Noncooperative,cooperative, and delegative R&D

We discuss alternative organizational forms of research and development in a symmetric duopoly framework. Firms play a noncooperative game at the output stage but can collaborate at the R&D stage. In the absence of patent protection, technology licensing that prevents imitative R&D may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. In general, greater probabilities of success in R&D rule out noncooperative arrangement at the R&D stage. Delegative R&D, where firms move sequentially, tends to dominate the cooperative form of R&D.Department of Economics, Monash University     

Drivers of R&D investment: The interaction of behavioral theory and managerial incentives

This research explores the interaction of behavioral theory and agency theory, investigating their joint effects on firm-level R&D investment. Based on the logic of organizational routines driving R&D investment, we rely on the effects of organizational slack, performance relative to aspirations and distance from bankruptcy as the foundation for our research model. We argue that managerial incentives moderate the relationships between these behavioral theory variables and R&D investment, albeit in contrasting directions. Specifically, we hypothesize that stock option pay positively moderates these relationships while managerial stock ownership has a negative moderating effect. Using panel data for 573 publicly-traded manufacturing firms, we find support for several of our hypotheses, highlighting the interdependence of these two perspectives on R&D investment.     

The influence of R&D investment on the use of corporate venture capital: An industry-level analysis

We consider how internal research and development (R&D) influences the use of corporate venture capital (CVC) and how this relationship varies across industries. We find that, in general, R&D investments increase the number of CVC deals in an industry. We also find that R&D investment has a particularly strong influence on the use of CVC in industries that are growing rapidly and changing technologically. Our analysis provides greater clarity on the relationships involving R&D and CVC in the presence of contingencies by integrating insights of absorptive capacity and real options reasoning.     

The Evolution of R&D Laboratories in the Brazilian Polymer Industry

ABSTRACT

Ronstadt observed that R&D laboratories in foreign subidiaries of American multinationals follow an evolutionary pattern of development. First, these laboratories adapt foreign technology to the local conditions and local raw materials. Later, laboratories focus their activity in obtaining product quality. In the last stage, these R&D units generate new technology of a long-term or exploratory nature for the corporate parent. Based on this theoretical background, this paper studies the evolution of R&D investments in polymer firms in Brazil. The methodology used was a case study conducted in 5 firms from the polymer area, complemented with secondary sources.

RESUMEN. Según Ronstadt, los laboratorios de I&D de las subsidiarias extranjeras de las multinacionales norteamericanas, cumplen un programa de desarrollo evolucionario. En primer lugar, estos laboratorios adaptan las tecnologías extranjeras a las condiciones locales y las materias primas existentes. A continuación, los laboratorios orientan sus actividades en obtener un producto de alta calidad. En la última etapa, estas unidades de I&D generan nueva tecnología de características a largo plazo o naturaleza exploratoria para la corporación matriz. Usando como base estos antecedentes teóricos, este documento estudia la evolución de las inversiones realizadas por las empresas de polímeros en el campo de la I&D en el Brasil. La metodología utilizada fue un estudio de caso realizado en 5 empresas fabricantes de polímeros, complementado con otras fuentes secundarias.

RESUMO. Ronstadt observou que os laboratórios de R&D em subsidiárias estrangeiras de multinacionais americanas seguem um padrão evolutivo de desenvolvimento. Primeiro, estes laboratórios adaptam a tecnologia estrangeira às condiç[otilde]es e às matérias-primas locais. Posteriormente, os laboratórios focalizam a sua atividade na obtenção da qualidade do produto. E, finalmente, estas unidades de R&D geram uma nova tecnologia para a matriz de natureza exploratória ou de longo prazo. Baseado nesta experiência teórica, este trabalho investiga a evolução dos investimentos de R&D em empresas de polímeros no Brasil. A metodologia usada foi um estudo de caso conduzido em cinco empresas da área de polímeros, complementada por fontes secundárias.     

