企业:一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织

本文沿着科斯的思路 ,把企业理解为一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织。企业用权威关系替代价格机制 ,而权威关系能够减少交易费用的原因在于“组织粘性”的存在。企业是一种有粘性的契约 ,而市场是一种无粘性的契约。企业的组织粘性把关键员工和企业联在一起 ,并使企业在引入企业家才能时有更低的临界交易效率。企业的边界由交易费用和组织粘性共同决定。     

企业大学合作创新组织的定位及行为分析

运用经济学中的交易费用理论,阐述了企业大学合作创新中间组织的产生、特征和合作模式选择,指出企业大学合作创新组织的不同合作模式构成了从市场到企业的连续的组织谱系。提出大学企业合作创新的5项基本行为假设,在此基础上分析了企业与大学进行合作创新的主要动机。     

Technology and Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics

Oliver Williamson has greatly contributed to refining neoclassical economics by incorporating transaction costs and internal organization; yet, his new institutional economics too easily dismisses the role of technology. In doing so, he has replaced the determinism of technological production efficiencies with the determinism of transaction cost efficiencies. A review shows that Williamson's new institutionalism has evolved through three stages in terms of the focus of his analysis and his views of transactions. Throughout this evolution, however, his proposed solutions to organizational failures have actually continued to rely heavily upon technology.     

A theory of interlinked rural transactions

This paper argues that a landlord/owner-cultivator who is unable to monitor a tent/laborer's effort input will link a wage-cum-output sharing contract with the provision of consumption credit. The response of contractual parameters to (a) alternative opportunities available to tenant/laborers, (b) the cost of credit, and (c) the riskiness of cultivation is then examined. The analysis shows that public policy designed to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the delicate relationships between technological considerations (prohibitive monitoring costs) and modes of transaction (interlinked contracts) that arise in the absence of a complete set of markets.     

IS THERE A ROLE FOR TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS IF WE VIEW FIRMS AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS?

This article assesses the usefulness of transaction cost economics when we view economic organizations, such as firms, as complex adaptive systems. Modern complexity science is radically different in orientation to neoclassical economics, which deals with decision making in contexts that are presumed to be simple and, therefore, disconnected from complex reality. However, transaction cost economics can be related to aspects of modern complexity science: bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are all associated with behavioral complexity. Furthermore, the emphasis of transaction cost economics on hierarchy and organizational rather than technological considerations is also consistent with complexity science. Drawing on literature in psychological economics, this article synthesizes transaction cost economics with aspects of complexity science in a manner that offers a new research agenda, not only in the context of the organization of production but in economics generally. Such theoretical developments are vital if policy makers are to have at their disposal analytical perspectives that are coherent and applicable in complex historical settings.     

流动性与资产定价:基于我国股市资产换手率与预期收益的实证研究

流动性与资产定价是目前金融研究的热点之一 (O’Hara,2 0 0 3 )。本文通过检验交易频率零假设和交易成本备择假设 ,深入分析我国股市流动性与资产定价的理论与经验关系 ,发现 :我国股市存在显著的流动性溢价 ,换手率低、交易成本高且流动性小的资产具有较高的预期收益 ;产生流动性溢价的原因是交易成本而不是交易频率 ;与国外股市相似 ,小企业收益率高于大企业 ,价值股收益率高于成长股。因此 ,我国股市并非令人无法捉摸 ,流动性、规模和价值效应都是资产定价的因素     

Induced Institutional Innovation and Transaction Costs: The Case of the Australian National Native Title Tribunal

The theory of induced innovation says that technological innovations which economize on relatively scarce inputs will be invented and adopted. Hayami and Ruttan have hypothesized that this model also holds for institutional innovations. Coase and Williamson suggest that economic organization, such as vertical integration, is the result of transaction cost minimization. Coase discusses the transaction costs of negotiation versus other alternatives for solving externality problems. This paper brings these previously unconnected threads of the literature together and incorporates transaction costs in an induced institutional innovation model.

This conceptual model is brought to bear on the issue of institutional innovations over time in relation to the National Native Title Tribunal. In addition to the reductions in transaction costs from a negotiated settlement rather than litigation, there are other advantages of negotiation. These may include improved “quality” of settlements, improved relations between the negotiating parties, and more timely resolution.     

