中美贸易中隐含的碳排放以及贸易环境效应——基于环境投入产出法的实证分析

中美贸易的巨额逆差带来的不仅仅是贸易问题,还包括一系列的环境问题。利用环境投入产出模型测算1997年-2009年中美贸易中所隐含的CO2排放量,得出如下结论:中美贸易中中国大部分行业污染贸易条件均大于1,且呈不断恶化趋势;出口规模越大、贸易竞争力越强的产业单位出口的CO2排放强度越小,中国出口美国的产品与污染品并无必然联系;美国对华FDI转移并未引起美国污染产业向中国转移,而全球FDI向华转移使得"污染天堂"理论在华成立;中国出口CO2排放速度低于其出口速度,单位出口的CO2排放强度呈下降趋势;改变中国污染顺差国的地位,中国需加强对美国污染品的进口,积极改变粗放型的生产方式,加快对价值链高端清洁产品的生产。     

论中美高技术产品贸易失衡之“谜”

中美高技术产品贸易失衡是由中美两国在高技术产品上出现与其比较优势不符的贸易所致。21世纪初,中美高技术产品贸易失衡主要表现为中美信息与通讯贸易顺差,以及中国对美部分高技术产品贸易顺差转为逆差;美国对华技术出口管制对贸易失衡的影响在减弱,外商对华高技术产品加工生产工序的产业转移,成为失衡的主要原因。由此造成美国、中国、东亚经济体在中美高技术产品贸易中形成三方"互利",但非"共赢"的利益分配格局。     

要素禀赋、制度红利与新型出口比较优势

本文在Eaton Kortum(2002)的基础上,从理论上研究了制度因素与行业特征的协同效应对出口的影响,以此来寻求中国新型出口比较优势的来源。研究表明,在一国的制度质量越过"制度门槛"的条件下,该国制度因素与行业特征的协同效应有利于该国对外出口并塑造制度比较优势;出口国对贸易伙伴国在制度质量上相对占优时,制度因素与行业特征的协同效应能够促进其对贸易伙伴国的出口。随后,本文运用我国20个行业对148个国家或地区时间跨度为20年的面板数据,分别检验了金融发展、教育发展、知识产权保护和法制水平等制度因素与产业特征的协同效应对出口的影响。     

中国对美国农产品贸易关系的持续时间分析

本文采用CEPII-BACI数据库1995-2009年中国出口到美国HS6分位农产品出口贸易数据,利用生存分析方法探讨中国对美国农产品出口贸易的持续时间。研究发现:中国对美国农产品出口持续时间普遍较短,中位生存时间为2年,59.2%的持续时间段在2年内消失;中美农产品贸易关系的风险函数存在明显的"门槛效应"。因此,在制定我国农产品对美国出口的贸易政策的过程中,农产品的出口持续时间应得到足够的重视。     

从产业转移看中美贸易不平衡

在回顾中美贸易发展和有关理论分析的基础上,结合外国对华产业转移和美国对外产业转移的事实,本文发现中美贸易不平衡是由经济全球化所引起的国家间比较优势动态转变所造成的,是国际分工主导下国际产业转移的必然结果。美国对外产业转移和外国对华产业转移促成了中国对美的巨额贸易顺差,只要产业转移趋势依然存在且美国不调整其经济结构,中美贸易不平衡的局面就难以发生根本性的改变。     

影响中美经贸合作的消极因素

近年来,在美国国内存在一系列影响中美经贸合作的片面认识和消极因素,如认为"中国贸易只惠己"、"中国对美出口剥夺了美国制造业工人的就业机会"、"中国对美国企业关闭市场"、"人民币汇率导致美中贸易逆差"等.从美国国内政治角度看,这些消极因素的产生和存在有其政治博弈的根源;从国际政治角度看,有其遏制中国的意图.应正确分析影响中美经贸合作的消极因素,以便理性应对,推动中美经贸合作良性发展.     