R&D spillovers through trade in a panel of OECD industries

This paper investigates the significance of Research and Development (R&D) spillovers through intra- and international trade in intermediate goods for productivity growth in a panel of OECD industries during 1973–1994. In the model, four different sources of R&D are identified: R&D conducted in the particular industry itself, R&D conducted in the same industries in other countries, R&D conducted in other domestic industries, and R&D conducted in other foreign industries. I find that among R&D sources the most important contributions to productivity growth come from the domestic R&D efforts. Here, own R&D is important for both domestic innovation and for the productivity catch-up process. Evidence that international R&D spillovers also have significant effects on productivity growth is found to be less robust. My analysis also shows that human capital affects productivity directly as a factor of production.     

Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs

This paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an LDC and a developed country. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive, third country market. Under Bertrand competition, unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low-quality LDC and an investment tax by the developed country, whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation. Under Cournot competition, unilateral policy is also reversed from the Bertrand outcome, but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries.     

Effectiveness of R&;D tax incentives in small and large enterprises in Québec

In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in Quebec, using manufacturing firm data from 1997 to 2003 originating from R&D surveys, annual surveys of manufactures and administrative data. The estimated price elasticity of R&D is –0.10 in the short run and –0.14 in the long run, with slightly higher elasticities for small firms than for large firms. We show that there is a deadweight loss associated with level-based R&D tax incentives that is particularly acute for large firms. For small firms it is not sizeable enough to suppress the R&D additionality, at least not for quite a number of years after the initial tax change. Incremental R&D tax credits do not suffer from this deadweight loss and are from that perspective preferable to level-based tax incentives.

R&;D in SMEs: a paradox?

This paper has three objectives: (1) to survey the relevant literature addressing the (apparent) paradox of Research & Development investments carried out within Small and Medium Enterprises; (2) to provide focused summaries of the articles in this special issue; (3) to draw some general conclusions in terms of policy implications.

The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in Systems Markets

We consider a systems market where two complementary components must be used in combination to provide valuable services. The market for the first component is monopolized whereas the market for the second is potentially served by multiple firms. We show that integration of the monopolist into the competitive complementary market may distort incentives for R&D, reducing total economic welfare.     

Science and Technology Take-off in China?: Sources of Rising R&D Intensity

China's ratio of research and development (R&D) spending to its gross domestic product (GDP) more than doubled from 0.6 per cent in 1996 to 1.4 per cent in 2005. This study documents the pattern of science and technology (S & T) take-off, characterized by an abrupt increase in the R&D to GDP ratio. This abrupt increase, observed in many of the now Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, typically drives R&D intensity from below 1 per cent to the range of 2–3 per cent. The question addressed in this work is whether China has begun a similar S & T take-off. The study reviews several conditions identified in the endogenous growth literature that drives R&D intensification and notes their emergence in China during the past decade. It also speculates why China's R&D intensification appears to be starting at such a low level of income per capita.     

Absorptive capacity and R&;D tax policy: Are in-house and external contract R&;D substitutes or complements?

Firms fund research and development (R&;D) to generate commercializable innovations and to increase their ability to understand and absorb knowledge from elsewhere. This dual role and opposed incentive structure of internal R&;D create a significant question for both theory and R&;D policy: Is internal R&;D a complement or substitute for external R&;D? We develop a model and novel technique for empirically estimating R&;D substitution elasticities. We focus on bio-pharmaceutical and software industries in California and Massachusetts, where tax credit rates changed differently over time for the two types of R&;D, creating a natural experiment. The effective tax prices for the two R&;D types differ from type to type, firm to firm, state to state, and year to year. This allows us to examine changes in the composition of firms’ R&;D budgets between in-house R&;D and external basic research when the relative tax prices of each category of research change. We find evidence of a substitute relationship both for a sample comprising exclusively small firms as well as for a more general distribution of firm sizes.     

Measuring Innovation in European Industry

This paper analyses the results of the 1993 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Fifty per cent of European firms introduced a product or process innovation during 1990-92. The share of innovating firms varies between industrial sectors and firm size. The percentage of innovating firms is higher for large firms than for smaller ones. In high-tech sectors this share is two thirds and for traditional ones is one third. The largest part of firms' expenditure for innovation is linked to the adoption and diffusion of technologies through machinery and equipment, which absorbs 50% of firms' innovation expenditure. R&D activities represent, on average, 20% of total innovation expenditure while other innovative activities, such as design and trial production, account respectively for 10% and 11%. The mix of innovation inputs, especially R&D and investment, is strongly correlated with firm size, displays little change across countries and varies greatly across industries.     

