管理防御与公司业绩的实证研究——基于高新技术企业与非高新技术企业上市公司数据

文章以中国上市公司2013—2017年相关数据为研究样本,分类探究高新技术企业和非高新技术企业经理人管理防御行为对公司绩效的影响,为抑制管理防御动机和行为,提高企业绩效提供经验证据。实证研究结果表明:高新技术企业中,管理者的年龄、任期、学历、薪酬、公司股权集中度、独立董事所占比例和董事长总经理两职设置情况对公司业绩有显著影响;非高新技术企业中,管理者年龄、学历、薪酬和两职设置情况与公司业绩有显著影响;不同因素在不同类型的企业中对公司业绩的影响作用程度也不尽相同。     

管理者持股对代理成本和企业业绩影响的文献综述

笔者认为,管理者持股对代理成本和企业业绩均有影响。通过对国内2000年到2012年相关文献的研究,学者采取计量经济学的方法,从高管薪酬、股权结构等角度,对管理者持股对代理成本的影响以及管理者持股对企业业绩的影响进行研究,研究结果各不相同。     

管理层激励与公司业绩

管理层激励是否能提升公司业绩一直是广大公司所有者关心的话题,也一直是学者们研究的热点。普遍的研究认为,管理层激励会提高公司业绩,减小股东与管理者之间的代理成本。本文分别从管理层薪酬、持股比例这两项显性激励和管理层在职消费这一隐形激励三个角度研究管理层激励与公司业绩之间的关系,并得出结论。     

上市公司高管特征与企业绩效关系研究——基于软件和信息技术服务业

高管人员是企业内部拥有最终决策权的团体,其战略决策势必将影响公司经营绩效。本文选取2018—2020年中国软件和信息技术服务业111家上市公司为样本,对高管平均年龄、平均学历、薪酬水平、持股比例等高管特征与企业绩效之间的关系进行研究,构建研究模型并进行描述统计、多元回归等实证分析。研究结果表明,高管年龄与企业绩效呈负相关;其受教育程度、薪酬水平、持股比例均与企业绩效呈显著正相关。     

债务对管理层薪酬业绩敏感性影响

管理者权力视角下,将管理层薪酬与公司业绩相关联的最优薪酬合约是无效的,此时引入外部监督,能够有效的降低股权代理成本,理性的管理层会要求增加薪酬业绩敏感性,但是同时需要考虑负债代理成本,所以需要权衡两类代理成本去研究负债对管理层薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。     

广西上市公司高管薪酬与经营业绩研究

通过广西18家上市公司面板数据的实证分析,发现高管薪酬与公司业绩无显著相关,与公司规模显著正相关,国有控股比例对高管薪酬无影响,近年来高管薪酬也没有显著改善。建议提高广西上市公司高管薪酬水平,完善薪酬结构,加大股权激励力度,逐步降低国有持股比例。     

机构投资者对高管薪酬激励影响的研究综述

实践管理中,高管薪酬激励往往不能达成理论预期,公司业绩明显下滑天价高管薪酬与不断下滑的公司业绩严重脱钩的现象也屡见不鲜。如何监督高管不当自利行为、提升其薪酬业绩敏感性,成为学术界一致探讨与讨论的焦点。而国外大量的研究发现,逐渐兴起的机构投资者通过参与公司治理,对高管薪酬激励制度产生了显著的影响,目前国内对该方面的研究不多,近乎空白。因此本文在回顾国内外相关文献的基础上,对今后国内可能需要研究方向提出自己的建议。     

股权集中度、管理层持股对公司业绩影响

文章从公司治理角度出发,以2006年A股上市公司为样本,研究了我国上市公司股权集中度、管理层持股对公司业绩的影响。研究结论表明,控股股东持股比例与公司业绩具有正相关关系,第二至第五大股东持股比例、管理层持股比例与公司业绩相关关系不显著。     

高管团队特征、激励机制和企业社会绩效的关系——基于电子制造上市公司的probit面板数据的分析

高管团队的经营活动决策受制于自身特征,往往也受制于股东治理机制的影响,尤其是以薪酬和晋升为手段的激励机制。基于代理理论和高层梯队理论,提出了高管团队-激励机制-企业社会绩效的研究框架,以2005年~2013年制造业上市公司面板数据为研究样本,分析了高管团队特征与企业社会绩效之间的影响关系,通过probit面板数据提出以薪酬和高管持股为主要特征的激励机制以及其在两者之间所起的调节作用。研究结果表明,高管团队年龄、性别、教育与企业社会绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系,而薪酬差距对高管团队年龄、性别以及任期与社会绩效的关系起到调节作用。     

