盈余操控方式对创业板上市公司IPO后业绩的影响

通过对创业板上市公司从应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两个视角比较不同盈余操控方式对IPO后企业业绩的影响。实证分析结果表明,创业板公司IPO前后同时实施应计项目操控和真实活动操控两种盈余操控行为。其中真实盈余管理是IPO后企业业绩下滑的深层次原因,且不同盈余操控方式对IPO后3年业绩影响具有时间差异。     

应计操纵、真实交易与公司未来业绩——基于避免亏损动机的实证检验

文章对微利公司的应计操纵和真实交易行为进行了实证检验,发现微利公司应计操纵和真实交易的程度均显著高于其他样本,表明上市公司不仅使用应计操纵,同时也会使用真实交易来实现避免亏损动机的盈余管理。在此基础上,文章进一步研究了微利公司盈余管理对未来业绩的潜在影响,研究发现微利样本中进行应计操纵和真实交易越多的公司,第二年的业绩越差,其中真实交易导致的业绩下滑比应计操纵更加严重,表明管理层为扭亏而进行的盈余管理更多的是一种机会主义行为。     

企业费用支出乘数及其合适度研究——以中国制造业上市公司为例

文章设计出一个反映企业费用支出相对水平的指标:费用支出乘数(EM,Expend iture Mu ltip lier),费用支出乘数是一定时期内的年均营业、管理费用合计与年均主业利润之比,通过对费用支出乘数的研究,达到指导企业合理控制费用支出水平的目的。文章的研究思路是,第一步,选择和确定研究样本,第二步,定义研究指标并分析样本公司费用支出及业绩状况,第三步,分析样本公司费用支出与经营业绩的关系,第四步,确定费用支出乘数合适度,第五步,给出研究结论。本文的研究结论是,我国制造业上市公司的经营业绩水平偏低,     

我国股权激励经济后果的实证检验

本文研究股权激励的经济后果,包括是否提升经营业绩,业绩提升是否源于盈余管理与业绩提升的影响因素三个方面。首先,对于某一年度的净资产收益率、净利润增长率与营业收入利润率,股权激励具有提升作用,但不具有持续性,甚至会出现反转。在实施当年到后四年的时间内,实施公司上述指标的平均表现也与配对公司无显著差异。换言之,股权激励无法有效提升公司经营业绩。其次,实施公司的操控性应计与经营业绩变化存在正相关关系;在剔除操控性应计后,股权激励的短暂提升作用消失,实施公司与配对公司无显著性差异。最后,当方案设计受到管理层操纵时,对实施公司的经营业绩产生负面影响。     

大股东股权质押、股权性质与盈余管理方式

外部监管环境的变化影响公司盈余管理成本及操控手段的选择,文章采用2009-2013年间大股东股权质押的上市公司样本,检验了在股权质押的特定情形下上市公司真实性盈余管理与应计性盈余管理的替代效应。研究发现,大股东股权质押债务融资引入了质权人这一外部治理角色,强化了对上市公司的外部监督,抑制上市公司的“应计性盈余”操控行为,使其盈余管理方式向更加隐蔽的真实性盈余管理转变。     

业绩预告的类型会影响其准确性吗?——基于盈余管理动机视角

业绩预告的经验品属性使得资本市场如何预判业绩预告的准确性显得尤为重要,但已有研究难以为资本市场提供简单直接且便于观测的预判标准.本文通过挖掘业绩预告类型可能隐藏的盈余管理动机,以2010-2018年度在资产负债表日后披露业绩预告的A股上市公司为研究对象,实证考察盈余管理动机是否以及如何影响业绩预告准确性.实证研究发现,盈余管理动机越强,业绩预告的准确性越低;作用机制检验发现,审计师对盈余管理动机较强的公司进行了更多的审计调整,使得定期报告中的盈余水平偏离了业绩预告中的盈余水平,从而导致了业绩预告准确性的降低;在控制内生性问题和稳健性测试后实证结果保持不变.研究表明业绩预告类型隐藏的盈余管理动机信息,可以帮助资本市场预判业绩预告的准确性.     

“金税三期”税收征管对上市公司审计费用的影响

税收征管作为公司外部治理手段,能够作用于公司经营环节,进而影响审计师面临的业务风险和审计风险,由此影响到公司的审计费用。但目前鲜有文献研究税收征管对公司审计费用的影响。本文借助"金税三期"工程这一"准自然实验",以2010—2019年A股上市公司为样本并使用双重差分法,研究发现"金税三期"工程提高了上市公司的审计费用。机制分析表明,"金税三期"工程推高了上市公司实际税率,降低了上市公司的盈利水平,提高了审计师的业务风险,进而提高了审计费用。同时,"金税三期"工程强化涉税信息监管,提高了上市公司会计信息质量,降低了审计师的审计风险,从而降低了审计费用。综合来看前者对审计费用的影响大于后者,导致了上市公司审计费用的提高。进一步分析发现,"金税三期"工程对审计费用的这一影响,在非国有上市公司和由非国际四大会计师事务所审计的上市公司中更为显著。     

