一级密封价格拍卖的博弈分析

公共物品是西方福利经济学的重要研究对象。传统理论认为公共物品是不能通过市场来有效提供的,但是随着技术的进步和制度的创新与完善,使得私人部门提供公共物品成为可能。因此,从私人部门提供公共物品的条件入手,引入一级密封价格拍卖模型来分析私人提供公共物品的可行性。     

略论第二价格密封拍卖

本文在对基本拍卖类型进行介绍的基础上,详细论述了第二价格密封拍卖的竞拍策略及优点,最后探讨了这种拍卖原理的实践运用情况.     

略论第二价格密封拍卖

本文在对基本拍卖类型进行介绍的基础上,详细论述了第二价格密封拍卖的竞拍策略及优点,最后探讨了这种拍卖原理的实践运用情况。     

不同一口价组合拍卖机制下的卖方收益比较研究

随着电子商务的发展,作为网上拍卖方式之一的一口价拍卖逐渐盛行起来。网上一口价拍卖打破了时间和空间的限制,因而被广泛应用于组合拍卖中。笔者针对目前拍卖网站所采用的两种不同拍卖规则:固定一口价和持久一口价,在独立私人估价模型下分析比较了上述两种规则下的卖方期望收益。     

对网络拍卖方式的思考

拍卖如何做到“公开、公平、公正”,尽量降低甚至杜绝可能出现的徇私腐败现象,是一个值得探讨的课题.纯网络拍卖有效地解决了这一问题,但也存在一些弊端.网络拍卖与现场同步拍卖有效地解决了这一难题,值得坚持和推广.     

腐败行为的成本收益问题分析

随着时代发展,腐败行为日益成为人们关注的对象。文章基于经济人假设对腐败的预期成本收益问题进行了一些新的探索,并指出腐败成本收益分析法应用于实际的复杂性和前提条件。根据成本收益分析,文章在此提出一些解决腐败问题的方案,以求降低腐败的发生率,实现政府行为的廉洁高效。     

堵住黑洞--谈遏制城市土地招标拍卖中的串谋

根据国土资源部今年５月下发的《招标、拍卖、挂牌出让国有土地使用权的规定》（以下简称《规定》），从今年７月１日开始，我国城市经营性土地必须通过招标、拍卖或挂牌的方式出让使用权，这对于显化土地价值和杜绝暗箱操作有着重大意义。但招标、拍卖中的竞争机制使得开发商陷入了“囚徒困境”，他们有强烈的串谋动机，而土地市场地域性较强和竞争不充分的特点，也使得开发商之间的串谋成为可能，对此，我们应制定相应的对策。一、土地招标、拍卖中的开发商博弈与“囚徒困境”招标或拍卖具有揭示信息和减少代理成本两个基本功能。当一件物…     

竞赛中的最优奖励：一个拍卖分析框架

本文在全支付（all—pay）拍卖的框架下，研究了一类非对称竞赛活动的最优奖励问题。我们假设竞赛组织者未知参赛者的成本信息，进而可供选择的奖励方式有两种，其一是固定奖励额；其二是线性奖励，最终奖励额由参赛者的投资内生决定。我们证明：如果投资不能完全披露成本信息，固定奖励优于线性奖励；如果投资完全披露成本信息，线性奖励可能优于固定奖励，同时我们得出了实现投资完全披露信息的一个必要条件。我们的结论不依赖于参赛者的对称性假设，不依赖于参赛者具体的成本分布函数形式，也不依赖于竞赛组织者试图最大化参赛者最大努力或最大化所有参赛者努力总和。     

在线拍卖与现场拍卖中的拍品特性分析

本文通过对现场拍卖和在线拍卖的比较 ,发现交易成本和拍品信息的可描述性是影响不同拍卖环境下拍器类型的主要因素 ,从而得出 :传统的现场拍卖适合有较高价值的商品 ,对商品的可描述性有较低的要求 ;在线拍卖适合可描述程度较高的商品 ,对商品价值的要求较低。     

竞赛中的最优奖励:一个拍卖分析框架

本文在全支付(all-pay)拍卖的框架下,研究了一类非对称竞赛活动的最优奖励问题。我们假设竞赛组织者未知参赛者的成本信息,进而可供选择的奖励方式有两种,其一是固定奖励额;其二是线性奖励,最终奖励额由参赛者的投资内生决定。我们证明:如果投资不能完全披露成本信息,固定奖励优于线性奖励;如果投资完全披露成本信息,线性奖励可能优于固定奖励,同时我们得出了实现投资完全披露信息的一个必要条件。我们的结论不依赖于参赛者的对称性假设,不依赖于参赛者具体的成本分布函数形式,也不依赖于竞赛组织者试图最大化参赛者最大努力或最大化所有参赛者努力总和。     

