Strategic Entry Deterrence by Limiting Qualities under Minimum Quality Standards

We consider a minimum quality standard (MQS) regulation under a vertically differentiated duopoly model where an incumbent may deter entry by limiting qualities, and explicity examine the strategic interaction between entry cost and a limit quality. We show that MQS will increase social welfare in most cases by reducing the incentive of the incumbent to limit quality, but it might render industry entry unprofitable for the entrant, which could induce predation to deter entry.     

RJV FORMATION AND STRATEGIC ENTRY ACCOMMODATION*

This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à la Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992 ) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be asymmetric per Long and Soubeyran (2002 ). It is found that conforming with the conventional wisdom, the incumbents prefer to form RJV to deter entry when the entrant is very inefficient. However, if the entrant is moderately inefficient, it is a better choice for the incumbent to accommodate entry by forming a RJV with it. In contrast, if the entrant is very efficient, then the equilibrium RJV structure depends on the magnitude of spillover effect: it is better to deter entry in the case of high spillover effect.     

Entry and espionage with noisy signals

We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off with an IS of relatively high quality. When the IS quality is private information of the entrant, the incumbent is better off with an IS of high expected precision while the entrant benefits from one of high quality. In this case espionage makes the market more competitive.     

How the source of the entrant's advantage limits entry‐deterring tying

I revisit a simple model of entry‐deterring tying—example 1 from Whinston's (1990) seminal paper—but allow the potential entrant to have either a cost advantage or a willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) advantage relative to the incumbent. I show that, compared to the usual case in which the potential entrant is cost‐advantaged, tying is less effective against an entrant with a WTP advantage because an entrant with a large WTP advantage may be able to induce the buyer to buy both the tied bundle and the entrant's product. I also show that tying but failing to deter entry can be less costly when facing an entrant with a WTP advantage than when facing an entrant with a cost advantage. For a firm facing uncertainty about, for example, the entrant's entry costs, this makes tying a more attractive entry deterrence strategy against a WTP‐advantaged entrant. These results shed light on the important policy question of which markets are most likely to be susceptible to entry‐deterring tying.     

Preemptive Spacing With Vertical Differentiation When Input Quality is of Inelastic Supply

This paper examines a model of vertical differentiation in which an incumbent engages in preemptive spacing to prevent entry. Input quality is of fixed supply, and the incumbent prevents high-end entry by producing a product with all the quality available. It also commits to the production of a minimum-quality product to deter low-end entry. There is no entry in equilibrium, and the incumbent monopolist chooses to sell only its high-quality product. Commitment to the production of the minimum-quality product is used merely as a credible threat to vigorously compete should an entrant also produce a minimum-quality product.     

Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach

The threat of future entry affects the exploitation of common property resources in important ways. An incumbent has a strategic incentive to manipulate the resource stock to deter entry or to harvest more stock prior to entry rather than share the resource with the entrant. It is possible that the threat of potential entry can lead to the extinction of the resource even though actual competition would result in a steady state with a positive stock level.     

Rebates as incentives to exclusivity

Abstract.  We show how rebates (or fidelity discounts) that take the form of lump‐sum payments made to retailers can be used by an incumbent manufacturer to achieve exclusivity and to deter the entry of a more efficient rival. The results, which hold whatever the degree of differentiation between retailers and whatever the cost advantage of the entrant, are found, despite minimizing asymmetries that may favour the incumbent. As such, there is no need to introduce buyers' disorganization, discriminatory offers, economies of scale, non‐coincident markets, or liquidated damages to find that exclusivity can lead to anti‐competitive effects. JEL classification: L12, L42     

Local loop unbundling and antitrust policy

This paper examines economic effects of local loop unbundling. We confirm the common belief that the incumbent can deter entry effectively by denying local loop unbundling. However, contrary to the widely held perception, the incumbent may also benefit from local loop unbundling if it is obliged to accommodate entry, because denying the entrant’s request for local loop unbundling may compel the entrant to build its own facilities and this is just to abandon the incumbent’s chance to reap rental revenues. Furthermore, the model demonstrates that local loop unbundling itself does not weaken the entrant’s incentive of building facilities.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Entry and Competition in the Postal Market: Foundations for the Construction of Entry Scenarios*

This paper presents a model of entry and imperfect competition, which is inspired by the product differentiation literature and incorporates facts pertaining to the postal sector. There are two operators: incumbent and potential entrant. The entrant offers only one of the products (commercial mail) with a specific technology and delivers only to part of the addressees (located in low cost areas). Its degree of coverage is viewed as a quality attribute; it affects demand and hence market share. The incumbent faces a USO while the entrant is an unregulated profit maximizing firm. To illustrate the potential applications of our approach, we provide some numerical simulations of entry scenarios.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

