, when a substantial enough discount is invoked, the face value effect can reverse and becomes a double‐edged sword. While existing research implies that the face value effect becomes stronger for high‐price products, the findings from this research suggest this is the case only when the product is not being promoted. The findings also reveal that the face value effect is robust for low‐price products, even when there is a discount, providing further evidence of the effect in new contexts. Consistent with earlier research, this is because in real terms the discount for a low‐price product is not perceived as substantial enough. The experiments also suggest that for high‐price products, discounts framed as absolute amounts in higher denomination currencies are perceived to be more substantial than discounts framed as percentage amounts. These findings extend existing theory on the face value effect and have several important managerial implications for pricing management in international markets.     

Debt composition and exchange rate balance sheet effect in Brazil: a firm level analysis

In this paper, we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990's. We start by assessing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change in the exchange rate risk. We then proceed to investigate if and how exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment, but the results were not statistically significant. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin's q can provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, but not for a balance sheet effect in Brazil. The main effect we found is that firms in industries with higher proportion of imported inputs tend to invest less when the exchange rate is depreciated.     

Currency Boards and Debt Traps: Evidence from Argentina and Relevance for Estonia

This paper analyses the November 2000 liquidity crisis that brought Argentina near default on its foreign debt. The main purpose of this paper is to assess whether this crisis may be taken as a warning signal for Estonia, given the similar exchange‐rate system shared by the two countries. It seems that with a low level of public debt and a balanced budget, Estonia will not face a similar liquidity crisis as its Latin American counterpart, which remained heavily reliant on foreign borrowings. But the substantial real exchange‐rate appreciation of the kroon under the Currency‐Board Arrangement has resulted in serious external imbalances, which will need to be corrected to avoid balance of payments pressure and reduce Estonia's high dependency on the level of foreign direct investments.     

Vendros in Brazil: Negotiating an international technology transfer

Vendros Technologies, an American software and equipment vendor, entered into negotiations about a technology licensing agreement with Netcom Brasil, a Brazilian telecommunications company, in March 1999. The negotiations became a swirl of conflicting points of view due to differences between Vendros and the contractor that wrote the program supporting Vendros's technology, cultural differences between the Americans and the Brazilians regarding negotiating practices, differences in the legal systems of the two countries, and problems stemming from Brazil's then‐erratic economy. Further complicating the negotiations were substantial differences of opinion on ownership of the technology, rights to source code, operational guarantees, and payment/currency risk. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

China's exports,export tax rebates and exchange rate policy

This paper examines the relationship between China's exports, export tax rebates and exchange rate policy. It offers an explanation for why China's exports continued to rise under RMB real appreciations during the Asian financial crisis. Based on a traditional export demand model, we test our hypothesis that the counteracting effects of China's export tax rebate policy have diminished the effectiveness of real exchange rates in facilitating the resolution of trade imbalances under the current pegged exchange rate regime. We find evidence that RMB real appreciations during the crisis negatively affected China's exports, but the negative effects were mitigated by the positive effects of export tax rebates. We also find evidence of a long‐run relationship between China's exports and the other explanatory variables. The empirical evidence suggests that under the pegged exchange rate regime with limited adjustments, real exchange rate movements alone cannot resolve China's external imbalances. The policy implication of this study is that China needs to redirect its decades‐long export‐oriented development strategy to one that emphasises domestic demand‐oriented development and to replace the current pegged exchange rate regime with a market‐oriented more flexible exchange rate regime.