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1.
Traditionally, the presence of the shadow economy (SE) has been associated, mainly and positively, with taxation. Recently,
some authors have suggested that the SE may be also linked to the institutional setting (efficiency of the bureaucracy, regulations,
corruption, etc.) so that just two stable equilibria are possible. In the “good” one, there is a small hidden sector, large
fiscal revenues and honest/appreciated institutions. The other, “bad”, equilibrium is the opposite. Unlike the traditional
approach, therefore, the recent literature argues that the tax burden and SE can be negatively correlated. Examining the links
between these variables in relatively uncorrupt systems, this paper reconciles the two views. Theoretically, it claims that
many different good equilibria can emerge whereby SE and its determinants are linked in complex and different ways. For instance,
taxation and SE can go hand-in-hand, even taking into account the institutional framework. Empirical evidence for OECD countries
supports both the model and the changing nature of the SE. 相似文献
2.
3.
The paper considers a market currently dominated by a dirty technology that imposes significant environmental costs. A clean
technology, with zero environmental costs, is introduced after the maturity of the dirty technology’s network. Adoption of
the clean technology is not possible due to the network benefits in favour of the dirty technology. The paper considers two
types of policy intervention to correct for the environmental externality. First, we find that the tax necessary to induce
adoption of the clean technology is very high implying that a tax equal to the marginal environmental damage would not resolve
the externality problem in many cases. Second, if tax revenues are earmarked towards subsidizing the clean technology, the
tax is lower than in the previous case and can be set equal to the marginal external damage.
*The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We would also like to thank Robert Androkovich,
Jim Seldon, Gordon Tarzwell, Christos Constantatos, participants of the EAERE 2002 conference, and the Sevilla Workshop on
Public Economics and the Environment 2004 for their suggestions. Financial support by the Scholarly Activity Committee of
the University College of the Cariboo is acknowledged by both authors. Eftichios Sartzetakis acknowledges also financial support
by the Pythagoras I research grant of the Greek government. 相似文献
4.
This paper examines Bayesian methods of examining posterior distributions of inequality, concentration, tax progressivity
and social welfare measures. Use is made of an explicit income distribution assumption and two alternative assumptions regarding
the distribution of pre-tax mean incomes within each income group. The methods are applied to a simulated distribution of
individual incomes and tax payments. It is possible to identify a minimum acceptable number of income classes to be used.
The results suggest support for the use of group means in practical applications, particularly where large sample sizes are
available.
First version received: August 2000/Final version received: July 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was supported by a Melbourne University Faculty of Economics and Commerce Research Grant. We should
like to thank Bill Griffiths and two referees for comments on an earlier draft. 相似文献
5.
This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118. 相似文献
6.
The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets
Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that
with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance
of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations.
This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes,
weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint
is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets.
Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments.
Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino 相似文献
7.
Generalized contest success functions 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents.
The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes
these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified
framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204,
1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.
This paper has benefitted from the comments of Aicke Hinrichs, Rene Levinsky, and two anonymous referees. We are especially
thankful to one of the referees for detailed comments which have helped improve every aspect of this paper. 相似文献
8.
This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields.We wish to thank Johann K. Brunner and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments. 相似文献
9.
Harvesting of prey biomass is analyzed in an integrated ecological-economic system whose submodels, a predator–prey ecosystem
and a simple economy, are microfounded dynamic general equilibrium models. These submodels are interdependent because the
ecosystem responds to harvesting—through the reactions of optimizing individual organisms—by changing the provision of public
ecosystem services to consumers. General analytical results are derived regarding the impact of harvesting policies on short-run
equilibria of both submodels, on population dynamics, and on stationary states of the integrated model. A key insight is that
prey biomass carries a positive ecosystem price which needs to be added as a tax mark-up to the economic price of harvested biomass to attain allocative efficiency. Further information on the dynamics is gained by resorting to
numerical analysis of the policy regimes of zero harvesting, laissez-faire harvesting and efficient harvesting.
It “... is a matter of weighing costs and benefits of taking action, whether the action is the “inert” one of leaving resources alone in order to conserve them, or whether it involves exploiting a resource ... for so-called material ends”. Pearce (1976, p. 320)Helpful comments from an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility. 相似文献
10.
Christopher P. Chambers 《Economic Theory》2007,33(2):285-309
We study a spatial model of political competition in which potential candidates need a fixed amount of money from lobbies
to enter an election. We show that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in which lobbies finance candidates whose policies
they prefer among the set of entrants coincides with the set of Nash equilibria with weakly less than two entering candidates.
Fixing lobbies’ preferences, if the total amount of money held by lobbies is finite, there exists some minimal distance between
the two candidates’ positions. This minimal distance is a bound for all such Nash equilibria and is independent of the distribution
of voters’ preferences.
I would like to thank John Duggan, Al Slivinski, and William Thomson for useful comments and suggestions. Dan Kovenock and
two anonymous referees also provided detailed comments and pointed out several errors. All errors are my own. 相似文献
11.
The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic
interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply
our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology
can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.
Earlier drafts of this paper were circulated under the title: “The Evolution of Perception Biases” and some of these results
appeared in the earlier working paper Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2003). We thank three anonymous referees for their helpful
comments. Shannon thanks the NSF for research support under grant SES-0351346. 相似文献
12.
Tetsuo Ono 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):141-168
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth
cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation
growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the
no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the
tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently
between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of
capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level.
