Imperfect competition,indirect tax harmonization and public goods

This paper shows that the welfare implications of indirect tax harmonization in a two-country imperfectly competitive framework, are, in general, indeterminate in the presence of public goods: Both countries can be made either worse off or better off. This holds under both the destination and origin principles of taxation and is in sharp contrast to existing results where revenue effects are not present. A consequence of this indeterminacy is that a precise evaluation of tax-harmonizing policies under both tax regimes requires an explicit consideration of the underlying preferences for private and public goods as well as the oligopolistic sectors’ relative cost structures. JEL code F15⋅ H21⋅ H41⋅ H87     

Poverty-decreasing indirect tax reforms: Evidence from Tunisia

This paper proposes a methodology to identify revenue-neutral directions for poverty-alleviating tax reforms. The search for such poverty-reducing tax reforms is done “robustly” over broad classes of poverty measures and poverty lines. The methodology, which is illustrated using data from Tunisia, is of significant policy interest given the widespread use of commodity subsidization and taxation in developing and developed countries alike. The results suggest that Tunisian poverty could be decreased robustly by following reform directions that are often at odds with frequently-heard views. They also highlight the importance of stating clearly under which set of ethical criteria the desirability of potential indirect tax reforms is assessed. JEL Code D12 ⋅ D63 ⋅ H53 ⋅ I32 ⋅ I38     

How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation?

Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows among 11 OECD countries over 1984–2000, we show that, although agglomeration-related factors are strong determinants of FDI, tax differentials also play a significant role in understanding foreign location decisions. We further investigate non-linearities in the impact of tax differentials, and explore the impact of tax schemes. Our results are consistent with the imperfect competition literature which underscores the possibility of tax differentials across countries in equilibrium.JEL Code: F21, H25, H87     

Public Investment Criteria in Overlapping Generations Models of Open Economies

This paper derives criteria for worthwhile public investment in an overlapping generations model of an “almost small” open economy- an economy with access to external funding at a given interest rate, but with some influence over its temporal terms of trade. If the economy is dynamically efficient (i.e. the interest rate exceeds the growth rate), committed to free trade, public investment is debt financed and lump sum taxes are feasible, two results follow. First, the “social opportunity cost of public funds” will exceed the government's borrowing rate because of the adverse effect of government borrowing on the terms of trade. Second, the marginal rate of return on worthwhile public investment will be greater than the social opportunity cost of public funds if public and private investment are complements (substitutes) and the tax on capital is below (above) the rate that minimizes the steady state burden of servicing the debt. JEL Code: F21, H43     

Corporate tax revenues in OECD countries

This paper studies variation among OECD countries in the size of corporate income tax revenues relative to GDP over the time period 1979–2002. A decomposition explains such variation as a function of the statutory tax rate, the breadth of the tax base, corporate profitability, and the share of the corporate sector in GDP. Empirical results indicate a parabolic relationship between tax rates and revenues, implying a revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate of 33% for the whole sample. This revenue-maximizing rate is found to decrease as economies are smaller and more integrated with the world economy. JEL Classification H25, H87     

Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income

A Norwegian tax reform committee recently proposed a personal tax on the realized income from shares after deduction for an imputed risk-free rate of return. This paper describes the design of the proposed shareholder income tax and shows that it will be neutral with respect to investment and financing decisions and decisions to realize capital gains, provided that full loss offsets are granted. Thus the tax allows some non-distortionary double taxation of corporate equity income. With an appropriate choice of tax rates, it also solves the problem of income shifting under a dual income tax. JEL Code: H24, H25     

The Property Tax as a Tax on Value: Deadweight Loss

Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under a property value tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: τ_V, the tax rate on pre-development land value; τ_S, the tax rate on post-development residual site value; and τ_K, the tax rate on structure value. Arnott (2005) identified the subset of property value tax systems that are neutral. This paper investigates the relative efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value tax systems [(i) “Canadian' property tax system: τ_V = 0, τ _S = τ_K; (ii) simple property tax system: τ_V = τ _S = τ_K; (iii) residual site value tax system: τ_K = 0,τ _V = τ_S; (iv) two-rate property tax system: τ_V = τ _S > τ_K > 0] under the assumption of a constant rental growth rate. JEL Code: H2     