中美技术贸易国际竞争力比较研究

随着全球经济的快速发展,国际贸易面临新的机遇与挑战,我国国际贸易发展模式从量向质的转变显得尤为重要。运用国际市场占有率(IMS)指数、显示性比较优势指数(RCA)、出口技术复杂度指数(ES)对中美两国技术贸易国际竞争力进行比较研究,并从技术贸易总体和细分行业,技术贸易数量和质量两个方面对中美两国技术贸易国际竞争力进行测算分析。研究显示:我国软技术贸易远落后于美国发展水平,尤其是细分行业中知识产权发展水平较低;硬技术贸易和美国相比发展较快,在全球市场上具有比较优势,细分行业中的计算机、电子通讯行业具有较强的竞争优势,而航空航天技术、医药品等行业弱势明显。     

人民币汇率波动的第三国效应对中国出口的影响——基于中美韩三角贸易的实证研究

本文基于在东亚生产网络中的中美韩三国的三角贸易模式,对中国对美国出口贸易是否存在汇率波动的第三国效应进行实证研究.首先利用三角贸易指数刻画了中关韩三国三角贸易的动态演变,并对“韩国出口中国”和“中国出口美国”的贸易数据进行格兰杰因果检验,证实了“韩国出口中国中间品-中国出口美国消费品”的贸易模式是中关韩三角贸易关系的实质,并基于此建立了包含美元和韩元兑人民币汇率波动变量的中美出口贸易协整和误差修正模型.研究结果表明在长短期内中国对美国出口贸易中都受到韩元兑人民币汇率波动的影响,即存在显著的汇率波动的第三国效应;在长期韩元兑人民币汇率波动对中国对美出口有正向的显著的第三国效应,其效应弹性要小于中美汇率双边波动效应弹性并与之方向相反;而短期内韩元兑人民币汇率波动对出口的增长有显著的负向效应.     

中美贸易摩擦分析及对策研究

中美贸易摩擦由来已久,主要体现在美国对华反倾销、中美纺织品贸易摩擦和知识产权保护问题三个方面.由于美国对高科技出口的管制政策,美在华外资企业出口的增多、世界经济不景气导致美国出口的下滑和政治因素导致的双边贸易平衡问题是导致中美经贸摩擦的症结所在.对此,中国应主要采取妥善处理中美双边经贸关系、积极应对中美贸易纠纷、大力发展"内需型经济",逐步改变过度依赖外需的局面、加快"走出去"步伐等政策.     

显性比较优势与中美贸易不平衡

中国和美国分别是世界第二和第一大经济体和货物贸易国,中美贸易在世界贸易中占有举足轻重的地位。近年来,随着中美贸易的快速发展,双边贸易不平衡也日渐引起关注。本文通过对中美两国显性比较优势指数的测算和对比,从比较优势的角度对巨额中美贸易顺差做出了解释,同时也指出,比较优势的不同仅仅是中美贸易不平衡的一个原因,中美贸易往来并不完全符合显性比较优势指数的测算结果。     

贸易统计差异与中美贸易平衡问题

本文研究发现(1)中美进出口计价方式不同和运输时滞导致双边贸易统计数据存在差异是自然的。(2)参照剔除香港转口毛利后中美贸易新估计值,1995—2003年美国对华出口低估年均在24%以上,从华进口高估年均在35%以上,而中国对美出口低估年均在20%以上,从美进口相对没变。(3)考虑服务贸易后,美中商品与服务贸易逆差估计值与中国对美贸易顺差新估计值已相当接近。上述结果得到IMF数据的证实。(4)外商在华直接投资增加会造成中国对美出口增加、对美贸易顺差增加。依据中美两国月度数据计量的结论是相一致的。这一结果证实中美贸易平衡问题已超越中美两国贸易范围而成为外商在华直接投资所引致的贸易逆差转移问题。剔除外资企业进出口贡献及贸易统计差异后,中国对美贸易估计值已非常趋近于美国对华贸易估计值。     

美中贸易收支与人民币汇率关系:实证分析

针对美中贸易收支与人民币汇率问题,经研究发现,汇率变动对贸易收支的影响是值得怀疑的,仅仅依靠人民币汇率变动是无法解决美中贸易逆差问题的。1994—2002年年度数据实证显示,美中贸易收支与人民币汇率(名义或实际汇率)之间没有稳定的关系;1998—2003年月度数据计量表明,美中贸易收支与人民币汇率之间没有长期稳定的协整关系。并且,依据美中两国月度统计数据计量的结论是相一致的。因此,“人民币升值论”或许更多的是基于政治而非经济因素,人民币汇率浮动并不能解决美中贸易逆差问题。     

