Can interest rate volatility be extracted from the cross section of bond yields?

Most affine models of the term structure with stochastic volatility predict that the variance of the short rate should play a ‘dual role’ in that it should also equal a linear combination of yields. However, we find that estimation of a standard affine three-factor model results in a variance state variable that, while instrumental in explaining the shape of the yield curve, is essentially unrelated to GARCH estimates of the quadratic variation of the spot rate process or to implied variances from options. We then investigate four-factor affine models. Of the models tested, only the model that exhibits ‘unspanned stochastic volatility’ (USV) generates both realistic short rate volatility estimates and a good cross-sectional fit. Our findings suggest that short rate volatility cannot be extracted from the cross-section of bond prices. In particular, short rate volatility and convexity are only weakly correlated.     

Model-free versus Model-based Volatility Prediction

The well-known ARCH/GARCH models for financial time series havebeen criticized of late for their poor performance in volatilityprediction, that is, prediction of squared returns.¹ Focusingon three representative data series, namely a foreign exchangeseries (Yen vs. Dollar), a stock index series (the S&P500index), and a stock price series (IBM), the case is made thatfinancial returns may not possess a finite fourth moment. Takingthis into account, we show how and why ARCH/GARCH models—whenproperly applied and evaluated—actually do have nontrivialpredictive validity for volatility. Furthermore, we show howa simple model-free variation on the ARCH theme can performeven better in that respect. The model-free approach is basedon a novel normalizing and variance–stabilizing transformation(NoVaS, for short) that can be seen as an alternative to parametricmodeling. Properties of this transformation are discussed, andpractical algorithms for optimizing it are given.     

Timing feminism, feminising time

This article deals with feminist engagement with the futures studies (and vice versa) and analyses the uneasy relationship that exists between the two. More specifically, it investigates the feminist theorizing of ‘patriarchal time’ and efforts to both decolonise and ‘reconstruct’ time based on feminist epistemological frameworks. Feminism is here understood as a social movement, ideology, theory, philosophy, worldview and a way of life. As such this term overlaps with, yet represents a distinct category from terms such as ‘women’, ‘gender’, ‘femininity’ and ‘women's movements’. Thus, feminism itself is historicized and spatially contextualised as is the notion of non-patriarchal ‘women's/feminist time’ developed by feminists.     

The office: The weakness of numbers and the production of non-authority

It often seems to be taken for granted that numbers produce effects and that practices of accounting enhance authority. This also goes for accounting and the environment. This paper shares this belief and argues that practices of accounting have been a crucial technology for taking nature or ‘the environment’ into account in the post-war era. Nevertheless, the ‘constitutive turn’ in the studies of accounting should not tempt us to leave unexplored the limitation of accounting practices and the inabilities to govern by numbers. With a point of departure in a pollution control agency, the paper explores the making of a non-authoritative office. It points to the emergence of what is labelled ‘accounting intimacy’ rather than the exertion of government at a distance. The paper also points to the ways in which the agency, rather than building a separate and distinct authority, came to reproduce the actor subjected to being governed, i.e., the polluting factory, within its own office. The author argues that this can be related to the investment in a shared ‘technical interest’ and the belief that the right (emission) number in itself would be sufficient to move the factory. The paper then explores the conditions for which numbers nevertheless came to have effects. The argument is that this should be seen as inextricably linked to the emergence of an ‘interesting object’, i.e., ‘the environment’ and an environmental interest, within the office. Thus, we need to pay attention to the formation of interests, and as accounting scholars turn to ‘the environment’, the latter should not be taken for granted.     

