The economics of well-being

Gross domestic product has long been the chief measure of national success. But there's been a lot of talk lately about changing that, from economists and world leaders alike. GDP is under siege for three main reasons. First, it is flawed even on its own terms: It misses lots of economic activity (unpaid household work, for example) and, as a single-number representation of vast, complex systems, is inevitably skewed. Second, it fails to account for economic and environmental sustainability. And third, readily available alternative measures may reflect well-being far better, by taking into account factors such as educational achievement, health, and life expectancy. HBR's Justin Fox surveys historical and current views on how to assess national progress, from Jeremy Bentham to Robert Kennedy to Nicolas Sarkozy. He also looks at where we may be headed. The biggest success so far in the campaign to supplant or at least supplement GDP, he finds, is the UN's Human Development Index-on which the United States has never claimed the top spot.     

The economics of PIPEs

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.     

The mystery of zero-leverage firms

We present the puzzling evidence that, from 1962 to 2009, an average 10.2% of large public nonfinancial US firms have zero debt and almost 22% have less than 5% book leverage ratio. Zero-leverage behavior is a persistent phenomenon. Dividend-paying zero-leverage firms pay substantially higher dividends, are more profitable, pay higher taxes, issue less equity, and have higher cash balances than control firms chosen by industry and size. Firms with higher Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ownership and longer CEO tenure are more likely to have zero debt, especially if boards are smaller and less independent. Family firms are also more likely to be zero-levered.     

The economics of interest rates

The paper looks at the behavior of investors in an economy consisting of a production process controlled by a state variable representing the state of technology. The participants in the economy maximize their individual utilities of consumption. Each participant has a constant relative risk aversion. The degrees of risk aversion, as well as the time preference functions, differ across participants. The participants may lend and borrow among themselves, either at a floating short rate, or by issuing or buying term bonds. We derive conditions under which such an economy is in equilibrium, and obtain equations determining interest rates.     

The economics of hedge funds

Hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation. Money flows, managerial restart options, and management ownership increase the importance of high-water-mark-based incentive fees but management fees remain the majority. Investors' valuation of fees are highly sensitive to their assessments of the manager's skill.     

The economics of network neutrality

Under the current regime for Internet access, “network neutrality,” parties are billed only by the Internet service provider (ISP) through which they connect to the Internet; pricing is not contingent on the content being transmitted. Recently, ISPs have proposed that content and applications providers pay them additional fees for accessing the ISPs’ residential clients, as well as fees to prioritize certain content. We analyze the private and social implications of such fees when the network is congested and more traffic implies greater delays. We derive conditions under which network neutrality would be welfare superior to any feasible scheme for prioritizing service.     

The economics of bank privatization

This paper surveys the empirical literature examining bank privatization. We begin by documenting the extent of, theoretical rationale for, and measured performance of state-owned banks around the world, and then assess why many governments have chosen to privatize their often very large state-owned banking sectors. The empirical evidence clearly shows that state-owned banks are less efficient than privately owned banks, and that state domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those countries with the largest state banking sectors. On the other hand, there is little in the empirical record to suggest that privatization alone transforms the efficiency of divested banks, especially when these are only partially privatized. Privatization generally improves performance, but by far less than is typically observed in studies of non-financial industries. An increasingly common outcome of large-scale bank privatization programs is foreign ownership of many nations’ banking sector, which evidence suggests is usually positive in an economic sense, but problematic politically.     

The financing decisions of innovative firms

The paper examines the relation between forms of financing and the level of expenditure on research and development (R&D). The paper shows that the probability of issuing new equity rises monotonically with the level of expenditure on R&D, whilst the use of debt finance follows an inverted U curve, rising and then falling as R&D expenditure rises. The analysis confirms ‘control rights’ theories of financing, in which firms follow an established hierarchy of preferences for modes of financing, with debt preferred to equity since it involves less loss of control rights. The mode of financing is linked to characteristic types of innovation, with debt financing associated with incremental innovation and equity funding with R&D intensive innovation, as in pharmaceuticals. The paper concludes by suggesting a linkage between modes of financing, types of innovation and business systems, with the UK's innovation pattern linked to market financing contrasting with the relationship financing of bank oriented systems such as Germany.     

The law and economics of self-dealing

We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.     

The economics of wild goose chases

Empirical evidence consistently finds that incentive pay is more frequent when authority is delegated to workers than when their superiors hold authority. We provide a model where incentive pay results in the abuse of authority by their superiors, and (under reasonable conditions) implies that (i) incentive pay is higher when an agent holds control rights than when her principal has authority, (ii) effort is less responsive on the margin to incentive pay when the principal holds authority, and (iii) more incentive pay can reduce effort under authority, even on tasks that can be easily measured.     

