The Canadian Hedge Fund Industry: Performance and Market Timing

We analyze the risk and return characteristics of Canadian hedge funds based on a comprehensive database we compiled. We find that Canadian hedge funds have higher risk‐adjusted performance and different distributional characteristics relative to the global hedge fund indices. We investigate market timing by Canadian hedge funds and find that they do not time the Canadian or global stock and bond markets, but hedge funds in the Managed Futures strategy group time the commodity market. These results are robust to parameter instability and structural changes in the model. We also illustrate the impact of using local and global risk factors to analyze the performance of local investment firms.     

The Risk-Return Relationship of Pension Funds With Investments in Hedge Funds

This article investigates if investing in local hedge funds improves the risk-return relationship of Brazilian pension funds. Investment in hedge funds by pension funds is growing elsewhere, with an increasing utilization of a multiplicity of hedge funds specialized in specific strategies or niches. We analyzed the performance of a typical pension fund allocation in Brazil as well as alternate allocations that included hedge funds. We used robust estimates of the covariance matrix to mitigate the errors in variables that are problematic in the inputs of the optimization. The results show that hedge funds improve the risk-return relationship of the typical pension fund allocation, contribute to a higher accumulated return at the end of a one-year period, and reduce portfolio rebalancing. Investments in hedge funds ease reaching the typical 6% annual return target with less risk exposure.     

Do hedge funds time market tail risk? Evidence from option-implied tail risk

This paper focuses on an unexplored dimension of fund managers’ timing ability: Market-wide tail risk implied by information in options markets. Constructing the option-implied tail risk, we investigate whether hedge fund managers can strategically time the tail risk through adjusting their exposure to changes of it. Using an extensive sample of equity-oriented hedge funds, we find strong evidence of tail risk timing ability of hedge fund managers. Furthermore, tail risk timing ability brings significant economic value to investors. Top-ranked funds outperform bottom-ranked funds by 5–7% annually after adjusting for risk factors. Our results are robust to various robustness checks.     

Hedge Fund Performance and Manager Skill

Using data on the monthly returns of hedge funds during the period January 1990 to August 1998, we estimate six‐factor Jensen alphas for individual hedge funds, employing eight different investment styles. We find that about 25% of the hedge funds earn positive excess returns and that the frequency and magnitude of funds' excess returns differ markedly with investment style. Using six‐factor alphas as a measure of performance, we also analyze performance persistence over 1‐year and 2‐year horizons and find evidence of significant persistence among both winners and losers. These findings, together with our finding that hedge funds that pay managers higher incentive fees also have higher excess returns, are consistent with the view that fund manager skill may be a partial explanation for the positive excess returns earned by hedge funds. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:1003–1028, 2001     

PROFIT SHARING IN HEDGE FUNDS

In a new scheme for hedge fund managerial compensation known as the first‐loss scheme, a fund manager uses her investment in the fund to cover any fund losses first; by contrast, in the traditional scheme currently used in most US funds, the manager does not cover investors' losses in the fund. We propose a framework based on cumulative prospect theory to compute and compare the trading strategies, fund risk, and managers' and investors' utilities in these two schemes analytically. The model is calibrated to the historical attrition rates of US hedge funds. We find that with reasonable parameter values, both fund managers' and investors' utilities can be improved and fund risk can be reduced simultaneously by replacing the traditional scheme (with 10% internal capital and 20% performance fee) with a first‐loss scheme (with 10% first‐loss capital and 30% performance fee). When the performance fee in the first‐loss scheme is 40% (a current market practice), however, such substitution renders investors worse off.     

Firm boundaries,incentives, and fund performance: Evidence from a private pension fund system

The private pension fund system in Turkey presents a unique institutional structure where bank holding companies can own both private pension companies and asset management firms. More often than not, pension companies delegate their operational mandates to the asset management arm of the same bank. This practice exposes the retail investor to a double agency problem and raises questions about conflicts of interest and fiduciary duty. Our analysis reveals that the funds set up and managed under the same bank holding company perform worse on a risk-adjusted basis than the funds with an arm's length relationship between the pension company and the asset manager. We show that this relative underperformance is not simply a bank effect; bank-affiliated pension companies and asset managers do just as well, if not better than their peers, when they are not operating under the same roof. Unfortunately, this inefficient institutional structure is not eliminated by market discipline because these funds attract more flows from retail investors, and the underperformance is not discernible in raw returns.     

Socially Responsible Investing: A Critical Appraisal

This paper makes three important points regarding socially responsible investing. First, the current methodology involving SRI fund divestiture of the securities of firms that engage in socially irresponsible activity often results in unacceptable unintended consequences. Second, in many cases the proper methodolgy for SRI funds may be purposely to include the securities of such firms in the portfolio in an effort to internalize socially irresponsible interfirm spillovers. Finally, that SRI fund managers may be able to bond their performance by organizing as closed-end funds subject to takeover and liquidation if the stated socially responsible objectives are not met.     

