政府补贴下考虑零售商竞争的供应链决策研究

为研究政府补贴制造商生产成本下零售商竞争对供应链决策的影响,考虑政府补贴率和零售商竞争强度两个因素,建立3种供应链决策模型,分析政府补贴系数和零售商竞争强度对供应链决策的影响。结果表明,零售商竞争会使零售价格提高,而不影响制造商的批发价,竞争越激烈,供应链各成员的定价和利润越低。在3种供应链决策模型下,竞争强度和政府补贴对制造商利润的影响程度最高。     

市场压力、财政补贴与上市高新技术企业双元创新投资

探讨上市高新技术企业如何利用财政补贴资源实施双元创新投资,并进一步分析市场压力对财政补贴激励双元创新投资的调节作用。研究发现：(1)财政补贴对企业创新投资具有激励效应,相对开发式创新投资,财政补贴对企业探索式创新投资具有更强的激励效应;(2)资本市场业绩预期压力的增加会显著促进财政补贴对企业开发式创新投资的激励效应;(3)当企业面临产品市场竞争与资本市场业绩预期双重压力时,财政补贴对企业开发式创新投资的激励效应更明显。研究结论对于引导企业合理分配财政补贴资源、减少创新投资的短视行为、提升企业自主创新能力和竞争优势具有一定的理论与现实意义。     

寻利还是寻租——补贴制度对企业投资的影响

文章首先根据现有研究对市场中存在的功能性、选择性两种类型的政府补贴进行区分,并运用固定效应、logit与tobit模型研究了我国A股上市公司2008-2016年政府补贴对企业投资决策的影响,发现选择性补贴具有明显的人际关系化交换特征;通过对企业是否具有寻租行为与政治联系的分样本检验,发现在人际关系化下,选择性补贴具有寻租性,会占用生产性资本,表现为投资不足,而功能性补贴具有寻利性,普遍易使生产投资过度;在产业层面,通过研究两类补贴的分布特征对行业结构的影响,发现选择性补贴会更大程度地降低市场竞争性,通过logit中介效应模型与交互项检验,发现前期选择性补贴由于提高了企业投资不足的概率,增加了市场份额下降的可能性,从而市场竞争性降低;然而,尽管投资不足会增加企业退市风险,但寻租下的选择性补贴会减少企业退出市场的可能性,因此,市场竞争机制易被人际关系化下的选择性补贴扰乱。     

Subsidy policies in a fertility choice model

This paper compares the effects that a subsidy to health expenditure or a subsidy to child-rearing costs has in a fertility choice model in which mortality is also endogenously determined. Whichever subsidy is instituted, the population growth rate rises. While a subsidy to health expenditure reduces welfare, a subsidy to child-rearing costs might increase welfare. The welfare analysis also suggests that a subsidy to health expenditure should be financed by a capital income tax, while a subsidy to child-rearing costs should be financed by a consumption tax.     

A choice‐theoretic analysis of a corporate tax holiday versus a subsidy

This paper attempts to compare the effect of a corporate tax holiday with that of a subsidy on the behaviour of the individual firm. Assuming the subsidy equals the amount of tax paid by a firm operating under the subsidy system, we find that the firm's net profit will be greater under the tax holiday than under the subsidy regime. Similarly, if the subsidy exceeds the tax by an amount that would equalize the profits made by the (“marginal”) firm under the two regimes, then it is found that firms with higher than “average” unit costs would opt for the subsidy system; conversely, firms with a low cost structure would maximize profits by selecting the tax holiday. Finally, a multiperiod analysis of the particular choice facing prospective manufacturers in Ciskei, shows that the firm would normally choose the subsidy system except if the current tax exceeded the subsidy at the output level representing maximum profit under the tax holiday.     

R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

The Sustainability of Indonesia's Upland Conservation Projects

The Upland Agricultural and Conservation Project in Central and East Java is representative of Indonesia's upland conservation efforts. An important component of the project was the use of subsidies to promote activities which increased farmer incomes and soil conservation. Two types of subsidies were used: an operating subsidy for annual inputs such as seed, fertiliser and pesticides; and a capital subsidy for terracing and related construction. This study measures the extent to which the effects of the subsidies were sustained over varying periods following termination of the project. The results show that the effects of the operating subsidies are clearly not sustainable; the effects of the capital subsidies may persist longer, but they too are probably not sustainable.     

