A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.     

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties.     

A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems

In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of the weighted Shapley value of the optimistic TU game associated with a minimum cost spanning tree problem. This characterization is based on two monotonicity properties, population monotonicity (if a new agent joint the society nobody is worse off) and the strong cost monotonicity (if the connection cost between any pair of agents increases nobody is better off), and weighted share of extra costs (the extra costs should be divided proportionally to the weights of the agents).      

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups. We assume that agents are located in different villages, cities, etc. The groups are the agents of the same village. We introduce a rule for dividing the cost of connecting all agents to the source among the agents taking into account the group structure. We characterize this rule with several desirable properties. We prove that this rule coincides with the Owen value of the TU game associated with the irreducible matrix.     

On marginal cost pricing with given tax-subsidy rules

We provide an existence proof for Generalized Marginal Cost Pricing with given tax-subsidy rules. The novelty is that our approach allows for economic environments where all the generalized marginal cost pricing equilibria are inefficient in the aggregate. An example is recalled in order to suggest how non-pathological these environments are.     

Optimum city size: A minimum congestion cost approach

The optimal allocation of urban land between the generation of traffic and the carrying of traffic which minimizes congestion costs is derived for a circular city. Unlike previous work which dealt only with the suburbs, this paper deals with both the suburbs and the central business district. This wider view of the problem leads to different conclusions, the most important of which is the fact that at no point in the city is all the land used for transportation. Existence of a maximum size for a city of a given working population, which is independent of relative land and congestion costs, is also discussed with special reference to the case where there is no land rent.     

An evaluation of excess demand,actual cost and normal cost pricing hypotheses using non-nested tests

This paper has emperically analyzed three versions(zero lag,geometric lag and almon lag) of three price change hypotheses – namely the excess demand, actual cost and the normal cost hypothesis – the goal being to select the hypothesis that describes the underlying price dynamics for manufactured goods. The rival models are specified as non-nested alternatives and each version is estimated by using an efficient estimator. The traditional discrimination criteria which clearly reject the zero lag version, are found to be impotent in discriminating between the dynamic versions of the models. A sequential cross-evaluation of the two dynamic versions using both pairwise and multiple non-nested hypothesis tests proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon reveals a systematic domination by the almon version of normal cost pricing over both the excess demand and the actual cost pricing mechanisms in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the period 1961:1–87:4. This result is robust under alternative specifications of the desired stock of inventories for the excess demand model. The finding implies that short–run variations in demand conditions or in actual unit costs arising from temperoary changes in productivity may not paly a significant role in manufactured goods pricing decisions.     

A two-stage translog marginal cost pricing approach for Floridian hospital outputs

Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, issues still remain regarding the mandated purchase of insurance to ensure more universal coverage. One such issue is the pricing of these insurance packages and whether or not the reimbursements will cover necessary services. Therefore, policy concerns exist that increasing the number of insured individuals may not curtail costs. Conversely, providers may not wish to treat patients covered by excessively frugal plans such as Medicaid; hence the trade-offs between access and cost control. In this article, we present findings from a cost function and a productivity approach to determine the marginal cost of providing inpatient hospital care for hospitals operating in Florida during 2005. Using these methodological approaches, we are able to use the marginal rate of transformation to determine the relative marginal costs while controlling for hospital technical and allocative inefficiency. Our work differs from earlier articles as we avoid the Greene problem for cross-sectional models through a two-step approach. By including both reimbursement rates under conditions of hospital efficiency, we can ascertain payment schemes that should, at least in theory, cover necessary costs for patient care without leading to excessive input usage.     

Network externalities, discrete demand shifts, and submarginal‐cost pricing

Abstract.  The introduction of a new product often causes a massive (discrete) demand shift to the new product. This study demonstrates that if a large‐scale demand shift to a new product is accompanied by network externalities, it may result in 'submarginal‐cost pricing,' by which the seller sets its price below the marginal cost. This finding casts new light on dumping and safeguard issues in the real world. JEL classification: D42     

On the non-existence of a marginal cost pricing equilibrium and the Ioffe normal cone

This paper is Chapter II of the author's Ph. D. thesis, being written at the University of Illinois. The author is indebted to M. Ali Kahn for his guidance, to R. Vohra for a valuable conversation and to an ananonymous referee for comments. The author was informed by M. Ali Khan that, subsequent to the submission of this paper, a similar example was independently announced by B. Cornet. — As usual, all remaining errors are the author's.     

Nodal pricing of electricity: how much does it cost to get it wrong?

Economists know how to calculate optimal prices for electricity transmission. These are rarely applied in practice. This paper develops a 13-node model of the transmission system in England and Wales, incorporating losses and transmission constraints. It is solved with optimal prices, and with uniform prices for demand and for generation, re-dispatching when needed to take account of transmission constraints. Moving from uniform prices to optimal nodal prices could raise welfare by 1.3% of the generators’ revenues, and would be less vulnerable to market power. It would also send better investment signals, but create politically sensitive regional gains and losses.      

Ramsey pricing in a hierarchical structure with an application to network-access pricing

This paper studies a hierarchical structure where an upstream regulated industry sells an intermediate good to a downstream regulated industry. Some sufficient conditions for all Ramsey prices to exceed marginal costs are derived. This hierarchical structure is shown to decrease the profit margin of the intermediate good but preserve its sign. Further, the hierarchical structure also decreases the profit margin of the final good sold by the downstream regulated industry. This is because this final good is a hierarchical complement to the intermediate good sold by the upstream regulated industry. The impacts upon other publicly produced goods, however, could be said to be neutral. Therefore, the hierarchical structure has asymmetric impacts upon publicly produced goods. Accordingly, the equiproportional output-reduction statement of Ramsey rule does not survive. This paper ends with providing an application to the network-access pricing problem.     

Asset pricing in large information networks

We study asset pricing in economies with large information networks. We focus on networks that are sparse and have power law degree distributions, in line with empirical studies of large scale social networks. Our theoretical framework yields a rich set of novel asset pricing implications. We derive closed form expressions for price, volatility, profitability and trading volume, as functions of the network topology. We also study agent welfare and show that the network that optimizes total welfare is typically a uniform one with an intermediate degree of connectedness.