Redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation

We examine the circumstances under which minimal equal sacrifice taxation reduces income inequality. Focusing on absolute sacrifice and relative inequality, we show that after tax incomes are more equally distributed than before tax incomes and that after tax inequality decreases with the revenue to be raised if and only if the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is decreasing. However, other things equal, after tax inequality is shown to decline as the utility function becomes more concave. We investigate next how these conclusions extend when one takes the absolute inequality view and considers that it is the relative loss in utility that has to be equalized across individuals.     

Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle

A classical problem in public finance is: when does equal sacrifice imply progressive taxation? Suppose that a tax schedule imposes equal sacrifice on all taxpayers in loss of utility, and that this property is preserved under re-indexing of the schedule. Then the utility function must exhibit constant relative risk aversion, i.e. it must be logarithmic or a power function. If equal sacrifice relative to such a utility function holds for all taxable incomes, and if tax rates do not exceed 100 percent, then the degree of relative risk aversion must be at least unity, and the tax must be nonregressive.     

Federalism and horizontal equity across Switzerland and Germany: a new rationale for a decentralized fiscal structure

Higher wages in agglomerations often do not reflect an increase in purchasing power, because a high percentage of the wage increase has to be spend on housing. Thus, after housing is considered taxpayers may have identical disposable incomes, although gross as well as after-tax income may differ. This unequal treatment of taxpayers is due to the taxation of nominal incomes. If tax systems taxed income based on regionally adjusted purchasing power, horizontal equity would be assured. Since this is an unfeasible option, the differences could be corrected by allowing a deduction on housing costs. Given the large revenue losses, it seems unlikely that governments in OECD countries move to a system where rents are deductible in determining taxable income. Another alternative—taxation of potentially achievable income—is unfeasible due to political opposition. A final and less costly alternative is fiscal federalism. Granting autonomy to the lower levels of the government offers local governments the power to design the tax system in a way that reflects differences in living costs. Although this option does not necessarily imply that governments effectively design the tax schedule in that way, a comparison of Germany and Switzerland shows that governments are aware of these differences across regions. The paper concludes that granting tax autonomy to the lower tiers in Germany would make many citizens, especially in the Southern part, better off and would promote horizontal equity among German taxpayers.     

Higher Tax for Top Earners

The literature can justify both increasing and decreasing marginal taxes (IMT & DMT) on top incomes under different welfare objectives and income distributions. Even when DMT are theoretically optimal, they are often politically infeasible. Then a flat tax seems to be a constrained optimal solution. We show however that, given any flat tax we can increase the total utility of a poor majority by raising the top income tax rate under a simple condition, which can be checked with empirical data. We further generalize our main results allowing different welfare weights, declining elasticity of labor supply and more tax bands.     

Production Efficiency and the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix

In the design of the optimal direct/indirect tax mix, the canonical view was laid by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who showed that commodity taxes are unnecessary in an economy in which there is an optimal nonlinear income tax provided that commodities are separable from labor in the utility functions of all taxpayers, that the aggregators over these commodities are ordinally equivalent and that wages are fixed. When wages are endogenous, Naito (1999) showed that this result may not hold and in addition that production efficiency may not be Pareto optimal. Given an optimal nonlinear income tax, we show that production inefficiency is Pareto optimal if the aggregate technology set is strictly concave. The Atkinson–Stiglitz condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for zero commodity taxation and commodity taxes are part of almost all Pareto optima.     

间接税负担对收入分配的影响分析

本文利用城市住户调查资料考察了中国增值税、消费税和营业税这三项主要的间接税在不同收入群体的负担情况。我们的研究表明 ,低收入家庭收入中负担增值税和消费税的比例大于高收入家庭 ,但高收入家庭收入中负担营业税的比例大于低收入家庭。整个间接税是接近成比例负担的。间接税恶化了收入分配 ,但并不显著     

Are Consumption Taxes Regressive?

It is often argued that a general consumption tax is necessarily regressive, particularly because households with high incomes typically save relatively more than those with low incomes. This paper uses very simple tax models to examine the combination of income and consumption taxes. It suggests that it is preferable to consider the overall impact of all taxes and transfers rather than relating payments of a single tax to gross income, instead of the relevant tax base. Insofar as savings might be relevant, attention should be given to the income tax treatment of investment income.     

Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies

A hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the IRS. There is a fixed distribution of income in the economy. Individuals differ by their income, which is known niether to the government nor to the IRS. We completely characterize the solution to the IRS's revenue-maximizing problem. When taxpayers are risk neutral, the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups. We show that the government provides a smaller budget to the IRS than the IRS would wish.     

TAXES,INCOME, AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS: DIFFERENCES BY PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY INCOME

This article examines the determinants of and benefits from saving for retirement in tax‐preferred accounts by permanent and transitory income levels. We find that higher incomes (both permanent and transitory) are associated with a greater probability to contribute and larger contributions. We also find that tax benefits for retirement savings increase strongly with income, although the increase is slightly smaller when taxpayers are ranked by their permanent (rather than current) income. In addition, we find that a large portion of the benefits from the Saver's Credit go to taxpayers who would not be eligible based on their permanent income. Finally, we find that recent tax changes (including the introduction of the Saver's Credit) significantly increased contributions among low‐income households, although the effect was centered among those with only transitorily low income. (JEL H24, H31, E21)     

Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany

We exploit a dataset that includes the individual tax returns of all taxpayers in the top percentile of the income distribution in Germany to pin down the effective income taxation of households with very high incomes. Taking tax base erosion into account, we find that the top percentile of the income distribution pays an effective average tax rate of 30.5% and contributes more than a quarter of total income tax revenue. Within the top percentile, the effective average tax rate is first increasing, then decreasing, with income. Since the 1990s, effective average tax rates for the German super‐rich have fallen by about a third, with major reductions occurring in the wake of the personal income tax reform of 2001–05. As a result, the concentration of net incomes at the very top of the distribution has strongly increased in Germany.     