我国能源补贴对能源结构的影响效应研究

文章依据2007-2011年间能源补贴与能源结构的样本数据,运用交叉相关系数方法,首次实证研究了我国能源补贴对能源结构的影响效应。研究表明,煤补贴在滞后二阶时与煤结构相关度达到最大,煤补贴在当期补贴过后,对煤结构产生滞后影响;石油补贴在滞后一阶时与石油结构相关度达到最大,石油补贴在当期补贴过后,对石油结构产生滞后影响;天然气补贴在滞后三阶时与天然气结构相关度达到最大,天然气补贴在当期补贴过后,对天然气结构产生滞后影响;非化石能源补贴在当期与非化石能源结构相关度达到最大,非化石能源补贴对其当期结构具有重要影响。最后,提出了我国能源补贴和能源结构优化的政策建议。     

Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under R&D competition: Output versus R&D subsidies

We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.     

The backfiring effects of monetary and gift incentives on Covid-19 vaccination intentions

We provide evidence that material inducements for Covid-19 vaccination may backfire. Results from a hypothetical survey experiment in China (N = 1365) show incentives of 8–125 USD reduce vaccine uptake intentions compared to simply offering vaccination for free. Ours is the first Covid-19 vaccine study to separately consider and directly compare the effects of monetary and goods-based incentives, both of which have been widely employed by countries seeking to increase uptake; we demonstrate that both types backfire equally. Results are compared against the burgeoning literature on Covid-19 vaccine incentives.     

What can we expect from subsidies for the long-term unemployed?

What can we expect from subsidies for the long-term unemployed? According to Snower (1994a) unemployment would fall dramatically. Furthermore, the subsidy scheme would pay for itself. In this paper we argue that the impact on unemployment is more likely to be limited and is unlikely to constitute a ‘free lunch.’ We present an adapted version of MIMIC where we model the distinction between short and long-term unemployment explicitly. Simulation results on subsidies for the long-term unemployed are in line with the findings of microlevel studies on actually implemented subsidy schemes for the long-term unemployed. The simulation results are in contrast with Snower's analysis.     

政府补助、保险支付与老年临终照料成本——基于2002-2014年CLHLS死亡人口追踪数据的分析

为应对日益增大的老年人照料压力,我国各地试点通过政府补助或社会保险支付的方式满足老人的照料需求。基于2002-2014年CLHLS死亡人口追踪数据,文章用两部分模型、Heckman选择模型和结构方程模型,分析了政府补助、保险支付对老年临终照料直接成本和总成本的影响及其中介机制。研究发现,老年临终照料服务由保险支付的直接成本和总成本都比家庭支付明显更高,政府补助的直接成本比家庭支付更高,保险支付的直接成本比政府补助更高。保险支付和政府补助对照料成本影响的机制存在差异,保险支付主要通过收入效应对照料成本产生显著影响,但替代效应也发挥了中介作用,政府补助则主要通过替代效应对照料成本产生显著影响。文章的研究结论具有重要的政策含义。我国发展长期护理保险,应合理界定政府、市场、社会和家庭对老年人的照料责任,并明确长期护理保险的有限责任,尽量降低可能的收入效应和替代效应对照料成本的影响。     

The Effects of Operating and Capital Subsidies on Total Factor Productivity: A Decomposition Approach

Past studies relied on ad hoc associations to establish relationships between productivity on one hand and operating and capital subsidies on the other. This article deviates from these studies. It builds on recent research based on private cost to derive a total factor productivity formula that includes subsidy effects. It specifies an empirical model to estimate the required parameters to apply the formula. The application to urban transit systems shows that the effects of these subsidies on productivity through technical change reinforce the decline in productivity.     

Adoption Subsidy Versus Technology Standards Under Asymmetric Information

Summary  Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firms to adopt new technologies than command-and-control policies. We compare the effects of a direct technology regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information about the costs of technological advances in controlling the socially undesirable activities. We show that the policy maker may want to commit to her policy. The reason is that asymmetric information about adoption costs induces the policy maker to set subsidy levels that increase over time; firms, expecting higher subsidies in the future, postpone investment. Direct regulation offers a commitment possibility that allows to prevent firms from postponing investment. The research of the the first author was sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO. We thank the participants of the First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society on March 29–April 1, 2007 in Amsterdam, and especially Frans van Winden, for comments.     