Objects and Subjects in Technological Interdependence. Towards a Framework to Monitor Innovation

Technology, even more than other aspects of economic life, is characterized by a strong interdependence across both sectors and organizations. However, we still know little about the determinants and impact of technological interdependence. The standard input-output analysis is unable to explain interdependence in technological life since a large proportion of innovations are either untraded or are disembodied from products. Innovations which are not appropriated by the innovators are not signalled by prices. Moreover, input-output tables do not systematically consider exchanges within economic organizations, such as firms. This paper proposes a more complex accounting framework for innovation which would monitor the technological field of the innovation and the product where it is used, as well as the producer-user interrelationship.     

R&;D,Size and Firm Growth in Taiwan‘s Electronics Industry

This paper documents the relationship between R&D, firm size, and growth rate for a panel data of Taiwanese electronics firms. Using GMM method to control for endogeneity of R&D, the main finding is that an increase in R&D induces a higher growth rate and this impact is particularly higher for small firms. Testing Gibrat’s law shows that small firms indeed have a higher growth rate than their larger counterparts, while size is independent with firm growth in the group of large-sized firms, supporting the weak form of Gibrat’s law.     

Essential research in technology management

Now that we live in a world full of cutting-edge breakthroughs, technology management seems to be particularly essential. The Journal of Business Research has published a special issue entitled “Essential Research in Technology Management.” This special issue includes 11 papers. Six of them are from the 2007 Chinese Society for Management of Technology Annual Meeting and Conference held at Feng Chia University, Taiwan, while the other five are invited. All of them went through double-blind reviews and revisions. These papers contribute to various perspectives of technology management in different countries.     

Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D and trade costs

We examine the effect of trade liberalization on the level and mode of R&D in an international duopoly setting. Firms have the choice to invest in R&D either independently or cooperatively. A reduction in trade cost increases R&D irrespective of the mode of R&D. However, an increase in spillovers has ambiguous effects on R&D. More precisely, we find that an increase in spillover leads to higher R&D activity under cooperation but lower R&D activity under non-cooperation. Concerning cooperation versus non-cooperation, we find that firms prefer cooperation only if trade costs are low. Consumers are better off under cooperation if spillovers are high. We find that there can be a mismatch between private and social incentives. If spillovers are low and trade costs are low then cooperation might be privately profitable but socially undesirable. On the other hand, if there are large spillovers and high trade costs then cooperation may be socially desirable but not privately profitable.     

Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry

This paper considers a duopoly with product differentiation and examines the interaction between merger and innovation incentives. The analysis reveals that a merger tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently low. This result holds irrespective of whether side payments between firms are allowed. When side payments between insiders within the merged firm are permitted, a standard result in the literature is reconfirmed, which suggests that a bilateral merger-to-monopoly is always profitable. When such side payments are not permitted, however, it is shown that a merger is not profitable when the efficiency of the new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a particular level.     

R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective

Investments in R&D can influence a firm's ability to develop new products and to create and adopt innovative technologies that may enhance productivity. However, due to uncertainty regarding the outcome, investments in R&D may lead to an agency problem between the owners and the managers of a firm. Family and founder firms are often considered to be different in their agency situation than other firms, which may have an influence on R&D investments. This paper analyzes R&D spending in family and founder firms versus other firms. The results show that while family ownership decreases the level of R&D intensity, ownership by lone founders has a positive effect not only on R&D intensity but also on the level of R&D productivity. The paper contributes to the understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in making high risk/high return R&D decisions.     

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger and motivated by real-world evidence, we incorporate a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We find that a horizontal agreement always arises in equilibrium, which is consistent with empirical findings that R&D complementarities between firms positively influence the formation of horizontal agreements. The insiders’ merger/RJV choice involves a trade-off: While merger offers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater contract enforceability (quality) and R&D investment costs both favour RJV. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible. We also explore the welfare implications of the firms’ merger/RJV choice.