The Austrian theory of the firm: Retrospect and prospect

Using as a focusing device the famous arguments of Coase (Economica 4(16), 386–405 1937) and Hayek (The American Economic Review 35(4): 519–530 1945), I sketch in bold strokes what an Austrian theory of the firm would look like. Such a theory would pay serious attention to issues of knowledge, uncertainty, change, and complementarity. I describe a literature in which much of this theory has already been constructed; make connections to closely related literatures in economics and management; and suggest directions for future development.     

Regret theory and the banking firm: The optimal bank interest margin

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate of a bank, when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the presence of regret aversion raises or lowers the optimal bank interest margin than the one chosen by the purely risk-averse bank, depending on whether the probability of default is below or above a threshold value, respectively. Regret aversion as such makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking when the probability of default is high, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

Dr. Anderson and the Austrians: Price formation as a cumulative process

The formation of money prices is a pervasive feature of market economies. The theoretical explanation of money prices requires economists to recognize that prices are the result of a cumulative process in which past prices and practices create present prices, which are the basis of the plans and actions that will create future prices and practices. Lavoie’s interpretive economics embraces the historical element in economic theory and furnishes an approach congenial to studying the market as a cumulative process.     

The regulated firm and the DCF model: Some lessons from financial theory

This paper explores lessons from established financial theory for allowed rate of return calculations within the constant-growth dividend (DCF) framework. Analysts using this model have been wedded to the conventional cost-of-equity formula. We set forth equivalent alternatives which make the analysts' task easier, more precise, and more confident. What is even more important, we derive a set of consistency conditions that must be observed for the appropriate use of the model. We also use a basic capital-market principle to determine an alternative, flotation-cost adjusted, rate of return, an expression which provides useful insights for regulatory participants.     

A bargaining theory of the firm

Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner’s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a well-known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conflict about the firm’s objective function tends to arise among its owners. In this paper, we take a new approach to this problem, which is based on non-cooperative bargaining. The owners of the firm play a bargaining game in order to choose the firm’s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature is resolved. We analyze the resulting firm decision in the limit of subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow–Debreu model. Contrary to that model, owners typically do use transfers to redistribute profits. When markets are incomplete, the production plan chosen is almost always different from the one in a transfer-free Drèze (pseudo-)equilibrium and again owners use transfers to redistribute profits. Nevertheless, our results do support the Drèze criterion as the appropriate objective function of the firm.     

The legacy of Max Weber and the early Austrians

The Review of Austrian Economics - This paper explores Max Weber’s intellectual relationship to the first generations of the Austrian School. Challenging his portrayal as a one-sided...     

On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theoryof the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derivedfrom the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However,a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed,based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is neverthelesscontractual in nature. This depends on ‘direction’,that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actorsto direct the activities of another, and of non-human factorsof production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundariesand organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealingto opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers theextent to which it is meaningful to speak of ‘contractual’theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysiscan be extended beyond the employment contract to encompassownership of assets by the firm.     

Consistent firm choice and the theory of supply

Summary. This paper analyzes the problem of deriving predictions, regarding supply behavior of a competitive firm, from prior consistency postulates about input-output choices made by such a firm. It extends the literature by introducing a consistency postulate for firm choice, which is weaker than profit-maximization. This consistency postulate is nevertheless both necessary and sufficient for supply responses predicted by the standard theory of firm choice based on the postulate of profit-maximization. Furthermore, our rationality postulate, in conjunction with another condition, is shown to be equivalent to firm choice behavior that can be rationalized in terms of profit maximization.Received: 11 April 2003, Revised: 26 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D21.Indraneel Dasgupta: I thank Bhaskar Dutta and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions.     

