Mergers,multiperiod Cournot competition,and Coasian dynamics

Under the simplifying conditions of product homogeneity, linear demand, symmetric and constant marginal costs, the static Cournot–Nash equilibrium predicts that exogenous horizontal mergers generate losses for the participants if the participants represent less than 80% of the firms in the industry. I successfully challenge the applicability of this well-known merger paradox to markets for durable goods by introducing Coasian dynamics to the quantity competition, while maintaining all other simplifying conditions. I demonstrate that exogenous mergers with a relatively small number of insiders in industries with a relatively large initial number of firms can be profitable as long as the common discount factor is sufficiently high and the decision-making horizon is sufficiently long. Unlike previous research on mergers in durable-goods industries, the significance of the decision-making horizon is emphasized; mergers that are unprofitable in a short-horizon version of my model for all values of the discount factor can prove profitable in a long-horizon version provided that agents are sufficiently patient.     

横向兼并的均衡影响分析——基于供给函数竞争的兼并模型

对于横向兼并所产生的影响,现有研究成果多是在产量竞争的古诺模型或基于价格竞争的伯川德模型基础上进行的.本文以Ugue(2004)提出的供给函数竞争概念为基础,考察了横向兼并、产业集中与福利权衡的关系,分析在同质产品市场上,供给函数竞争对企业横向兼并产生的均衡影响,并与古诺模型做了对比分析.基本结论为:供给函数竞争下,任何兼并都会使产业的总产出下降,价格升高.供给函数竞争导致产量的下降,不仅仅由于兼并企业减少产量,而且非兼并企业也会减少供给,结果导致兼并总是有利可图.     

Merger Waves and Firm Growth: Contemporary Historical Evidence

This article presents the outcomes of an evaluation of the impact of the series of mergers of the local exchange companies that have taken place between 1988 and 2001 on an important measure of performance of the firms undergoing the mergers. The analysis reveals that after firms have undertaken one merger they experience little or no growth after such mergers, but the impact of second mergers on firm growth have been negative. If an important motive in undertaking mergers has been to enhance firm growth, then the merger waves that have been approved and consummated have led to performance declines. The impacts of the merger wave on the growth of the telecommunications sector firms have been negative.     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

Using a standard differentiated goods quantity competition setting, we show three facts about horizontal two‐firm mergers that are not true for a homogeneous goods Cournot market. First, merger of two firms is profitable for the merging firms provided that goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. Second, merging of two firms can lead to more two‐firm mergers. Third, an initially non‐profitable two‐firm merger can occur in anticipation of subsequent mergers. These facts imply that mergers are more likely to occur in differentiated goods markets than in homogeneous goods markets.     

Mergers,Privatization and Environmental Considerations

The purpose of this paper is to analyze both merger sustainability and optimal privatization decisions, in an international mixed oligopoly model when it is explicitly assumed that firms’ production pollutes the environment. Contrary to traditional theory it is shown that both a merger between private firms and between one private and one public firm could be sustainable. Furthermore, the effects of environmental considerations on mixed firms’ optimal degree of privatization are analyzed.     

Horizontal Mergers and Merger Waves in a Location Model

We consider sequential mergers in a spatial model with Cournot competition. This model is suitable for explaining the behaviour of some industries where several brands of the same product are delivered by plants. The automobile and oil product industries are examples. To discuss sequential mergers, we use the method of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998). We show that if the transportation cost per length is large relative to market size, a merger wave occurs. In addition, it might improve social surplus. On the other hand, if the transportation cost per length is relatively small, a merger wave does not occur even though firms would be better off with sequential mergers.
We also compare our model to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992) who consider horizontal mergers with spatial price competition. We show that in a merger of neighbouring firms the merged firm's profit decreases. This result is opposite to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992).
Finally, we consider how a regulator affects sequential mergers. When each merger occurs, the regulator assesses each merger. In this case, there is a possibility that the existence of the regulator deters welfare-improving sequential mergers.     

政府产业重组规划、信号博弈与企业兼并行为

文章以2009年我国腾中重工公司兼并通用公司"悍马"品牌为现实索引,为水平兼并不存在"整合效应"的负盈利资产提供两种基于信号博弈的理论解释.第一种解释基于限制性定价的思路,说明在成本信息不对称的企业进行产量竞争背景下和在一定的市场环境下,总会对应一定负盈利水平的资产,使得低成本类型企业宁愿选择收购非盈利资产,以向竞争者显示其成本类型而得益.另一种解释引入政府推进产业重组的因素,当高效重组不同成本类型企业的概率条件和资产负盈利水平满足一定条件时,存在使低成本类型企业选择收购非盈利资产,以避免在产业重组中可能被低效兼并的分离均衡.     

