代际传承对家族企业风险承担的影响

家族企业代际传承已经成为学术界和实务界关注的一个焦点。文章尝试建立一个风险分析框架，深入分析代际传承对企业风险承担的影响机理及经济后果。基于2004-2016年我国沪深两市A股上市家族企业的研究数据，文章以家族二代继任者成为董事长或总经理的时点作为代际传承始点进行实证分析。研究结果表明：家族企业进入代际传承实施期后，企业风险承担水平会降低。与“家族—家族”类别的接班方式相比，在“职业—家族”类别的接班方式下，代际传承对企业风险承担水平的负效应更明显；创始人弱参与下的企业风险承担水平低于创始人强参与下的企业风险承担水平。此外，代际传承通过企业风险承担这项路径引起企业会计绩效下降。     

浙江省上市公司董事会组成与公司绩效研究

利用浙江省上市公司的数据,应用SPSS统计软件,选择净资产收益率和每股收益作为被解释变量,选择董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理的两职是否分离和控股股东担任董事比例四个指标作为解释变量,建立回归模型,对浙江省上市公司董事会组成与公司绩效关系进行实证分析。结果显示,控股股东成员担任的董事比例与浙江省上市公司业绩正相关,而且,董事长与总经理分设是现代公司治理的发展趋势。     

民营企业家族化现状及利弊分析

一年来,笔者在250家民营企业中对家族企业的状况进行了深入细致的调查。通过调查研究,主要地了解了家族企业的数量比例,研究了家族企业存在的必然条件并对家族企业的发展进行了利弊分析。一、家族企业在民营企业中所占的比例本次研究,将家族企业的特征指标界定为:临界持股权为70％;家族成员或准家族成员担任董事长或者总经理;家族成员或准家族成员担任公司董事席位超过公司董事席位的一半以上。按此界定,在调查研究的260家民营企业中,有197家企业属家族企业,家族企业占民营企业比例为76％。按企业规模划分:年销售收入100万元以内规模的企业,家族企业所占比例为82％;年销售收人100-999万元现模的企业,家族企业所占比例为79％;年销售收入100-9999万元规模的企业,家族企业所占比例为75％;年销售收入过亿元规模的企业,家族企业所占比例为72％。     

家族企业CEO特征与企业创新投入——基于薪酬激励和股权激励的调节作用

文章选取2015—2021年908家A股上市家族企业的平衡面板数据，分析家族企业CEO特征、薪酬激励和股权激励与企业创新投入的关系，结果显示：（1）家族成员担任CEO、从企业内部晋升的CEO更具有创新意愿，对家族企业创新投入有显著的促进作用。任职期限、教育背景和专业技术背景对创新投入具有显著的正向影响。年龄特征对家族企业创新投入无显著影响。（2）薪酬激励与担任总经理方式、任职期限、专业技术背景的交互项显著为正，股权激励与任职期限、教育背景的交互项显著为正。说明薪酬激励或股权激励在一定程度上能调节CEO特征与创新投入的关系。但由于存在家族CEO保护家族社会情感财富、舒适区维持、家族期望所带来的压力以及创新能力不足等原因，薪酬激励与股权激励对部分CEO特征与创新投入关系的调节作用不显著或者为负效应。     

家族企业代际传承推动还是抑制了创新

文章将家族企业传承进程分为参与管理、共同管理和接收管理三个阶段,研究传承进程的不同阶段推动还是抑制了家族企业创新。本文利用2012-2014年A股主板上市家族企业的404个代际传承数据进行实证研究,发现家族企业代际传承会导致企业创新活动的减少。具体而言,二代进入家族企业管理层参与管理或者二代与一代共同管理企业日常经营活动抑制了创新,即参与管理降低了研发资金和研发人员的投入,共同管理也减少了研发投入强度;二代接任董事长职位完成接收管理后,可能会重新推动家族企业创新,使之逐渐恢复到未传承前的创新水平。因此,传承进程的三阶段划分可以作为家族企业代际传承研究的理论基础,需要充分认识到传承进程不同阶段的差异性,家族企业不能一味保护社会情感财富而忽视企业创新,进而影响企业的可持续发展。     

打破企业用人的恶性循环

一次具有典型意义的对抗 最近,一家业界颇有影响的高科技民营企业发生了这样一件事：高层副总经理联名要求董事长罢免总经理和一名副总经理,否则他们将集体辞职。 据知情人事介绍,公司是由董事长一手操办起来的,董事长是国内外软件领域知名专家。从 １９９６年开始;董事长任命其儿子担任总经理（分管财务）。任命其亲属担任人事副经理。而这几个联名的副总经理则是分管销售、研究与开发和客户服务的。 为什么他们要联名罢免总经理？因为这些副总经理下属的人员任免、工资升降都不经过他们;总经理以董事长名义直接指挥。公司一些经营决…     