Do sectoral training funds stimulate training?

Sectoral levelling funds are an arrangement aimed at alleviating a well‐known theoretical problem of underinvestment in worker training because of free‐rider behaviour of firms. In the Netherlands, collective agreements require firms to participate in such funds in a number of sectors. Using a comprehensive dataset of Dutch firms, we attempt to determine the extent to which these levelling funds have a stimulating effect on the level of training investments of firms. Surprisingly, no indications are found for the existence of such an effect. Training levels are not higher in sectors with a fund than in sectors without a fund. Several explanations are discussed to account for these findings.     

Does mutual fund investment influence accounting fraud?

Does mutual fund investment deter accounting fraud? Using a bivariate probit model, this study examines the relationship between mutual funds and accounting fraud between 2007 and 2014. We observed mutual fund investment has significantly higher levels of fraud detection, reducing firms' propensity to commit fraud. This validates Chinese regulators' efforts to develop mutual funds to address accounting fraud. Open-end mutual funds outperform closed-end mutual funds in detecting accounting fraud and reducing fraud commission; redeemable shares appear to discipline managers. This effect is moderated by state ownership of listed firms: mutual funds cannot effectively detect fraud in state-owned firms.     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

The role of top management team human capital in venture capital markets: Evidence from first-time funds

This paper examines whether the human capital of first-time venture capital fund management teams can predict fund performance and finds that it can. I find that fund management teams with more task-specific human capital, as measured by more managers having past experience as venture capitalists and by more managers having past experience as executives at start-up companies, manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio company exits. I also find that fund management teams with more industry-specific human capital in strategy and management consulting and, to a lesser extent, engineering and non-venture finance manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio company exits. Perhaps counter-intuitively, I find that fund management teams that have more general human capital in business administration, as measured by more managers having MBAs, manage funds with lower fractions of portfolio company exits. Overall, measures of task- and industry-specific human capital are stronger predictors of fund performance than are measures of general human capital.     

The impact of institutional sources of capital upon the minority-oriented venture capital industry

Venture capital (VC) funds specializing in investing equity capital in minority-owned businesses have grown rapidly over the past decade, fueled by the willingness of major institutional investors to support this traditionally neglected niche. We investigate impacts of public pension funds upon the minority VC sector. These funds, providing over half of all capital invested in minority VCs, selectively invest, seeking to fund only those VCs likely to generate high returns. Although they attempt to pick the winners, our findings indicate that they have failed to do so. The influence of public pension funds upon the minority VCs is nonetheless real, skewing investing away from traditional practices and toward those of the venture capital mainstream. In the process, minority VCs funded by pension fund money invest in high-tech fields more than other minority-oriented VC funds do. Further, they are less likely to fund minority-owned small firms, focusing increasingly upon firms owned by nonminority Whites. Neither of these trends has resulted in increased returns. Rather, diverting minority-oriented VCs away from their traditional mission of investing in minority firms operating in a broad range of industries has resulted in lower returns over the years studied.     

Fallout from the Mutual Fund Trading Scandal

In September 2003, several prominent mutual fund companies came under investigation for illegal trading practices. Allegations suggested these funds allowed certain investors to profit from short-term trading schemes at the expense of other investors. Surprisingly, regulatory authorities have known for more than two decades of the potential for such abuses, yet have taken limited steps to correct the problem. We explore investor reaction to the scandal by measuring assets under management, stock returns, and performance. Mutual funds managed by investigated firms show a substantial decline in post-announcement assets under management. These firms also experienced significantly negative announcement-period returns. Finally, we discuss several policy suggestions to prevent future trading abuses and provide direction for future research.     

How Norway’s sovereign wealth fund negative screening affects firms’ value and behaviour

This paper examines the impact of negative screening by responsible sovereign wealth funds on the value of excluded firms. We focus on the main sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway, which excluded 149 firms from its portfolio during the period 2006–2018. Using an event study methodology, we document a significant decrease in excluded firms’ stock prices. Moreover, we find that the nature of screening matters: norm‐based exclusions suffer from a significant and permanent decrease in their stock value, suggesting that market participants reacted to the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway exclusions. Overall, it can be asserted that the Norwegian fund has a strong signalling effect on financial markets, in terms of social and environmental information. We conclude that sovereign wealth funds could be used by governments as investment vehicles in order to promote responsible investments on a large scale.     

