The effects of audit firm rotation on perceived auditor independence and audit quality

Our study explores loan officers’ perceptions of auditors’ independence and audit quality under three experimental audit firm rotation scenarios. We use a case experiment with a between-subjects design to determine whether rotation of the audit firm impacts financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor’s independence and quality. Findings based on 212 useable responses indicate that loan officers do perceive an increase in independence when the company follows an audit firm rotation policy. However, the length of auditor tenure within rotation fails to significantly change loan officers’ perceptions of independence. Findings also indicate that neither the presence of a rotation policy nor the length of the auditor tenure within rotation significantly influences the loan officers’ perceptions of audit quality.     

Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An analysis of industry specialization and fee effects

This study investigates the relation between audit firm tenure and clients’ financial restatements. Specifically, we extend the audit tenure literature by assessing restatement-based reporting failures using dimensions of auditor expertise and independence previously assumed to underlie short and long audit tenure problems. Short tenure expertise and independence effects are hypothesized using audit firm industry specialization and audit fees as proxies. Long tenure independence effects are hypothesized using nonaudit fees as a proxy. Using matched-sample logistic regression and 382 companies with and without financial restatements during 2000–2004, the results support prior findings by indicating a negative relation between the length of the auditor–client relationship and the likelihood of restatement. For short tenure engagements, we find that auditor industry specialization and audit fees are negatively related to the likelihood of restatement. This result is consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge and low audit fees on new audit engagements. Alternatively, the long tenure results indicate an insignificant relation between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of restatement. This finding contradicts independence concerns about nonaudit fees paid to entrenched auditors.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

The impact of audit firms’ characteristics on audit fees following information security breaches

Given the importance of auditors’ assessing business risks and evaluating internal controls, we investigate whether an audit firm’s industry expertise, tenure, and size can help its auditors better understand external and internal threats faced by the client with less effort. Using reported information security breach incidents from 2004 to 2013, we find that, consistent with prior studies, audit fees are higher after the occurrence of an information security breach. However, such an association is negatively moderated when the audit firm has industry-specific expertise, longer experience with the client, and is one of the Big 4 firms. Our results suggest that because of their better knowledge about a specific industry, increased familiarity with the client’s operations, and more resources to understand a client’s vulnerabilities and/or information security policies and procedures, these auditors are more capable of assessing the potentially changing information security risks implied by the occurrence of information security breach incidents. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.     

Auditor–client management relationships and roles in negotiating financial reporting

We carry out an interview based field study of chief financial officer (CFO)–audit partner dyads to examine the assumption that the roles played by each side and the nature of the relationships are similar across negotiations. These dyads freely discussed with us their relationship, a specific issue negotiated and it’s resolution process. Employing the lens of social positioning negotiation research, we find these negotiations are ‘fluid’, with continual redefinition not only of the substantive issues under negotiation, but also of the negotiation roles and relationships (i.e. ‘shadow’ negotiations). The CFO’s actions and expectations in these ‘shadow’ negotiations appear to define the auditor’s role and the relationship’s parameters, but both can evolve over time. The audit partners express a desire to be in the “ideal” relationship where they assume the role of the ‘expert advisor’ (as opposed to a ‘police officer’) but they seemingly have no explicit strategy to move the relationship toward a ‘proactive’ (rather than ‘reactive’) state. Furthermore, the audit partner is always the ‘relationship manager’ whose job it is to see that client management remains “happy”. These roles and relationships negotiated in the ‘shadows’ also affect how the negotiation process unfolds, including the set of alternative accounting treatments considered during negotiations. Finally, audit firms appear to manage the assignment of partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and remove those partners who are in “poor” relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be “poor”. Implications for the broader research program on auditor–client management negotiations are discussed.     

