CREDIT,HOUSING COLLATERAL,AND CONSUMPTION: EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN,THE U.K., AND THE U.S.

The consumption behavior of U.K., U.S., and Japanese households is examined and compared using a modern Ando‐Modigliani style consumption function. The models incorporate income growth expectations, income uncertainty, housing collateral, and other credit effects. These models therefore capture important parts of the financial accelerator. The evidence is that credit availability for U.K. and U.S., but not Japanese, households has undergone large shifts since 1980. The average consumption‐to‐income ratio rose in the U.K. and U.S. as mortgage down‐payment constraints eased and as the collateral role of housing wealth was enhanced by financial innovations, such as home equity loans. The estimated housing collateral effect is similar in the U.S. and U.K. In Japan, land prices (which proxy house prices) continue to negatively impact consumer spending. There are negative real interest rate effects on consumption in the U.K. and U.S. and positive effects in Japan. Overall, this implies important differences in the transmission of monetary and credit shocks in Japan versus the U.S., U.K., and other credit‐liberalized economies.     

GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS

The United States imports around 25% of its merchandise under some form of preferential trade regime. This paper examines both the origins and the consequences of U.S. trade preferences in the context of the gravity model of international trade. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, it provides estimates of the impact of preferential trade regimes in terms of access to U.S. markets while controlling for geostrategic interests that determine the countries that are offered commercial preferences. Second, we consider not only country eligibility but also the extent of utilization of these programs. Third, we provide new estimates of the impact of transport and transactions costs beyond distance. In the standard gravity estimation, we find that beneficiaries of these preferences, except GSP, export between two and three times more than the excluded countries, after controlling for country and product characteristics. Nonetheless, the estimated effects of these programs are lower when controlling for utilization ratios and selection biases due to the correlation between geopolitical interests and the standard explanatory variables used in the gravity model of trade, such as countries' geographic distance from the United States.     

International trade and macroeconomic dynamics: The case of U.S. bilateral trade with G-7 countries

The short- and long-run effects of exchange rates, income, interest rates and government spending on U.S. bilateral trade with the other G-7 countries are investigated using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. The primary contribution of this study is to consider separating the analysis of exports and imports in an integrated model that empirically encompasses four major schools of thoughts – elasticity, Keynesian income, absorption and monetary approaches – in order to identify macroeconomic linkages to U.S. bilateral trade with the other G-7 countries accurately. Results suggest that, in both the short- and long-run, U.S. imports and exports are highly sensitive to changes in U.S. and foreign income, while U.S. imports and exports are relatively insensitive to changes in bilateral exchange rate. It is also found that both exports and imports are more responsive to changes in government spending than changes in interest rates in both the short- and long-run.     

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Defense contractors in the United States face a painful choice between downsizing or investing in new high-risk commercial ventures. Past experience reveals numerous failed efforts to penetrate commercial markets and few, if any, successes.
The capabilities required to succeed in civilian business are fundamentally different from those needed to design and produce weapon systems. Defense firms and defense divisions of diversified corporations lack adequate knowledge of commercial products, production methods, advertising and distribution, financial approaches, and customer demand.
Given the outlook for a sustained decline in U.S. military spending, the author advises companies catering to military markets to cut their costs by reducing excess capacity. Smaller but more competitive positions can be achieved through restructuring, mergers, sales of assets, and, if necessary, closing down unneeded facilities. Firms that ignore the pleas for "conversion" and do not dissipate their assets in civilian markets alien to them stand the best chance of surviving during a period of reduced military demand.     

Terms of trade volatility,government spending cyclicality,and economic growth

This paper presents estimates of the effects that terms of trade volatility has on real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth. Based on 5‐year nonoverlapping panel data comprising 175 countries during 1980 to 2010, the paper finds that terms of trade volatility has significant negative effects on economic growth in countries with procyclical government spending. In countries where government spending is countercyclical, terms of trade volatility has no significant effect on growth. Conditional on the mediating role of government spending cyclicality, the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector has no significant effect on the relationship between growth and terms of trade volatility.     

Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.     

量化宽松、财政赤字与美元资产安全

次贷危机爆发以来,美国采取了一系列货币和财政政策以拯救深陷泥潭的本国经济。美联储运用非常规政策工具向金融体系注入大量流动性资产,美联邦政府也大幅度提高了财政支出,使得财政赤字愈加恶化。在此背景下,美元资产的安全性成为投资者关注的焦点。本文分别从货币政策效果、财政赤字的可持续性以及投资主体等方面考察了美元资产的安全性,分析了美国宏观经济政策的实际作用,并从投资主体结构探讨了美国联邦政府的经济取向,最后以所涉及资产的市场表现回应美元资产安全问题。笔者认为,与其它货币资产相比,持有美元资产并不会承担额外的币种风险。     

Regulation and investment in the U.S. telecommunications industry

Reversing a two-decade deregulatory trend of telecommunications services, in 2010 U.S. regulators embarked on an aggressive regulatory agenda including, but not limited to, the regulation of high-speed Internet services under the auspices of net neutrality using utility-style regulations codified in the 1930s. Firms, regulators, and analysts feared a reduction in capital spending, contradicting established policy goals of expanding Internet availability and adoption. In this article, a difference-in-differences regression model augmented with randomization inference is applied to government data on capital spending in telecommunications. Large negative effects on investment are found. The estimated effects are robust across changes in estimation periods and model specifications, and multiple tests of the model’s assumptions lend credibility to the findings.     

