Devaluation of fixed exchange rates: optimal strategy in the presence of speculation

Summary. This paper analyzes devaluations in a fixed exchange rate system by endogenizing both the speculation and devaluation decisions. It is shown that deterministic devaluation rules are generally sub-optimal for the central bank. In order to deter speculation the central bank introduces uncertainty into the timing of devaluation. The nature this mixed strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy for speculators. The analysis allows an explanation of successful devaluations that are not precipitated by a speculative attacks, even under perfect capital mobility. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: June 2, 1999     

Devaluation,long-term contracts and rational expectations

This paper considers the effects of devaluation and expected devaluation on output, prices and foreign exchange reserves in a small open economy with overlapping two period wage contracts and rational expectations. A devaluation has an expansionary effect on output provided it is unanticipated by at least some contracts when it occurs. Expected devaluations, however, have no effect on prices until they take place. If a devaluation is expected, but fails to take place, output is reduced. Reserves increase in response to all devaluations; but the expectation of a devaluation causes a loss of reserves prior to its expected date.     

Currency devaluations,aggregate demand,and debt dynamics in economies with foreign currency liabilities

The article uses a post Kaleckian model to analyze how currency devaluations affect aggregate demand and capital accumulation in an economy with foreign currency liabilities in the short-run. In benchmark post Kaleckian open economy models, currency devaluations have two effects. First, they change international price competitiveness and thus affect net exports. Second, devaluations change income distribution and thereby affect consumption and investment demand. The overall effect on aggregate demand and investment is ambiguous and depends on parameter values. Existing models, however, disregard balance sheet effects that arise from foreign currency-denominated external debt. The article develops a novel post Kaleckian open economy model that introduces foreign currency-denominated external debt and balance sheet effects to examine the demand-effects of devaluations. Furthermore, the article models the dynamics of external and domestic corporate debt. It discusses how an economy may end up in a vicious cycle of foreign-currency indebtedness and derives the conditions under which indebtedness becomes stable or unstable. It shows that the existence of foreign currency-denominated debt means that contractionary devaluations are more likely, and that foreign interest rate hikes, and high illiquidity and risk premia compromise debt sustainability. Devaluations only stabilize debt ratios if they succeed in boosting domestic capital accumulation.     

Exchange rate reform and its inflationary consequences: an empirical analysis for China

In examining China's exchange rate policy in the reforming years, the study finds empirical evidence of its long-run inflationary consequences, but the effects appear not to be sizable. In the short run, while changes in the devaluation rate are positively correlated with the increase in the growth rate of inflation, the inflation inertia is also modest. The moderate inflationary cost of devaluations provides some explanation of the smooth transition of exchange rate policy regime in China and the authorities' ability to put more weight on external competitiveness.     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE CYCLES AROUND ELECTIONS

We develop the implications of devaluation cycles for real exchange rates in a two-sector small open economy with a cash-in-advance constraint. Policy-makers are office-motivated politicians. Voters have incomplete information on the competence and the opportunism of incumbents. Devaluation acts like a tax, and is politically costly because it can signal the government is incompetent. This provides incumbents an incentive to postpone devaluations, and can lead to an overvalued exchange rate before elections. We compare the implied cycle of appreciated/depreciated exchange rates with empirical evidence around elections from Latin America.     

The Exchange Rate and Inflation in Argentina: A Classical Critique of Orthodox and Heterodox Policy Prescriptions

In this paper we present an alternative framework to neoclassical theory of international trade and exchange rate determination. Our model, inspired in the classical tradition, provides support for the assertion that an exchange rate policy aiming to improve national competitiveness and to bring about a sustained trade surplus is a viable option. In fact, the success of this strategy does not depend on the effectiveness of monetary sterilization —as many argentinean heterodox authors claim— but on the ability to overcome the boundaries imposed by the evolution of the domestic wage rate and the potential emergence of competitive devaluations. In the particular case of Argentina, the introduction of export taxes on land-intensive commodities, in which the economy has absolute advantages, brings an additional policy tool that can make both the exchange rate target and the workers claims consistent.     

The Exchange Rate and Inflation in Argentina: A Classical Critique of Orthodox and Heterodox Policy Prescriptions

In this paper we present an alternative framework to neoclassical theory of international trade and exchange rate determination. Our model, inspired in the classical tradition, provides support for the assertion that an exchange rate policy aiming to improve national competitiveness and to bring about a sustained trade surplus is a viable option. In fact, the success of this strategy does not depend on the effectiveness of monetary sterilization —as many argentinean heterodox authors claim— but on the ability to overcome the boundaries imposed by the evolution of the domestic wage rate and the potential emergence of competitive devaluations. In the particular case of Argentina, the introduction of export taxes on land-intensive commodities, in which the economy has absolute advantages, brings an additional policy tool that can make both the exchange rate target and the workers claims consistent.     