Audit Firm Tenure and Audit Quality in a Constrained Market

We examine the relation between audit quality and audit firm tenure in the Iranian audit market, which is constrained by government policies that create intense competition for clients among many small audit firms. We develop arguments that these circumstances create cost pressures that entrench low audit quality and render auditors' plans more predictable to managers wishing to misstate their accounts. Using publicly available data for the audits of listed companies in Iran prior to mandatory audit firm rotation and the incidence of misstated financial reports identified by the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants Inspection Office, we find that the likelihood of a misstatement is lowest in the first two years of audit firm tenure. We also find that the likelihood of misstatement is not associated with the year preceding a mandatory audit firm rotation, suggesting outgoing auditor effort is not sensitive to the prospect of subsequent revelations of deficiencies. Although our results from a pre-mandatory rotation period show that frequent rotations appear to improve the financial reporting quality in our sample, we are wary of interpreting these results as support for the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in Iran. Rather, we suggest this is a peculiar consequence of deficiencies in audit quality inherent in the Iranian market.     

On the Relationship between Audit Tenure and Fees Paid to the Audit Firm and Audit Quality

Abstract

We investigate the impact of audit firm tenure, partner tenure, audit fees, fees for non-audit services and total fees on audit quality, as measured by discretionary accruals. Our sample consists of Spanish non-financial public companies for the years between 2006 and 2013. Results indicate that audit quality increases with audit firm tenure but decreases with partner tenure. Moreover, the level of fees paid to the audit firm seems to have a negative impact on audit quality, which is mainly driven by fees for audit services. In this regard, we do not observe any significant relationship between fees for non-audit services and audit quality. Our results also show that the negative relationship between either long partner tenures or high fees and audit quality does not occur when the tenure with the audit firm is long. Therefore, long audit firm tenures do not only seem to involve higher audit quality ‘per se’, but also moderate the negative effects of partner tenure and audit fees on audit quality. The results of this study, which are robust to several sensitivity checks, may be relevant for the current debate on auditor rotation and the joint provision of audit and non-audit services.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.     

CAP Forum on Enron: Former Audit Firm Personnel as CFOs: Effect on Earnings Management*

Corporate hiring of former audit personnel to fill key financial positions is a practice that has attracted attention from the media, the accounting profession, and regulators. The concern is that the former external auditor who now holds a key position with the client may be able to circumvent the audit or exert pressure on the audit team and adversely influence audit quality. We compare a sample of 172 test companies that appointed to the position of chief financial officer (CFO) personnel who are former employees of the companies' auditors, with a control sample of companies that appointed new CFOs who were not affiliated with their auditors. We investigate whether the level of discretionary accruals is greater for the test sample compared with the control sample during the two years following appointment of the CFO. Both univariate and multivariate results for signed discretionary accruals suggest some support for the hypothesis that firms with affiliated CFOs are associated with greater earnings management than firms with unaffiliated CFOs. Furthermore, the results for signed discretionary accruals suggest that the association is stronger for nonpartners who moved from the audit firm to the client with little or no time gap. On average, the results for absolute discretionary accruals do not suggest differences in earnings management between affiliated and unaffiliated CFOs. However, they do indicate some earnings management relative to unaffiliated CFOs by CFOs who had little or no time gap between leaving the audit firm and joining the client firm, although at a weaker level of significance.     

Some Economics of Audit Market Reform

The purpose of audit market reforms since 2001 is to restore public confidence in the institution of auditing based on two considerations: (1) ensuring audit quality; and (2) controlling the ‘adverse effect of competition’ in audit supply. Market reforms for audit quality are delivered through a package of prescribed actions motivated by an analytical relationship between audit quality and its possible determinants: (1) limiting audit tenure through a combination of mandatory firm rotation, partner rotation and re‐tendering; (2) limiting provision of non‐audit services (NAS) by the incumbent auditor; and (3) joint auditing and empowering the audit committee to enhance audit quality. This paper examines the competing independence hypothesis and expertise hypothesis that produce ambiguous theoretical relationships for audit quality–audit tenure and the independence‐provision of NAS. We then review whether the empirical literature resolves these conundrums. We also review the usefulness of joint auditing and empowering the audit committee to improve audit quality in the context of audit market reform.     