LIMITING U.S. OIL IMPORTS: COST ESTIMATES

The Energy Modeling Forum recently compared ten world oil models. This paper examines the costs of curtailing growth in U.S. oil imports based upon the supply and demand responses to price in six of these models. The analysis estimates direct resource costs over the 1989–2010 period from U.S. results for aflat and a rising price case spanning an $18 per barrel difference by the year 2000 and beyond. To provide a balanced perspective, the paper also includes estimates of some potential benefits from import-reduction policies. These benefits include smaller wealth transfers during a disruption and lower oil prices without disruptions. While keeping future oil imports at today's level appears to be quite costly, the results here indicate that less aggressive import-reduction programs offer some opportunity for economic gain.     

Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War

ABSTRACT

Three major concerns drove the U.S. into initiating the trade war, and they are (a) the concern that China’s chronically large trade surplus was depressing job creation in the U.S. (b) the concern that China was using illegal and unfair methods to acquire U.S. technology at an effectively discounted price; and (c) the concern that China seeks to weaken U.S. national security and its international standing. On the dispute over China’s exchange rate and trade imbalance, the first conclusion is that it was marked by analytical confusion over the meaning of the term ‘equilibrium exchange rate’. The second conclusion is that China’s trade imbalance reflects the economic conditions in both China and U.S., and that the efficient and fair solution of the problem requires policy changes in both countries. On the industrial policy dispute, the first conclusion is that the issue of forced technology transfer is largely a dispute about China using its market power to benefit itself at the expense of its trade partners. The second conclusion is that China’s use of market power can last only until the other large countries could unite and retaliate as a group. The inevitability of retaliation means that China should replace the joint-venture (JV) mechanism for technological diffusion with other ways to strengthen its technological capability. On the U.S. concern about whether China trade weakens its national security, the first conclusion is that the notion of national security that is commonly adopted in the U.S. trade policy debate is ignorant about the primary determinants of U.S. capability in innovation. By focusing instead mainly on how to hold down China technologically, the long-run outcome will be a technologically weaker U.S. and hence, a more vulnerable U.S. The second conclusion is that the U.S. must identify a clear, short list of critical technologies and critical infrastructure for the recently reformed Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to cover, and update this list constantly. Otherwise, the broad and changing nature of notions about national security would allow the bureaucratically driven phenomenon of mission-creep to steadily expand the coverage of the CFIUS process, thereby steadily rendering CFIUS to be operationally capricious. Our principal policy suggestion to China is that, because China’s economy in 2018 is very different from that in 1978 (e.g. many parts of China now look like Singapore and China is Africa’s biggest donor), there should be more reciprocity in China’s trade and investment relations with the advanced economies despite China’s status as a developing economy under WTO rules. Our principal policy suggestion to President Trump is to stop equating strategic competition with economic competition. Strategic competition is normally a zero-sum game. While fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run.     

The causes of government expenditure growth: A survey of the U.S. evidence

The growth of government budgets can be broken down into a-institutional and institutional components. The former component — the familiar substitution, income, and population/public goods-tax sharing effects — is estimated to contribute about two-fifths of the growth of U.S. government spending. The latter component — rent-seeking political redistributions, bureaucracy and perceptual/informational impedimentia — is important, too, but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory. The cross-effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures, though interesting, is not pursued.     

全球经济失衡的调整趋势 ——基于美国中心的视角

本文对以美国为中心的全球经济失衡模式进行了趋势性分析。尽管外部失衡呈现出周期性的调整，但这些调整过程也是围绕着美国的经济和利益中心而展开的。对于美国而言，它并不需要刻意对其逆差大小进行调整，而主要通过金融渠道的资本流动收益为其贸易逆差提供融资；其外部失衡的调整是贸易失衡对象的转换，而不是贸易余额的逆转。对于顺差方，外部失衡的调整意味着贸易条件的恶化和经济结构的调整，出口贸易地位将逐步被弱化和替代。以美国为中心的全球经济失衡模式将继续存在，除非美元崩溃和美国经济霸主地位丧失。     

Import competition,fast-track authority and U.S. policy toward China

Has the rise of China influenced U.S. legislation? China’s economic rise in the past 30 years has largely been driven by its exports of labor intensive products. Taking advantage of this supply shock in the United States and cross-district variation in the composition of industries, we investigate the potential role of Chinese imports in U.S. legislators’ decision on granting Fast-Track Authority to the president. Consistent with Conconi et al. (2012), our empirical analyses indicate that in districts with more industries that are exposed to Chinese import competition, legislators are less likely to give up the power to amend international trade agreements. Interestingly, Chinese imports may distort the view of constituents toward China which render legislators in districts subject to large Chinese import competition to take an affirmative position on foreign policy that may hurt China.     

