On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

We study renegotiation in an agency setting where the number of offers and accept/reject decisions parties can make is potentially unlimited. Thus any contract, either on or off the equilibrium path, may be subject to possible renegotiation. We first show that the principal will not be able to gain complete access to the agent’s private information with unlimited renegotiation, unlike when the potential number of renegotiations is finite. Rather the agent either employ a randomized reporting strategy or do not to report at all. We then identify conditions under which expected allocations are most efficient with the contract that induces no agent communication. More significantly, by doing so we also identify conditions under which the parties are made strictly worse off by committing to end renegotiation after a fixed number of rounds. We thank workshop participants at University of California, Irvine, University of Chicago, Duke University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of Houston, London School of Economics, University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, the Carnegie Mellon Accounting Research Conference, the editor, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Renegotiation in agency contracts, menus vs. simple contracts

The literature on contracts has shown that renegotiation in agency relationships generates efficiency losses when the principal leads the renegotiation. We show that contractual incompleteness may reduce such efficiency loss. This provides an explanation to the widespread use of simple contracts. We further point at the limited liability of the agent as a source of inefficiency when he leads the renegotiation; this latter result tempers the irrelevancy of contractual incompleteness demonstrated earlier in the literature. I thank E. Del Rey and the referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the EU RTN grant HPRN-CT-2000-00064 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Repeated Protection for Sale

This paper addresses whether the efficient equilibria characterized by Grossman and Helpman's one‐shot protection‐for‐sale game are renegotiation‐proof in an infinitely repeated setting. We propose a simple strategy profile that can support the efficient, truthful equilibrium in each period as a strongly renegotiation‐proof subgame perfect equilibrium. This result provides another plausible reason to explain why the truthful equilibrium may be focal in the game of protection‐for‐sale. In addition, when the timing of the contributions is specified explicitly, the special interest groups should minimize the upfront payment to the government before policy implementation to reduce the possibility of the collapse of such relational contracts.     

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing—or of even foreseeing—the possible states of nature in advance. We argue, however, that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting ( i.e. transaction costs need not be relevant ), provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs (even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast). In other words, all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming, an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature. The foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate. Moreover, we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality. However, even if renegotiation is allowed, the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse.     

Double moral hazard and renegotiation

We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium leads to an allocation that is superior to the second-best allocation of the standard double moral hazard model without renegotiation. The result of this paper gives some reasons for the existence of intermediary organizations such as holding companies, law houses, consulting firms, investment banks or venture capital. The result can also provide the rationalization for a fund set up by a group of firms of the industry in which their product is legally required to be recyclable.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.     

SCREENING AS A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELINQUENCY,RENEGOTIATION, AND BANKRUPTCY

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her endowment, and a lender uses random contracts to screen different types of borrowers. In equilibrium, some borrowers choose not to repay and thus become delinquent. The lender renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delinquency leads to bankruptcy. Applied to mortgage restructuring, our mechanism generates amplification of house‐price shocks through foreclosure spillovers. We also show that government intervention aimed at limiting foreclosures may have unintended consequences.     

Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting

We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal–agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent; and the distortion induced by the renegotiation-proofness constraint is non-decreasing in the persistence of types.     

Age at marriage,social norms,and female education in Nepal

We study the impact of age at marriage on female education. We hypothesize that in cultures where women marry young, parents discount the pecuniary benefits of educating girls; the earlier the anticipated age at marriage the greater this discount. We empirically test this effect using household data from Nepal. We control for potential endogeneity of age at marriage by exploiting variations in cultural norms regarding dowry and differences in the average age of female marriage among ethnicities and regions as instrumental variables. The econometric results support the hypothesis that female education is negatively affected by cultural norms that favor early marriage.     

Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation

We study Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function, and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents.     