Can clients of economically dependent auditors benefit from voluntary audit firm rotation? An experiment with lenders

This study utilizes a nationwide random selection of 111 lenders in a 2?×?2 between-subjects experiment to determine whether the level of an auditor's economic dependence on a client and type of auditor rotation affect lenders’ independence and reliability perceptions and decisions to lend money to a potential borrower. Previous literature shows that financial statement users use client importance as a measure of audit quality when revenue streams are not equal across clients. This can negatively affect perceptions of independence and financial statement reliability. As United States regulators look for ways to improve audit quality under the current partner rotation mandate, this study explores whether an audited entity that voluntarily adopts a policy of firm rotation can mitigate the negative effects of the auditor's dependence on the client. Findings suggest that lenders view clients of economically dependent auditors (CEDA) as less independent from its auditor and perceive its financials as less reliable than clients without a dependent auditor (non-CEDA). Lenders are less likely to grant a loan to CEDA. However, under firm rotation, there is not only an increase in lenders’ perceptions of reliability of CEDA financials, but also no difference in perceptions of reliability of CEDA and non-CEDA financials.     

The effects of audit partner pre-client and client-specific experience on audit quality and on perceptions of audit quality

We examine the associations between audit partner pre-client and client-specific experience and audit quality using data from Taiwan, where signing audit partner names are disclosed. Using discretionary accruals and interest rate spreads to proxy for audit quality and perceptions of audit quality, respectively, we find that both pre-client and client-specific experience improve audit quality and creditor perceptions of audit quality. We also find that audit partner pre-client experience is positively associated with audit quality early in the engagement, but not when the partner has been with the client for at least five years. Our findings provide evidence consistent with the assumption underlying the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s decision to require the disclosure of engagement partner names. They also suggest that pre-client experience cannot completely mitigate the loss of client-specific knowledge when partner or audit firm turnover occurs.     

Auditor rotation and the appearance of independence: Evidence from non-professional investors

We examine the impact of audit firm versus partner rotation on non-professional investors’ independence-related perceptions, extending prior research on auditor rotation and independence in fact. Arguments for mandatory audit firm rotation continue to be made by regulators and investor groups based, in part, on the idea that firm rotation will incrementally strengthen independence in appearance relative to audit partner rotation. We report the results of two experiments. The first examines 5-year audit firm versus partner rotation under relatively weak or strong audit committees. We find no statistically significant difference in beliefs about how much of an income reducing audit difference management will record, or in beliefs about auditor independence, between the two auditor rotation conditions. On the other hand, we find that non-professional investors do believe more of the audit difference will be recorded, and the auditors will be more independent, under a strong audit committee than a relatively weak audit committee. The second experiment provides further evidence on audit firm versus partner rotation by examining a setting involving a 26-year audit firm–client relationship. Again, no statistically significant differences between the two auditor rotation conditions were found. These findings suggest that compared to audit partner rotation, audit firm rotation does not strengthen independence in appearance among non-professional investors and that non-professional investors recognize the value of strong audit committees.     

Audit committee diligence around initial audit engagement

Studies focusing on governance mechanisms argue that auditor monitoring is one of several governance mechanisms that exist in the firm, and these mechanisms supplement each other. Extending this argument, I examine whether firms support auditor monitoring with audit committee monitoring when auditor oversight is deemed to be weak. Prior auditing literature argues that audit quality is affected by auditors' lack of familiarity with their clients' activities. Since lack of auditor–client familiarity exists in the first year of auditor–client tenure, I examine whether firms increase their audit committee monitoring during the year of auditor change. For a sample of firms that changed auditors between 2006 and 2012, the findings show that audit committees meet more frequently in the first year of audit engagement. Further tests show that firms' past reporting behavior play a significant role in the demand for more audit committee meetings and the increase in the audit committee meetings in the initial year of auditor engagement positively affects reporting quality.     

CPAs and Big 4 office audit quality

Both accounting firms and regulators recognize the importance of human capital in the audit function, yet we know little about whether and how the level of professionally qualified human capital varies across offices of an audit firm and whether it is associated with audit quality. In this paper, we examine the association between office professionally qualified human capital and audit quality. Using hand-collected data on Big 4 audit firm office CPA levels from 30 U.S. cities, we find that offices with relatively more professionally qualified human capital deliver higher quality audits, with this benefit being more pronounced for audits performed during busy season than for non-busy season audits. The results underscore the importance of the availability of professionally qualified human capital in an audit office to the office’s audit quality. Our finding of CPA levels being an office-level audit quality indicator will potentially help the PCAOB in their ongoing Audit Quality Indicator (AQI) project, whose goal is to assist audit firms, clients, and investors in measuring audit quality. Furthermore, the results lend credibility toward the CPA designation, which helps justify the AICPA’s, NASBA’s, and state Accountancy Boards’ regulatory roles of admitting and licensing qualified candidates.     

