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1.
Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus.Received: 22 October 2004, Revised: 21 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
D44, D82.We are very grateful to two anonymous referees, Jacques Crémer, Patrick François, Angel Hernando-Veciana and seminar participants at the 2004 SCSE conference (Quebec, Canada) for their valuable comments. Moez Bennouri acknowledges the financial support by the Initiative of the New Economy (INE) program of SSHRC (Canada). 相似文献
2.
In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player’s bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation. 相似文献
3.
Kin Chung Lo 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):1-20
Summary. Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability
measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing
this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium
bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model,
it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.
Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: February 19, 1997 相似文献
4.
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of industry concentration in common value auctions.
Greater concentration of information among fewer bidders reduces competition but increases the precision of private estimates.
We demonstrate that this generally leads to more aggressive bidding. However, the reduction in competition dominates the informational
effects, resulting in lower prices. We examine these hypothesized effects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions
with constant informational content but distributed among a varying number of bidders. The experimental results are consistent
with our theoretical predictions.
The authors would like to thank Octavian Carare, Eric Friedman, Luke Froeb, Ron Harstad, Toshi Iizuka, Mike Rothkopf, Charles
Thomas, and two anonymous referees, for many useful comments and suggestions. 相似文献
5.
Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It may be possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this could make the proportion of winners known, and thus provide all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections. 相似文献
6.
Shulin Liu 《Economics Letters》2012,115(3):408-411
We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction. 相似文献
7.
We analyze the value of being better informed than one's rival in a two bidder, second price common value auction. Standard models of these auctions do not pin down relative bidding postures, but we show that by adding small amounts of private value information, a unique equilibrium can be restored. Additional common value information affects a bidder's payoff both directly, by increasing his information rent, and indirectly, by shifting the relative bidding posture of his opponent. Although the latter effect need not be positive, we establish broad conditions under which bidders with more information do better than their rivals. We turn to information acquisition and release and show that the desire to influence relative bidding postures can lead sellers to create new information rents (by releasing information privately to only one bidder) and bidders to forego information rents (instead choosing to gather information that a rival already has). 相似文献
8.
Experimental research on first price sealed bid auctions has usually involved repeated settings with information feedback
on winning bids and payoffs after each auction round. Relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, significantly higher
bidding has been reported. The present paper reports the results of experimental first price auctions with n=7 where feedback on payoffs and winning bids is withheld. Under these conditions, average bidding is below the risk neutral
Nash equilibrium prediction but converges to it with repetition.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
9.
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k1+k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters. 相似文献
10.
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format. 相似文献
11.
Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Summary. We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 5 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D44, C78, D82.Correspondence to: Lawrence M. AusubelThe authors gratefully acknowledge the generous support of National Science Foundation Grants SES-97-31025, SES-01-12906 and IIS-02-05489. We appreciate valuable comments from Ilya Segal. Special thanks go to Mordecai Kurz, who served as Larry's dissertation advisor and who introduced both authors to the economics profession back at IMSSS at Stanford. Congratulations and best wishes are extended to Mordecai and his family on the happy occasion of the publication of Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics: Essays in Honor of Mordecai Kurz, in which this article also appears. 相似文献
12.
When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction. 相似文献
13.
Joakim Ahlberg 《Portuguese Economic Journal》2009,8(1):3-14
This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects
bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals
of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue
of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue
to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.
相似文献
Joakim AhlbergEmail: |
14.
We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups. 相似文献
15.
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. Those last valuations are shown to form a zero-measure subset of the submodular valuations that have positive measure. While we show that the allocation problem among submodular valuations is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case and generalize it to the case of limited complementarities. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for arbitrary complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented. 相似文献
16.
Using data on 17 industrial countries from 1982 to 2003 and controlling for a wide array of factors, this paper finds that higher exchange rate volatility increases the unemployment rate. The magnitude of the effect is small. The results are robust to variations in specification. 相似文献
17.
We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed. 相似文献
18.
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations
exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information,
and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets
are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization
of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation.
We gratefully acknowledge comments by Marco Battaglini, Benny Moldovanu and participants at seminars held at Montreal, Yale,
Texas A&M, Washington St. Louis and at the Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints held at SUNY - Stony Brook.
Sandro Brusco acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias D.G.E.S., proyecto SEC2001-0445. 相似文献
19.
Cost information sharing with uncertainty averse firms 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. A homogeneous Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information is analyzed. Every firm learns its own marginal cost parameter, but not the marginal cost parameter of the opponent. Every firm can commit to revealing its private information to the other firm, i.e. to share information. The influence of uncertainty aversion on the readiness of the duopolists to share cost information is analyzed. Uncertainty aversion is modeled according to the Choquet utility theory. It is shown that low uncertainty aversion leads the firms to share information, while high uncertainty aversion leads the firms not to share. A simple economic explanation for this result is given.Received: 5 January 2001, Revised: 7 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D43, D81, D82.I wish to thank Jürgen Eichberger, Volker Krätschmer, Willy Spanjers, seminar participants at Universität des Saarlandes, seminar participants at University College London, participants in the conference of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Mainz 1999 and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank. 相似文献
20.
Jinwoo Kim 《Journal of Economic Theory》2008,143(1):585-595
I compare two information structures in a common value first-price auction with two bidders: In one, each of the two bidders knows only his own signal about the value of the object, and in the other, one of the bidders learns his opponent's signal as well. Gaining the additional information in the second information structure makes the informed bidder worse off if the value is submodular in the bidders' signals and better off if it is supermodular. If the value is supermodular, then the seller's revenue tends to be lower with the informed bidder than without. 相似文献