Natural monopoly and differential pricing

Under uniform pricing a monopolist cannot make a positive profit in equilibrium. I analyze how differential pricing can be exploited by a natural monopolist to deter entry when entry is costless. In a two-stage game with price competition before quantity competition I show that the incumbent firm can deter entry and make a positive profit in equilibrium. The incumbent sets two different prices, the low price to deter entry and the high price to generate profit. Entry is not possible because of scale effects. If dumping is allowed for all firms no positive profits are realizable, but welfare is reduced. I show that for some parameter values the incumbent is forced to engage in a stunt (i.e., set a negative low price) to keep entrants out.     

Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence

I study how a potential entrant influences quality in a model of vertical product differentiation with quality-dependent production costs. With identical costs, the incumbent will always deter entry if possible, i.e., if fixed costs are high. Quality will be set at a level lower than or equal to the optimal quality under either duopoly or monopoly. Results are completely different when the entrant has substantially lower costs. They are explained by the relative location of the entrant's quality best response to the incumbent's optimal quality choice in monopoly. This sheds new light on the influence of industrial policy on market conduct.     

Information transmission and incentives not to price discriminate

This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the demand level but also on the demand composition. A signalling game with two periods and two players (an established firm and a potential entrant) is considered. The potential entrant has incomplete information on market demand. There exist many sequential equilibria in which the uniform price policy acts as an entry deterrence device by hiding actual market profitability. We can interpret the uniform pricing policy as a rejection of the use of superior information on market demand composition in order to reduce the entrant's expected profits.     

Excess capacity as a policing device

A great deal of recent work has been devoted to the question of whether an incumbent firm can successfully deter entry by investing in excess capacity. This paper demonstrates that a dominant firm may invest in excess capacity even when it is certain that this will not deter entry. Rather, the excess capacity is held by the dominant firm in order to ensure that its competitors will exercise appropriate restraint in their own output decisions. An example is provided that illustrates that the rate of return on the capital invested in excess capacity may be very high.     

Strategic bypass deterrence

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. Second, we extend the baseline model studied in the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network installation. By analogy to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distinguish three régimes of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated bypass depending on the entrant’s unit cost. We show that the make-or-buy decision of the entrant is not necessarily technologically efficient: when bypass is chosen, it is always the cheapest option but access may be chosen when it is not cost effective.     

中国轿车市场差异化进入壁垒探析

对于在位企业而言,进入壁垒对于保持其竞争优势至关重要。产品差异化是在位企业构建进入壁垒的重要手段之一。本文通过一个两阶段动态博弈模型,分析了在位企业通过合理的产品差异化程度设置进入壁垒的问题,进而从产品差异化的角度解释了轿车市场的进入壁垒问题。轿车产品通常具有较大的差异。产品的差异性一方面使得在位企业拥有竞争优势,另一方面有使得进入者可能在产品空间中找到理想的位置进入。为了达到遏制进入的目的,在位企业应当合理地设置自己的产品线,使得自己的产品保持合理的差异程度。合理的差异化程度将使得进入者在进入之后面对相近的替代产品的竞争无法达到规模经济的产量。而且,通过对中国轿车市场销量排行榜的分析,找到了支持理论模型的经验证据。     

Progressive entry and the incentives to invest in alternative infrastructures

In this paper we study an entrant’s incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step into the market by progressively acquiring market experience. We show that the acquisition of experience in the phase of service-based competition delays the entrant’s investment when the prospects for infrastructure investment are good, and accelerates investment otherwise. We also show that when the acquisition of experience depends on the entrant’s current customer base and facility-based entry is a long-term possibility, setting a low access price can accelerate the entrant’s investment.     

Tariff Policy and the Foreign Entry Decision in the Presence of a Cost-Based Informational Asymmetry

The paper demonstrates that the standard prediction on the relation between tariff rates and the mode of foreign entry—exports or direct investment—may not hold in the presence of incomplete information. A foreign firm lacks full information on the cost structure of an informed incumbent firm located in the domestic (potential) host country. Within a two‐period model, the local incumbent may behave in a manner which keeps the potential foreign entrant uninformed of its cost structure. In such a pooling equilibrium, the uninformed foreign firm either refrains from entering altogether or serves the host country via exports at tariff rates which would, otherwise under complete information, induce entry via direct investment. When entry mode is altered, other standard full‐information effects of trade policy may also no longer hold.