债务重组的公司治理效应——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

债务重组存在虚假破产信息和道德风险问题。本文运用SPSS筛选变量分析法对2003～2007年中国宣布债务重组公报的上市公司数据进行实证研究,结果显示,我国上市公司债务重组没有有效改善公司的治理绩效。     

‘An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance’ – Commitment vs. Flexibility

In this paper, we take an incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European Commission (EC) and any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular. Incomplete contract approach makes possible to put a long process of Eurozone Fiscal Governance into an extensive form game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. We theoretically reveal the conflict of interests between the EC (Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015. We show that the Greek’s position is consistent with incomplete contract theory, but that the EC (Germany) does not allow the renegotiation for restructuring for growth-oriented debt repayment program proposed by the Greek government because the EC (Germany) judges that the commitment effect (on fiscal austerity) is greater than the flexibility one (pro-growth effect). This will undoubtedly provide a novel and interesting approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance.     

Lender's risk incentive and debt concession

This paper demonstrates that a lender's risk incentive may render it difficult to conduct efficient debt renegotiation. When a lending bank has a risk incentive, the bank is not likely to make a debt concession, even though such a concession could resolve inefficiencies caused by a borrower's risk incentive. If the lender refrains from renegotiation the debt, then the borrowing firm chooses a value-decreasing risky project. As a result, the cash flow that the lending bank collects becomes risky, and the wealth of the bank's shareholders increases. The lender's risk incentive thus accelerates the borrower's risk incentive.     

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agentsituations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to theprincipal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signalabout their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agentsreduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile downto the first-best level, even though the principal cannot observe theagents' actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the principal to use a"simple" initial contract, in the sense that it consists of nomore than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments tothe agents are the same regardless of the realised state. An importantimplication is that decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiationand proposals from the agents, can be as effective as centralized schemesthat utilize revelation mechanisms in unrestricted ways.     

Renegotiation in repeated games

In repeated games, subgame-perfect equilibria involving threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing one player hurts the other(s). If players can renegotiate after a defection, such a punishment may not be carried out. We explore a solution concept that recognizes this fact, and show that in many games the prospect of renegotiation strictly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained. We characterize those outcomes in general, and in the prisoner's dilemma, Cournot and Bertrand duopolies, and an advertising game in particular.     

One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade

I estimate the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereigns may fear the trade consequences of default; because creditors deter default, or because trade finance dries up. I use an empirical gravity model of trade and a panel data set covering 50 years, over 150 countries, and other factors that influence bilateral trade. Debt renegotiation is associated with an economically and statistically significant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The decline in bilateral trade is approximately 8% a year and persists for around 15 years.     

中国中年人群婚姻满意度的影响因素：基于计量经济学模型的分析

本文利用2002年中国高龄老人健康长寿跟踪调查（CLHLS）子女问卷数据,通过多元回归模型对35～65岁的中年人群婚姻满意度的影响因素进行了分析。研究表明,健康状况及受教育程度对于婚姻满意度有显著性影响;在控制住受教育程度时,职业及收入等经济因素对婚姻满意度无显著影响;父母与其成年子女的婚姻满意度有正相关关系。本文未发现中年人群存在婚姻的家庭生命周期效应,婚姻满意度不受婚龄及子女离家生活事件的影响。研究还发现,男女婚姻满意度的影响因素存在差别,当通过相亲途径结婚或家庭经济权由男性掌握时,男性的婚姻满意度较低,但这些因素对女性无显著影响。     

Tax Rate Harmonization,Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim‐trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process requires more patient tax authorities to implement tax harmonization as a weakly renegotiation‐proof equilibrium. In this case, we find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make tax harmonization less sustainable.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

Do children of the first marriage deter divorce?

In terms of economics, individuals divorce if their expected gains from marriage fall short of their expected utility outside the current marriage, and children represent a marriage-specific type of investment, which generally increases the value of marriage for the spouses. However, children may also disrupt marital stability as they will induce dramatic changes into the household allocation of money and time. In particular, children conceived before or after first marriage may be valued differently by the spouses and this may lead to marital conflicts. It is difficult to assign a priori the direction of the effect of children on marriage stability, and causality may run either way, as couples who anticipate a separation are more likely to have fewer children than those who are happy together, while children born before first marriage may be associated with a lower marriage attachment of their parents. Here, we follow an empirical approach and take advantage of the richness of the data on pre-marital history from the 24 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth79, to estimate the effect of children conceived before or after first marriage on marital stability. We find a significant deterrent effect of young children conceived during first marriage to the likelihood of divorce, while children conceived before first marriage are found to have a disruptive effect on marital stability.