企业组织的经济学解读

本文从新古典经济学究全信息假设的局限性,来说明企业组织产生及存在的原因,并利用交易成本经济学理论中的交易成本为基本分析工具,来解释企业组织和各种制度安排的产生与发展.提出了在信息不完全和不对称条件下,市场的价格机制和组织的六种非价格机制是相互补充和相互替代的交易协调方式,以及对信息的不同需求是决定选择市场的价格机制或组织非价格机制等不同协调机制的根本原因,通过组织形式和相关作用力的综合五边形分析了组织形式的可能发展空间和中间性组织形式的发展,说明了各种经济组织实际上是为了解决交易过程中的信息问题而产生的.     

交易成本与创新治理视阈下创新群体组织性质及治理模式分析

从科技管理到创新治理，是新时期实施创新驱动发展战略、建设创新型国家在科技政策与科技治理领域的必然要求。经济学中的交易成本治理模式理论是分析组织性质与治理模式的经典理论。创新研究群体是受自然科学基金资助的我国基础研究高水平科研创新团队，从交易成本与创新治理视角分析其组织性质、合作网络与治理模式，具有重要理论意义与实践价值。研究发现，创新研究群体是科研合作网络组织与中间组织，治理模式走向为网络治理。明确创新群体组织性质，并实施网络治理模式，有助于促进研究目标实现与高水平团队培养。     

虚拟企业和网络组织:基于交易成本的解读

虚拟企业和网络组织是20世纪80年代以来组织创新的结果.交易成本经济学认为:组织的多样化是一个可检验的假定,造成这种多样性的主要原因是为了节约交易成本.然而,虚拟企业或网络组织能降低内部交易成本.并不是针对这种组织形式本身,而是针对组织中的成员企业(科层企业).由于不同的企业参与虚拟企业或网络组织的目的并不一致.构建联盟给每个成员企业所带来的经济后果也不尽相同.从这个视角考察虚拟企业或网络组织,所得到的结论更符合实际的情形.     

Drivers of participation in collective arrangements in the agri‐food supply chain. Evidence from Italy using a transaction costs economics perspective

The analysis of institutions in the agro‐food sector is gaining momentum since it represents a complex and relevant area of study as concerns intermediate‐product markets. Traditionally there has been a problem of organization among farmers mainly due to the reluctance to pool decisional and property rights on input and/or output. Following the Transaction Costs Economics framework, the paper aims to investigate which are the main drivers of the collective forms of organization in the Italian agro‐food system, paying particular attention to transaction costs’ attributes and to the increasing role played by the institutional environment as well. The choice to join a cooperative or producer organization is therefore conceptualized as a governance structure choice. In this regard, based on the Italian version of the Farm Accountancy Data Network, econometric models are estimated in order to account for the two organizational alternatives under investigation.     

交易成本是影响纵向整合选择的重要因素吗?——来自中国煤电上市公司的实证检验

笔者以中国52个煤电上市公司的纵向整合状况为例,运用面板数据模型分析了煤电企业选择纵向整合方式时考虑的因素。研究结果表明:交易成本对煤电企业采用纵向整合的影响较大,生产成本和策略效应的影响较小,这证实了交易成本和组织成本影响到了纵向整合的选择。纵向整合是中国煤电协调的有效但非唯一选择。     

Transaction cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies

Policy choice and policy design need to take account of transaction costs in order to increase the efficiency and sustainability of policies. However, transaction costs must first be measured to be included in the evaluation of alternative environmental or natural resource policies. While a number of studies measure transaction costs, there has been no systematic treatment of the fundamental issues involved. This article examines the issues involved in transaction cost measurement and makes recommendations regarding a typology of costs as well as the measurement methodologies themselves. In particular, methods used for nonmarket valuation of environmental goods may have potential for the measurement of transaction costs.     

