社会资本对区域产业创新的影响研究

信息的不对称性增加了创新主体间的交易成本。信息经济学揭示了信息不对称,说明了信息和资本、土地一样,是一种需要进行经济核算的生产要素。信息不对称的根本表现以至于影响了市场机制配置资源的效率,造成占有信息优势的一方在交易中获取太多的剩余,出现因信息力量     

企业信用的现代经济学分析

传统经济学在分析问题时有严格的假设条件,故企业信用问题并不在其分析的视野中。但随着经济学理论的发展,这些假设前提被逐渐放宽。于是,现代经济学中的交易成本理论、博弈理论、信息不对称理论等为企业信用问题提供了一个很好的解释框架。本文对此展开了论述。     

信息不对称与商业银行的信用风险管理

商业银行在信贷过程中常常面临着借款人可能违约的风险,称之为信用风险.信用风险产生的根本原因是借贷双方的信息不对称.不对称信息在交易发生前后分别导致逆向选择和道德风险问题.因此,要防范和化解商业银行的信用风险,必须降低信息的非对称化程度.本文从信息经济学的角度探讨了商业银行信用风险的形成机制,并提出了防范和化解商业银行信用风险的对策建议.一、信息不对称条件下商业银行信用风险的形成机制根据信息经济学理论不对称信息在交易发生前后分别导致逆向选择和道德风险问题.逆向选择是交易前发生的信息不对称问题,而道德风险产生的根本原因是交易发生后双方信息的不对称.在商业银行与借款人之间的借贷关系中,这两种情况都会导致信用风险.     

信息不对称下的消费者行为探讨

信息不对称是现代经济学中十分重要的概念之一,它是指信息在市场交易双方之间的分布是不均匀的,一方对交易对象的内在属性比另一方更为了解。经济学分析了信息不对称引起的市场失效以及由此产生的逆向选择、道德风险等问题。本文尝试运用信息不对称理论对消费者行为进行分析,并尝试提出解决该信息不对称问题的一些建议。     

保险代理制度的经济学分析

保险代理制度是各国保险业重要的营销制度，在拓展保险市场，推动保险业的发展方面发挥着不可替代的作用。保险市场信息不对称和交易成本的存在是保险代理制度产生和存在的经济根源。保险代理制度可以改善保险市场信息不对称的状况，节约交易成本，提高保险效率。     

虚拟企业合作伙伴评价模型理论基础探讨

一、评价模型的经济与管理学理论基础(一)交易成本理论交易成本概念由诺贝尔经济学奖获得者科斯教授提出,经威廉姆森等人发展成为现代经济学的一个分支——交易成本经济学。交易成本经济学是以交易为基本分析单位,研究经济组织的比较制度理论,属于新制度经济学的范畴。根据威廉姆森的定义,交易成本包括事前成本和事后成本。事前部分包括协议的起草、谈判和维护等成本;事后部分包括交易偏     

保险代理制度的经济学分析

保险代理制度是各国保险业重要的营销制度，在拓展保险市场，推动保险业的发展方面发挥着不可替代的作用。保险市场信息不对称和交易成本的存在是保险代理制度产生和存在的经济根源。保险代理制度可以改善保险市场信息不对称的状况，节约交易成本，提高保险效率。     

用经济学方法分析合同法诚实信用原则的必要性

诚信原则作为合同法的基本原则,在法律上的地位不仅仅是"道德的诚信"与"法律的诚信"这么简单,而是商品经济发展的必然要求所决定的。本文用法律经济学的基本分析方法阐明了诚信原则对市场交易所具有的特殊功能以及在合同法上得以确立的必然性。作为克服信息不对称的法律制度设计,诚信原则可以降低交易成本、促进交易从而提高整体效率,是交易的本质反映,是历史发展的结果。     

涨跌幅限制对我国证券市场流动性影响研究

世界上大多数国家的证券交易所都设立了涨跌幅限制措施,但理论界对于涨跌幅限制是否有利于市场质量的改善存在争议。文章以上海证券交易所为研究对象,考察了涨跌幅限制对于价差、深度、信息不对称和交易成本等不同流动性代理变量的影响。利用分笔交易数据,得到了涨跌幅限制改善了信息不对称程度,减小了交易成本和价差并提高市场深度的证据。这些结果意味着针对个股的涨跌幅限制改善了价格发现过程,增加了市场的流动性．     

代理理论及其在政府采购中的应用

在政府采购活动中，交易双方存在着信息不对称问题。本文通过引用信息经济学中的委托代理理论。分析了不对称信息条件下政府采购活动的模型和供应商可能出现的道德风险问题，最后就完善对供应商的监督和激励机制提出相应对策。     

国外交易成本经济学实证研究应用领域的扩展

近年来,国外交易成本经济学的实证研究领域已从传统的产业组织经济学扩展到了市场营销、财务管理、会计、关系型契约等多个领域。本文对国外交易成本经济学在这些领域的实证研究作了简要的回顾,希望能够为我们的研究提供参考。     

Transaction costs, relational contracting and public private partnerships: a case study of UK defence