The firm as a subeconomy

This article explores the economic role of the firm in a marketeconomy. The analysis begins with a discussion and critiqueof the property rights approach to the theory of the firm asexposited in the recent work by Hart and Moore ('Property Rightsand the Nature of the Firm'). It is argued that the Hart-Mooremodel, taken literally, can only explain why individuals ownassets, but not why firms own assets. In particular, the logicof the model suggests that each asset should be free standingin order to provide maximal flexibility for the design of individualincentives. These implications run counter to fact. One of thekey features of the modern firm is that it owns essentiallyall the productive assets that it employs. Employees rarelyown any assets; they only contribute human capital. Why is theownership of assets clustered in firms? This article outlinesan answer based on the notion that control over physical assetsgives control over contracting rights to those assets. Metaphorically,the firm is viewed as a miniature economy, an 'island' economy,in which asset ownership conveys the CEO the power to definethe 'rules of the game', that is, the ability to restructurethe incentives of those that accept to do business on (or with)the island. The desire to regulate trade in this fashion stemsfrom contractual externalities characteristic of imperfect informationenvironments. The inability to regulate all trade through asingle firm stems from the value of exit rights as an incentiveinstrument and a tool to discipline the abuse of power.     

Without judgment: An empirically-based entrepreneurial theory of the firm

Austrian ideas about the firm have grown rather naturally out of the central body of Austrian thought with its focus on entrepreneurship, subjectivism and market processes. In this paper we critically evaluate some Austrian ideas on the firm, with particular attention to the concept of entrepreneurial judgment. We then describe recent empirical work in entrepreneurship that has identified key elements of what might reside inside the “black box” of entrepreneurial decision making. We conclude that expertise in this type of decision making embodies procedural knowledge that is adaptive in the absence of substantive knowledge, i.e. without judgment.     

A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution

One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees’ behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.     

The firm as an interactor: firms as vehicles for habits and routines

This paper pursues a research agenda inspired by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winters Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). This seminal work applied the Darwinian concepts of variation, replication and selection to the evolution of firms. It proposed a level of evolution, replication and selection at a level higher than individuals or genes, involving the replication and selection of routines and institutions. Significantly, the applicability or otherwise of these Darwinian concepts depends on precise definitions of terms such as replication and selection. The present essay builds on previous work where the concepts of replication (Godfrey-Smith, 2000; Aunger, 2002; Hodgson, 2003b) and selection (Price, 1995; Frank, 1998; Knudsen, 2002b, 2003) have been refined. We deploy the key concepts of replicator and interactor from the modern philosophy of biology (Hull, 1981, 1988). It is shown that while habits and routines can be regarded as replicators, there is a case for regarding firms and similarly cohesive organizations as interactors. We explore some of the implications of this result and provide an important component in the construction of a multiple-level evolutionary theory, involving replicating units at several socio-economic levels.JEL Classification: B25, B52, D20, D83, L20Correspondence to: Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Malting House, 1 Burton End, West Wickham, Cambridgeshire CB1 6SD, UK     

Spillovers,integrated production and the theory of the firm

Recent econometric literature has demonstrated the existence of significant technological spillovers within and around groups of advanced (R&D-intensive) firms. I demonstrate thatcompetence blocks of advanced firms operate as technical universities and research institutes, unintentionally providing free educational and research services, often in areas where such services are not supplied by existing educational institutions or where the nature of competence makes traditional educational institutions incapable of supplying them. I demonstrate that the competence that diffuses from such competence blocks is botheconomic andtechnological, that it only diffuses under particular market circumstances, notably characterized by competition, and that the outcomes are typically experimental.Integrated production is an organizational technique to coordinate complex production in mechanical engineering industry within firms and over specialized consultants and subcontractors in the market. Such organizational competence is typically tacit and difficult to communicate outside its production context. Hence, such a production organization often functions as a competence block that spills knowhow throughout the industry. This organizational form is also very useful in illustrating the nature of the firm, the nature of the organizational competence that forms the backbone of western industrial technology and how that competence generates economic growth through the intermediation of firms. I use Swedish aircraft industry as a case illustration.