股权结构、公司治理与企业业绩——来自中国上市公司的新证据

在充分考虑股权替代变量之间可能存在多重共线性问题的基础上 ,本文对股权结构在公司治理中作用的各种理论假设进行了检验。研究发现 ,经理人员持股比例与上市公司业绩相关性不显著 ;国有股比例与上市公司业绩显著负相关 ;法人股比例与上市公司业绩正相关 ;社会公众股比例对公司财务业绩的影响虽然是负面的 ,但极不显著 ,而与公司市场业绩显著正相关 ;股权集中度与公司业绩显著负相关。     

管理防御对上市公司资本结构的影响

在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突引发管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。从影响管理防御的管理者特征、管理者激励和管理者监督三个方面选择了7个因素,利用深、沪两市上市公司2001-2007年3804个样本,实证分析了管理防御影响因素对资本结构的影响。研究发现:在没有外部威胁的情况下防御的管理者偏好低负债,国有控制样本和非国有样本管理防御对资本结构影响存在一定差异。     

高管持股与盈余稳健性:协同效应与堑壕效应

本文研究了高管持股与盈余稳健性的协同效应与堑壕效应。研究发现,上市公司对盈余稳健性的需求与高管持股呈非线性的关系。在高管持股水平较低和较高的区间,高管持股具有协同效应,高管持股与盈余稳健性呈负相关关系;在高管持股的中间水平,高管持股具有堑壕效应,高管持股与盈余稳健性呈正相关关系。     

Governance, organizational capabilities, and restructuring in transition economies

This paper focuses on the links between governance, firm capabilities and restructuring following the large-scale privatization process in Central and Eastern European transition economies using an integrative approach. Restructuring in these countries has been motivated by political and institutional changes and less so by market forces. Accordingly, political processes have produced political solutions such as “give-away” privatizations to insiders. These privatizations, in contrast to divestitures to outside owners, have realized less substantive restructuring because non-market incentives, such as too much managerial equity ownership, have created managerial entrenchment. In addition, we propose a connection between governance and organizational learning suggesting that learning is inhibited by excessive managerial ownership and lack of board knowledge regarding its oversight function. Furthermore, this entrenchment and poor board functioning may be perpetuated in financial-industrial groups, which have emerged as substitutes for market intermediaries in emerging economies. Thus, we propose that outside ownership involvement and the development of organizational capabilities may facilitate restructuring in the Central and Eastern European context. Our theoretical arguments are supported by case study evidence from transition economies.     

Dual entrenchment and tax management: Classified boards and family firms

This study examines whether and how multiple managerial entrenchment devices within a firm, specifically the structure of the board of directors and family firm status, interact to influence tax management. Using a sample of 4,000 U.S. public firm-year observations covering the period 1999–2013, we find that the classified board structure and family firm status are both negatively related with tax avoidance. However, accounting for the interaction between board structure and family firm status, we also find that the negative associations between both entrenchment measures and tax management apply only where the other entrenchment mechanism is absent. In further analysis, we find that higher levels of monitoring by institutional investors neutralize the interaction between the presence of a classified board and family firm status. Our evidence highlights that governance/monitoring mechanisms can interact in complex ways, including an offsetting effect between potentially redundant dual-level entrenchment mechanisms, to influence tax management behavior.     

Managerial Ownership and Agency Cost: Evidence from Bangladesh

This study examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm agency costs among listed firms in Bangladesh. This is an institutional setting that features a mixture of agency costs. This institutional setting has a concentration of ownership by managers, but the firms are not solely owned by managers. The extant literature suggests that the sacrifice of wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the agents is known as the agency cost. This study uses three measures of agency cost: the ‘expense ratio’, the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’, and the ‘asset utilisation ratio’. The finding of the study is that managerial ownership reduces the firm agency cost only under the ‘asset utilisation ratio’ measure of agency cost; this is robust with regard to a number of robustness tests. Furthermore, the non-linearity tests suggest that the convergence of interest is evident with very high and low levels of managerial ownership. The entrenchment effect by the owners is evident at moderate levels of managerial ownership. Although there has been great scepticism among management researchers on the validity of agency theory, overall, the findings of this study do not reject the validity of agency theory. Given that the entrenchment by managers is evident at certain levels of ownership and that the agency problem may still exist between insiders and outsiders, legislative guidelines for controlling share ownership may be required.     

