产品差异化战略：企业获得竞争优势的新途径

价格竞争和价格非竞争是企业在市场经济运行中实现利润最大化的两种主要策略行为方式。本文通过对中国彩电产业价格战的案例实证分析,表明价格战是市场竞争的高级形式,发生价格战的根本原因就在于产品同质化。因此,要摆脱困境,走出价格战的怪圈,使企业竞争在更高的层次上进行并获得竞争优势,必须不失时机地实施新的战略－产品差异化战略,为此应采取相应的策略。     

试论以非价格竞争制约价格竞争

在当前市场竞争中 ,企业普遍运用价格竞争手段夺取市场份额 ,其结果是价格战爆发而参与者几败俱伤。确立以满足客户需要为中心的创新理念 ,以非价格竞争应对价格竞争 ,是企业避免陷入价格战的基本策略     

关于寡头垄断企业定价的一个博弈分析

价格竞争是寡头垄断市场竞争的主要手段，本文以“价格战”现象为研究背景，在寡头企业产品差异化的基础上，通过运用防降价均衡博弈模型来分析寡头垄断市场上寡头企业之问的价格竞争策略，最终由防降价均衡模型得出稳定的均衡价格而不会受到竞争对手降价的威胁，即寡头企业的最佳定价策略；从而能够有效地避免“价格战”及其所导致的寡头企业的恶性竞争，对寡头企业如何实施产品定价策略具有重要意义。     

浅析煤炭企业市场营销中的非价格竞争

在市场经济条件下，一场场价格战席卷全国，其激烈程度也日趋上升，企业应该面对现实，重新认识价格战，重新认识竞争。本文从五个方面分析了价格竞争的利弊，同时提出了非价格竞争策略。     

行业自律：实现价格竞争向非价格竞争转变的一种选择

在当前市场竞争中,企业普遍运用价格竞争手段夺取市场份额的结果是价格战频繁爆发,而价格自律不可能解决价格战问题。只有行业自律才是促使企业由价格竞争的向非价格竞争,从而适步解决价格战问题的可行选择。     

浅谈企业市场竞争产生的后果

企业在市场竞争中,必然要面,临着许多竞争对手,在这众多的竞争对手中企业要做好自己的定位,认清自己的对手是对自己有利的还是不利的。在不同的竞争中,掌握不同的竞争策略。随着经济社会的快速发展,企业间的竞争越来越激烈。环境的急速变化使一些企业措手不及,在营销运作上依然比较肤浅,难以开展更深层次的营销经常陷入“价格战”的误区。价格竞争一直深受生产经营者重视,企业由于资源、品牌等方面的不足,对价格战更是青睐有加。本文主要就企业在价格竞争中的生存现状、价格战对其的危害性以及企业在市场竞争中如何实施的非价格竞争篆略进行分析和探讨。     

价格战该不该打——董明珠女士访谈录

价格战,特别是家电业的价格战,对我国来说既是一个老的话题,也是一个新的话题。说它老,是因为价格战从上个世纪90年代中期当我国进入买方市场后就开始了;说它新,是因为价格战在我们身边每时每刻都在花样翻新地发生着。特别是我国加入WTO后,外资品牌、合资品牌也加入到价格战的行列,形成了汹涌澎湃的价格战狂潮,在可以预见的将来,我国的价格战狂潮将会一浪高过一浪地向前推进。我国的产业怎么了?我国的价格战为什么会这样生生不息?作为一个企业,如何在这场价格战中采取适宜的策略而胜出,又如何采取适宜的策略规避如此残酷的价格战而使企业快速成长?     

中国乳制品业价格战的起因及企业策略

我国乳制品价格战始于2002年,2004年以后随着市场竞争而趋于白热化。关于乳制品业持续的价格战,已有各种评论。一种观点提出降价的主要因素是竞争的压力和较高的利润[曹日柬、王玉斌：《中国乳品行业结构、行为与绩效分析》,《农村技术经济》,2005（1）]。但这很难解释为何在利润大幅消减的情况下价格竞争依然激烈。李晶和李相合（2006）的分析指牛奶价格抵不过矿泉水的原因一方面在于企业的过度竞争,另一方面在于奶农与乳品加工企业的不平等地位,乳业企业可以取得低廉的原料奶来维持低价竞争[李晶、李相合：《我国乳制品价格过低原因和对策探讨》,《前沿》,2006（5）]。段东渔（2005）认为,乳品差异化不足和质量难以检测导致了价格战。[段东渔：《如何解决中国乳业市场的症结？》,《乳品与人类》,2005（3）]。这些研究多是从企业微观个体价格竞争行为角度来分析的,未能从产业组织的层次去把握价格竞争发生的内生性。何玉成（2005）进行了乳业的产业组织研究,提出降价行为是由垄断竞争市场结构决定的[何玉成：《中国乳业产业组织研究》,《生产力研究》,2005（7）],但在竞争对手之间的行为互动方面缺乏相应的分析。     

对中国钢铁市场价格竞争及价格战的认识

介绍钢铁市场中价格竞争及价格战的产生，阐述：价格竞争和价格战的区别。     

价格竞争与"价格战"浅议

价格竞争是市场竞争的基本内容和手段。但在我国，价格竞争往往演变为“价格战”。大到汽车，小到日用品，生产者和商家竞相降价。把价格战当作价格竞争的应用，大有把价格战进行到底之势。事实上。     

Dynamic Model for Market Competition and Price Rigidity

This article presents a price floor model in which durability, unit costs and production period are factors in explaining price rigidity. This article elaborates that cost structure plays an essential role in resolving the inconclusive relationship between market concentration and price rigidity. When the industry is characterized by decreasing returns of scale, the degree of price flexibility decreases as market competition intensifies. The reverse is true when the industry exhibits increasing returns of scale. The factors that cause price rigidity also foster price adjustment asymmetry and price adjustment lag. During times of recession, the model exhibits upward price flexibility as costs increase, but downward price rigidity as costs decrease. Even under forward-looking expectations, the way in which firms adjust prices could look as though they have adaptive expectations. If price stickiness is a characteristic of market competition, then public policies determined by price level could be too drastic for firms in competitive markets.     