Auctions with cross-shareholdings

Summary. We study the effect of cross-shareholding among two competing firms on their bidding behavior and the expected sales revenue for the seller in an auction environment. The bidders private signals are independent, and the model encompasses the private values model and a particular common value model as special cases. When cross-shareholding is symmetric, the bids decrease towards the collusive level as the degree of cross-shareholding increases. The Revenue Equivalence result no longer holds: the first-price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller than the second-price auction.With asymmetric cross-shareholding, revenue comparisons are only possible in the common value setting. Expected revenue for the seller is again higher in the first-price than in the second price auction. Bidding behavior in the second-price auction is more sensitive to changes in cross-shareholding and the value environment than in the first-price auction.Received: 18 September 2000, Revised: 27 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44.Correspondence to: Sudipto DasguptaWe thank Sugato Bhattacharyya, Paul Klemperer, Kunal Sengupta and Guofu Tan for helpful discussions, and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved the paper. The usual disclaimer, of course, applies.     

Auctions with Financial Externalities

We study auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers care about how much the winner pays. In the first-price auction, larger financial externalities result in a lower expected price; in the second-price auction, the effect is ambiguous. Although the expected price in the second-price auction may increase if financial externalities increase, the seller is not able to gain more revenue by guaranteeing the losers a fraction of the auction revenue. With a reserve price, we find that both auctions may have pooling at the reserve price. This finding suggests that identical bids need not be a signal of collusion, in contrast to what is sometimes argued in anti-trust cases. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO 510.010.501 and NWO-VICI 453.03.606). For valuable discussions and comments, we would like to thank Eric van Damme, Jacob Goeree, Thomas Kittsteiner, Marta Kolodziejczyk, seminar participants at Tilburg University, Humboldt University Berlin, and National University of Singapore, and audiences at ESEM 2001 in Lausanne, and the FEEM 2002 conference in Milan on auctions and market design. The suggestions of an anonymous referee of this Journal greatly improved the article. The usual disclaimer applies.     

信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例

本文使用网上拍卖交易数据,就卖者信誉对市场交易的影响进行了实证研究。我们发现,卖者的信誉评价一方面影响物品成交的价格,另一方面还对物品拍卖成功的概率有着显著的正面影响;但相对来说,卖者的信誉评价对后者的效果比对前者要更显著。这是本文的主要发现。该结果验证了在一个没有政府干预、近乎自由放任的“虚拟”市场上信誉机制的积极作用。     

Auctions of licences and market structure

Summary. This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at which industry profits decrease with repeated entry is not too large, at the unique solution either a single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage, depending on the net benefit of complete preemption to an incumbent. If we relax the assumption, a third outcome can occur: two firms may coordinate their choices to avoid further entry. The analysis employs a new refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of recursively undominated equilibrium. Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: September 12, 2000     

Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

Corruption in public service delivery: An experimental analysis

To improve our understanding of corruption in service delivery, we use a newly designed game that allows us to investigate the effects of the institutional environment on the behavior of service providers and their monitors. We focus on the effect of four different factors: whether monitors are accountable to the service recipients, the degree of observability of service providers’ effort, the providers’ wages and the providers’ professional norms. In accordance with theory, we find that service providers perform better when monitors are elected by service recipients and when their effort is more easily observed. However, there is only weak evidence that service providers perform better when paid more. Monitors are more vigilant when elected and when service providers are paid more. Playing the game with Ethiopian nursing students, we also find that those with greater exposure to the Ethiopian public health sector perform less well, either as provider or as monitor, when the experiment is framed as a public health provision scenario, suggesting that experience and norms affect behavior.     

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete information and fully characterize its Nash equilibria, and show that the uniform-price Prosper mechanism, while simple, can lead to much larger payments for the borrower than the VCG mechanism. We next compare the Prosper mechanism against the borrower-optimal auction in an incomplete information setting, and conclude by examining the Prosper mechanism when modeled as a dynamic auction, and provide tight bounds on the price for a general class of bidding strategies.     

On Corruption and Countervailing Actions in Three South Asian Nations

We argue that readily available data and information in newspaper stories enable one to discern the nature and patterns of corruption and to understand actions taken to combat corruption. We analyze and compare numerous newspaper reports of corruption in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Using analysis derived from existing theory of corruption, we demonstrate how information in news accounts improves our understanding of corruption. Bangladesh had more coercive corruption, with countervailing actions dominated by direct actions of victims. In India and Sri Lanka, corruption was generally collusive, with countervailing actions on behalf of victims frequently leading to legal actions and investigative reports.     

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

Corruption and military spending

Anecdotal evidence relates corruption with high levels of military spending. This paper tests empirically whether such a relationship exists. The empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries during 1985–1998. The association between military spending and corruption is investigated by using cross-section and panel regression techniques. The results suggest that corruption is associated with higher military spending as a share of both GDP and total government spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government spending. The results can be interpreted as evidence that defense spending may be used as a component of an indicator of the quality of governance.