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1.
Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets. 相似文献
2.
Bloomberg Intelligence Roundtable on The Theory and Practice of Capital Structure Management
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《实用企业财务杂志》2017,29(4):72-85
Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial “pecking order” in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In this roundtable, a leading finance professor is joined by six practitioners in discussing whether and how capital structure decisions and payout policies can create value, with special attention to the healthcare industry. The consensus is that for those parts of the pharma industry with large growth opportunities, equity financing should be the main source of capital. But for those parts of the industry with shrinking prospects, increasing levels of debt and raising dividends are recommended. 相似文献
3.
Since the formulation of the M & M irrelevance propositions 40 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes current firm value. Some finance scholars have followed M & M by arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the increased probability and costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M & M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other “contracting”) costs, and information costs (the main factor in the pecking order theory) all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much if not most of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (leverage ratios) and flows (specific choices between debt and equity). Even if companies have target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation from those targets—one that will depend on the transactions and information costs associated with adjusting back to the target relative to the costs of deviating from the target. As the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the target. 相似文献
4.
Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios. 相似文献
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios. 相似文献
5.
Vivien Beattie Alan Goodacre Sarah Jane Thomson 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2006,33(9-10):1402-1434
Abstract: Despite theoretical developments in recent years, our understanding of corporate capital structure remains incomplete. Prior empirical research has been dominated by archival regression studies which are limited in their ability to fully reflect the diversity found in practice. The present paper reports on a comprehensive survey of corporate financing decision-making in UK listed companies. A key finding is that firms are heterogeneous in their capital structure policies. About half of the firms seek to maintain a target debt level, consistent with trade-off theory , but 60% claim to follow a financing hierarchy, consistent with pecking order theory . These two theories are not viewed by respondents as either mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Many of the theoretical determinants of debt levels are widely accepted by respondents, in particular the importance of interest tax shield, financial distress, agency costs and also, at least implicitly, information asymmetry. Results also indicate that cross-country institutional differences have a significant impact on financial decisions. 相似文献
6.
《Global Finance Journal》2006,16(3):369-387
Using a sample of 117 Irish software companies, we examine the capital structure of new technology-based firms. Consistent with the findings on financing for other small businesses, internal funds are the most important source of funding in new technology-based firms. However, in apparent contradiction to the pecking order hypothesis, the use of debt is rare and equity financing is the prime source of external finance. By questioning chief executive officers via survey on their perceptions and opinions on various financing issues, we are able to conclude that in many cases software firm founders prefer outside equity to debt. The dearth of debt in the capital structure of new technology-based firms cannot be wholly explained by financing constraints due to information asymmetries in the banking sector. 相似文献
7.
Each of today's three dominant academic theories of capital structure has trouble explaining the financing behavior of companies that have seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In conflict with the tradeoff theory, the authors’ recent studies of some 7,000 SEOs by U.S. industrial companies over the period 1970‐2017 notes that the vast majority of them—on the order of 80%—had the effect of moving the companies away from, rather than toward, their target leverage ratios. Inconsistent with the pecking‐order theory, SEO issuers have tended to be financially healthy companies with low leverage and considerable unused debt capacity. And at odds with the market‐timing theory, SEOs appear to be driven more by the capital requirements associated with large investment projects than by favorable market conditions. The authors’ findings also show that, in the years following their stock offerings, the SEO companies tend to issue one or more debt offerings, which have the effect of raising their leverage back toward their targets. Whereas each of the three theories assumes some degree of shortsightedness among financial managers, the authors’ findings suggest that long‐run‐value‐maximizing CFOs manage their capital structures strategically as opposed to opportunistically. They consider the company's current leverage in relation to its longer‐run target, its investment opportunities and long‐term capital requirements, and the costs and benefits of alternative sequences of financing transactions. This framework, which the authors call strategic financial management, aims to provide if not a unifying, then a more integrated, explanation—one that draws on each of the three main theories to provide a more convincing account of the financing and leverage decisions of SEO issuers. 相似文献
8.
《The British Accounting Review》2014,46(2):179-197
This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally. 相似文献
9.
The popular argument for convertibles holds that they provide issuers with "cheap" debt and allow them to sell equity at a premium over current value. Objecting to the "free lunch" implied by such an argument, financial economists have offered other explanations that show how the combination of debt and equity built into convertibles can serve to reduce information and agency costs faced by companies and their investors.
In this article, the authors use the results of their recent study to reconcile the two positions. Following Jeremy Stein's view of convertibles as "backdoor equity," the authors argue that convertible bond financing is an attractive alternative for companies that have large growth potential but find both conventional debt and equity financing very costly. Such companies are often deterred from funding their capital investments with straight public bonds by their high risk, relatively short track records, and high expected costs of financial distress. At the same time, the information "asymmetry" between management and outside investors can make equity very expensive in such cases. In layman's terms, management may feel that the company's share price does not accurately reflect its growth prospects, or be concerned that the mere announcement of a new equity offering will cause the share price to fall sharply.