Better Than the Euro? The European Monetary System (1979–1998)

ABSTRACT

The euro crisis has provoked a debate on the pros and cons of adjustable exchange rate regimes that enable their participants to negotiate nominal de- and revaluations. To evaluate the functioning of such regimes, we revisit the EMU’s predecessor, the European Monetary System (EMS). We show that in the EMS, devaluations did indeed help more than revaluations did hurt. Assuming that the political-economic heterogeneity of the Eurozone will not vanish in the foreseeable future, the move to a more flexible exchange rate regime might therefore be economically advantageous. However, a purely economic view ignores the huge political ‘maintenance costs’ of negotiable realignments, costs that the EMS members aimed at overcoming when they opted for the euro. The re-politicization of nominal exchange rate policy in today’s Eurozone would therefore not end transnational political conflicts in the Eurozone but fuel new ones.     

An Australian Model: Nontraded Goods, Real Exchange Rates and Unemployment

A popular model for considering many international trade and macroeconomic questions is the 'Australian model' of Wilson, Swan and Salter. This paper develops a general equilibrium trade version of the 'Australian model' where unemployment comes from a specified factor market distortion, and considers the effects of immigration, transfers, changes in wage fixing arrangements, terms of trade shocks, tariffs and devaluations. Debates over policies for external and internal balance are revisited, with the advantage that the general equilibrium specification allows welfare consequences of various alternatives to be explicitly considered. In the model external balance is achieved through a flexible exchange rate and the most attractive policies for achieving internal balance are encouraging skilled immigration and skill augmenting technical change, training, and unskilled wage cuts (accompanied by redistribution to affected workers). Foreign borrowing, import tariffs and currency devaluation are problematic policies from a welfare point of view.     

A Dynamic Model of Export Competition, Policy Coordination, and Simultaneous Currency Collapse

This paper shows that the "price wars during booms" logic of Rotemberg and Saloner ( American Economic Review , vol. 76, 1986, 390–407) provides an explanation of contagious currency crises. The idea is as follows. When a group of countries relies on exports to a common foreign market, pressures for competitive devaluations arise. In response, competing exporters peg their exchange rates to the currency of their export market. However, it must be in each country's self-interest to adhere to its peg, and a common adverse external shock can make an existing (implicitly) cooperative arrangement unenforceable. Maintaining the arrangement requires a collective devaluation that reduces the unilateral incentive to devalue.     

Asymmetric volatility of stock returns during the Asian crisis: Evidence from Indonesia

This paper investigates the conditional volatility in stock returns in Indonesia over the period covered by the Asian crisis. Rolling regression parameter estimates from three asymmetric volatility models suggested that all parameters, including those capturing asymmetric response, were time-varying. The precise pattern of adjustment was sensitive to model selection. Nevertheless, increases in asymmetric response patterns appear to coincide with the very large exchange rate devaluations in the rupiah over this period and were followed by more general symmetric short-term volatility in the post crisis period. Estimates from a smooth transition volatility model indicated both sign and size asymmetries during the crisis period.     

NOMINAL SOVEREIGN DEBT

I show that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt, which is subject to both the risks of default and opportunistic devaluations. Nominal debt combined with a countercyclical exchange rate policy allows more hedging against shocks than real savings if markets are incomplete. Thus, the loss of either repayment or monetary reputation severely affects the government's ability to smooth consumption. The model offers a simple explanation for the Bulow and Rogoff critique, while simultaneously helping explain the issuance of nominal sovereign bonds by emerging economies. The model also helps explain why many governments borrow and save at the same time.     

Exchange Controls,Political Risk and the Eurocurrency Market: New Evidence from Tests of Covered Interest Rate Parity

This study employs daily data to examine the effects on Eurocurrency and onshore returns of the May 21, 1981 imposition of exchange controls by French President Mitterand. Prior to this time, transaction costs explain the average onshore deviations from covered parity; however, these averages ignore short-lived political risk premia which emerged just before the imposition of controls. As expected, there is no evidence of political risk of Eurocurrency markets. Yet when exchange controls were in effect, premia in excess of transaction costs surfaced on nonfranc Eurocurrency deposits at the time of devaluations of the franc within the EMS. [431]     

Devaluations and Consumption Smoothing

The paper considers the effect of a nominal exchange rate devaluation on the current account, using an intertemporal model that highlights the interaction between leisure and consumption. An analytical solution demonstrates that household behavior may differ markedly from the simple consumption smoothing emphasized in most previous literature. This distinction has special significance for demand shocks, in which output rises through a rise in labor input and hence a fall in leisure. In particular, consumption tends to move closely with increased output in this context, so a devaluation tends not to improve the current account. This result may cast doubt on the effectiveness of competitive devaluations.     