The Causes and Consequences of Accelerated Stock Repurchases

We examine the choice between accelerated share repurchase (ASR) and open market repurchase (OMR) as repurchase mechanisms between 2004 and 2007. For a sample of ASRs and OMRs that actually buy shares in the announcement quarter, we find that ASR firms have lower market‐to‐book ratios, less cash, but greater managerial entrenchment. Prior to repurchase, ASR firms are subject to significantly more takeover rumors than OMR firms are, and this, along with entrenchment and undervaluation, affects the choice to use ASRs. ASR firms experience positive average abnormal returns both before and after the announcement. Moreover, the latent takeover probability is significantly lower for both ASR and OMR firms (when compared with pre‐announcement levels), but the reduction for ASR firms is more pronounced. Our results suggest that repurchases, and especially ASRs, indeed make a firm a less attractive prospect for takeover.     

Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration

The separation of ownership and control can lead to managerial entrenchment and a convergence of decision making and decision control. Decision-making refers to management's authority to make strategic and operating decisions while decision control refers to the ratification and monitoring of management decisions. Managers that possess decision control may behave in a risk-reducing manner relative to the behavior of owner managers because of management's desire to maximize job security Amihud and Lev 1981, McEachern 1975. For example, the managers of such firms may choose to diversify the firm into a wide variety of industries in an attempt to smooth revenues and earnings and avoid a series of peaks and valleys in the company's financial performance. These managers may believe that stable earnings will be viewed positively by shareholders and should help lessen the risk of stockholder action to replace upper-level management. Managers that possess both decision-making and decision-control capabilities may pursue a variety of risk-reducing strategies in addition to broad diversification.The existence of large outside investors has been shown to result in management becoming less risk-averse; management is more willing to adopt a wide range of strategies that present greater risk, but offer greater returns to shareholders. Hill and Snell (1988) found a significant, positive correlation between stock concentration and R&D intensity, indicating that large outside beneficial owners or dominant stockholders can influence management to pursue higher risk-higher return strategies. R&D intensity is used as a proxy for innovation and is generally operationalized as a firm's industry-adjusted R&D expenditures as a percentage of its sales. Findings of other studies also suggest that large investors are associated with decreased risk aversion by management. When controlling for the effects of time, previous R&D spending, liquidity, market share, diversification, market concentration, industry, and leverage, Hansen and Hill (1992) found a mild positive correlation between institutional stock concentration and R&D spending.This paper examines management's ability to utilize employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to facilitate managerial decision control or the capability to ratify and monitor decisions and subsequently adopt greater risk-reducing behavior. It is possible that management may adopt an ESOP to enhance entrenchment by placing a large block of the company's shares under the control of company managers and employees that are under the supervision of management. As a result, some ESOPs may not be effective alignment mechanisms since participants may find it difficult to organize a vote against management proposals or generate adequate enthusiasm and momentum to replace top-level managers. The paper anticipates that a positive relationship exists between the degree of ESOP stock concentration and the reduced risk-taking behavior of management. Specifically, the study argues that as ESOP stock concentration increases, management will likely behave in a risk-reducing manner and decrease its commitment to innovation, as measured by R&D intensity.Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are qualified retirement plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and are treated similarly under the Act to other qualified pension plans with the exception of portfolio diversification. Employee stock ownership plans consist only of shares of the employer's stock and the performance of an ESOP-based retirement fund hinges with the market performance of that single stock. An agency theory framework would suggest that ESOPs that control large blocks of outstanding shares have an effect on management similar to that of other large investors and act to encourage management to craft and implement strategies that will yield superior financial and market performance. As ESOP stock concentration increases, agency theory proposes that ESOP participants would readily act to protect their interests and the interests of other shareholders. However, some previous research suggests that large ESOPs are not alignment mechanisms, but further entrench current management into their positions.Gordon and Pound (1990) found that management can use large ESOPs to increase effective insider ownership to protect against unwanted changes in corporate control. The authors suggested that ESOPs were less effective than other types of large investors at monitoring management decisions since ESOPs are unilaterally undertaken by management, ESOP shares are held only by incumbent managerial and non-managerial employees, and ESOP trustees are frequently appointed by management. The market has been shown to view an ESOP as a management entrenchment mechanism when the ESOP was adopted as a possible takeover defense Chang 1990, Dhillon and Ramirez 1994. The market reacts more favorably to an ESOP adoption when other large outside shareholders are present who have the capability to offset the influence of inefficient managers who might choose to use the ESOP to further entrench themselves into their positions (Park and Song 1995).The results of this study find that after the implementation of an ESOP, R&D intensity decreases as ESOP stock concentration increases. A significant negative relationship exists between ESOP stock concentration and change in industry-adjusted R&D intensity at the 0.05 level when controlling for firm size and change in profitability. The sample included firms where ESOP stock concentration represented as little as 3% of the employer's outstanding shares and as much as 67% of all outstanding employer stock. The sampled firms with the greatest ESOP stock concentration were associated with the greatest decreases in industry-adjusted R&D intensity after the implementation of the ESOP. The results suggest that management of high ESOP stock concentration firms became more risk-averse in regard to commitment to innovation after implementation of the ESOP.Agency theory adequately explains the effect of large outside stockholders on management's choice of strategy. Hill and Snell (1988) and Hansen and Hill (1992) have found that as stock concentration increases, incentive alignment becomes increasingly likely. The independent nature of large outside blockholders contributes to a separation of decision making from decision control, a reduction in agency costs, and a minimization of managerial risk-reducing behavior. As highly independent blockholder size decreases, decision making and decision control converge, and management entrenchment is more probable.Agency theory fails to adequately explain the effect of employee stock ownership on managerial risk-reducing behavior. Employee stock ownership does have the capability to align shareholder and employee interests under the proper conditions. However, ESOPs lack independence from managerial influence and are much less likely than outside institutional investors to monitor management decision-making and pressure management to adopt strategies that incorporate greater risk and an opportunity for greater returns. The study found that increased ESOP stock concentration was associated with greater managerial risk-reducing behavior. The results suggest that agency effects are more likely in firms with modest ESOP stock concentration since the ESOP does provide incentives for an alignment of interests, but does not provide management with a mechanism to block the actions of other large blockholders. ESOPs with higher levels of stock concentration are likely to facilitate management entrenchment by preventing some large percentage of shares from aligning with other large shareholders to challenge management decision-making. If other investors lack the capability to put full pressure on management, the monitoring and ratification of management decisions has been yielded to management. Therefore, a managerial entrenchment hypothesis is better suited than agency theory in explaining the effect of large ESOPs on management's risk-reducing behavior.     

