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1.
We investigate how the retailer’s inventory policy affects the total cost of a serial supply chain. When the retailer uses the locally optimal (s,S) policy, there is randomness in order time and order quantity to the supplier whereas the supplier sees randomness only in order quantity for the suboptimal (R,T) policy and only in order time for another suboptimal (Q,r) policy. Using an extensive computational study, we find that the suboptimal policies perform better from the total supply chain perspective. The benefit of policy changes is magnified when the retailer costs are low, when the supplier costs are high, and when there is information sharing.  相似文献   

2.
本文假定市场需求不确定和供给存在中断危机,同时考虑订货过剩损失和缺货成本,研究了由零售商、主供应商和备份供应商组成的供应链网络,构建了收益共享合同协调模型,通过相关参数的设定达到供应链协调。供应链协调时的供货量及整体利润均大于分散模型;备份供应商的供货量及利润随着中断危机的增大而增加,零售商利润也随之增加。  相似文献   

3.
随着行为运营管理的发展,利他、公平、信任等行为得到广泛的关注。文章构建一个由供应商和零售商的闭环供应链,供应商负责旧产品回收再加工。将利他行为引入到供应链中,研究利他属性对供应链决策的影响。研究发现,在该模型的供应链中,供应商的利他属性,对于供应链的回收率、零售商的利润、供应商的效用、供应链的整体利润都是有益的。而零售商的利他行为,有利也有弊,带来的效益是局部的。然后通过数值分析对结论作出解释和说明。  相似文献   

4.
In this paper, we consider a single-product single-period inventory model in which the retailer can source from two suppliers. The primary supplier is cheaper but unreliable in the sense that it generates supply yield uncertainty, whereas the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive. The reliable supplier's capacity is fixed and the retailer cannot order more than the quantity reserved in advance. We study the problem in the context of a risk-averse retailer who has to determine the optimal order quantity from the primary supplier and the optimal reserved quantity from the secondary supplier. We develop the model in the perspective of a low risk averse retailer and quantify the risk via an exponential utility function. We show by numerical experiments how the resulting dual sourcing strategies differ from those obtained in the risk-neutral analysis. We also examine the sensitivity of some model-parameters on the optimal decisions.  相似文献   

5.
本文分别构建了政府补贴下,供应链上企业单独减排、供应商对制造商碳减排成本进行分担、供应商和零售商均对制造商碳减排成本进行分担3种减排模型,求解得到不同减排模式下,包括成本分担率和单位减排量在内的供应链最优决策。研究发现,政府补贴率的提升反而使成本分担率降低。通过博弈分析及算例验证得出:在供应链上三方企业联合减排下,即供应商和零售商都对制造商的碳减排研发提供资金支持时,单位产品的减排量及各企业利润达到最大,仅供应商对制造商碳减排成本分担时次之, 供应链上企业单独减排时最小, 但仅供应商一方对制造商的碳减排成本进行分担时的成本分担率,比其与零售商同时分担时的要大。这些结论为政府确立合适的补贴方案及供应链上企业减排策略的制定提供了理论依据。  相似文献   

6.
It is possible to realize considerable savings by aggregating the replenishment of a variety of items in a multi-item supply chain. This joint multi-item replenishment policy has already been widely applied in a variety of industries. This type of policy may make it possible for the retailer to take advantage of transport economies of scale by the utilization of freight discounts for greater weight. In addition, a supplier will often extend forward financing to a retailer. In this paper, a multi-item supply chain with a credit period and weight freight cost discounts is considered. The retailer bears the freight costs, but the freight carrier provides freight-transport discounts that are positively related to the weight of the cargo transported. From both the individual and the channel perspectives, we deal with the dual problems of determining the ideal supplier credit period, and of the best way for the retailer to make multi-item replenishment and pricing decisions, while still maximizing profits. We outline the optimal properties and develop algorithms for solving the problems described, as well as discuss the impact of the freight cost discounts, the inventory holding cost, and the interest rate on the behavior of both parties.  相似文献   

7.
针对市场需求的不确定性,本文通过建立风险规避型零售商与风险中性供应商的Stackelberg博弈模型,供应商为主导者,综合考虑零售商风险规避特性和公平偏好心理对该供应链运作产生的影响。研究发现,当风险规避型零售商不具有公平意识时,零售商的风险规避程度与供应商的批发价、绿色创新投入水平以及供应商和供应链整体的效用正相关;供应商的绿色成本系数的大小可影响风险规避程度对产品售价以及零售商效用的影响。当风险规避型零售商具有公平偏好时,零售商的公平偏好负向影响产品售价、批发价以及供应商绿色投入水平和供应商效用;零售商公平偏好对零售商以及供应链效用产生的影响受到零售商风险规避程度的影响。  相似文献   

