The Production Responses of the Competitive Firm to Three Conventional Distributional Shifts: a Unified Perspective

This paper presents a unified perspective on the production responses of the competitive firm to three conventional distributional shifts: (i) a rightward shift of the distribution, (ii) a Rothschild–Stiglitz increase in risk, and (iii) a Menezes et al. increase in downside risk. In particular, assuming that the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility is increasing and concave, and assuming its higher‐order derivatives are uniformly signed, we demonstrate that the production responses are unambiguous in the case of price less than or equal to marginal cost. In the alternative case of price greater than marginal cost, we then demonstrate that the production responses can be signed unambiguously by reference to sufficient conditions motivated by absolute risk aversion and by absolute prudence.     

Financial development,the choice of technology,and comparative advantage

In this general equilibrium model, banks and manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition. A more advanced manufacturing technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production. We show that manufacturing firms located in a country with a more efficient financial sector choose more advanced technologies and this country has a comparative advantage in the production of manufactured goods. Even though the foreign country has a less developed financial sector than the home country, the opening up of trade with the foreign country leads domestic manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies. An increase in the level of efficiency in the financial sector of one country causes manufacturing firms in both countries to adopt more advanced technologies.     

INVESTMENT,EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES: A BARGAINING APPROACH

This paper analyzes a three stage game between a firm and its unionized workers. In the first period the firm decides the level of its capital stock. In the second period union and firm bargain over how many workers to hire and the wage rate, then production takes place. In the third stage new production occurs after union and firm have bargained over possible changes in the employment level and wage rate. The hiring of workers is associated with sunk training costs. The main result is that distortions in the use of labor due to sunk training costs induce distortions in the use of capital, even in the absence of sunk investment costs. Because of the strategic impact of investment on later stages of the game, the firm will not equate marginal revenue product and rental cost of capital. Underinvestment or overinvestment will result depending on whether the marginal revenue product of labor is an increasing or decreasing function of capital.     

物流成本层次性分析与优化途径探析

本文认为,企业的物流成本可以划分为物流战略成本、物流经营成本和物流作业成本三个层次。物流战略成本发生在战略资源层次,是物流成本的起源;物流经营成本是在物流经营层面上发生的成本,它根据物流战略成本的目标和规划制定出具体的执行方案,并控制着物流作业成本的形成过程;物流作业成本是物流作业实际发生过程中的成本,是物流成本的最终凝结和转化。文章提出,物流成本的控制应该以战略成本为导向,以经营成本为核心,以作业成本为重点,通过不同层次的物流成本—价值分析,建立基于外部扩展供应链、贯穿于企业生产制造过程或顾客价值提供全过程的横向物流成本控制系统以及贯穿于物流战略资源层次、物流经营管理层次和物流作业层次的一体化通贯式的纵向成本控制体系。     

Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?

This paper examines the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in a mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and foreign competition. Major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms?? move; secondly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and cost is symmetric, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the maximum-revenue tariff; thirdly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and the domestic firm is highly ineffective in production, under Stackelberg public leadership, the optimum-welfare tariff is low and then it is more possible that the optimum-welfare tariff is lower than the maximum-revenue one.     

跨国市场竞争企业合并决策研究

通过构建一个两阶段古诺模型研究在跨国市场竞争的企业合并行为,发现企业的合并选择与国外市场相对规模、合并带来的边际成本降低程度相关,只有当国外市场规模变小或合并能够降低成本的程度较大时企业才会愿意合并。根据模型,促进整体福利的政府政策也应有针对性:对于能够带来提高生产效率的合并,政府应提供充足资金和政策支持;对于不能提高生产效率的合并,政策应激励企业进行研发和创新。     

Learning by doing,inventory and optimal pricing policy

The notion of the “learning effect” suggests that when a firm introduces a new product, the costs of production will decline as the accumulated output increases. In this paper we analyze this effect on price paths and production rates along time. The distinction between production level and sales level affects the behavior of the firm that can utilize the option of holding inventory. In this case we show that the optimal price increases, even though production costs decrease over time due to “learning by doing.”     