This paper is concerned with the economics of public private partnerships (PPPs)/private finance initiative (PFIs) and in particular the role of transaction costs and the importance of trust in relational contracting. The discussion is illustrated by reference to the UK defence sector. The paper begins by discussing the nature of PPPs/PFIs before moving on to consider how the economics of contracting literature can shed light on their strengths and weaknesses. The transaction cost literature is reviewed alongside a resource-based perspective of procurement decisions. The concepts of trust and reputation are then considered in the context of minimising procurement transaction costs. The theoretical framework developed is then applied and illustrated through a case study of UK defence contracting, in an attempt to assess whether the use of PPPs will necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency. The case study highlights both the scope of PPPs/PFIs and their potential transaction costs in defence procurement, with the normal perils in terms of contracting given information asymmetry, asset specificity and the resulting scope for opportunistic behaviour.     

Revisiting agency and transaction costs theory predictions on vertical financial ownership and contracting: electronic integration as an organizational form choice

This paper provides an organizational economics foundation to guide managers in matching the comparatively more efficient organizational mode with transactional characteristics such as: (1) the degree of (human capital) asset specificity involved in the transaction, (2) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and (3) the number of trading partners (suppliers and buyers) in the vertical supply chain. The key role of technology, and more specifically the e‐business infrastructure and its effects on organizational mode choice, is highlighted. The main results from this analysis suggest that changes in information technology are changing the nature of transaction costs leading to more efficient management through an electronic integration solution thus favoring contracting and outsourcing than would have been technologically possible when Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies (Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press: New York, 1975) was published. It is emphasized that the transaction cost economics principles are durable but that the breathless advances in information technology, especially in the past decade, have comparatively favored lower transaction costs of markets over hierarchies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Global,Local, or Regional? The Locus of MNE Strategies

This paper provides an overview of the main insights arising from the ‘regional strategy’ literature. It also develops the contours of a new, rich research agenda for future international strategy scholarship, whereby the region should be introduced as an explicit, third geographic level of analysis, in addition to the country‐level and the global level. Regional strategy analysis requires a fundamental rethink of mainstream theories in the international strategy sphere. This rethink involves, inter alia, internalization theory, with its resource‐based view and transaction cost economics components, as well as the integration (I) – national responsiveness (NR) framework.     

TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: THE PRECURSORS

Theories commonly progress through four stages, from informal to pre‐formal to semi‐formal and fully formal. This paper reports on the earliest stage of transaction cost economics that extended from the 1920s to the 1970s. That the gestation stage lasted so long is partly because transaction cost economics departed significantly from the then‐prevailing economic orthodoxy. Also, and related, it is an interdisciplinary undertaking. As reported herein, transaction cost economics selectively combines economics, organisation theory and law and is the product of the contributions of some of the finest minds in those three fields.     

Barbarians at the gate: a critical appraisal of the influence of economics on the field and practice of HRM

This article considers the influence of economics on the field and practice of HRM. Modern innovations, such as transaction cost economics and personnel economics, have enabled mainstream economists to encamp on the terrain of HRM and neighbouring fields. The article will contend that these perspectives incorporate certain ‘myths’ about key HRM issues and will argue against their transplantation into the study of HRM. The claim made by some critics that the language and assumptions of economics contribute to ‘bad HRM’ practices in the real world will also be critically assessed. It will be argued that modern economic theories of HRM reflect reality rather more than they create it, and that their support for a narrow and regressive form of HRM is, to some extent, in keeping with the actual reality of many organisations in which unequal power and conflict remain ever‐present (if sometimes under the surface).     

A transaction cost perspective on why,how, and when cash impacts firm performance

While both financial and behavioral theories suggest that cash holdings may be beneficial to R&D‐intensive firms, agency theory would suggest that strong monitoring may be needed to ensure that cash holdings are not squandered. We contend that transaction cost economics provides a valuable lens for understanding the performance implications of cash holdings because not only does it explicate the benefits and costs of cash holdings in a single unified theoretical framework, but it further clarifies how environmental uncertainty critically moderates these relationships. Empirical tests on a large sample of US corporations yield strong support for our theory. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于交易费用理论的土地整治招投标制度分析

招投标作为土地整治交易的重要制度,将引致交易费用,按照制度经济学理论,可以从信息对称性、委托-代理关系、博弈、外部性四个维度对土地整治招投标进行交易费用分析。在土地整治招投标中,存在围标串标失控、投标人失信、代理机构失德、政府部门失位等问题。基于交易费用理论,应当设计信息显示机制,降低信息不对称对土地整治招投标的影响;建立信用长效约束机制,对土地整治招投标参与者实行优胜劣汰;树立公共利益目标约束,增强集体选择力量;强化政府制度建设职能,促进土地整治招投标的市场化和社会化进程。     

Transaction cost economics in Scandinavian business administration

This Introduction briefly surveys transaction cost economics and explains its general relevance for business administration. A discussion of the impact of transaction cost economics on Scandinavian work in business administration is offered, after which the contributions to the present Special Issue are introduced.