Measuring Effective Tax Rates in the Presence of Multiple Inputs: A Production Based Approach

We suggest a new method for comparing tax regimes acrossjurisdictions. The approach aggregates taxes on inputs by focussingon production, rather than investment, decisions. Taxes on variousinputs affect production decisions by increasing marginal costs.By calculating the difference between the tax-inclusive and tax-exclusivemarginal cost of production, we determine the effective excisetax rate on marginal costs implied by all of the various taxesimposed upon the firms inputs. The effective tax rate on marginalcosts provides a convenient summary measure of the potentialimpact of taxes on all inputs on production location decisions.     

Taxpayers' responsiveness to tax rate changes and implications for the cost of taxation in Sweden

Historically, labor supply elasticities have been used to evaluate tax policy and predict tax revenue effects. They are likely to underestimate taxpayers' response to tax rate changes, and hence to underestimate changes in potential tax revenues, however, because they measure only how taxpayers alter hours worked. Taxpayers can also respond to tax rate changes by altering, for instance, their work effort and form of compensation. An alternative measure that accounts for these responses as well as hours worked is the elasticity of taxable income. This paper estimates the elasticity of earned taxable income for Swedish taxpayers using two different approaches and a number of control variables and the 1990/1991 tax reform as a “natural experiment”. The preferred elasticity estimates fall in the range of 0.4–0.5, comparable with recent estimates for the U.S. and larger than most of the labor supply elasticity estimates used to evaluate tax policy in Scandinavia previously, which suggests that deadweight losses are two to three times higher than previously thought. JEL Classification H21 · H24 · H31 · J22     

Chief Financial Officers’ Power,Institutional Environment,and Corporate Effective Tax Rate: Evidence from China

Abstract

In this study, we investigate how chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) power and institutional environment influence corporate effective tax rates (ETRs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2010, we find that firms with expert power or political power CFOs enjoy a low effective tax rate. Furthermore, CFOs’ expert power plays a more important function in reducing ETR in regions with a better institutional environment compared to those with less-developed institutions. CFOs’ political power is the most important factor in reducing ETR in regions with a less developed institutional environment than in those regions with a better institutional environment.     

Effective labor taxation and the international location of headquarters

Profit taxes are widely acknowledged to influence the location of firms’ headquarters. This paper sheds light on the role of aspects of labor taxation for the international location of headquarters. While profit taxes can be avoided in various ways, it is much harder for firms to manipulate the firm-specific labor tax base so that labor taxes may be relatively important for firm location. We construct a unique data set of effective labor taxes in 120 countries and use data on the location of 35,206 firms to analyze the impact of labor income tax rates, the progressivity of the income tax schedule, and social security contributions on firms’ decisions where to locate their headquarters. The findings suggest that both a higher progressivity of the tax system and higher (employee- and employer-borne) social security contributions negatively influence a country’s attractiveness for headquarters location. Hence, a one percentage point increase in these payroll taxes, reduces the probability of a country to attract headquarters by 6.1 %. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications and subsets of the data.     

税率锚定效应与企业投资决策

已有文献证实了高管过度自信等非理性因素对企业投资决策的影响,但尚未有文献研究锚定心理在投资决策中的作用。税收政策连续性不足会使得企业实际税率充满不确定性,高管在预测未来实际税率时很可能会非理性地锚定当期的高税率,进而产生税率锚定行为。本文研究这种非理性的税率锚定行为对企业投资决策的影响,结果发现:企业投资决策中存在显著的税率锚定行为,对高税率的锚定显著降低了企业未来的投资支出,且内在锚效应(纵向对比)强于外在锚效应(横向对比)。进一步地,我们发现经验更丰富的高管有助于缓解投资中的税率锚定效应,但更大的税率波动性加剧了这种效应,最终降低了公司业绩和价值。本文研究表明,控制投资中的税率锚定行为,有利于提高投资效率和企业价值,同时也表明保持宏观税收政策连续性有利于促进企业健康可持续发展。     

