On the dynamics of an endogenous growth model with learning by doing

Summary. The paper studies the local dynamics of an endogenous growth model with externalities of investment. It is demonstrated that, in case of sustained per capita growth, the competitve economy is characterized by a situation with a unique balanced growth path which is saddle point stable or by a situation with two balanced growth paths. If there are two balanced growth paths, the one with the higher growth rate is a saddle point whereas the path with the lower growth rate is either completely stable, with convergence to a rest point or limit cycle, or completely unstable. In the social optimum the existence of a balanced growth path implies that it is unique and that this path is a saddle point. Received: May 15, 2000; revised version: December 14, 2001     

Convex Games and Stable Sets

It is well known that the core of a convex coalitional game with a finite set of players is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set of the game. We extend the definition of a stable set to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and give an example of a convex simple game with a countable set of players which does not have a stable set. But if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, we prove that its core is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. We also show that a game with a countable (possibly finite) set of players which is inner continuous is convex iff the core of each of its subgames is a stable set.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71.     

Expectations and intertemporal separability in an empirical model of consumption and investment under uncertainty

An intertemporal model of consumption and investment under uncertainty is formulated, and compared with the existing literature; it is argued that an assumption of myopia is necessary for its empirical applicability. It is estimated by maximum likelihood with quarterly British data. A specification search for a satisfactory form of expectations is made, and the estimated model is compared with a static demand system. Strong intertemporal separability is formulated as a nested hypothesis, and strongly rejected by a likelihood ratio test.     

Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential information

Summary. This paper analyzes intertemporal seller pricing and buyer purchasing behavior in a laboratory retail market with differential information. A seller posts one price each period that a buyer either accepts or rejects. Trade occurs over a sequence of "market periods" with a random termination date. The buyer and seller are differentially informed: The seller's cost of producing a unit of a fictitious good is known and constant in all periods, but the buyer's value for the good (demand) is a random variable governed by a Markov Process whose structure is common knowledge. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by "nature" and is privately revealed only to the buyer. The market termination rule is a binary random variable. We conduct 32 laboratory experiments designed to study intertemporal pricing by human subjects in the Posted Offer Institution when demand follows a stochastic process. There are four series of experiments: 8 with simulated buyers, 8 with inexperienced subjects, 8 with once experienced subjects, and 8 with twice experienced subjects.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL MATRICES

The paper is concerned with a method of organizing and analyzing information relating to human stocks and flows. The kind of statistical reporting system envisaged is of a traditional kind, but extended so as to record year-to-year changes of state. Life is divided into a number of sequences, each with its own set of characteristic classifications, to avoid an excessive proliferation of categories and so enable many analyses to be made with the kind of statistics already avilable in a number of countries. The need, for some analytical purposes, to combine classifications from different sequences is fully recognized; and this need indicates a direction in which statistical reporting systems should move in the future.
The main analytical tool is a set of linear difference equations which, under suitable conditions, can be interpreted either in terms of an input-output system, as in economics, or in terms of an absorbing Markov chain, as in probability theory. A simple regression model is used to link characteristic classifications.
About half the paper is taken up with numerical examples, mainly connected with the British educational system as it was in the mid-1960's. An application is also given to movements into, through and out of a psychiatric service system in Scotland.     

Information at equilibrium

Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation. Received: June 20, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We wish to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fran?oise Forges, Franco Donzelli, Leonidas Koutsougeras, Aldo Rustichini, Rajiv Vohra and Nicholas Yannelis for their comments. Correspondence to: H. Polemarchakis     

Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one-dimensional issue space. One theorem is that there exists an equilibrium in which the median voter is decisive: an incumbent wins re-election if and only if his most recent policy choice gives the median voter a payoff at least as high as he would expect from a challenger. The equilibrium is symmetric, stationary, and the behavior of voters is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. A second theorem is that, in fact, it is the only equilibrium possessing the latter four conditions — decisiveness of the median voter is implied by them.     

The enfranchisement of women and the welfare state

We offer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico-economic model where men are richer than women, women display a higher preference for public goods, and women's disenfranchisement carries a societal cost. Men and women are matched within households which are the center of the decision process. We derive the optimal tax rate under two alternative regimes: a males-only enfranchisement regime and a universal enfranchisement regime. The latter is associated with a higher tax rate but, as industrialization raises the reward to intellectual labor relative to physical labor, women's relative wage increases, thus decreasing the difference between the tax rates. When the cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under universal enfranchisement, the male median voter is better off extending the franchise to women. A consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively high cost of disenfranchisement.We empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870–1930 period. We proxy the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income and the cost of disenfranchisement with the presence of catholicism, which is associated with a more traditional view of women's role and thus a lower cost. The gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability of divorce, which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women. Consistently with the model's predictions, women's suffrage is correlated positively with per capita income and negatively with the presence of catholicism and the availability of divorce, while women's suffrage increases the size of government only in non-catholic countries.     

Current Account, Capital Formation and Terms of Trade Shocks: a Revisit of the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler Effect

This paper extends the Blanchard model of a closed-economy to a three-good (exportable, importable and non-tradable goods) open-economy model with capital accumulation and uncertain lifetimes to study the impacts of terms of trade shocks on the current account. The simulation results show that a model with uncertain lifetimes is more appropriate to describe a small open economy like Taiwan at the steady-state equilibrium than a model with infinite lifetimes. We find that the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect is discernible for temporary or permanent terms of trade shocks. Furthermore, the steady state is a saddle point and the speed of convergence of capital and consumption is quite low.     