家族企业所有权控制权结构对高管薪酬的影响研究

由于家族企业内部权力的集中性,使得家族企业高管薪酬的分配更容易有失公平。本文针对家族企业特性,研究了家族企业所有权控制权结构对高管薪酬的影响,在此基础上提出理论假设并构建回归模型,得出家族企业所有权集中度和控制权集中度与高管薪酬存在负相关关系,董事长和总经理两职合一对高管薪酬有提高作用,金字塔持股方式会放大加强家族控制权的结论。     

我国上市公司内部控制信息披露问题实证研究

本文研究的内控信息披露的影响因素,于理论层面和现实层面而言都具有重要意义。本文选取2015年湖北省A股上市公司为样本运用效率市场理论等四个相关理论,从公司的基本特征等四个方面,从中再选取九个因素进行分析。把内控信息披露分为内部控制信息披露制度等五个方面,在此基础上,通过从各种渠道采集上市公司年报数据,同时结合内部控制信息披露评价表进行量化打分,确定其内部控制信息披露水平。研究表明：企业规模、上市地点、上市公司董事长和总经理是否完全两职分离、成长速度和会计师事务所声誉对内部控制信息披露有显著影响。     

中国家族企业传承现状研究及对策分析——以上市公司为例

本文着眼于家族企业传承现状的热点话题,以家族企业中的上市公司为研究样本,调查创始人年龄分布,探讨中国家族企业是否已进入接管的关键时期。同时在分析传承现状的基础上,展开对选用家族内部成员、引进职业经理人、内部员工提任等主要传承模式的论述。     

2009中国影视广告社会公益特别贡献大奖

彭家煌新经典公司董事长,中国著名导演,实战营销专家彭家煌以其集前期创意、中期拍摄、后期制作于一体的全程服务模式,获得市场的高度认同与广泛     

钢贸企业不良贷款对商业银行发展中小企业信贷业务的启示

在发展中小企业信贷业务方面,钢贸企业不良贷款的产生可资借鉴。钢贸企业不良贷款在宏观经济背景下逐渐生成,在运作模式变动中慢慢酝酿,并在银行监管不力及自身经营弊端的推动下最终爆发。以此为前车之鉴,小企业信贷的发放应强化宏观经济考察,建立科学的考核问责制度,健全中小企业早期风险预警体系,通过合理举措,消除不良信贷风险。     

MODELLING BANKS' LENDING BEHAVIOUR IN A CAPITAL‐REGULATED FRAMEWORK

This paper adds to the literature on the money supply theory by assessing the effect of banks' equity on the loan generating process. First, a new ‘credit’ multiplier is examined, the so‐called ‘equity’ multiplier model. This, in a second stage, is incorporated in a new multivariate lending model. The models are assessed by using panel data cointegration techniques for the G7 countries. According to our results, a feedback relationship exists between banks' loans and equity. Moreover, the factors determining loans are: the aggregate demand, the loan–customer relation, the banks' equity and banks' portfolio adjustments and/or the monetary stance.     

Incrementality of SME Loan Guarantees

In many countries, loan guarantee programs are important elements of government policy with respect to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). If loan guarantee schemes are to be effective, a majority of firms obtaining assistance through such a scheme ought not to be able to obtain financing from existing sources: a property known as incrementality or additionality. This paper describes a new approach to measuring incrementality. This work uses a two-stage process to estimate the incrementality of loans made under the terms of the Canada Small Business Financing (CSBF) program. First, a logistic regression-based model of loan outcomes (essentially a credit-scoring model) is estimated based on a large representative sample of SMEs. The resulting model was consistent with prior expectations and exhibited high levels of goodness-of-fit. The model was then employed to classify a sample of firms that had received loans under the terms of the loan guarantee scheme. Incremental loans ought to be classified as “turndowns” by the model; hence the proportion of loan guarantee recipients that the model classified as turndowns is a direct measure of incrementality. For the CSBF loan guarantee program incrementality was estimated (with 95% confidence) as 74.8±9.0%.     

Does Bank Consolidation Hurt the Small Business Borrower?

The recent wave of mergers in the commercial banking sector in the United States has led to tremendous industry consolidation. Some fear that such consolidation will leave the small business borrower with fewer opportunities to obtain bank credit. This study uses regression analysis to empirically determine if consolidation has caused larger banks to abandon relationship loans extended to small businesses over time. If so, this leaves small business borrowers with two distinctly different choices, a low interest rate loan from a large bank for those small business borrowers who qualify or a high interest rate loan from a small bank for those who do not. The results of this study support this theory, and find consolidation has raised small business loan rates at small banks and lowered rates at large banks, ceteris paribus.     

