试论中国特色的社会主义司法制度

中国特色社会主义司法制度,是中国共产党领导广大人民群众,以马克思主义法律思想为指导,立足中国国情,在认真总结中国特色社会主义法治国家建设成功经验,科学借鉴人类法治文明优秀成果的基础上建立和发展起来的司法制度。中国特色社会主义司法制度是坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国的有机统一,具有无可比拟的政治优势和制度优势。当前中国的司法制度还存在司法地方化、司法腐败、司法程序不规范、司法监督机制不完善、“执行难”等问题,进一步深化司法体制改革,完善和发展中国特色的社会主义司法制度,对于我们实现“依法治国,建设社会主义法治国家”的战略目标,具有十分重要的意义。     

清初养廉银制度与当代公务员高薪养廉的比较研究

薪酬制度是公务员制度的重要组成部分,对廉政建设起着至关重要的作用。通过对比研究清初养廉银制度与当代公务员的高薪养廉制度,探讨清初养廉银制度的意义和失败的原因,并总结经验教训。同时,阐述了＂高薪不一定养廉,低薪肯定助贪＂的观点,并提出廉政建设的若干建议。     

反腐败、市场建设与经济增长

在市场不完善的情况下，有一部分腐败活动虽然有损于社会公平和正义，而且造成了社会资源的损耗，但对经济资源的配置也有着一定的作用。本文通过一个经济增长模型讨论了代表社会利益的政府如何规划反腐败路径，并保证经济的增长。分析结果表明。政府是可能在反腐败的同时实现经济增长的。一旦政府开始加大反腐败力度，则社会的腐败程度将持续下降。随着市场的完善，经济资源可以更好地借助于市场机制进行配置，这时社会可以加大打击腐败的力度。如果腐败的路径依赖性更强，政府也将加强对腐败的打击。     

反腐败、市场建设与经济增长

在市场不完善的情况下,有一部分腐败活动虽然有损于社会公平和正义,而且造成了社会资源的损耗,但对经济资源的配置也有着一定的作用.该文通过一个经济增长模型讨论了代表社会利益的政府如何规划反腐败路径,并保证经济的增长.分析结果表明,政府是可能在反腐败的同时实现经济增长的.一旦政府开始加大反腐败力度,则社会的腐败程度将持续下降.随着市场的完善,经济资源可以更好地借助于市场机制进行配置,这时社会可以加大打击腐败的力度.如果腐败的路径依赖性更强,政府也将加强对腐败的打击.     

我国反腐败工作的现状与进展

反腐败问题是现代社会所面临的一个共同课题。我国反腐败现状可以从监督、领导干部廉洁自律、查办违法违纪案件、纠正损害群众利益的不正之风和源头治理等五个方面来进行深入了解和总体把握。在此基础上,针对我国反腐败理论研究的薄弱环节,从“腐败”的概念和类型划分、反腐败的领域范围、预防腐败以及制定反腐败的专门法律等方面探讨和研究反腐败的基本问题,以便促进我们对反腐败工作的认识,并推动相关的工作。     

如何构建中国城市房屋强制拆迁的司法制度

中国城市房屋的强制拆迁应当由法院统一行使。城市房屋强制拆迁的司法制度就是在拆迁权利配置上,由法院规定并组织城市房屋强制拆迁,剥夺行政机关的强制拆迁权。在拆迁裁决还没有司法制度的前提下,由政府的房屋拆迁管理部门向有管理权的法院提出强制拆迁申请,由法院审查后,决定是否采取强制拆迁措施。法院的审查,不但包括在非诉案件中对拆迁裁决的审查,还包括在行政诉讼先予执行案件中对拆迁裁决的审查。对中国城市房屋拆迁强制措施司法制度进行构建,是一个涉及到立法及司法的系统工程,不但要在立法上夯实其法律基础,而且要在司法的过程中对许多问题加以明确。     

公务员工资该不该涨

正年初有消息披露要给公务员涨工资,一石激起千层浪,可以说这是新中国成立之后给公务员涨工资引起反响最强烈的一次。赞同者有之,说公务员多年未涨工资,处级工资水平还不如小时工;反对者也有之,认为公务员灰色收入太多,即使3年不发工资生活也没有问题,甚至有人     

腐败、反腐败和中国县际收入差距

中国经济的快速增长和地区间收入差距紧密相联。虽然目前大部分研究文献都用经济因素来解释这一问题,但文章认为,地方政府的反腐败力度也是影响地方收入水平的重要因素。通过利用中国县级横截面数据以及采用普通最小二乘法,文章发现,反腐败力度越大的县的收入水平越高。利用最近发展起来的夏普里值分解法来量化各个解释变量对收入差距的贡献率,文章还发现,反腐败是解释中国县际收入差距的一个重要因素。     