The effect of taxes on multinational debt location

We provide new evidence that differences in international tax rates and tax regimes affect multinational firms' debt location decisions. Our sample contains 8287 debt issues from 2437 firms headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in 59 countries. We analyze firms' marginal decisions of where to issue debt to investigate the influence of a comprehensive set of tax-related effects, including differences in personal and corporate tax rates, tax credit and exemption systems, and bi-lateral cross-country withholding taxes on interest and dividend payments. Our results show that differences in personal and corporate tax rates, the presence of dividend imputation or relief tax systems, the tax treatment of repatriated profits, and inter-country withholding taxes on dividends and interest significantly influence the decision of where to locate debt and the proportion of debt located abroad. Our results are robust to firm and issue specific factors and to the effect of legal regimes, debt market development, and exchange rate risk.     

An evasive topic: theorizing about the hidden economy

This paper reviews some central issues that arise in theorizing about tax evasion decisions and the hidden economy. It starts from the Allingham and Sandmo (J. Public Econ. 1:323–338, 1972) modeling of the tax evasion decision as a choice under uncertainty based on expected utility maximization and risk aversion. It goes on to discuss alternative specifications of the taxpayer’s preferences with particular regard to the explanation of the extensive margin, i.e. the decision on whether or not to engage in tax evasion. It extends the model to the case of variable labor supply with work in both official and black labor markets. It then considers the application of the theory to taxes on wealth and income from capital, indirect tax evasion, and smuggling. It also includes a consideration of general equilibrium effects and of the problems that evasion causes for the theory of optimal income and commodity taxes. It concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of tax evasion for economic policy in the welfare state.     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?

This paper provides clear evidence of substantial tax effects on the choice between issuing debt or equity; most studies fail to find significant effects. The relationship between tax shields and debt policy is clarified. Other papers miss the fact that most tax shields have a negligible effect on the marginal tax rate for most firms. New predictions are strongly supported by an empirical analysis; the method is to study incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis. Previous researchers examined debt/equity ratios, but tests based on incremental decisions should have greater power.     

The marginal cost of public funds and the flypaper effect

A lump-sum intergovernmental transfer has a “price effect”, as well as an “income effect”, because it allows the recipient government to reduce its tax rate, which lowers its marginal cost of public funds, while still providing the same level of public service. This reduction in the effective price of providing the public service helps to explain the “flypaper effect”—the empirical observation that a lump-sum grant has a much larger effect on spending than an increase in personal income. Contrary to the assertions of Mieszkowski (Modern Public Finance, 1994) and Hines and Thaler (J. Econ. Perspect. 9:217–226, 1995), a model of a benevolent local government financing its expenditures with a distortionary tax predicts flypaper effects from lump-sum grants that are similar to those observed in many econometric studies.     

The ability of deferred tax to predict future tax

We examine the usefulness of tax allocation accounting (deferred tax) for predicting future tax paid and future tax expense. Deferred taxes increase the explanatory power (R²) of regression models where future taxes paid or future tax expense is the dependent variable. However, the mean out‐of‐sample forecast errors for tax paid (future tax expense) is 30 (45.5) percent. Deferred tax increases predictive ability on pooled data, but is inconsistent on a year‐by‐year basis. We examine three explanations for poor predictive ability: losses, tax changes and asset growth. We discuss the policy and practical implications of our findings.     

Corporation tax asymmetries: effective tax rates and profit shifting

This paper examines the way in which the asymmetric treatment of losses within corporate tax codes can be expected to affect behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. The paper uses the concept of an equivalent tax function, raising the same present value of tax payments as the actual function, in which the effective rate on losses in any period, and thus the degree of asymmetry, is explicit. The influence on the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate of this effective rate is then examined, where ‘loss-shifting’ occurs. Results suggest that estimates of the behavioural effect on tax revenues of changes in tax rates can be expected in general to be smaller in regimes which involve greater asymmetries in the tax treatment of losses. Importantly, as losses vary over the economic cycle, the model predicts that the asymmetric tax treatment generates effects on tax revenues that are non-linear between above-trend and below-trend parts of the cycle.