中小企业融资中的自有资金信贷机制

银行贷款收益取决于贷款利率和贷款风险两个因素。在贷款利率受到管制时,理性的银行为了实现期望利润最大化,要求企业提供足够抵押来规避贷款风险。我国中小企业由于自身特征及所处信贷环境的原因,银行向其贷款风险大,且得不到足够抵押品,也没有第三方提供担保,这就导致中小企业贷款难现象。因此,我国商业银行应该灵活运用抵押、担保、关系贷款和自有资金多种手段,积极构建中小企业的多层次信贷机制体系。     

Perceived credit constraints in the European Union

The promotion and support of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is an essential component of policies designed to help improve Europe’s economic performance. A crucial issue is whether SMEs face difficulty obtaining bank loans. Using pre-crisis survey data from 2005 and 2006 for nearly 3,500 SMEs (firms with fewer than 250 employees) in the European Union (EU), we investigate the determinants of perceived bank loan accessibility at the firm level and at the country level. Based on hierarchical (multi-level) binomial logit regressions, our findings show that the youngest and smallest SMEs have the worst perception of access to bank loans. The SMEs in nations with concentrated banking sectors are more positive about loan accessibility. In addition, a high fraction of foreign-owned banks is associated with improved perception of loan accessibility in the EU 15 but not in the EU 10.     

商业银行与小额贷款公司合作模式探索

小额贷款公司相对商业银行而言,资金来源渠道较窄。而商业银行相对小额贷款公司而言,贷款条件较苛刻,独立经营小额贷款成本较高。商业银行和小额贷款公司可以在相互竞争的环境下更好地合作发展小额贷款业务,建立小额贷款批发机制,创新以外包零售业务方式、以资源共享为主和以技术输出为主的双赢的合作模式,为中小企业和"三农"提供更多贷款。     

Does the origin of a succession CEO matter in the market value of innovation? Disentangling the origin of internal CEOs

This study complements previous research regarding CEO origin and family businesses by incorporating upper echelons theory with the perspective of family effect as well as disentangling CEO origin to provide a better understanding of how external, unrelated internal, and family succession CEOs affect innovation performance. We further reveal how a family founder helps improve the value of innovations undertaken by family heirs. The results show that firms with unrelated internal succession CEOs experience higher (lower) stock market reactions to innovation announcements than those with family (external) succession CEOs. Founders serving on the board reduce the negative effect between family heirs and innovation performance. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Loan guarantees: Costs of default and benefits to small firms

Governments of most countries seek to encourage Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) growth and the job creation that many believe is fostered by such growth. Substantive growth usually requires expansion capital. It is often perceived that compared with larger firms, SMEs face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start-up, growth, and survival. Consequently, governments and trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to SMEs. For example, the Small Business Administration in the United States provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small firms. Similar schemes are in effect in, among other countries, Canada, Japan, the U.K., Korea, and Germany. Trade associations take on such roles in France, Spain, and other nations.Loans that support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and, through job creation and retention, to the rest of society. However, to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt, guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders. Loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of ways. Often these programs do not appear to reflect guidance from economic theory or experience. This paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits. In addition, it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs. Finally, the study shows that loan guarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start-up, growth, and survival of new and risky enterprises. The work finds that substantial total and incremental job creation may be attributed to the Canadian loan guarantee program.The paper reviews previous attempts to conduct cost-benefit analyses of loan guarantee programs. It finds wide variation, internationally, in default rates. Published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5% (Germany) to more than 40% (U.K.). The empirical analysis reported here focuses on the Canadian implementation of loan guarantees, the Small Business Loans Act (SBLA). Findings include (1) loan guarantees granted under the terms of the SBLA provide an extremely efficient means of job creation, with very low estimated costs per job; (2) default rates are higher for newer firms, increase with the amount of funds borrowed, and vary widely by sector (borrowers in the retail and accommodation, and food and beverage sectors were significantly more likely to default than borrowers in other sectors); and (3) the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the program. Moreover, reducing the loan ceiling would arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those SMEs most in need of early-stage capital.In addition, analysis of the lenders' motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and, therefore, the costs of honoring guarantees, are particularly sensitive to the level of the guarantee. Small reductions in the level of the guarantee (for example, guaranteeing 80% of principal and accrued interest instead of 85%) could lead to substantial reductions in default rates.Debate persists in economic theory about whether or not government intervention in the credit market is warranted, in spite of the findings that loan guarantees seem to make positive contributions. Further analysis of these issues is advised.