Learning by doing, export subsidies, and industry growth: Japanese steel in the 1950s and 1960s

The paper examines the Japanese steel industry to evaluate the role of export subsidy policies. Export subsidies can be instrumental in increasing an industry's cost competitiveness in the presence of learning by doing, a characteristic of production in the steel industry. Using a dynamic estimation model, this paper identifies a significant learning rate of above 20% with little intra-industry knowledge spillover. Simulations made with the model indicate that the subsidy policy had an insignificant impact on industry growth. The paper finds that the export subsidy had a small effect in stimulating industry growth, because the estimated steel supply function was relatively inelastic.     

基于精益视角的供应链流程时间效益研究

经过多年的探索与实践,精益生产方式已经展现出诸多优势,并以其最佳的运作方式和快速的反应速度获得了制造业的大力支持。但是,企业在学习精益生产的过程中,时间成本往往是被忽略的对象,与传统生产方式相统一的传统会计模式也显现出与精益生产方式的不匹配,阻碍了制造业精益之路的可持续发展。为了提高精益改善的有效性,本文以精益生产理论为依托,根据时间具有经济性的特点,深入研究成本控制与时间效益的关系,应用基于过程周期时间的成本分摊方法找出改善环节,依据供应链流程提出创造时间效益的对策。     

Live Broadcasting,Gate Revenue,and Football Club Performance: Some Evidence

This paper presents new evidence concerning the main argument of the English Premier League for collective arrangements in selling television broadcast rights. Matches that are broadcast live on television can be considered as a substitute for watching at the stadium. New panel-data show that broadcasting live has a small negative effect on gate revenue for the best performing clubs and a much larger effect for the worst performing clubs. However, the marginal cost is outweighed by the marginal revenue, concluding that restrictions on quantity stemming from collective arrangements are detrimental to the consumers, broadcasters, and clubs themselves.     

RISK‐AVERSION,OPTIMAL LEVERAGE AND THE INVESTMENT–UNCERTAINTY RELATION

We develop a partial equilibrium dynamic model in which firms are risk‐averse. We analyse the determinants of the investment–uncertainty relationship by means of numerical techniques. When firms can borrow ‘outside’ resources at the riskless rate, an increase in price volatility depresses investment for realistic parameter values. In our model, portfolio considerations play an important role. When the marginal revenue of capital becomes more uncertain, the risk‐averse firm's owners reduce their ‘short position’ in the risk‐free asset, thus diminishing the firm's debt level. The contraction in leverage reduces the expected returns on investment because the expected marginal revenue product is higher than the user cost of capital. In turn, the reduction in expected yields tends to depress investment.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Consumption Externalities, and Market Opening

This study investigates the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on market opening in the presence of consumption externalities between separate markets. Assuming symmetric interdependent linear demands and constant marginal cost, we indicate the possibility that with negative externalities a monopolist can do better by closing the relatively small market from the social welfare viewpoint, while it prefers opening that market if price discrimination is feasible. This result contradicts the previous literature on third-degree price discrimination and market opening which asserts that, in the case of non-increasing marginal cost, price discrimination improves social welfare if it opens new markets that are closed under uniform pricing.     

国有企业隐性失业显性化的成本分析

国有企业隐性失业显性化已势在必然。隐性失业显性化在降低企业内部成本的同时,却会产生和增加外部成本。内部成本与外部成本此消彼长。均衡原理寻求隐性失业显性化的均衡规模,即当边际内部成本等于边际外部成本时,国有企业隐性失业显性化才能保持效率与稳定的均衡。     

基于Bertrand模型的横向兼并单边效应分析

刻画横向兼并的基准模型一般为Bertrand模型,通过对无效率改进情形下两厂商横向兼并的价格效应建模分析和测算可知,将价格维持在兼并前的均衡价格水平所需的边际成本下降幅度与两种产品的边际利润率和分流率成正比,同时可以得到对称条件下不同的分流率和边际利润率所需的效率改进程度。     