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments,
which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at
Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University,
and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine. 相似文献
13.
This paper analyzes a managerial delegation model in which the government chooses an environmental tax to control environmental
damage. By giving the managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we
show that firm owners have to pay a higher environmental tax and both environmental damage and social welfare increase compared
to the profit-maximization case.
Financial support from UPV (Subvención a grupos, 2001), UPV (HB-8238/2000) and MEC (BEC 2000-0301) is gratefully acknowledged.
We would like to thank A. Saracho and two referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
14.
The paper examines the effect of freer North–South trade in goods on pollution, commodity terms-of-trade and national welfare,
utilizing a factor endowment framework. North and South are distinguished in terms of the relative endowment of a pollution
causing natural resource: South is relatively more resource abundant. Compared to the analysis of Copeland and Taylor (1994)—which
is the central work so far on this subject—this paper internalizes the commodity terms-of-trade impact of individual environment
policies. It is derived that if countries specialize completely in the free-trade equilibrium, both are induced to reduce
their pollution as compared to autarky. It is interesting and paradoxical that the South also reduces its pollution, despite
specializing in the pollution-intensive good. Again, contrary to common perception, free trade may entail an overall terms-of-trade
loss for the North, while South will always have a positive change in the terms-of-trade. Finally, inspite of better environment,
free trade may cause both the countries to gain or lose in terms of aggregate welfare.
This research has benefitted from comments received at the conference on International Dimension of Environment Policy organized
by the European Science Foundation and Tilburg University, October 7–12, 2000 Kerkrade, The Netherlands and the International
Conference on Environment and Development organized by CITD, School of International Studies, JNU, April 7–8, 2005, New Delhi,
India, as well as those received from two anonymous referees. A small section of this research was published in Mehra and
Das (2002). 相似文献
15.
Tax competition may be different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a ‘race to the top’ in taxes before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable equilibria with partial agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery equilibria. A bell-shaped tax differential also arises in our model. Therefore, the ‘race to the top’ result generalises to a framework with partial agglomeration. 相似文献
16.
Vincenzo Scoppa 《Empirical Economics》2008,35(1):123-140
Many incentive contracts are based on subjective evaluations and contractual disputes depend on judges’ decisions. However,
subjective evaluations raise risks of favouritism and distortions. Sport contests are a fruitful field for testing empirically
theories of incentives. In this paper the behaviour of the referees in the Italian soccer (football) league (“Serie A”) is
analyzed. Using data on injury (or extra) time subjectively assigned by the referee at the end of the match and controlling
for factors which may influence it (players substitutions, yellow and red cards, penalty kicks, etc.), we show that referees
are biased in favour of home team, in that injury time is significantly greater if home teams are losing. The refereeing bias
increases greatly when there is no running track in the stadium and the crowd is close to the pitch. Following the 2006 “Serie
A” scandal we test whether favouritism emerges towards teams suspected of connections with referees finding that these teams
obtain favourable decisions. Social pressure by the crowd attending the match however appears to be the main cause of favouritism.
I would like to thank Francesco Aiello, Martin Brimble, Maria De Paola, Filippo Domma, Nicola Meccheri, Antonio Nicita, Michela
Ponzo and two anonymous referees for useful comments. The usual caveats apply. 相似文献
17.
Johannes Münster 《Economic Theory》2009,41(2):345-357
This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of contest success functions of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996)
and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998) to contests between groups.
Comments by Dan Kovenock significantly improved the paper and are gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank Pavlo
Blavatskyy, Aron Kiss, Kai Konrad, Florian Morath, Dana Sisak, participants of the SFB/TR 15 meeting in Gummersbach 2004,
the 2004 meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Dresden, and two anonymous referees. Any errors are mine. Financial support
from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
18.
Steven Russell 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):111-140
Summary. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study the determination of the exchange rate in an economy with fundamental
uncertainty. The model has steady state equilibria in which the exchange rate is constant. These equilibria may coexist with
“quasi-fundamental” equilibria – nonstationary equilibria in which the exchange rate displays stochastic fluctuations that
are correlated with the fluctuations in fundamental random variables. The quasi-fundamental equilibria are Pareto dominated
by the corresponding constant-exchange-rate steady states. They also converge to these steady states, inevitably or with positive
probability.
Received: October 2, 1999; revised version: March 26, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper began as a joint project with Alex Mourmouras, who has made many helpful comments and suggestions but is
not responsible for any errors or deficiencies. In addition, I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
19.
The absolute health income hypothesis revisited: a semiparametric quantile regression approach 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper uses the 1998–1999 Canadian National Population Health Survey data to examine the health–income relationship that
underlies the absolute income hypothesis. To allow for nonlinearity and data heterogeneity, we use a partially linear semiparametric
quantile regression model. The “absolute income hypothesis” is partially true; the negative aging effects appear more pronounced
for the ill-healthy population than for the healthy population and when annual income is below 40,000 Canadian dollars.
We would like to thank two anonymous referees and Baldev Raj, the editor, for useful and constructive comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Statistics Canada.
Both authors would also like to acknowledge financial support from SSHRC of Canada. 相似文献
20.
The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework
in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is
the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement
on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining
models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes
a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We
embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and
the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise
if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining
impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement
is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original
viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant
examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist
for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at
the same competitive prices. 相似文献