BORROWING RELATIONSHIPS,MONITORING, AND THE INFLUENCE ON LOAN RATES

While monitoring borrowers, a bank obtains private information about its customers, giving the bank an informational advantage in the production of subsequent services. Competing theories exist on the way banks use this advantage in the pricing of subsequent services to the customer. If moral hazard limits the transfer of private information, the borrowing relationship transforms into an informational monopoly and can be characterized as a “wasting asset.” Alternately, if the banks' competitive environment necessitates that cost economies are shared, the relationship has “value.” Ordering pairs of successive loans made to a particular borrower as prior loans and subsequent loans, and controlling for environmental, borrower, and loan characteristics, we show that the subsequent loan is priced significantly lower than the prior loan.     

Macroeconomic Implications of “Deep Habits” in Banking

Recent empirical evidence shows that price‐cost margins in the market for bank credit are countercyclical in the U.S. economy and that this cyclical behavior can be explained in part from the fact that switching banks is costly for customers (i.e., from a borrower hold‐up effect). Our goal, in this paper, is to study the “financial accelerator” role of these countercyclical margins as a propagation mechanism of macroeconomic shocks. To do so, we apply the “deep habits” framework in Ravn, Schmitt‐Grohé, and Uribe (2006) to financial markets to model this hold‐up effect within a monopolistically competitive banking industry. We are able to reproduce the pattern of price‐cost margins observed in the data, and to show that the real effects of aggregate total factor productivity shocks are larger the stronger the friction implied by borrower hold‐up. Also, output, investment, and employment all become more volatile than in a standard model with constant margins in credit markets. An empirical contribution of our work is to provide structural estimates of the deep habits parameters for financial markets.     

Liquidity creation through efficient M&As: A viable solution for vulnerable banking systems? Evidence from a stress test under a panel VAR methodology

According to the “cost efficiency - liquidity creation” hypothesis (CELCH), introduced in this paper, a rise in a bank’s cost efficiency level increases its liquidity creation. By employing a novel stress test scenario under a panel VAR methodology, the CELCH and the direction of causality between liquidity creation and cost efficiency are tested. Moreover, using new measures of liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), the question of whether potential bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can enhance liquidity creation and generate additional credit channels in the economy is addressed. The robustness of potential consolidation scenarios are evaluated and compared through the use of new “half-life” measures (Chortareas and Kapetanios, 2013). In line with CELCH, the positive impact of cost efficiency on liquidity creation is shown. The empirical evidence further suggests that potential consolidation activity can enhance the flow of credit in the economy. Bank shocks seem to have the most persistent effect on both liquidity creation and cost efficiency. Finally, doubts are cast on the strategies followed by policy authorities regarding the recent wave of M&As in the banking sector.     

Prototype risk rating system

This paper explores the traditional and prevalent approach to credit risk assessment – the rating system. We first describe the rating systems of the two main credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Then we show how an internal rating system in a bank can be organized in order to rate creditors systematically. We suggest adopting a two-tier rating system. First, an obligor rating that can be easily mapped to a default probability bucket. Second, a facility rating that determines the loss parameters in case of default, such as (i) “loss given default” (LGD), which depends on the seniority of the facility and the quality of the gurantees, and (ii) “usage given default” (UGD) for loan commitments, which depends on the nature of the commitment and the rating history of the borrower.     

The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return

Previous research demonstrates that a firm's common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities. By contrast, commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns. This article investigates whether the lender's identity influences the market's reaction to a loan announcement. Although we find no significant difference between the market's response to bank and nonbank loans, we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns. This evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor's or investment banker's perceived “quality” signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors.     

Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program

This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) Program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm–bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it was a relationship lender (main bank) that extended an ECG loan, the increased availability was partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extended ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm–bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.     

Do capital flows change domestic credit allocation?

Since the 1990s, domestic bank credit has been reallocated away from lending to non-financial business and toward households. An expanding literature discusses negative effects on growth and stability of this change in credit allocation. We research its drivers. We hypothesize that if foreign capital flows into economies with few investment opportunities, it may substitute for domestic bank lending to non-financial business, so that bank balance sheets become more dominated by household lending. In GMM estimations on data for 36 economies over 1990–2011, we find evidence consistent with this mechanism. Foreign capital inflows into the non-bank sector (but not into the bank sector) are associated with lower shares of business lending in domestic bank portfolios. The association is weaker in economies with more investment opportunities, whether proxied by investment shares, current account surpluses, or EMU membership. Our results highlight the importance of sectoral destination in determining the effects of capital flows.     