8.
This paper considers a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain model with setup of production and delivery and develops a new inventory control policy for the supply chain. Previously, a two-echelon supply chain model without setup of production and delivery is considered and a one-for-one inventory control policy is applied to the supply chain. In the inventory control policy, production is stopped when the warehouse inventory reaches the upper limit and is started again immediately after the inventory drops below the limit. Moreover, delivery to the retailer is stopped when the store inventory reaches the upper limit and is started again immediately after the inventory drops below the limit. The total cost that consists of inventory holding costs and lost sales cost is considered, and setup costs are not considered in the total cost. Once setup costs are introduced, the one-for-one inventory control policy is no longer appropriate. Then, this paper develops a new control policy for the two-echelon dual-channel supply chain with setup of production and delivery. As performance measure, the total cost that consists of inventory holding costs, lost sales cost, and production and delivery setup costs is considered, and the total cost calculated on the basis of Markov analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed control policy.  相似文献   

9.
Inventory control in a two-level supply chain with risk pooling effect   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
We consider an inventory control problem in a supply chain consisting of a single supplier, with a central distribution center (CDC) and multiple regional warehouses, and multiple retailers. We focus on the problem of selecting warehouses to be used among a set of candidate warehouses, assigning each retailer to one of the selected warehouses and determining replenishment plans for the warehouses and the retailers. For the problem with the objective of minimizing the sum of warehouse operation costs, inventory holding costs at the warehouses and the retailers, and transportation costs from the CDC to warehouses as well as from warehouses to retailers, we present a non-linear mixed integer programming model and develop a heuristic algorithm based on Lagrangian relaxation and subgradient optimization methods. A series of computational experiments on randomly generated test problems shows that the heuristic algorithm gives relatively good solutions in a reasonable computation time.  相似文献   

10.
Impact of loss aversion on the newsvendor game with product substitution   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper studies a newsvendor game in which two substitutable products are sold by two different retailers (newsvendors) with loss-averse preferences. Each loss-averse retailer facing stochastic customer demand and deterministic substitution rate will make an order quantity decision to maximize his expected utility. Since product substitution causes two retailers to make decisions in a competitive environment, game theory is used to find the retailers' optimal order quantities. It is shown that under certain conditions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the newsvendor game. Under a symmetry assumption, each retailer's equilibrium order quantity is decreasing in the loss aversion coefficient and increasing in the substitution rate. Further, if the effect of loss aversion on the order quantity is strong enough to dominate the effect of competition, the total inventory level of a decentralized supply chain will be lower than that of a centralized supply chain. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate our results.  相似文献   

11.
We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.  相似文献   

12.
This paper is focused on supply chain management from the perspective of inventory management. The coordination of order and production policies between buyers and suppliers in supply chains is of particular interest. When a buyer of an item decides independently, he will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer's EOQ may not lead to a favorable policy for the supplier. A cooperative order and production policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the dominant position to impose his EOQ on the supplier, then consequently no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative policy. To induce the buyer to order in quantities more favorable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a cooperative policy associated by a side payment to the buyer. The research presented in this paper provides several bargaining models depending on alternative production policies of the supplier. With these bargaining models the offered cooperative policy and the offered side payment can be derived.  相似文献   

13.
This study explores trust and shared vision moderate the relationship between the manufacturer's influence strategies and supplier delivery flexibility. The major components of this study are based on reviews of marketing research that focus on influence strategies and literature regarding supply chain flexibility. The results show that the request strategy has a negative effect on supplier delivery flexibility. The model predicts that trust and shared vision have an asymmetrical effect across recommendations, information exchange, and promises influence strategies. When the relationship contains a highly shared vision, a manufacturer's use of the recommendation influence strongly promotes supplier delivery flexibility, whereas the use of a promise strategy depresses supplier delivery flexibility. In contrast, an information exchange strategy will have a negative effect, but the promise strategy will have a positive effect on supplier delivery flexibility when trust is high. This paper contributes to guidelines for management on how to align their suppliers for delivery flexibility to respond quickly to customer demands.  相似文献   