To the extent the stock market is persuaded that management's choice of convertibles is based on this combination of promising growth prospects with limited financing options, it is likely to respond more favorably to the announcement of a new convertible offering. The authors furnish evidence in support of this argument by reporting that the market reacts less negatively to those convertible issuers with higher post-issue capital expenditures and higher market-to-book ratios, but with lower credit ratings and higher (post-offering) debt-equity ratios. 相似文献
In this article, the authors use the results of their recent study to reconcile the two positions. Following Jeremy Stein's view of convertibles as "backdoor equity," the authors argue that convertible bond financing is an attractive alternative for companies that have large growth potential but find both conventional debt and equity financing very costly. Such companies are often deterred from funding their capital investments with straight public bonds by their high risk, relatively short track records, and high expected costs of financial distress. At the same time, the information "asymmetry" between management and outside investors can make equity very expensive in such cases. In layman's terms, management may feel that the company's share price does not accurately reflect its growth prospects, or be concerned that the mere announcement of a new equity offering will cause the share price to fall sharply.
To the extent the stock market is persuaded that management's choice of convertibles is based on this combination of promising growth prospects with limited financing options, it is likely to respond more favorably to the announcement of a new convertible offering. The authors furnish evidence in support of this argument by reporting that the market reacts less negatively to those convertible issuers with higher post-issue capital expenditures and higher market-to-book ratios, but with lower credit ratings and higher (post-offering) debt-equity ratios. 相似文献
10.
In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:
- ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
- ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
- ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.
11.
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
DARREN J. KISGEN 《The Journal of Finance》2006,61(3):1035-1072
This paper examines to what extent credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions. The paper outlines discrete costs (benefits) associated with firm credit rating level differences and tests whether concerns for these costs (benefits) directly affect debt and equity financing decisions. Firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. This behavior is consistent with discrete costs (benefits) of rating changes but is not explained by traditional capital structure theories. The results persist within previous empirical tests of the pecking order and tradeoff capital structure theories. 相似文献
12.
The Capital Structure of PE‐Funded Companies (and How New Debt Instruments and Investors Are Expanding Their Debt Capacity)
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Joseph V. Rizzi 《实用企业财务杂志》2016,28(4):60-67
The capital structures and financial policies of companies controlled by private equity firms are notably different from those of public companies. The concentration of ownership and intense monitoring of leveraged buyouts by their largest investors (that is, the partners of the PE firms who sit on their boards), along with the contractual requirement of PE funds to return their capital within seven to ten years, have resulted in capital structures that are far more leveraged than those of their publicly traded counterparts, but also considerably more provisional and “opportunistic.” Whereas the average U.S. public company has long operated with roughly 30% debt and 70% equity, today's typical private‐equity sponsored company is initially capitalized with an “upside‐down” structure of 70% debt and just 30% equity, and then often charged with working down its debt as quickly as possible. Although banks supplied most of the debt for the first wave of LBOs in the 1980s, the remarkable growth of the private equity industry in the past 25 years has been supported by the parallel development of a new leveraged acquisition finance market. This financing innovation has led to a general movement away from a bankcentered funding base to one comprising a relatively new set of institutional investors, including business development corporations and hedge funds. Such investors have shown a strong appetite for new debt instruments and risks that banks have been unwilling or, thanks to increased capital requirements and other regulatory burdens, prohibited from taking on. Notable among these new instruments are second‐lien loans and uni‐tranche debt—instruments that, by shifting the allocation of claims on the debtor's cash flow and assets in ways consistent with the preferences of these new investors, have had the effect of increasing the debt capacity of their portfolio companies. And such increases in debt capacity have in turn enabled private equity funds—now sitting on near‐record amounts of capital from their limited partners—to bid higher prices and compete more effectively in today's intensely competitive M&A market, in which high target acquisition purchase prices are being fueled by a strong stock market and increased competition from corporate acquirers. 相似文献
13.
Merton H. Miller 《实用企业财务杂志》2005,17(1):106-111
In his 1990 Nobel Prize address, the "father of modern finance" begins by discussing the benefits of debt financing and hen goes on to discuss potential costs. Although certainly capable of excesses, private capital markets have self-correcting mechanisms that limit corporate "overleveraging." Contrary to popular perception, corporate leveraging does not increase risk for the economy as a whole, and the financial difficulties of highly leveraged companies involve "mainly private, not social costs." (And provided the Chapter 11 process doesn't get in the way, debt often plays the socially constructive role of eliminating excess capacity.) Finally, regulations designed to reinforce capital markets' built-in controls against overleveraging are generally not only unnecessary but positively harmful to the economy. 相似文献
14.