生产分工视角的中国对美国货物出口竞争力验证

考虑生产分工对中美间经贸联系程度、贸易规模和结构的影响,基于生产分工下价值链视角,构建出口竞争力测度指标体系,验证中国对美国货物出口竞争力。结果显示:2016年及之前,中国仅在杂项制品大类上,对美国显示出较强出口竞争力,机械和运输设备、动物和植物油、油脂和蜡我国具有比较优势,化学成品及有关产品、按原料分类的制成品双方竞争性较强,其余大类上,中国对美国出口竞争力不具优势。引入其他国家作对比的分析结果表明:中国对对比国家均无显著出口竞争力,而且对美国出口具有单价优势的资本技术密集型产品,对这些国家出口多缺乏单价优势,而2017年以来对美国和对比国家的贸易变化,进一步勾画出中国对美国货物出口竞争力不足。在生产分工主导全球产业发展背景下,提升我国在全球生产分工中的参与地位,宜强化自主技术研发、提升外资质量和技术外溢、加快"走出去"学习先进技术。     

中、日、韩知识密集型服务贸易结构变动及比较优势的实证研究——基于RCA与特化系数等的分析

笔者从进出口总量、贸易结构与贸易竞争力3个角度,应用对称性RCA指数、特化系数等指标,对于21世纪以来中、日、韩知识密集型服务贸易比较优势与贸易结构变化进行了比较分析。研究结果表明:中国知识密集型服务贸易逆差较大,且呈现出扩大的趋势,对知识密集型服务贸易需求急剧增长;在知识密集型服务贸易领域,中国在整体上比较优势弱,与日本、韩国相比,还有很大差距;从分项目的知识密集型服务贸易来看,中国位于知识密集型服务贸易的低端,中国弱势行业多为2国强势行业,中国通讯贸易与韩国通讯贸易在出口上存在竞争。     

Understanding the recent Sino-U.S. trade conflict

ABSTRACT

To understand Sino-U.S. trade relations, this article interprets the trade imbalance between China and the United States from the Trump administration’s perspective. The Trump administration claims that the Chinese government’s subsidies and high import tariffs cause the Sino-U.S. trade deficit, resulting in job losses in the U.S. The Trump administration therefore argues that imposing high tariffs on Chinese exports can resolve the deficit. The article finds that U.S. statistical accounting overestimates the deficit. Reducing China’s imports cannot increase U.S. employment, and China provides the United States with low-price and high-quality products. Chinese investors tend to invest the surplus by purchasing U.S. Treasury bonds. In addition, the United States limits Chinese investments due to ‘national security’ concerns. China’s upgrading to the high end of the global value chain is a consequence of economic development. Therefore, the two countries should rebalance Sino-U.S. trade by seeking economic and trade cooperation via trade negotiations.     

Import competition,fast-track authority and U.S. policy toward China

Has the rise of China influenced U.S. legislation? China’s economic rise in the past 30 years has largely been driven by its exports of labor intensive products. Taking advantage of this supply shock in the United States and cross-district variation in the composition of industries, we investigate the potential role of Chinese imports in U.S. legislators’ decision on granting Fast-Track Authority to the president. Consistent with Conconi et al. (2012), our empirical analyses indicate that in districts with more industries that are exposed to Chinese import competition, legislators are less likely to give up the power to amend international trade agreements. Interestingly, Chinese imports may distort the view of constituents toward China which render legislators in districts subject to large Chinese import competition to take an affirmative position on foreign policy that may hurt China.     

美国金融危机对我国进出口贸易冲击的实证研究

中美两国互补型的直接贸易关系紧密,美国金融危机导致美国国内收入水平的下降、美元贬值以及物价水平波动易通过直接贸易溢出对中国进出口贸易状况形成冲击。研究发现,危机通过收入效应对我国贸易状况产生的溢出较弱,而通过价格效应对我国贸易状况产生了明显溢出,并且对我国的出口贸易冲击较大。出口贸易对美国价格水平变化冲击的响应强度、持续时间和衰减方式都发生了显著变化。     