Entry and Merger in Commercial Fishing with Multiple Markets

Received May 23, 2001; revised version received October 22, 2001     

企业购并的产业组织理论分析

在经济全球化的大背景下,为强化市场地位、降低成本、提高效率的企业购并行为已经从过去的遮遮掩掩到了今日的开放透明,日益表现出冷静与成熟。本文透过产业组织理论这一新的视角辩证地对企业的购并行为进行分析,从而说明企业购并是社会主义商品经济发展的客观要求,是竞争机制发挥作用的必然结果,也是深化企业改革的重要内容。     

兼并和伯特兰德竞争的价格效应分析

本文采用博弈论方法研究兼并和伯特兰德竞争对价格、竞争等的影响.首先,分布在两个市场中的寡头公司分别选择同市场或跨市场的兼并活动,其次,两个市场中的寡头公司进行伯特兰德竞争.结论显示,有关需求函数的各种约束条件是决定价格升高或下降的关键因素,从而揭示了价格效应产生的原理.美国航空业的案例研究支持模型的基本结论.     

并购潮的动因:国内研究的新进展

本文大致以2000年为界将国内理论界关于企业并购潮动因的研究划分为两个阶段,首次以政府主导论、管制驱动论和价值转移论对第二阶段的研究进展进行总体概括,并指出进一步深入研究并购潮动因的可能方向。     

Oligopolistic Competition and New Technology Adoption under Uncertainty

The paper examines the adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex ante uncertainty about variable costs of the new technology. Each firm can either adopt the new process by bearing some up-front investment or may continue to use the old one, after which firms play a Cournot market game. If in equilibrium both technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price if the up-front investment is large (small). Our model applies readily to vertical integration if integrated firms neither buy nor sell the intermediate good on the market. However, if buying and selling is allowed, the number of integrated firms is independent of input price uncertainty.     

论我国企业合并的反垄断控制

过度的企业合并会限制甚至消灭市场竞争,因此,保持市场的有效竞争需要反垄断立法。反垄断法合并控制应关注整 体经济效率;合并控制的实质性标准是产生或加强市场支配地位;而符合反垄断禁止标准同时又存在法定豁免事由的的合并有 可能会被批准     

Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment

This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which complements the analysis of playersʼ actual choices with data on the information acquisition process they follow. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly, with limited a priori information. The econometrics hinges on a model built upon Experience Weighted Attraction learning, and the simultaneous analysis of data on the information gathered and on actions taken by the subjects. Results suggest that learning is a composite process, in which different components coexist. Adaptive learning emerges as the leading element, but when subjects look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes markets more competitive. Reinforcement learning also plays a role, as subjects favor strategies that have yielded higher profits in the past.     

Sequential mergers and competition policy under partial privatisation

We examine optimal merger and privatisation policies in a partially privatised oligopoly with differentiated goods. We first show that under the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, sequential mergers either emerge completely or do not emerge at all. Given this outcome, we derive the following policy implications. First, the level of social welfare can be U‐shaped with respect to the number of merged firm pairs. That is, given that there are some mergers that have already taken place, further mergers may actually lead to welfare improvement. However, these welfare‐improving mergers may not be privately profitable, implying that merger‐friendly policies are appropriate. Second, policymakers can halt privatisation in order to diminish the private incentive for further sequential (welfare‐deteriorating) mergers and improve welfare. Third, full nationalisation is never optimal unless the goods are homogeneous or independent. Our results are applicable to the Japanese life insurance industry and the partial privatisation of Japan Post Insurance.     

全球外资并购市场的形成及规律研究

19世纪60年代企业并购开始,经历上世纪90年代跨国公司的迅速膨胀和第五次并购浪潮的深入,全球外资并购市场已经初见端倪。经济全球化、科技创新、投资自由化对外资并购市场的形成起了关键作用。外资并购市场形成过程伴随着产业转移规律、地域转移规律、行业演进规律。     

跨国公司的兼并收购成本

跨国公司的并购活动不但规模日益增大,而且通过利用资本市场并购活动能更顺利地进行。这种国际间资本流动需要考虑成本,跨国公司的并购成本可以从并购过程所涉及的各项进行分析,包括对目标公司的评估成本、协商确认并购活动、并购进行过程。评估目标公司成本常采用现金流折现法,也可采用基于古诺模型的公司评估方法,更多地考虑市场因素,多角度分析目标公司的可能价格。     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Merger,Partial Collusion and Relocation

We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.Acknowledgement We thank Jonathan Cave, Frode Meland, participants at the Royal Economic Society Conference 2003 and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.     

基于同时博弈和序贯博弈的寡头市场古诺均衡比较分析

根据国内外在古诺模型研究上的缺陷,分别从古诺假定、产品差异、成本差异以及非线性市场需求等方面对垄断市场结构中厂商之间同时博弈与序贯博弈两种情况的均衡状况进行比较分析,得出寡头垄断市场中厂商之间的均衡与产品质量、成本状况、市场需求以及博弈的顺序等因素有关的结论,从而为中国相关行业的决策提供理论依据。