纵向交易理论与中国煤电的纵向交易效率

纵向交易理论的核心在于纵向专业化经济和纵向一体化经济之间的取舍与平衡。节约组织成本会产生纵向专业化经济,节约交易成本会带来纵向一体化经济。理想情况下,两条边际成本曲线的交点决定纵向交易关系(如煤、电关系)最优形式的决择。本文对煤电纵向交易关系进行了分类,构建了煤电纵向交易关系形式选择的理论分析框架,并结合中国煤电纵向关系实际,分析了中国煤电企业的纵向交易关系效率。     

The internal organization of complex teams: Bounded rationality and the logic of hierarchies

This paper explains the emergence of hierarchical organization in teams of specialized producers carrying out a production activity when their members are constrained by bounded rationality. In contrast to the focus on transaction costs, monitoring and incentive structures, it derives hierarchical organization as the only feasible organizational response to the need to solve complex coordination and information problems that emerge in carrying out the production, in a changing environment, of a product composed of many parts.     

产权界定、市场禁入与农村非正规金融——由我国第一家私人钱庄兴衰引发的思考

通过对改革开放后第一家私人钱庄兴衰的史实进行重新考察和审视,本文经研究发现,尽管权力当局把资金自由交易权界定给了监管部门,但因监管成本和信息成本过高而无法保障该产权,个人会通过参与各类非正规金融活动来攫取一部分置于公共领域的权利。本文还基于交易费用理论解释了我国金融市场禁人政策出现松动的原因,也即维持扭曲型二元金融制度的成本以及严禁农村非正规金融活动的费用都越来越高,而且国内的经济形势也提出了放松监管的要求,在这些因素的作用下监管部门执行原有金融抑制政策的力度终于降低了。     

At the Interfaces of Governance and Competence Perspectives: Discussing Organizational Choices in the Scottish Biotechnology Cluster

This paper focuses on the desirability of different modes of governance in the context of the Scottish biotechnology cluster. The objective is to design theoretical models able to predict organizational choices made by firms seeking access to key complementary assets. Inspiration is drawn from two distinct streams of research: transaction cost economics and the competence perspective. The procedure adopted replicates the static and comparative approach used in several empirical investigations by transaction cost economics. However, as in a competence perspective, 'strategizing' behaviour is taken into account. The data needed to run econometric analysis have been collected via mail surveys based on the completion of a questionnaire. Valid responses were provided by 31.2% of an original sample that was composed of a range of organizations including dedicated biotechnology firms, equipment and service providers, clinical research organizations, etc. Empirical results show that both transaction cost and competence-related consideration help explain the selection of specific governance modes. However, Scottish biotechnology companies seem to be predominantly concerned with enhancing existing competences.     

产业组织模块化及其应用

本文概述了模块化的产生及其基本界定,在交易费用框架下对产业组织的模块化机理进行了分析。研究发现信息化改变了产品生产活动的监督与度量成本,从而使得经济组织结构向着节省交易费用的方向变迁,即组织模块化。本文基于模块化在产业组织中的构造规律,通过对我国电信业的实证研究,对产业组织的模块化及其政策制定提出了建议。     

如何理解“制度重要”命题——从哈耶克“知识问题”视角看科斯的比较制度分析

虽然自科斯定理出现以来,人们普遍接受了在一个交易成本为正的世界中制度重要命题,但由于各种原因该命题存在着极大的被新古典化的风险,制度分析被窄化为制度的均衡分析。从这种分析出发,作为外在第三方的经济学家被认为可以基于对有关交易成本信息的完全掌握而对制度效率进行事前比较。本文从哈耶克的知识问题出发对这种分析路径进行批判,认为这实际上相当于以另外一种方式将人们重新拉回到零交易成本世界。     

In or out: efficient inclusion of installations in an emissions trading scheme?

Regulators around the world are currently considering national emissions trading schemes (ETS) as cost-effective instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the process, they are confronted with numerous design issues. The coverage of installations in an ETS is one such issue. While “blanket coverage” that includes all industrial emitters of greenhouse gases in an economy has some intuitive appeal, and seems equitable, it does not take into full account all the costs related to the extent of coverage. This paper shows that an alternative approach of “partial coverage” based on benefit–cost analysis can achieve the same emission reduction outcome at lower social cost. The approach is based on maximizing the benefits from inclusion of installations in an ETS at the same time as taking all relevant transaction costs into account. A broad definition of transaction costs is used, which covers the regulatory costs to the government as well as regulatory costs imposed on covered installations. We find that particularly for relatively modest emissions reduction targets the cost savings of a “partial coverage” compared to “blanket coverage” are significant.