The Effects of Devaluation on Aggregate Output: Empirical Evidence from Africa

This paper tests the contractionary devaluation hypothesis in the context of select African countries. The output effect of devaluation is examined within an empirical model that controls, among others, for the parallel currency premium, the rate of net capital inflow, the degree of capacity utilization and political instability. The model is estimated on pooled data drawn from 20 African countries, employing alternative indicators of devaluation and pooling procedures. The results indicate that the contemporaneous output effect of nominal devaluation is negative, providing statistical support for the hypothesis that devaluation is contractionary in the short run. On the other hand, the coefficient of the lagged rate of devaluation is found to be positive, implying that the contractionary problem is temporary. The magnitude of the observed contractionary effect appears to depend on the rate of net capital inflow and the degree of capacity utilization. Devaluations accompanied by augmented net capital inflow and implemented in the presence of excess capacity are found to be less contractionary than otherwise equivalent exchange‐rate changes. The results also seem to imply that devaluations launched in the context of sizeable unofficial markets for foreign exchange are less injurious to aggregate economic activity than other exchange‐rate adjustments.     

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation

We characterize optimal debt policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of defaults and devaluations in which self-fulfilling crises can arise. When the government cannot commit to repay its debt and cannot commit to maintain the exchange rate, consumers’ expectations of devaluation make the safe level of government debt very low. We show that, when the debt is in the crises zone—where self-fulfilling crisis can occur—the government finds it optimal to reduce the debt to exit the zone. The lower the probability that consumers assign to devaluation, however, the greater is the number of periods that the government will choose to take to exit the crisis zone. We argue that our model can help understand events in Argentina in 2001–2002 and throw light on some aspects of the current EMU sovereign debt crisis.     

Fiscal stabilizations: When do they work and why

This paper studies the determinants and channels through which fiscal contractions influence the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth. Using data from a panel of OECD countries, the paper shows that the success of fiscal adjustments in decreasing the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the size of the fiscal contraction and less on its composition. The rate of growth of output matters too, but higher GDP growth does not drive the success of a fiscal stabilization. In contrast, whether a fiscal adjustment is expansionary depends largely on the composition of the fiscal maneuvre. In particular, stabilizations implemented by cutting public spending lead to higher GDP growth rates. The effects of the composition on growth work mostly through the labor market rather than through agents’ expectations of future fiscal policy. Finally, the evidence suggests that successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are not the result of accompanying expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate devaluations.     

DID INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC FORCES CAUSE THE GREAT DEPRESSION?

This paper reviews and assesses international explanations for the depth and duration of the Great Depression. Many of the conclusions are negative. The U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 came too late to account for the 1929 downturn and fails to explain the severity of the contraction in the U.S. The competitive devaluations of the 1930s redistributed the Depression's effects across countries but did not worsen it overall. The deflationary consequences of the liquidation of foreign exchange reserves were minor. Domestic central bank policies and their failure to be coordinated internationally must bear the major responsibility for the Depression.     

Floating exchange rates versus a monetary union under rational beliefs: the role of endogenous uncertainty

Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated. Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged.     

Food supply and inflation

The paper presents an analytic version of the Latin American structuralist theory of inflation. It emphasizes the difference between the productive sectors of the economy and draws attention to the fact that the inflationary process is closely linked to inconsistent claims for shares in income. It describes a Keynesian economy with two (three) sectors. Real desired wages are rigid. Money is passive. It is shown that the structuralist hypotheses are capable of generating disequilibria that can lead to constantly rising prices without any built in mechanism to offset them. Steady inflation can only persist if workers allow their real wage to be kept below target. As the workers try to catch on, the model will blow up: an accelerating inflation can be observed in many Latin American countries during periods when wage settlements, aimed at restoring inflation losses, escaped the government control. The paper also explores the implications of foreign trade: it shows that, under structuralist hypotheses, external disequilibria cannot be corrected through exchange rate devaluations alone, and it examines the stagflationary impacts of an increase in the price of imported intermediates.