收入与成本费用配比性研究

盈余是公司在一定期间的经营成果,也是会计系统最重要的产出,而在盈余的决定上收入与费用的配比具有重要的影响。收入费用配比的程度越高,企业越能够反映该期间内公司的经营业绩。文章以上市公司中的制造业为对象,对这一行业2005~2011年的收入成本费用配比程度进行研究,发现这段时期内制造业的收入成本费用配比趋势的特征明显。文章还通过将成本费用进一步分解,更具体地找出影响成本费用配比的主要费用成分。     

基于高管变更下的盈余管理研究——以沪市A股上市公司为例

文章以沪市A股上市公司2006²011年数据为研究样本,研究高管变更会导致怎样的盈余管理发生。研究结果显示:在CEO变更当年,企业倾向于采用应计项目负向盈余管理;在CEO变更后的一至二年内,企业倾向于运用应计项目和真实活动正向盈余管理,这源于新上任的CEO急于通过盈余管理调节来增加企业的会计盈余,从而粉饰自己上任后的经营业绩并向高层领导者展示自己的"能力"。     

高管持股变动、盈余管理与现金流预测

对于资本市场上会计信息的外部使用者来说,上市公司的会计信息处理过程绝对是一个黑盒子。外部投资者只看到会计信息披露的结果,但难以观察是否有管理层操纵会计信息的处理。本研究通过选择高管持股连续三年增加或减少的上市公司为样本,实证探讨了样本公司的盈余管理行为对未来1至3年现金流量变动的解释能力。结果显示,就上市公司高管持股变动此项重要信息披露工具来说,高管连续增加持股公司盈余管理无法显著解释任何未来现金流量变动。相反,高管连续减少持股公司的盈余管理能够透漏相关公司信息给外部投资者,非常值得外部投资者注意,尤其关注管理者通过应计会计项目进行投机性盈余管理行为。本研究最后也给政府监管部门提供了相关建议。     

业绩承诺变更会影响企业研发费用操纵吗?

以 2011-2022年A股并购业绩承诺事件为研究对象,探讨了业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响。研究发现:业绩承诺变更加剧了上市公司研发费用操纵现象,且这一影响是通过激发高管机会主义、降低商业信用融资能力实现的;异质性检验发现,业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响在关联并购事件、主并方为国有企业、以及分析师关注程度较低的企业中更为显著;动机和经济后果检验发现,业绩承诺变更主要通过激发高管的政策迎合动机提高了研发费用操纵水平,而该行为使得企业获取了更多的税收优惠和政府补助。     

我国封闭式基金折价与潜在利益输送关系研究

本文从基金管理公司利益操纵及其控股股东利益输送两个角度解释我国证券市场封闭式基金的折价交易现象,并进行了相应的实证检验。研究表明市场确实对于潜在的利益输送有着负面的反应,一旦基金管理公司开始发行开放式基金,则该公司管理的封闭式基金折价率显著提高。证券公司控股的基金管理公司管理的封闭式基金的折价率也显著高于其他类型的基金管理公司管理的封闭式基金。本文还就如何避免和减少利益操纵和利益输送行为提出若干建议,以进一步推动我国封闭式基金的发展和规范基金管理公司管理运作。     

Earnings Manipulation in Failing Firms

Prior literature and anecdotal evidence, most recently provided by allegations relative to Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom, suggest that failing firms (defined here as prebankruptcy firms) may be motivated to engage in fraudulent financial reporting to conceal their distress. I examine two research questions: (1) Are failing firms' prebankruptcy financial statements more likely to exhibit signs of material income increasing earnings manipulation than those of nonfailing firms? (2) Do auditors detect the overstatements in firms that they perceive to be failing? I predict and find that as (ex post) bankrupt firms that do not (ex ante) appear to be distressed approach bankruptcy, their financial statements reflect significantly greater material income‐increasing accrual magnitudes in nongoing‐concern years than do control firms. The accrual behavior of these firms resembles that of bankrupt firms that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has sanctioned for fraud. Like sanctioned firms, the nonstressed bankrupt firms display significantly greater (material) increases in receivables; inventory; property, plant, and equipment; sales; net working capital, current, and discretionary accruals in prebankruptcy nongoing‐concern years than do control firms. They also display significantly more negative changes in cash flows from operations and net cash and a greater disparity between accrual‐based net income and operating cash flows than do control firms, consistent with Lee, Ingram, and Howard 1999. Finally, I predict and find that these firms' going‐concern years reflect evidence consistent with auditor‐prompted reversal of previous overstatements. These results are based on parametric and nonparametric tests for various subsample combinations drawn from a sample of 293 bankrupt firms representing approximately 2,500 observations.     

Tax Incentives,On-the-job Training,and Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from China

This study investigates the effects of an increase in the proportion of tax credit (IPTC) policy on firms' on-the-job-training expenses. We document that the IPTC significantly increases on-the-job training expenses; the result remains valid after a series of robustness tests. An analysis of heterogeneous effects shows that privately owned firms and small-scale firms are more susceptible to the IPTC's impacts than state-owned and large-scale firms. Finally, we find that the IPTC can improve the production efficiency of firms and promote firm performance and innovation.     