Edwards and Townsend on Business Enterprise

In this paper, the hypothesis that managerial capitalism has become the dominant form of company control in industrial societies is tested on several of the largest Swedish enterprises. The conclusion is that, while professional managers were influential during the creation of large companies, they have lost part of their power to large owners who have been able to create their own power base in banking and through extensive networks in Swedish industrial society. This enables them to make independent decisions and control the recruitment of managerial leaders. Managerial capitalism exists, but it has not become dominant.     

China's managers

This is a preliminary attempt to look at the environment within which senior executives in the People's Republic of China (PRC) operate and to throw some light on their managerial behavior. It tries to compare the way in which they allocate their time between various activities with Mintzberg's findings on the behavior of Western managers. The spread of Western-style management training in China during the last decade is discussed, and the fact that the managers studied made the effort to set aside significant amounts of uninterrupted time for their own personal education is pointed out.     

The internationalization of Japanese business: Different approaches,similar problems

In staffing their overseas operations, Japanese firms generally maintain a view that prime positions should be held by the home-country personnel. Having thus decided not to follow the European or American pattern of overseas operations, Japanese firms continue to rely very heavily on their own managerial resources to run fast-expanding operations abroad. However, contrary to a general impression that Japanese managers are adept at working in foreign environments, our study of Japanese subsidiaries in Hong Kong points out that the success rate of their expatriate assignments is not necessarily as high as the figures widely reported by studies conducted elsewhere. This article will attempt to determine the causes of problems related to managerial assignments abroad by examining the practices employed by Japanese firms in the selection and training of managers for overseas assignments.