How effective are macroprudential policies? An empirical investigation

In recent years, policymakers have generally relied on macroprudential policies to address financial stability concerns. However, our understanding of these policies and their efficacy is limited. In this paper, we construct a novel index of macroprudential policies in 57 advanced and emerging economies covering the period from 2000:Q1 to 2013:Q4, with tightenings and easings recorded separately. The effectiveness of these policies in curbing credit growth and house price appreciation is then assessed using a dynamic panel data model. The main findings of the paper are: (1) Macroprudential policies have been used far more actively after the global financial crisis in both advanced and emerging economies. (2) These policies have primarily targeted the housing sector, especially in the advanced economies. (3) Macroprudential policies are usually changed in tandem with bank reserve requirements, capital flow restrictions, and monetary policy. (4) Our analysis suggests that macroprudential tightening is associated with lower bank credit growth, housing credit growth, and house price appreciation. (5) Targeted policies – for example, those specifically intended to limit house price appreciation – seem to be more effective, especially in economies where bank finance is important.     

Bank Forward Lending in Alternative Funding Environments

This paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit-funding and liability management environments. Assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain, the bank must choose its supply of commitments. Given this choice, the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders. Our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers' assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending, but merely “accommodate” the credit needs of their customers. Similarly, the central banker's claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short-run becomes understandable in a new context. It is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system. It is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments, expected bank and banking system size.     

The role of rating agency assessments in less developed countries: Impact of the proposed Basel guidelines

We assess the potential impact for non-high-income countries (NHICs) of linking bank capital asset requirements (CARs) to private sector ratings–as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Specifically, we show that linking bank CARs to external ratings would have a series of undesirable effects for NHICs. First, since ratings are by far less widespread for banks and corporations in NHICs, bank CARs would be practically insensitive to improvements in the quality of assets, widening the gap between banks of equal financial strength located in higher and lower income countries. Second, bank and corporate ratings in NHICs (as opposed to their homologues in high-income countries) are strongly linked to their sovereign ratings. This would expose bank capital requirements in NHICs to the same “pro-cyclical” swings, which have characterized sovereign rating revision in the recent crisis episodes. We conclude that linking bank CARs to private sector ratings would worsen the availability and cost of credit to NHICs – with potential negative effects on the level of economic activity – and suggest that a reassessment of the Basel proposal may help to avoid such undesired consequences.     

Public initiatives to support entrepreneurs: Credit guarantees versus co-funding

We analyze financial support for the entrepreneurial sector. State support can raise welfare by relaxing financial constraints, but it can also reduce lending standards if entrepreneurs substitute public sources of collateral for their own assets, if it encourages excessive entrepreneurial entry, or if it undermines bank monitoring incentives. We derive a “pecking order” for support schemes: support funds should be channeled first to credit guarantee schemes and then, when entrepreneurs start to substitute public for private collateral, to co-funding entrepreneurial projects. The optimal level of credit guarantee is diminishing in the costs of incentivising bank monitoring. We show in an extension that the long-term effect of public subsidies may be to impair the private sector’s initiative to uncover cost savings.     

Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence from Exporting Firms

We develop a novel approach for measuring bank specialization using granular data on borrower activities and apply it to Peruvian exporters and their banks. We find that borrowers seek credit from banks that specialize in their export destinations, both when expanding exports and when exporting to new countries. Firms experiencing country-specific export demand shocks adjust borrowing disproportionately from specialized banks. Specialized bank credit supply shocks affect exports disproportionately to countries of specialization. Our results demonstrate that firm credit demand is bank- and activity-specific, which reduces banking competition and affects the transmission and amplification of shocks through the banking sector.     

Banks' consumer lending reaction to fintech and bigtech credit emergence in the context of soft versus hard credit information processing

Access to credit information and the ability to process this information effectively determine the conditions of competition in the credit market. Traditionally, local banks have had an advantage in relationship lending (based on soft credit information), whereas foreign banks are considered to base on hard credit information. With the advent of financial technology (or “fintech”) companies (or “fintechs”) and giant technology (or “bigtech”) companies (or “bigtechs”) providing alternative credit, the conditions of competition in the credit market have changed. In this empirical study, we shed light on the nature of the information advantages fintech and bigtech companies have compared to banks and how alternative lenders use them. We analyze competition in the consumer lending segment between banks and fintechs as well as bigtechs providing alternative lending. We used a database combining bank-level characteristics and country-level proxies for 72 countries from 2013 to 2018. We find that in developed markets, the relationships between fintech and bigtech credit providers and banks are similar and competitive in nature. However, banks' consumer lending grows simultaneously with fintech credit market development in emerging economies, but decreases in the aftermath of the emergence of bigtech credit. Fintech credit seems to penetrate market segments not serviced by banks; thus, it plays a complementary role, however only in emerging economies. Bigtech companies compete even more with banks and push some banking offers out of the market, both in emerging and developed economies. Furthermore, we show that domestic and privately-owned banks are more negatively affected by competition from technology-based lending, particularly bigtech, than foreign banks. Thus, bigtech lending may be treated as a serious competition for banks' relationship lending based on soft credit information processing, traditionally provisioned by local banks.     