The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper traces the growing power of pension funds to provide managerial oversight of the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. Increasingly pension funds are exercising their legitimate rights as owners to raise the corporate governance standards of the firms they invest in. Within corporate governance generally, pension funds are shifting their attention away from managerial accountability and toward measures that increase transparency in firm-level decision-making. Pension funds use transparency to ensure that shareholders are the primary interest being served by the firm. Transparency not only aligns managers and owners, it also raises issues of firm behaviour that allow other stakeholders to engage the corporation more broadly. I contend that secrecy is economically inefficient. When organizations are opaque and interests are secret, decision-making can and does distort efficiency. I examine recent pension fund corporate governance campaigns with particular reference to the California Public Employees Retirement System. Dr. Hebb is a senior research associate at the Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard University and the Oxford University Centre for the Environment. She is researching the role of US public sector pension funds and urban revitalization as lead investigator on a two-year Rockefeller and Ford Foundation grant. Her doctoral work at Oxford University examined the impact of pension fund corporate engagement on the corporate governance, social and environmental standards of firm behaviour. She was a Clarendon Scholar at Oxford University and was awarded the prestigious William E. Taylor Fellowship (2003) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Government of Canada. Dr. Hebb is also a recipient of the York University Schulich School of Business National Research in Financial Services and Public Policy Scholarship (Canada). Dr. Hebb is also the Director of the Capital Strategies Program at the Carleton Centre for Community Innovation (3ci), Carleton University, Canada. Here her work focuses on the financial and non-financial impact of pension fund economically targeted investment in Canada as part of a three-year SSHRC Initiatives in the New Economy grant.     

证券投资基金管理费用的实证分析

采用多元线性回归方法,以2000-2003年我国已发行基金为研究对象,对年度基金管理费用与基金业绩、规模之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:基金业绩、规模在2000年和2001年是影响基金管理费的主要因素;但自从2002年证监会全面停止提取业绩报酬之后,基金业绩对管理费用的影响不再显著,甚至出现了基金收益系数为负的怪现象。在此基础上,提出了对我国基金管理费用改革的几点建议。     

The Relation between Abnormal Main Fund Movements and Subsequent Earnings Management: Political Costs and Political Connections

Movement of major fund1 flows has great impact on capital markets, especially in China. This study investigates the relationship between abnormal main fund movements and firm’s earnings management behavior, specifically, whether the abnormal main fund movements cause firms to keep a low profile for “self-protection” from being detected by the government. The empirical results of this study suggest that: (1) The mandatory disclosure of the “Top-ten circulating stockholders” requirement does not only reduce information asymmetry between investors and listed firms, but also strengthens and improves the efficiency of related government regulations in detecting disclosure of false information. This, in turn, increases the risk of being detected for firms with earnings management activities. (2) After abnormal main fund movements, relevant firms significantly reduce the level of earnings management to avoid attention from the public and regulatory agencies. (3) Using political connections as a proxy for the “shield effect” to mask political cost, we show that the negative relation between abnormal main fund movements and earnings management exists only for the subsample of firms without political connections. This paper provides a new angle for political cost study, and suggests that traditional political cost hypothesis should be further generalized.     

The Financial Performance of a Socially Responsible Investment Over Time and a Possible Link with Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper empirically examines the financial performance of a UK unit trust that was initially “conventional” and later adopted socially responsible investment (SRI) principles (ethical investment principles). Comparison is made with three similar conventional funds whose investment objectives remained unchanged. Analysis techniques employed in previous studies find similar results: mean risk-adjusted performance is unchanged by the switch to SRI, with no evidence of over-or under-performance relative to the benchmark market index by any of the four funds. More interestingly, changes in variability of returns over time are also modelled using generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models, not previously applied to SRI funds so far as is known. Results show a temporary increase in variability of returns, followed by a return to previous levels after around 4 years. Evidence shows the increased variability to be associated with the adoption of SRI rather than with a change in fund management. Possible explanations for the subsequent reduction in variability include the spread of corporate social responsibility activities by firms and learning by fund managers. In addition to reporting on a previously unobserved phenomenon, this paper raises questions for further research.     

Internal capital markets,empire building,and capital structure

Internal funds generated by assets in place are available to finance the bulk of new investment by nonfinancial firms. Self-interested management has incentives to misallocate these funds in order to increase their control rents. There are two ways to impact future discretionary investment. First, using debt diverts funds to creditors and away from management. Second, having in place more assets that do not provide internal financing reduces the funds subject to managerial discretion. Investment in such assets and debt financing are inversely related in controlling self-interested management. As a result, firms borrow more and own proportionally more assets that provide internal funds as the average profitability of these assets, or that of future investment, increases. Firms may borrow less while increasing investment in the less valuable assets that do not supply internal financing as the expected profitability of these assets increases.     

Stock picking,market timing and style differences between socially responsible and conventional pension funds: evidence from the United Kingdom

As far as we are aware, this study presents the first comparative analysis of the stock picking and market timing abilities of managers of conventional and socially responsible (SR) pension funds, and of their use of superior information. For the United Kingdom, the results obtained show a slight stock picking ability on the part of SR pension fund managers (although it disappears if multifactorial models are considered), and a negative market timing ability on the part of both SR and conventional pension fund managers (these results hold for multifactorial models controlled by home bias). In relation to the management styles, both conventional and SR pension funds usually invest in small cap and growth values, although it is the SR pension funds that are the most exposed to these styles. We also observed that, while conventional pension fund managers make certain use of superior information to follow stock picking strategies, managers of SR pension funds use superior information to follow market timing strategies.