The simple economics of bank fragility

Banks are linked through the interbank deposit market, participations like syndicated loans and deposit interest rate risk. The similarity in exposures carries the potential for systemic breakdowns. This potential is either strong or weak, depending on whether the linkages remain or vanish asymptotically. It is shown that the linearity of the bank portfolios in the exposures, in combination with a condition on the tails of the marginal distributions of these exposures, determines whether the potential for systemic risk is weak or strong. We show that if the exposures have marginal normal distributions the potential for systemic risk is weak, while if e.g. the Student distributions apply the potential is strong.     

The boundaries of firms as information barriers

When contracts are incomplete, the property‐rights theory of firms suggests that ownership of physical assets provides better outside options, which in turn strengthen the owner's incentives to invest in the enterprise. This approach is less suitable for human capital firms such as management consulting that lack physical assets. This article develops an alternative theory for integration that sheds light on the boundaries of human capital firms. In particular, when a relationship between parties includes large potential externalities, reducing the outside option of each party will be beneficial. Integration provides this reduction by blurring the contribution of individual parties within the firm, and thus lowering their independent market valuation. Unlike some results in the property‐rights literature, the results here are robust to variations in ex post bargaining solution.     

The financing behaviour of listed Chinese firms

This paper examines the corporate financing behaviour of listed companies in the People's Republic of China. Our results suggest that some determinants of firm leverage (e.g., size, asset tangibility, growth opportunities and profitability) commonly cited in studies on developed economies also appear to be important in China. In particular, the positive relationships that firm size and asset tangibility have with firm leverage are consistent with the predictions of the static trade-off capital structure model. However, these commonly quoted determinants function in a way different from that reported in developing countries. Moreover, we do not find that State ownership, legal person ownership and foreign ownership have important influences on the capital structure choices of Chinese firms. Given the tight regulatory control over equity issues and acute owner–manager incentive conflicts in State-owned firms, we also hypothesise, and find evidence to support, that Chinese firms have built-in incentives for raising equity. This provides one explanation of the negative effect of profitability on firm leverage and shows that some of the unique Chinese institutional features do help shape corporate financing behaviour.     

如何在会计师事务所实施CIS战略

企业形象识别系统(Corporate Identity System,简称CIS)是企业将各种形象要素信息化、规范化、系统化,并以有效的组合方式传递给社会公众,实现以形象声誉优势争取公众支持与合作,占据市场的一种现代企业管理思想,被国际企业界引为塑造和改进自身形象、拓展市场空间的有效战略.     

浅谈新办事务所的激励机制

一所新办的会计师事务所必然要经受创业艰难的考验,如资金不雄厚、占领市场份额少、知名度不高、人员流动大等.特别是员工来自五湖四海,能否真正形成合力,直接关系到事务所在改制后激烈竞争的市场环境下能否生存下来.通过实践,我们认为,新所必须要建立一种充满活力的激励机制,以留住人才,用好人才,并树立起事务所的品牌.我们主要在倡导企业文化和建立考核制度两个方面做了一些工作.     

The real earnings management of cross-listing firms

We examine the existence of real and accrual-based earnings management before and after cross-listings on the U.S. market. The results indicate that firms actively manage their earnings around cross-listing events, using both accrual and real earnings management, but real earnings management is dominant. American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) cross-listed at Level 1 and sponsored ADRs show the largest increase in real earnings management from before to after the listing. Firms that have adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) display lower increases than firms under domestic GAAP. Finally, our results confirm a significant negative relationship between long-run performance and real earnings management before and after major corporate events.     

The politics and economics of offshore outsourcing

This paper reviews the political uproar over offshore outsourcing connected with the release of the Economic Report of the President (ERP) in February 2004, examines the differing ways in which economists and non-economists talk about offshore outsourcing, and assesses the empirical evidence on the importance of offshore outsourcing in accounting for the weak labor market from 2001 to 2004. Even with important gaps in the data, the empirical literature is able to conclude that offshore outsourcing is unlikely to have accounted for a meaningful part of the job losses in the recent downturn or contributed much to the slow labor market rebound. The empirical evidence to date, while still tentative, actually suggests that increased employment in the overseas affiliates of US multinationals is associated with more employment in the US parent rather than less.     

The organizational culture of public accounting firms: evidence from Taiwanese local and US affiliated firms

This study examines the organizational cultures of public accounting firms with data from US affiliated international accounting firms in Taiwan and Taiwanese local firms. Hypotheses are tested about the impact of the national culture of the US firms on their Taiwanese affiliates, and about cultural differences across function and rank. The study extends previous research by (1) examining an oriental country whose culture is significantly different from that of the US, (2) using the Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D. D., & Sanders G. (1990). Measuring organizational cultures: a qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 286–316 practices-based measure of organizational culture, and (3) examining the importance of the fit between employee preferences and organizational culture in influencing organizational commitment, job satisfaction and propensity to remain with the organization. Support is found for the cultural impact and fit hypotheses. Additonally, while culture is found to be relatively homogeneous across function, differences are found across rank.