基于人力资本视角的中国服务贸易比较优势分析

随着全球产业结构的升级和国际贸易的发展,服务贸易成为了各国竞争的焦点。研究服务贸易比较优势的形成和转换成为了当务之急。本文从服务贸易总量、国际市场占有率、服务贸易结构三个方面对我国服务贸易的比较优势进行了测度,结果表明我国服务贸易总量增长迅速,远超于世界平均水平,但是总体竞争力低,结构不平衡。运用1982—2006年的数据,以柯布·道格拉斯生产函数为基础,构建服务贸易比较优势影响因素的多要素模型进行实证分析,回归结果显示,物质资本、劳动力、人力资本和FDI对服务贸易出口显著正相关。其中,劳动力的产出弹性最大,人力资本的产出弹性次之,说明我国服务贸易的比较优势主要来源于劳动力,人力资本的促进作用较小,从加大教育投入、增强技术创新、吸引外国投资方面提出促进我国服务贸易比较优势转换的建议。     

Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War

ABSTRACT

Three major concerns drove the U.S. into initiating the trade war, and they are (a) the concern that China’s chronically large trade surplus was depressing job creation in the U.S. (b) the concern that China was using illegal and unfair methods to acquire U.S. technology at an effectively discounted price; and (c) the concern that China seeks to weaken U.S. national security and its international standing. On the dispute over China’s exchange rate and trade imbalance, the first conclusion is that it was marked by analytical confusion over the meaning of the term ‘equilibrium exchange rate’. The second conclusion is that China’s trade imbalance reflects the economic conditions in both China and U.S., and that the efficient and fair solution of the problem requires policy changes in both countries. On the industrial policy dispute, the first conclusion is that the issue of forced technology transfer is largely a dispute about China using its market power to benefit itself at the expense of its trade partners. The second conclusion is that China’s use of market power can last only until the other large countries could unite and retaliate as a group. The inevitability of retaliation means that China should replace the joint-venture (JV) mechanism for technological diffusion with other ways to strengthen its technological capability. On the U.S. concern about whether China trade weakens its national security, the first conclusion is that the notion of national security that is commonly adopted in the U.S. trade policy debate is ignorant about the primary determinants of U.S. capability in innovation. By focusing instead mainly on how to hold down China technologically, the long-run outcome will be a technologically weaker U.S. and hence, a more vulnerable U.S. The second conclusion is that the U.S. must identify a clear, short list of critical technologies and critical infrastructure for the recently reformed Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to cover, and update this list constantly. Otherwise, the broad and changing nature of notions about national security would allow the bureaucratically driven phenomenon of mission-creep to steadily expand the coverage of the CFIUS process, thereby steadily rendering CFIUS to be operationally capricious. Our principal policy suggestion to China is that, because China’s economy in 2018 is very different from that in 1978 (e.g. many parts of China now look like Singapore and China is Africa’s biggest donor), there should be more reciprocity in China’s trade and investment relations with the advanced economies despite China’s status as a developing economy under WTO rules. Our principal policy suggestion to President Trump is to stop equating strategic competition with economic competition. Strategic competition is normally a zero-sum game. While fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run.     

THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF U.S. AND SWEDISH MULTINATIONALS

While the U.S. and Sweden both lost more than 20 percent of their shares of world and developed countries' exports of manufactures between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, the export shares of their multinational firms stayed fairly stable or even increased. The multinationals raised the proportion of their worldwide exports that they supplied from their overseas affiliates. These developments suggest that the declines in the trade shares of the US. and Sweden were not due mainly to deterioration in the innovativeness or inventiveness of American and Swedish firms, their management ability or their technological capabilities, but rather to economic developments in the firms' home countries.
The finding that firms have done better as exporters than their home countries is strengthened when we look at different industry groups. In both the U.S. and Sweden, and in all industry groups, with one exception, the multinationals' export shares increased relative to those of their home countries. The margins were often wide, and were mostly larger for Swedish firms than for U.S. firms.
Part of the explanation for the growth of each country's exports and those of its multinationals is the initial composition of exports, or the comparative advantages of the countries and their firms. These were skewed, in the mid-1960s, to industries that were to enjoy rapid growth in the next decade or so. Despite these initial comparative advantages, the exports of both countries fell far behind world export growth.
The comparative advantages of both countries' multinationals were even more biased toward fast-growth industries than those of the countries. That fact partly accounted for the better export performance of the multinationals relative to their home countries, but the multinationals outperformed their countries within each industry as well as for manufacturing as a whole.