基于GARCH模型的黄金指数与美元指数波动性研究

近几年的黄金市场与美元指数市场波动都比较大,但波动的方向不一致。通过对两者的波动进行研究,主要有单位根检验、ARCH效应的检验、GARCH模型分析以及因果关系检验,结果表明,黄金指数GARCH(1,1)最适合描述其市场波动,美元指数GARCH(2,1)最适合描述其市场波动,美元指数的预测对黄金指数的预测会有帮助。     

中国和台湾地区经济波动的实证研究

本文利用ARCH类模型对中国和台湾地区的实际GDP增长率的波动进行了实证分析,结果表明,中国实际GDP增长率的波动有ARCH效应,并且GARCH模型拟合效果最好,而台湾地区实际GDP增长率的波动没有ARCH效应。这表明中国经济波动率是变化的,实际GDP的增长率是对称的,而台湾地区的GDP的波动率是不变的。     

The impact of firms' internationalization on financial statement presentation: Some French evidence

Historically, the format of financial statements has varied from one country to another. Recently, due to the attractiveness of their capital markets, the strength of their accounting professions and the influence of their institutional investors, Anglo-American countries have seen a steady increase in the impact of their accounting practices on other nations, even influencing the actual format of financial statements. Given that French accounting regulations allow a certain degree of choice in consolidated balance sheet format (‘by nature’ or ‘by term’) and income statement format (‘by nature’ or ‘by function’), this study examines a sample of 199 large French listed firms in an attempt to understand why some of these firms choose not to use the traditional French formats (‘by nature’ for the balance sheet and ‘by nature’ for the income statement), instead preferring Anglo-American practices that we call ‘alternative’ (‘by term’ format for the balance sheet and ‘by function’ format for the income statement). We first analyze the balance sheet and income statement formats separately using a logit model, then combine the two and enrich the research design with a generalized ordered logit model. Our results confirm that opting for one or two alternative formats is related to internationalization, influenced by several factors: size, international auditor, accounting standards, foreign listing and international sales. When distinguishing the decision to adopt at least one versus two alternative-format financial statements, our findings also provide evidence that not all variables play the same role: ‘Accounting standards’ and ‘Foreign listing’, which are important in explaining the use of at least one alternative format, are irrelevant in explaining the use of two alternative-format financial statements.     

Power ARCH modelling of commodity futures data on the London Metal Exchange

A recent addition to the ARCH family of econometric models was introduced by Ding and co-workers wherein the power term by which the data is transformed was estimated within the model rather than being imposed by the researcher. This paper considers the ability of the Power GARCH class of models to capture the stylized features of volatility in a range of commodity futures prices traded on the London Metals Exchange (LME). The results of this procedure suggest that asymmetric effects are not generally present in the LME futures data. Further, unlike stock market data which is well described by the model, futures data is not as well described by the APGARCH model. Nested within the APGARCH model are several other models from the ARCH family. This paper uses the standard log likelihood procedure to conduct pairwise comparisons of the relative merits of each and the results suggest that it is the Taylor GARCH model which performs best.     

A productivity analysis of Central and Eastern European banking taking into account risk decomposition and environmental variables

This paper develops a Luenberger productivity index that is applied to a technology where desirable and undesirable outputs are jointly produced and are possibly negative. The components of this Luenberger productivity index - the efficiency change and the components of the technological shift - are then decomposed into factors determined by the technology, adjusted and then for ‘risk and environment’, ‘risk management’ and ‘environmental effects’. The method is applied to Central and Eastern European banks operating during 1998-2003 utilising three alternative input/output methodologies (intermediation, production and profit/revenue). Additionally, the comparative analysis of the sensitivity of the productivity indices in the choice of the methodologies is undertaken using statistical and kernel density tests. It is found that the main driver of productivity change in Central and Eastern European banks is technological improvement. That is, in the beginning of the analysed period, the results hinged on the banks ability to capitalise on advanced technology and successfully take into account ‘risk and environmental’ factors. Whereas, in later periods, one of the most important factors of technological improvement/decline was ‘risk management’. Finally, the tests employed confirm previous findings, such as Pasiouras (2008)in this journal, that different input/output methodologies produce statistically different productivity results. Finally, we find that external factors, such as ‘risk in the economy’ and banking production, and a ‘corruption perception’ affect the productivity of banks.     