考虑政府补贴的闭环供应链决策研究

考虑一个再制造商、一个电商回收平台和消费者构成的闭环供应链,对比分析不同的政府补贴方式与不同的平台回收模式下的4种回收情境。结果表明：回收模式的选择会影响平台的服务水平,并不会受到政府补贴的影响;回收量的多少不仅与政府补贴有关,还与再制造商的碳减排成本有关;碳减排补贴能实现更高的碳减排率,而产量补贴能实现供应链整体利润最大化。     

Promise,trust, and betrayal: Costs of breaching an implicit contract

We study the cost of breaching an implicit contract in a goods market. Young and Levy (2014) document an implicit contract between the Coca‐Cola Company and its consumers. This implicit contract included a promise of constant quality. We offer two types of evidence of the costs of breach. First, we document a case in 1930 when the Coca‐Cola Company chose to avoid quality adjustment by incurring a permanently higher marginal cost of production, instead of a one‐time increase in the fixed cost. Second, we explore the consequences of the company's 1985 introduction of “New Coke” to replace the original beverage. Using the Hirschman's (1970) model of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, we argue that the public outcry that followed New Coke's introduction was a response to the implicit contract breach.     

论出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利的经济效应

本文从经济学角度分析了出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利和进口国福利的影响,认为补贴措施会降低出口国的总福利并容易遭到进口国的反补贴报复,反补贴税的效果受多种因素影响,具有不确定性,指出我国在实施出口补贴政策时应考虑产品市场的供求弹性,选择合适的补贴类型、数量和形式,以求在达到补贴的预期目的的同时尽量降低补贴的不利影响。     

Anti-Poverty Programs in Indonesia

Between 1994/95 and 1997/98, Indonesia's spending on anti-poverty programs grew from 0.1% to 0.3% of GDP. The introduction of the 'social safety net' raised anti-poverty spending to 1.4% of GDP in 1998/99 and changed its main focus from job creation schemes, financed mainly by loans and grants to small firms and community groups, to in-kind subsidies for rice, public health care, scholarships for children in poor families and grants to schools in poorareas. The most accurately targeted program was health care, which covered twice as many people in the two poorest deciles as in the remaining eight. For most other programs, this targeting ratio was only about 1.5. We argue that the education and health care programs were the most successful, and doubt that the rice subsidy, job creation and loans schemes were worthwhile.     

The distributional impacts of removing energy subsidies in China

The distributional impact on households is an important factor for the acceptance of energy subsidy reform. Based on energy consumption features of the Chinese households at different income levels, this paper adopts an input–output price model to analyze possible impacts of removing energy subsidies on income distribution under different scenarios. Results show that: (1) The distributional impacts of removing subsidies vary by fossil fuels. From the perspectives of combined effects, transport fuel subsidy removal and coal subsidy removal have the strongest and the weakest progressive effects respectively, while the removal of electricity subsidies has a regressive effect. Moreover, the removal of petroleum product subsidies has the greatest impact on households, followed by the removal of electricity and coal subsidies, respectively. (2) Indirect impacts of energy subsidy reform are greater than direct impacts on households. (3) Government price controls can reduce the negative impact of energy subsidy reform. Policy implications are thus summarized. Energy subsidy reform can start from the energy that has the strongest progressive effect and the minimum impact on households. The Chinese government can take certain compensatory measures to mitigate the impact of reform on poor households.     

A Rationale for the WTO Prohibition of Export Subsidies: Strategic Export Subsidies and World Welfare

This article presents a model that provides an economic rationale for multilateral agreements, such as the WTO, that prohibit export subsidies. The model is a multicountry version of the well-known Brander and Spencer (Journal of International Economics (1985) 18, 83–100) analysis of profit-shifting export subsidies, with the addition of an opportunity cost of government revenue greater than unity, as in Neary (Journal of International Economics (1994) 37, 197–218) to capture the fact that the export subsidy will typically be funded by distortionary taxation. It explains the unilateral incentive for welfare-maximizing governments to provide export subsidies and shows how the multilateral prohibition of export subsidies may increase world welfare.