SOKU BYOUN 《The Journal of Finance》2008,63(6):3069-3096
If firms adjust their capital structures toward targets, and if there are adverse selection costs associated with asymmetric information, how and when do firms adjust their capital structures? We suggest a financing needs‐induced adjustment framework to examine the dynamic process by which firms adjust their capital structures. We find that most adjustments occur when firms have above‐target (below‐target) debt with a financial surplus (deficit). These results suggest that firms move toward the target capital structure when they face a financial deficit/surplus—but not in the manner hypothesized by the traditional pecking order theory. 相似文献
15.
David Mayers 《实用企业财务杂志》2000,13(1):8-21
For companies whose value consists in large part of “real options”‐ growth opportunities that may (or may not) materialize‐convertible bonds may offer the ideal financing vehicle because of the matching financial options built into the securities. This paper proposes that convertible debt can be a key element in a financing strategy that aims not only to fund current activities, but to give companies access to low‐cost capital if and when their real investment options turn out to be valuable. In this sense, convertibles can be seen as the most cost‐effective solution to a sequential financing problem‐how to fund not only today's activities, but also tomorrow's growth opportunities (some of them not yet even foreseeable). For companies with real options, the ability of convertibles to match capital inflows with corporate outlays adds value by minimizing two sets of costs: those associated with having too much (particularly equity) capital (known as “agency costs of free cash flow”) and those associated with having too little (“new issue” costs). The key to the cost‐effectiveness of convertibles in funding real options is the call provision. Provided the stock price is “in the money” (and the call protection period is over), the call gives managers the option to force conversion of the bonds into equity. If and when the company's investment opportunity materializes, exercise of the call feature gives the firm an infusion of new equity (while eliminating the debt service burden associated with the convertible) that enables it to carry out its new investment plan. Consistent with this argument, the author's recent study of the investment and financing activities of 289 companies around the time of convertible calls reports significant increases in capital expenditures starting in the year of the call and extending three years after. The companies also showed increased financing activity following the call, mainly new long‐term debt issues (many of them also convertibles) in the year of the call. 相似文献
16.
Philippe Gaud Martin Hoesli André Bender 《International Review of Financial Analysis》2007,16(3):201-222
Using a sample of over 5000 European firms, we document the driving factors of capital structure policies in Europe. Controlling for dynamic patterns and national environments, we show how these policies cannot be reduced to a simple trade-off or pecking order model. Both corporate governance and market timing impact upon capital structure. European firms limit themselves to an upper barrier to leverage, but not to a lower one. Debt constrains managers to payout cash, and equity may become cheap during windows of opportunity. Internal financing, when available, is preferred over external financing, but companies limit future excess of slack as it constitutes a potential source of conflict. 相似文献
17.
In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention.
Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating—a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition—or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision.
Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30–60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10–20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework. 相似文献
Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating—a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition—or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision.
Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30–60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10–20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework. 相似文献
18.
We argue that domestic business groups are able to actively optimise the internal/external debt mix across their subsidiaries. Novel to the literature, we use bi‐level data (i.e. data from both individual subsidiary financial statements and consolidated group level financial statements) to model the bank and internal debt concentration of non‐financial Belgian private business group affiliates. As a benchmark, we construct a size and industry matched sample of non‐group affiliated (stand‐alone) companies. We find support for a pecking order of internal debt over bank debt at the subsidiary level which leads to a substantially lower bank debt concentration for group affiliates as compared to stand‐alone companies. The internal debt concentration of a subsidiary is mainly driven by the characteristics of the group's internal capital market. The larger its available resources, the more intra‐group debt is used while bank debt financing at the subsidiary level decreases. However, as the group's overall debt level mounts, groups increasingly locate bank borrowing in subsidiaries with low costs of external financing (i.e. large subsidiaries with important collateral assets) to limit moral hazard and dissipative costs. Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of a complex group wide optimisation process of financing costs. 相似文献
19.
我国上市公司融资啄序的实证分析 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
鉴于融资啄序理论主张的在信息不对称条件下的"留存收益-债权-股权"的企业最优融资啄序,以我国A股上市公司1994~2007年的融资数据为样本,根据上市公司的规模、成长性和杠杆水平对其进行分类,运用面板数据模型分析不同规模、成长性和杠杆水平的上市公司融资行为的啄序特征.实证结果表明:我国上市公司均存在不同程度的股权融资偏好,但这种偏好会受到诸如规模、成长能力和负债水平等内部条件以及外部融资政策的制约. 相似文献
20.
论文以2006-2010年四川省53家上市公司为样本,对其融资方式选择的偏好顺序及影响因素进行实证分析。研究结果与融资优序理论相悖,四川上市公司的融资偏好顺序依次为短期债务融资、股权融资、长期债务融资、内部融资。其中,短期偿债能力、长期偿债能力、资产营运能力、资产盈利能办、市场竞争能力、股利支付能力在不同程度上分别影响上市公司的内部融资度、债务融资度和股权融资度。 相似文献