The Differential Role of R&D and SG&A for Earnings Management and Stock Price Manipulation*

This paper documents a differential role of R&D versus selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) for real earnings management. The distinction of these two components is important because prior studies mostly examine their combined use, but firms could manipulate them differently given the differing valuation implications. Reduced SG&A is viewed positively by investors as evidence of cost reduction, while reduced R&D is viewed negatively by investors as such expenditures are critical signals of expected growth. I examine their use in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) as well as firms receiving accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs). Although both groups face strong incentives to manage earnings upward by reducing expenses, I predict and find that firms will reduce SG&A but increase R&D. During the manipulation period, SEO and AAER firms exhibit lower discretionary SG&A and higher discretionary R&D, relative to control firms, and investors positively value low discretionary SG&A and high discretionary R&D. Overall, this study confirms the importance of distinguishing between R&D and SG&A in real earnings management contexts and suggests a complementary (substitutive) relation between cutting SG&A (R&D) and accruals management.     

The market for corporate subsidiaries in Japan: An empirical study of trades among listed firms

We investigate trades of wholly- or partially-owned subsidiaries between firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) for the years 1996–2010, to explore the economic impact in terms of strategic refocusing, stock market valuation and performance effects. By pairing both sides to each deal, we show differences in firm characteristics, returns, and subsequent performance of buying and selling firms. Unlike mergers between whole firms, most subsidiary deals straddled different industries. Most sellers were larger, more diversified and less profitable than buyers. Our event study reveals that abnormal returns were positive for buyers yet insignificantly different from zero for sellers. However, subsidiary sales in the core business earned negative returns, the more so the larger the deal. An analysis of ex-post operating results shows that the performance of sellers often declined after the trade, in particular for firms that divested a core-related subsidiary. We conclude that subsidiary trades in Japan in this period contributed importantly to strategic repositioning and a more efficient use of corporate assets.     

Operational Restructuring Charges and Post‐Restructuring Performance*

Firms incur restructuring charges as a result of actions intended to improve their operating performance. However, there is little evidence on whether restructuring charges are associated with improved performance. We examine a sample of firms reporting restructuring in 1991‐93 and find that the restructuring firms' earnings increase over the levels immediately before restructuring. Compared with a control sample of firms that report no restructuring, the restructuring firms improve their earnings and operating income, but evidence for improvements in cash flow from operations is mixed. In regression analysis, we find that restructuring charges are significantly positively associated with post‐restructuring changes in earnings relative to the restructuring year, but this association is largely driven by firms with multiple restructurings and firms reporting losses in the restructuring year. We find no association between restructuring charges and post‐restructuring changes in earnings relative to the year before restructuring. Restructuring charges are significantly positively associated with post‐restructuring changes in operating income and cash flow from operations for firms with multiple restructurings. In summary, restructuring charges are associated with improved earnings, but our results suggest that restructuring in the early 1990s did not necessarily guarantee improved operating performance.     

EBITDA and Managers' Investment and Leverage Choices

EBITDA is a commonly used performance measure for (i) valuation, (ii) debt contracting, and (iii) executive compensation. The widespread use of EBITDA by stakeholders may induce managers to focus their attention on EBITDA. Since EBITDA excludes various expenses, managers who fixate on EBITDA may underweight the excluded expenses when determining their firms' investments in capital and leverage levels. I find that managers who fixate on EBITDA overinvest in capital and overlever their firm relative to their industry peers. These results are robust to alternative proxies for managers' focus on EBITDA and alternative specifications. I also find that firms whose managers focus on EBITDA have weaker operating performance, which is attributed to higher depreciation expense. My primary proxy for managers' focus on EBITDA is whether they choose to disclose EBITDA in annual earnings announcements. I find that the use of EBITDA in setting executive compensation, the prevalence of EBITDA estimates by analysts, and the use of EBITDA‐based covenants in firms' debt contracts are all positively associated with the propensity to disclose EBITDA in earnings announcements. I find weaker evidence of opportunistic motives explaining EBITDA disclosure. These results are consistent with managers disclosing EBITDA to portray to investors that it is a metric they seek to maximize. Overall, this study suggests that while EBITDA is a widely used metric, there is a systematic cost to using this measure—it provides managers with incentives to overinvest in capital and to acquire excessive debt.     

ST制度能否作为一种选择机制吗?

究竟是什么决定了ST公司的命运？本文利用顺序Logit回归模型,对142家ST企业的三种不同命运（恢复正常、仍然ST和停牌）进行了研究。公司在ST时期内的经营绩效、资本结构以及公司治理等方面解释这些因素对ST公司命运的影响。研究结果发现,公司的经营绩效以及债务结构对ST公司生存与否具有显著影响,而资本大小以及社会法人持股比例并没有显著影响。结论表明,ST制度有助于财务健全以及经营良好的企业生存,ST期间在财务结构以及经营绩效得到改善的企业可以重新成为正常类公司。