腐败与反腐败的理论逻辑

在经济飞速发展和改革逐步深入的今天,腐败问题已成为危害经济社会生活的毒瘤,而反腐败工作也日益提上了议事日程。本文描述了腐败对政治、经济与社会的危害,并在系统地分析了腐败成因的基础上,详细地论述了预防与治理并举的反腐败逻辑。     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Wage Rigidity,Inflation, and Institutions

We study the possible existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) at wage growth rates different from zero in aggregate data. Even if DNWR prevails at zero for individual workers, compositional effects might lead to falling aggregate wages, while changes in relative wages combined with DNWR might lead to positive aggregate wage growth. We explore industry data for 19 OECD countries, over the 1971–2006 period. We find evidence for a floor on nominal wage growth at 6 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, at 1 percent in the 1990s, and at 0.5 percent in the 2000s. Furthermore, we find that DNWR is stronger in country‐years with strict employment protection legislation, high union density, centralized wage setting, and high inflation.     

The stained China miracle: Corruption,regulation, and firm performance

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.     

Is the Efficiency Wage Efficient? The Social Norm and Organizational Corruption

The effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption. We model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem. We find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high, social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor; pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect—the snowball effect—which intensifies the corruption effect. This intensified effect, due to the snowballing character of social norms, may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages, resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm.
JEL classification : D 82; J 41     

How Political Institutions Determine Corporate Governance Reforms: The Polity,Law and Corporate Practices in the Case of Switzerland

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the role that political institutions play in the reform processes of national corporate governance regimes. I argue that existing theories are limited in that they conceive of political institutions' impact on corporate governance largely in terms of a deterministic influence on the political coalitions that emerge and on the policy outcomes. Based on the analysis of the paradigmatic case of a consensual democracy – Switzerland – I show that the consensual polity does not directly determine the outcome of a reform process, but rather the direction of causality between legal changes and changes in practices as well as the nature of the changes. Consensual polities require large parliamentary majorities for legal change to happen. Therefore, corporate practices are likely to change before legal rules and less demanding forms of institutional change, such as ‘layering’, are favoured.     

城市公用事业民营化中的腐败与削减

城市公用事业民营化虽然作为中国城市公用事业改革的趋势方向,同任何改革一样,也存在着负面效应,民营化中的腐败就是其主要负面效应之一.与民营化相关的腐败主要包括两个方面,即民营化中的国有资产流失与民营化后的寻租.本文分析了城市公用事业民营化中的腐败、形式、成因,并结合模型从预防角度上提出了治理对策.     

Wage Setting, Wage Curve and Phillips Curve: The Italian evidence

The purpose of this paper is to investigate some issues of wage setting in order to assess if nominal inertia and wage flexibility characterise the Italian supply side, using multivariate cointegration models. Our estimates indicate that an explicit distinction between stationary and non-stationary variables and a joint analysis of long-run and short-run structure is crucial for achieving clearer results. To this end, we use quarterly time series data for industry sector 1976:1–1993:4. Interesting results have been found concerning the empirical evidence of a long-run wage curve and the existence of a Phillips curve, through adopting alternative order reduction of the I(2) wage and price variables. Moreover, some insights on regional (North-South) unemployment effects are pointed out and discussed.     

Economics and the Supreme Court: The Case of the Minimum Wage

In the United States, laissez-faire has been the policy advocated in good times, while social legislation has been called for during crises. One instance of this dichotomy concerns the transformation of the American understanding of minimum wage laws during the early 20^th century. During this time, the view of minimum wage laws changed from one that viewed such laws as theft, to one that saw such laws as being required for distributional justness. We examine the legal-historical debate concerning whether the Supreme Court renounced its policy of laissez-faire individualism in its 1937 ruling finding the minimum wage law constitutional, arguing that it did not. We investigate the free market standard that the Court used to find minimum wage laws unconstitutional in 1923. We demonstrate how the economic conditions of the Depression, coupled with the development of economic theory, explain how the Court eventually found the minimum wage law constitutional.     

Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay

This paper explores the interaction between wage inequality and the marriage and fertility decisions of young women. We develop an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce, and investment in children that allows for differential timing of fertility. We show how patterns of fertility timing in U.S. data can be explained by the incentives for fertility delay implied by marriage and labor markets. We find that these incentives help explain both the cross-sectional relationship between women's wages and fertility timing and the changes over the past 40 years in married women's fertility timing and labor supply. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, J13.