The incidence of income taxes on high earners in Canada

This article explores the “brain drain” explanation for the concentration of incomes in Canada during the past 30 years, namely, that high-skilled Canadians make use of high salaries on offer in the United States to extract higher salaries at home. If this is the case, then for a given level of US salaries, the threat to accept outside offers should be more credible when the Canadian dollar is depreciating against the US dollar, and weaker when the Canadian dollar is appreciating. The data are broadly consistent with this claim: income concentration worsened during the depreciations of the 1980s and 1990s, and eased when the Canadian dollar began to appreciate in value. The article develops a simple two-parameter model based on the propositions that high earners in Canada can use US salaries to bargain for higher salaries, and that Canadian high earners can shelter part of their income from personal income taxes. It also offers some preliminary evidence about the parameter values consistent with available data. The results suggest that higher top marginal personal income tax rates may potentially accentuate top-end after-tax income inequality. If high earners are able to use their bargaining power to extract pay increases to offset higher tax rates, then the burden of increased personal income taxes will be deflected elsewhere, and may even have the perverse effect of making the after-tax income distribution more unequal than it was before.     

Optimal tax perturbations

The paper considers an economy with H households, N+1 commodities and M fixed factors with commodity taxes and government expenditures on goods and services. The paper studies under what conditions (small) Pareto improving tax changes exist, i.e., tax changes which increase the utility of each household in the economy. The basic analytical technique used is just the usual comparative statics apparatus, except that duality theory is used in order to simplify the computations. The paper derives both the changes in prices and in real incomes that are induced by (small) changes in exogenous tax variables (differential real income balanced budget incidence analysis).     

The tale of the tails: Canadian income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s

Abstract.  We present new evidence on levels and trends in after-tax income inequality in Canada between 1980 and 2000. We argue that existing data sources may miss changes in the tails of the income distribution, and that many of the changes in the income distribution have been in the tails. For this reason, we turn to an alternative source. In particular, we construct data on after-tax and transfer income using Census files augmented with predicted taxes based on information available from administrative tax data. Using these data, we find that Canadian after-tax inequality levels are substantially higher than has been previously recognized, primarily because income levels are lower at the bottom of the distribution than in commonly used survey data. We also find larger long-term increases in after-tax income inequality and far more variability over the economic cycle. This raises interesting questions about the role of the tax and transfer system in mitigating both trends and fluctuations in market income inequality.     

Are Tax Expenditures of Individuals Only a Tool of Tax Optimisation?

The paper focuses on tax expenditures of individuals, which are one of the fiscal tools of the state. In the Czech Republic they are primarily aimed at housing policy, pension policy, and philanthropy, and the question is the extent to which tax expenditures can influence the preferences of tax payers. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of tax expenditures of individuals in the form of tax deductions for social policy, housing support and retirement savings. We also evaluate whether these tax deductions fulfill the fiscal functions for which they were introduced and the extent to which taxpayers use them. Methodically, the research is based on the analysis of secondary statistical data of the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic and results from aggregated tax returns filed for the period 2005–2015. The effect of tax deductions was decreased by abolition of the progressive rate of personal income taxes and by introduction of a uniform tax rate of 15%. Tax deductions for retirement savings do not have a sufficiently strong motivational impact and do not affect taxpayers in the context of public policy. Deductions for mortgage interest can be regarded as a form of major housing support, but are related to taxpayer income and favor those with higher incomes.     

Redistributive taxation in democracies: Evidence on people's satisfaction

Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the International Social Survey Programme. Individuals categorized as having high, middle, or low incomes were asked whether they consider the overall tax burden in their countries too high, too low or about right. Very few citizens indicated that they were satisfied with tax systems; most believed that taxes on low and middle incomes are too high, while taxes on high incomes are too low. Support for tax systems is bimodal within the income classes, with the richest 5% being the most supportive, and the median in a population being second. Ideological values have a strong impact on political support for redistribution across all income classes. The results bear witness to the multidimensional nature of preferences for redistribution, and to the delicate question of the effectiveness of democracy in implementing citizens' preferences.     

Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons

Abstract. Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax rates, and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, income tax rates in cantons are the lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.     

Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance and endogenous labour supply

I determine the optimal income tax schedule when individuals both choose endogenously their labour supply and have the possibility of avoiding paying taxes. Considering a convex concealment cost function, I propose a formula for the optimal marginal tax rate, that generalizes the formula of the standard Mirrlees model to the case of tax avoidance. I also show that the results obtained by Casamatta (2021) in the fixed income case hold true when labour supply is endogenous: with a low enough marginal cost of avoidance, it is optimal to let some taxpayers, located in the interior of the skill distribution, avoid taxes.     

Do National Basketball Association players need higher salaries to play in high tax states? Evidence from free agents

This article investigates the impact of taxes on the salaries received by National Basketball Association free agents from 2010 to 2014. High state income tax rates affect the after-tax income received by players from their team as well as on any ancillary income. Using data on 576 free agents, we find statistically significant evidence that free agents signing in high tax states receive higher salaries, ceteris paribus. Our results suggest that a one-unit increase in the Average Tax Rate experienced by a free agent in a state leads to free agent salaries being over $60,000 higher.     

Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime‐Dynastic Income Concepts*

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth‐tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes. In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by high‐income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.