外资零售企业进入、混合竞争与中国培育大型流通企业政策——基于混合寡占博弈模型的流通政策分析

组建与培育具有国际竞争力的大型国有控股流通企业集团是转型经济时期我国政府的一种积极的市场治理方式。通过构建三类混合寡占零售博弈模型和均衡分析表明,在多种所有制零售企业共同参与竞争时,国内社会总体福利的大小与外资零售企业的信息技术管理水平并不成简单正相关关系;当国有零售企业完全以社会总剩余最大化为目标时,即使其效率低于外资企业、市场的价格小于国有企业的边际成本,它的存在也将提升社会福利;国有零售企业具有规定市场规模、维护市场稳定的重要功能;明确国有流通企业在不同状态下目标函数预期,合理构建零售市场的组织结构与所有制结构,可以有效增强我国零售市场的供给保障和调控能力。     

The Industry Determinants of Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Canadian Producer Prices

This paper models and estimates exchange rate pass-through and its determinants in Canadian manufacturing industries. The paper predicts theoretically that the exchange rate pass-through should be between one and zero, where it is positively affected by the share of tradable inputs in production costs and the domestic firms’ market share, and negatively by the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. The sign for the degree of product differentiation is not theoretically clear. Results of estimation indicate that pass-through is incomplete and is mostly affected by the share of tradable inputs in production costs (positively) and the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output (negatively).     

The Division of Labor,Investment and Capital

A dynamic general equilibrium model based on corner solutions is used to formalize the classical theory of investment and capital which considers investment to be a vehicle for developing a high level of division of labor in roundabout productive activities. If it takes time for a specialist producer of tractors to learn the right method to produce commercially viable tractors, specialization in producing tractors is infeasible in the absence of investment in terms of consumption goods which are consumed by the specialist producer of tractors before he can sell tractors. If specialized learning by doing can speed up accumulation of professional knowledge so that roundabout productive machines become cheap, such investment for increasing the level of division of labor in roundabout productive activities will speed up economic growth. Because of the trade-off between economies of specialized learning by doing and transaction costs, the model can be used to investigate the effects of a change in the transaction cost coefficient, which can be affected by policy, the legal system and urbanization, on the evolution of the division of labor, on real interest rates and on the saving rate.     

一体化经营企业的转移定价实证分析

为使企业总体利益最大化,在企业两个或数个不同的分部之间确定适当的价格和产量对一体化经营企业而言极为重要。同时,转移定价可作为一种分部之间的激励机制。采用边际成本等于边际收益的方法,可以得到不同的市场结构中最优的转移价格和产量。     

RELIABILITY AND REGULATION IN PRICING PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICE

The principal question addressed in this paper concerns the optimal price profile for a regulated public utility where demand is stochastic. Through the introduction of rationing costs and a rate-of-return constraint, marginal revenue will be approximately equated to the cost associated with satisfying the last unit of consumers’demand. This has significant implications for capacity expansion. Namely, capacity is added to keep the risk of failure minimal. As a result, to the extent that the associated costs are higher for the last unit of capacity, a higher marginal revenue and hence price will result. That is, if the marginal unit of capacity has a high operating and delivery cost and low capital cost with high reliability and consequent high total cost (e.g., an internal combustion peaking unit), the indicated result follows. Consequently, there is a direct trade off between the level of risk of failure and marginal revenue. This provides a rationalization for the existence of the price differential between firm and interruptible customers. Finally, if the firm is contrained to earn a fair return on its capital investment, it will set prices to favor the consumers generating the expansion in capacity.     

Export-promoting production subsidies and the dynamic gains from experience

This paper examines export-promoting production subsidies in a dynamic product-cycle model with learning by doing and spillovers from experience. History dictates that the South is less experienced than the North and, thus, produces less advanced goods. Non-uniform Southern export promoting production subsidies applied to a small set of marginal industries that are on the verge of being internationally competitive, generate conventional static benefits for the South and costs for the North. Since such an industrial policy expands the South's range of production, it ultimately enhances Southern learning. The South's rate of production and technology transfer and the North's rate of innovation both increase, creating dynamic benefits for each country. While the South must gain overall, the North will also gain if the dynamic benefits outweigh the static costs.