Stock and Industry Return Characteristics Around Price Shocks

The author investigates positive and negative price shocks in individual securities and the degree to which they affect related firms in the same industry. This price contagion effect is significant with initial price shocks leading to substantial long-term abnormal returns across firms in the same industry over time. Price shocks also have predictive value regarding future earnings and revenues for the firm in question and its industry overall. Positive (negative) price shocks that are continued over time are associated with higher (lower) Sharpe ratios suggesting that abnormal returns are not simply a form of compensation for greater expected future volatility.     

Incentive regulation in local telecommunications: The effects on price markups

The governing bodies of the telecommunications industry instituted a major shift from rate of return to price cap regulation in an effort to foster competition and improve efficiency. This paper focuses on the local exchange market and examines the price markup before and after the implementation of price cap regulation to measure the effects of the change on consumer welfare. The average price markup increased slightly after price cap regulation; however, the average price decreased, indicating that consumers benefited without firms losing from the regulatory shift.      

Market structure and market performance in E-commerce

We analyze the interaction between market structure and market performance and how it varies over the product cycle. To account for the potential endogeneity in this relation, we use an instrumental variable approach. We combine data from the largest Austrian online market for price comparisons with retail data on wholesale prices provided by a major hardware producer for consumer electronics. Our results show that instrumenting is important for estimating the empirical effect of competition on the markup of the price leader. One more firm in the market is associated with a reduction of the price leader׳s markup which is equivalent to competition between existing firms for an additional 3 weeks in the product life cycle. Our results support search theoretic models and contradict models of monopolistic competition. Moreover our results support the existence of price dynamics over the product cycle. They also highlight the substitutability between newly innovated and old expiring technologies and how it varies with respect to competitors׳ and own brand innovations.     

旅行社价格战的博弈分析

旅行社是旅游产品设计、组织和销售的渠道商以及消费者之间的桥梁.旅行社对旅游业具有重要影响，旅行社之间的价格竞争日益严重，盈利率低。随着我国加入世贸组织，越来越多的外国旅行社进入我国、针对我国旅行社如何走出困境，本文从博弈角度分析旅行社的价格竞争及其对策。     

电信产业默契合谋的存在性与稳定性分析

合谋是产业组织理论研究的重要问题之一,它易出现于寡头垄断行业中。合谋的出现会降低消费者剩余,对整个社会福利造成损失,因此应当尽量去除。电信产业是一个典型的寡头垄断产业,电信运营商之间具有很强的相互依赖性,易出现合谋,特别是默契合谋。所谓默契合谋是指寡头垄断厂商以一种纯粹“非合作”的方式进行的合作。本文首先应用古诺模型对电信产业默契合谋的存在性进行理论分析,并举出实例予以佐证。在此基础上,从理论上进一步证明了电信产业默契合谋具有不稳定性,指出运营商之间的合谋是一个“囚徒困境”。进而应用冷酷策略,研究了电信产业默契合谋维持的激励条件,并从成本对称性、市场信息透明度、产品差异性、卖方集中度和技术进步程度等方面分析了影响电信产业默契合谋的相关因素。并指出现实中,默契合谋和价格竞争往往是交替出现的。     

On price competition with complementary goods

We consider a duopoly industry with two separate firms each selling an indivisible product. The joint consumption of these goods has a specific value for the consumers which exceeds the mere addition of utilities when products are consumed in isolation: the higher this excess, the larger the complementarity between the goods. We analyse price equilibria in this market as related to the degree of complementarity existing between the two products.     

差异化产品价格战的产生与扩散机制分析

本文基于消费者的"0-1"购买特征和产品的纵向差异化特征,建立了一个新的价格战模型。通过应用数学证明和数值模拟的方法发现:(1)合谋体系、背叛体系以及价格战体系的均衡结果均与需求冲击无关;(2)差异化产品厂商的背叛动机以及产品链条的合谋稳定性也与需求冲击无关;(3)产品的差异化程度是影响合谋稳定性的重要因素,差异化程度越大,合谋越稳定;(4)合谋集团对背叛厂商的惩罚策略存在着"误伤效应",这种效应在一定条件下能够自我抑制,表现为产品链条上的价格战和合谋共存,在其他条件下,这种效应不能自我抑制,价格战一旦发动就会迅速扩散到整个产品链条。     

Analysis of price competition and strategic implications for heterogeneous market structure

This paper examines strategic competition behavior in heterogeneous market structure where both conventional offline and online firms coexist in equilibrium and draws strategic implications with some remarks on welfare. Research on the price competition between conventional offline and online firms has been done through empirical approaches; however, the results are conflicting. This paper reconciles the existing conflicting empirical findings on price levels between conventional offline and online firms through a theoretical approach. We find that as the online market matures, prices in both conventional and online firms drop, and the price in the online firm can be higher than that in a conventional offline firm. Furthermore, if convenience associated with the online increases, the online price tends to exceed the conventional offline price.