A study of auditor-client relationships and problems in the Bahraini audit environment

We report on a survey study of auditor-client relationship problems in an under-developed audit market in Bahrain. The study investigates client perspectives and views on important auditing process issues, value added audit activities for client organizations, and auditor rotation. Clients viewed high fees, excessive audit time requirements, difficulty in meeting auditor's requests, and audit personnel difficulties in understanding the business due to a lack of adequate audit professionals' experience as problems. From the audit firm perspective, the study explores audit client acceptance factors, independence issues, and common problems encountered with the clients. Auditor respondents indicated the major process problems to be associated with the client's culture, lack of access to information, and poor accounting systems. Auditors reported problems in collecting evidence. The audit process and evidence problems reported indicate possible audit quality problems faced by audit firms in Bahraini environment when conducting external audits, indicating the need for future research on auditor-client relationships in emerging economies.     

The effects of disclosing critical audit matters and auditor tenure on nonprofessional investors’ judgments

In an effort to provide more meaningful information to financial statement users, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently adopted sweeping changes to the audit report, requiring the audit firm to disclose whether or not it identified a critical audit matter (CAM) and its tenure with the client. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to explore how nonprofessional investors’ judgments are influenced by (1) the relative effects of a CAM disclosure versus a disclosure that the auditor did not identify a CAM, and (2) the disclosure of the audit firm’s tenure. We find that, relative to disclosing that no CAMs were identified, disclosing a CAM reduces investment intentions. We do not find a significant effect of tenure disclosure on investment intentions, despite evidence that participants attended to and understood the tenure manipulation. Concerning investors’ cognitive processes, we find that perceptions of both risk of material misstatement and management disclosure credibility mediate the effect of CAM disclosure on investment intentions, while perceived audit quality suppresses this effect. Our contributions include furthering the understanding of cognitive mechanisms through which CAM disclosure influences investment intentions, identifying a relatively unique setting in which perceptions of management disclosure credibility and audit quality move in opposite directions, and providing evidence that auditor tenure disclosure does not appear to affect investment intentions. Our findings should be of interest to regulators, auditors, issuers, and investors.     

Does auditor tenure affect accounting conservatism? Further evidence

Accounting regulators are concerned about the potential threat of long-term auditor–client relationships on auditor independence, leading to lower audit quality. Jenkins and Velury (2008, hereafter JV) document a positive association between the conservatism in reported earnings and the length of the auditor–client relationship. A primary objective of this study is to extend JV by providing evidence that the relationship between conservatism and auditor tenure is not unique for all firms. In particular, this study finds that the positive association only exists for large firms or firms strongly monitored by their auditors, while for smaller firms or firms weakly monitored by their auditors, I observe a significantly negative association between auditor tenure and conservatism.     

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.     

Corporate employment,red flags,and audit effort

U.S. regulatory agencies and congressional oversight committees have expressed concerns that auditors often neglect red flags embedded in the operating characteristics of firms that misstate their financial reports. This study examines whether labor employment decisions, a major part of a firm’s operations, help predict accounting improprieties and consequently play a role in audit planning and pricing. We find that negative abnormal employment changes are associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent financial restatements, accounting irregularities, and lawsuits related to accounting fraud, and generally require greater effort from auditors as manifested by higher audit fees and longer audit report lags. Positive abnormal employment changes are associated with subsequent restatements and longer audit report lags, but not associated with fraud or audit fees. Taken together, the results are consistent with auditors recognizing the individual misstatement risks pertaining to companies’ employment decisions. These results suggest that standard setters, regulators, and practitioners should devote more attention to operational statistics to identify potential red flags.