Bank competition,concentration and EU SME cost of debt

Despite the plentiful debate on the effects of bank competition on SME access to finance and growth, only few studies have explored the impacts on SME cost of debt. This study examines how bank market power affects the credit costs of SMEs by using unique matched SME-bank data from 17 EU countries. We show that bank market power reduces the cost of debt for SMEs. Such a favorable effect is stronger for SMEs that are less informationally transparent, and in the economies subject to less credit information depth and business extent of disclosure. These findings support the Information-based Hypothesis, whereby market power motivates banks to invest in soft information acquisition and to build lending relationships to reduce information costs. In addition, we show that despite the favorable effects of relationship lending brought by bank market power, SME credit conditions worsen in a more concentrated banking market.     

Lending relationships in line-of-credit and nonline-of-credit loans: Evidence from collateral use in small business

Lender–borrower relationships facilitate monitoring in small business loans. We investigate how the duration and scope of the bank–borrower relationship affect the decision to secure line-of-credit and nonline-of-credit loans. We find that the likelihood of collateralizing a line of credit decreases with the length of the bank–borrower relationship. For nonline-of-credit loans, however, the incidence of collateral pledge decreases with the number of lender-provided financial services used by the borrower. Our finding indicates that the mechanism through which banks obtain private information depends on the type of the loan. Pooling across loan types may dilute the impact of both the duration and scope on the terms of a loan.     

Information asymmetry,external certification,and the cost of bank debt

This paper examines how the cost of bank debt reflects public information about borrower quality, and whether such information complements or substitutes the private information of banks. Using a sample of small business loans, and the award of a competitive public subsidy as an observable positive signal of external certification, we find that certification is associated with a lower cost of debt for subsidy recipients if the amount of private information of the lender is limited or the local credit market is less competitive. Public information loses importance once the bank accumulates information over the course of the lending relationship or the credit market is more competitive. Our results highlight a positive effect of external certification, driven by the signal it provides to both the lending bank and its competitors, and suggest that public and private information can be substitutes in the pricing of bank debt.     

银行竞争背景下定向降准政策的“普惠”效应——基于A股和新三板三农、小微企业数据的分析

本文基于A股和新三板企业的微观数据,采用倍差法(DID)检验定向降准货币政策的实施是否对农业和小微企业等所谓“弱势部门”的信贷资源产生了作用,从而实现政策的“普惠”效应。同时基于定向降准政策的影响机制,本文将基于时间维度和区域维度的银行竞争引入实证模型,进一步探讨了银行竞争对定向降准政策“普惠”效应的影响。结果表明:首先,我国定向降准政策可以促进农业企业和小微企业获取信贷资源,发挥了普惠效应;其次,银行竞争可以在一定程度上对定向降准政策的“普惠”效应表现出正向调节作用,具体来说,时间维度的银行竞争对定向降准政策的“普惠”效应的影响较为明显,区域维度的银行竞争没有调节作用。     

劳动力成本与中小企业融资约束

本文利用世界银行提供的中国企业调查数据,基于信贷配给理论,考察劳动力成本对企业融资约束的影响。分别以劳动力成本占企业总成本的比重和劳动力成本相对于企业销售额的比值作为劳动力成本代理指标,通过考察企业是否需要银行贷款的自主决策与贷款可得性两方面信息,甄别企业受到的不同类型的信贷配给,进而系统考察劳动力成本对企业信贷约束的影响。研究发现:第一,劳动力成本显著地提高了企业受到信贷配给约束的概率,信贷对劳动力成本较高的企业具有明显的“筛选效应”;第二,劳动力成本对企业受到银行信贷配给和自我信贷配给约束的概率均有显著的正向影响,说明劳动力成本较高的企业不仅会受到更高的来自银行的信贷约束,还会受到来自自身的信贷约束,形成双重“筛选效应”;第三,机制分析表明,较高的金融发展程度和市场化水平通过减轻信息不对称问题,能够显著缓解“筛选效应”的不利影响。本研究为深化金融供给侧结构性改革、破解企业融资难题提供了新的政策启示。     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

Bank Lending Standards and Access to Lines of Credit

This paper examines how changes in bank lending standards are related to the availability of bank lines of credit for private and comparable public firms. Overall, we find that access to lines of credit is more contingent on bank lending standards for private than for public firms. The impact of bank lending standards is however asymmetric: while private firms are less likely than public firms to gain access to new lines when credit market conditions are tight, we find no difference between public and private firms in terms of their use or retention of pre‐existing lines. We also find that private firms without lines of credit use more trade credit when bank lending standards are tight, which is suggestive of a supply effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that “credit crunches” are likely to have a disproportionate impact on private firms. However, pre‐existing banking relationships appear to mitigate the impact of these contractions on private firms.