Optimum city size: A minimum congestion cost approach

The optimal allocation of urban land between the generation of traffic and the carrying of traffic which minimizes congestion costs is derived for a circular city. Unlike previous work which dealt only with the suburbs, this paper deals with both the suburbs and the central business district. This wider view of the problem leads to different conclusions, the most important of which is the fact that at no point in the city is all the land used for transportation. Existence of a maximum size for a city of a given working population, which is independent of relative land and congestion costs, is also discussed with special reference to the case where there is no land rent.     

基于耦合理论的旅游业与新农村建设协调发展研究

建设中国特色社会主义新农村是我国现代化进程中的重大历史任务,也是国家十一五规划中解决三农问题的战略方向。旅游业符合新农村建设中的资源节约、环境友好型和谐社会的国策取向。我国是一个农业大国,建设新农村任务艰巨。为了发挥旅游业在加快新农村建设方面的主要作用,文章提出基于耦合理论的旅游业和新农村建设协调发展研究,构建旅游业和新农村建设的耦合模型,并进行评价,最后得出结论。     

Threatened Species as Public Goods and Public Bads

This paper discusses Pareto efficient allocations of an environmental commodity, which is both a public good and a public bad, with an application to the Scandinavian problem of conserving wild predators that are killing semi-domesticated reindeer. The paper begins by briefly outlining this conflict. This is followed by a theoretical analysis employing a diagrammatic tool called the Kolm triangle, which is an analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good. Bargaining, Pareto improving reallocations and the shape of the Pareto set are discussed, using a simple model, where one of the agents is involountarily contributing to a public good. The paper concludes with an analysis of income-loss compensations and incentives for illegal hunting of predators.     

Firm Heterogeneity,Contract Enforcement,and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.     

The Relevance of Bargaining for the Licensing of a Cost‐reducing Innovation*

In the context of a Cournot duopoly, this paper studies the licensing of a cost‐reducing innovation by means of three possible allocation mechanisms: auction, fixed fee, and direct negotiation. Once the use of an arbitrary reserve price (which is not credible) has been excluded, it is no longer true that auction always yields higher profit to the patentee than a fixed fee. However, the authors propose a direct negotiation mechanism which restores the patentee's profit to the level of an auction with an arbitrary reserve price (which is unimplementable). Direct negotiation is superior to both an auction with a nonarbitrary reserve price and a fixed fee. From the social point of view, however, licensing with a fixed fee is the best option.     

Trade using assets divisible at a cost

The consequences of costly divisibility of assets are studied using a model with the following features. The demand for assets is generated from an overlapping generations model with a continuum of agents in each generation and with intrageneration trade (intermediation) ruled out. There is a once-for-all supply of a stock of nonnegative-dividend assets in a large size, and there is a costly technology for dividing them into smaller sizes. Stationary equilibria are shown to exist. In contrast with similar models with costless divisibility of assets, competitive equilibria are not necessarily desirable; there can be Pareto-ordered equilibria.     

Using Angler Characteristics and Attitudinal Data to Identify Environmental Preference Classes: A Latent-Class Model

A latent-class model of environmental preference groups is developed and estimated with only the answers to a set of attitudinal questions. Economists do not typically use this type of data in estimation. Group membership is latent/unobserved. The intent is to identify and characterize heterogeneity in the preferences for environmental amenities in terms of a small number of preference groups. The application is to preferences over the fishing characteristics of Green Bay. Anglers answered a number of attitudinal questions, including the importance of boat fees, species catch rates, and fish consumption advisories on site choice. The results suggest that Green Bay anglers separate into a small number of distinct classes with varying preferences and willingness to pay for a PCB-free Green Bay. The probability that an angler belongs to each class is estimated as function of observable characteristics of the individual. Estimation is with the expectation–maximization (E–M) algorithm, a technique new to environmental economics that can be used to do maximum-likelihood estimation with incomplete information. As explained, a latent-class model estimated with attitudinal data can be melded with a latent-class choice model. Edward Morey and Jennifer Thacher are equal authors and rotate authorship across articles.     

SEARCH EXTERNALITIES IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY

The paper gives a survey of the basic features of macroeconomic models with search externalities. It presents a simple static general equilibrium model with search externalities. Within this context the main results characterizing steady state in dynamic search models are reproduced in a simple context. Specifically, the link between transaction technology and strategic complementarity is analysed. It is shown that increasing returns to scale in the transaction technology create feed-back effects and multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria may arise. With economies of scale in matching, fluctuations in the economy can be large even with a low elasticity of search activity. The formal equivalence to models with investment externalities is analysed. In an application to the labour market, the allocative role of wages in the presence of search frictions and hysteresis effects are discussed. General conditions are given under which the set of welfare ranked equilibria is described by a closed loop. Finally, it is shown that with a more general transaction technology, even with constant returns to scale multiple equilibria may occur in the presence of externalities.     

Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

The optimality of a control band policy

Consider a firm with an arbitrary profit function whose relative price follows a Brownian motion with negative drift. When the firm faces a fixed cost of price adjustment, we prove the optimal pricing policy is a control band if the following sufficient conditions are met: the profit function is continuous, strictly concave and single-peaked; moreover, together with its first and second derivatives, it is bounded in absolute value by a polynomial. We also demonstrate various ways of constructing the value function associated with the control band policy and show it has certain properties carried over from the profit function. Numerical examples are found to be consistent with empirical estimates regarding the frequency of price adjustments.