14.
When the manufacturer opens an online channel to compete with its traditional retailer, what valuable strategy can be utilized to alleviate the O2O (online to offline) competition and conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating an innovative strategy considering the retailer's sales effort and the manufacturer's support in local advertising simultaneously in a manufacturer – retailer O2O supply chain. Our results show that although the retailer's sales effort helps improve the channel coordination and leads to a win-win solution for both the manufacturer and the retailer, investing in both the retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's support in local advertising is a more effective strategy to be employed to coordinate the O2O distribution and achieve higher profits for all parties in the manufacturer - retailer supply chain. In addition, our results also show that compared to the simultaneous mode, the Stackelberg leader-follower mode provides no competitive advantage to the manufacturer or the retailer when the retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's support in local advertising strategy is implemented to coordinate the O2O distributions.  相似文献   

15.
This paper proposes a two-stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach for two of the most critical tasks in supply chain management, namely, supplier selection and order allocation. In the first stage, to address multiple decision criteria in supplier ranking, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is employed. In the second stage, supplier ranks are fed into an order allocation model that aims at maximizing a utility function for the firm as well as minimizing the total supply chain costs, subject to constraints on demand, capacity, and inventory levels. A dynamic programming approach is crafted to solve the proposed bi-objective model.  相似文献   

16.
We study a problem of dynamic quantity competition in continuous time with two competing retailers facing different replenishment cost structures. Retailer 1 faces fixed ordering costs and variable procurement costs and all inventory kept in stock is subject to holding costs. Retailer 2 only faces variable procurement costs. Both retailers are allowed to change their sales quantities dynamically over time. Following the structure of the economic order quantity (EOQ) model, retailer 1 places replenishment orders in batches and retailer 2 follows a just-in-time (JIT) policy. The objective of both retailers is to maximize their individual average profit anticipating the competitor's replenishment and output decisions. The problem is solved by a two-stage hierarchical optimization approach using backwards induction. The second-stage model is a differential game in output quantities between the two retailers for a given cycle length. At the first stage, the replenishment policy is determined. We prove the existence of a unique optimal solution and derive an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We show that both retailers follow contrary output strategies over the order cycle. The EOQ retailer, driven by inventory holding costs, decreases his market share whereas the output of the JIT retailer increases. Moreover, depending on the cost structure, the EOQ retailer might partially be a monopolist. At the first stage, the EOQ retailer determines the cycle length, anticipating the optimal output trajectories at the second stage.  相似文献   

17.
This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.  相似文献   

18.
This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.  相似文献   

19.
In a supply chain setting, we analyze a manufacturer's customer and retailer rebates, which are sales incentives offered to the end buyers and retailers, respectively. The performance of both rebates is influenced by the retailer's objective and response to the promotion due to his intermediary position in the channel. Earlier studies investigating rebates in distribution channels have traditionally assumed that the retailer is risk neutral with the objective of maximizing expected profits. In our paper, we consider a risk-averse retailer. We formally model risk aversion by adopting the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) decision criterion. Using a stochastic and (effective) price dependent demand, we analyze the manufacturer's rebate amount decisions and the retailer's joint inventory and pricing decisions in a game theoretical framework. We provide several structural properties of the objective functions and show monotonicity of the retailer's decisions in the degree of risk aversion. For the case of retailer rebates, we characterize the unique equilibrium, and for the case of customer rebates, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. Using numerical examples, we provide further insights on the impact of risk aversion. For example, given an exogenous wholesale price, we observe a threshold value on the retailer's risk-aversion parameter below (above) which the manufacturer is better off with retailer rebates (customer rebates); implying that the manufacturer's preferred rebate type can be different depending on whether the retailer is risk neutral or sufficiently risk averse.  相似文献   

20.
This paper develops and solves a general finite horizon trade credit economic ordering policy for an inventory model with deteriorating items under inflation and time value of money when shortages are not allowed. The time horizon is divided into different cycles each of which has its own demand rate and its own trade credit period offered from the supplier to his retailer so that the retailer should pay his supplier before or after the end of the permissible trade credit of that cycle. Up to the end of the trade credit of a cycle, the retailer is free of charge, but he is charged on an interest for those items not being sold before this end. The retailer can also earn the interest of the money from the generated sales revenue in any cycle by depositing such revenue into an interest bearing account. The objective of the retailer is then to minimize his net total relevant costs. A closed form of this net total cost is derived and the resulting model is solved. Then rigorous mathematical methods are used to show that, under some seemingly possible conditions, there exist a unique vector of the relevant decision variables that solve the underlying inventory system. A numerical example which shows the applicability of the theoretical results is given.  相似文献   

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