The price-setting behavior of banks: An analysis of open-end leverage certificates on the German market

This paper presents the first analysis of open-end leverage certificates on the German market. The major innovations of these certificates are twofold. First, issuers announce a price-setting formula according to which they are willing to buy and sell the certificates over time. Second, the product’s lifetime is potentially endless. Our main findings are that the price-setting formula is (i) designed to strongly favor the issuer and (ii) is consistent with the main outcome of the ‘life cycle hypothesis’ for structured financial products [Stoimenov, P.A., Wilkens, S., 2005. Are structured products ‘fairly’ priced? An analysis of the German market for equity-linked instruments. Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 2971–2993]. (iii) This holds for different product features and also in the presence of issuers’ credit risk and jump risk in the underlying.     

The ‘laissez faire’ bias of managed floating

The government of a small open economy trying to manage its exchange rate faces a ‘time consistency’ problem. If markets expect implementation of the optimal linear intervention rule, the government will be tempted to ‘defect’: knowing this, markets will expect less activism; and, in the discretionary equilibrium, this is what they get. How far this credibility problem can shift discretionary policy towards a free float is shown in two popular models of floating rates. One way of offsetting the ‘laissez faire’ bias of discretionary policy is to appoint a relatively ‘conservative’ central banker: but, as the time period of policy action and precommitment shrinks towards zero, the required conservative bias is found to go towards infinity. Other institutional features — such as central bank reputation, contracts and intermediate targets — may be crucial for successful exchange rate management.     

The science of ‘what-if?’

An appropriate response to the new challenges to science will require more than new explicit goals and social organisation. New leading questions will be appropriate. The traditional questions of ‘what/how?’ for research and ‘how/why?’ for the design fields, will be supplemented by ‘what-if?’. This previously had its place in exploratory phases of all research; now it will become an essential component of ‘post-normal’ science. Its form precludes the dogmatic and exclusive styles which have hitherto been dominant in science as applied to policy problems; and it lends itself to open enquiry and public participation.     

Post-normal science in postnormal times

Post-normal science (PNS) was a herald of postnormal times. For Functowicz and Ravetz contemporary issues in which ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent’ necessitate PNS. PNS deals with the postnormal character of contemporary challenges by bringing the contextualised insights of non-scientific stakeholders to bear through the formulation of ‘extended facts’. However, while the contextual content of ‘extended facts’ caters to the indeterminate character of postnormal issues this remains in tension with an implicit assumption that outcomes reflect the quality of the ‘facts’ informing them. This paper takes the claim that postnormal times involves ‘that we abandon…ideas of ‘control and management” seriously by arguing that science should be the servant of outcomes framed in, primarily, societal terms, rather than the other way around. This argument is illustrated using the example of fashioning an effective response to climate change.     

Urban futures in the age of unsettlement

Rather than appealing to the agency of community and the received discourse of sustainability, this paper offers a critical perspective on both concepts. It puts forward a contextually dynamic view of urban futures - presented at a moment when the continuity of human settlement in its current forms appears as increasingly problematic. Against this backdrop, both community and urban futures are rethought and brought into relation with (i) the emergent discourse of ‘sustainment’ (named as a moment, project and process) and (ii) the rise of ‘redirective practice’. Overall, the argument and ideas presented seek to reframe how the fate of the city, its social fabric, economy and political structures are viewed and engaged.     