DRIFTING APART: CANADIAN AND U.S. LABOR MARKETS

Canadian and U.S. unemployment rates moved together within a narrow margin from 1961 to the mid-1970s. Since then, Canadian rates have exceeded U.S. rates by large margins—at times as much as 3 percentage points. Throughout this period, interest rates in the two countries have been nearly identical. Aggregate demand stimulation by government deficits has been greater in Canada than in the U.S., and the trade surplus in Canada has added to demand while the trade deficit in the U.S. has subtracted from demand. Therefore, it seems that conventional Keynesian arguments cannot explain the recent differences in unemployment rates.
Differences in labor market developments, however, can do so. During a period when real wages rose 35 percent in Canada, they fell 5 percent in the U.S. Since the recession of 1981, U.S. wages have dropped while Canadian wages have remained constant. Differences in labor productivity do not account for these developments. A strong case exists for the argument that the different paths of unemployment rates are due to different paths of real wage developments.
It is argued that the causes for these differences in labor market conditions are associated with substantial growth and decreases in unionization rates in Canada and the U.S., respectively. In addition, the unemployment insurance system in Canada is shown to be considerably more generous than that in the U.S.     

Impact of exchange-rate variability on commodity trade between U.S. and Germany

Previous studies that looked at the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows used aggregate trade data between one country and rest of the world or between two countries. More recent studies, however, have expanded the literature by using a highly disaggregated commodity level data between two countries. In this paper we consider the sensitivity of 131 industries that trade between U.S. and Germany. We find that exports and imports of a majority of the industries react to the real dollar–euro volatility in the short run. The short-run effects, however, last into the long run only in almost 50 % of the industries. Among these industries, while almost all U.S. exporting industries are affected favorably by exchange rate volatility, a majority of the U.S. importing industries are affected adversely.     

Fiscal financing and the efficacy of fiscal policy in Korea: An empirical assessment with comparison to the U.S. evidence

This paper aims to assess the empirical implications of fiscal financing in Korea and study how they differ from those of the U.S. We estimate two versions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—a small open economy (SOE) model for Korea and its closed economy counterpart for the U.S.—in which the former nests the latter as a special case. The fiscal policy specification posits that government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor income, capital income and consumption expenditures respond to the level of government debt and the state of economic activity. Analysis of the data from 2000 to 2015 shows that distortionary capital taxes play a critical role in stabilizing government debt in the U.S., whereas non-distorting fiscal instruments are the primary means of fiscal adjustment in Korea. Regarding the magnitude of debt-financed fiscal stimuli, the substantial trade openness of Korea is significant in that it produces relatively smaller government spending and transfer multipliers compared to the U.S.     

Asymmetric J-curve: evidence from industry trade between U.S. and U.K.

ABSTRACT

Previous research that assessed the impact of exchange rate changes on the trade balance between the U.S. and U.K. assumed the effects are symmetric. In this paper, we add to the literature on the asymmetric J-curve phenomenon by considering the trade balance of 68 two-digit industries that trade between the two countries. We find short-run asymmetric effects of the real dollar-pound rate in almost all industries. However, short-run asymmetric effects were translated into significant long-run asymmetric effects in 25 industries. Indeed, the asymmetric J-curve hypothesis was supported in 18 industries.     

直接投资引致的美中贸易逆差:经验研究

运用基于误差修正模型的格兰杰因果关系检验模型,在商品分类层面研究关中贸易逆差与关国对华直接投资的内在联系。结果显示：从长期和短期来看,中国制成品的出口都是关中贸易逆差的“因”,中国制成品的出口与关国对华直接投资之间具有显著的双向格兰杰因果关系,因此关国进入中国的FDI,尤其是进入制造业的FDI越多,美中贸易逆差就越大;美中贸易逆差是结构性的,它不仅不会在短期内消除,而且会随着美国劳动密集型产业向中国的进一步转移而加剧。     

Mexican real wages and the U.S. economy

This article examines real wage determinants from 1996 to 2014 across Mexican states. Real wages are determined in equilibrium by combining labor supply (years of education and population growth) and labor demand (mostly external factors) forces. Panel data models provide two main results. First, years of education and U.S. real GDP appear to be reliable predictors of wages in fixed effects models, with very marked changes after the U.S. 2008–2009 financial crisis and stronger effects on northern Mexican states. Second, dynamic panels confirm the role of foreign forces: positive from the U.S. economy and negative from the real exchange rate.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the post-war U.S.

A New Keynesian model allowing for an active monetary and passive fiscal policy (AMPF) regime and a passive monetary and active fiscal policy (PMAF) regime is estimated to fit various U.S. samples from 1955 to 2007. The results show that data in the pre-Volcker periods strongly prefer an AMPF regime, even with a prior centered in the PMAF region. The estimation, however, is not very informative about whether the Federal Reserve's reaction to inflation is greater than one in the pre-Volcker period, because much lower values can still preserve determinacy under passive fiscal policy. In addition, whether a PMAF regime can generate consumption growth following a government spending increase depends on the degree of price stickiness. An income tax cut can yield an unusual negative labor response if monetary policy aggressively stabilizes output growth.