The effectiveness of the mandatory disclosure of independent directors’ opinions: Empirical evidence from China

Since 2001, the regulatory authority of the Chinese stock market has required the independent directors of listed firms to disclose their opinions on important board decisions. Using a novel dataset of independent directors’ opinions, this study examines the effectiveness of that mandatory disclosure requirement. We find that the stock market reacts negatively to announcements of independent directors saying ‘no’. Firms with more severe agency problems are prone to experiencing independent directors saying ‘no’. Independent directors are also more likely to say ‘no’ when they have multiple directorships, longer tenure, financial expertise, or live in places other than where the firms they serve are located. Consequently, firms with independent directors who say ‘no’ tend to experience cuts in inter-corporate lending, a lower propensity to pay dividends, reduced bank loans, and greater turnover of top executives. In addition, these firms are more likely to receive a modified audit opinion, obtain ‘special treatment’, or be subject to regulatory enforcement action in the year after independent directors say ‘no’. Overall, the results indicate that independent directors saying ‘no’ can help to protect the interests of outside investors, and thus lend support to regulations mandating the disclosure of independent directors’ opinions.     

GARCH model selection criteria

Abstract

The autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) family of models has grown to encompass a wide range of specifications, each of which is designed to enhance the ability of the model to capture the characteristics of the data. In this paper, the ability of a number of model selection criteria to correctly identify the data generating process in simulated data is established. The results of this study suggest that the Hannan-Quinn and stochastic complexity criteria provide a superior level of performance for ARCH and generalized ARCH (GARCH) processes compared to the more commonly used criteria. Where leverage and/or power effects are present, however, none of the procedures considered perform well. A new LM based test for the presence of nonlinearity and power effects is introduced and tested.     

Futurists and their schools: A response to Ziauddin Sardar's ‘the namesake’

A ‘futurist’ is the generic term for someone seriously engaged in the consideration of future conditions. ‘Futures research’ has a systems science orientation with a planning horizon in excess of 10 years. ‘Futures studies’ has a social science connotation and ‘foresight’ is the most popular term within the management science and corporate sectors. Five schools of futures researchers are defined: 1. Environmental and geosciences. 2. Infrastructure systems and engineering technology. 3. Social, political and economic science. 4. Human life, mind and information science. 5. Business and management science. The academic route to a futures qualification is outlined with a list of futures orientated organisations. The inclusion of urbanisation in the next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment, would involve replacing the notion of economic equilibrium by the concept of far-from-equilibrium stability. Finally futures research is described as an evolutionary science, which will possibly become integrated within complexity science by 2050.     

Jungle studies: the state of anthropology

The anthropological project, tired and exhausted after years searching for ‘methodological absolution’, remains mired in a spiral of self-doubt and self-indulgent ‘crisis’. Anthropological teaching continues the very complicities that a self-critical reflexivity professed to avoid. Co-option and incorporation, even at the best of times. This essay asks just what would break the cycle of ‘suicidal rejoicing’ for an ‘end of anthropology’ that never comes, that continues to be taught anew, over and over? Nietzsche once suggested that what is falling down should be pushed. A reconfigured anthropology would be a different discipline, perhaps reinvesting the tasks of knowledge production with a purpose that was not wholly slave to the same interests of power. There is much to be cleared away.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

Has science ever been normal? On the need and impossibility of a sustainability science

In this article, I develop a constructive critique of ‘post-normal science’ by challenging the underlying conception of ‘normal science’. Invoking Bruno Latour's constructivist approach, I change focus from a representationalist understanding to a practice-inspired account of science in which the composition of a matter of fact necessarily implies a politically significant differentiation between internalities and externalities. Contending that science has never been normal in that it has always already been political, I further elaborate on this political dimension by connecting Latour's concepts of matters of fact and matters of concern with Rudolf Boehm's distinction between logical and topical truth. Whereas logical truth is a measure of the validity of matters of fact, topical truth is a measure of the relevance and adequacy of scientific knowledge regarding a particular matter of concern. This allows me to argue that any attempt to install a new ‘post-normal science’ with a higher topical truth vis-à-vis sustainability issues neglects the irreducible political moment situated at the point of determining who and what we should be concerned about. Finally, I draw on the notion of ‘forms of life’ to suggest a ‘politics of the imaginable’ that takes socio-material practices as primary matters of a concern for sustainability.