An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow

We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a dominance solvable version of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies, play tends toward the Stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player. Convergence is significantly more robust for a “serial cost sharing” game, which satisfies a stronger solution concept of overwhelmed solvability. As the number of players grows, this improved convergence tends to diminish, seemingly driven by frequent and highly structured experimentation by players leading to a cascading effect in which experimentation by one player induces experimentation by others. These results have implications both for traditional oligopoly competition and for a wide variety of strategic situations arising on the Internet.     

An assessment of the impact of tax incentives relative to socio-economic characteristics on charitable giving in Canada

This research examines the effectiveness of the Canadian tax incentive system for charitable giving while attempting to deal with two persistent methodological problems in past research. The Heckman selection model and the ordered probit model are used to examine the Canadian tax incentive system with 2010 survey data. The results imply that the effect of the tax credit systematically increases with an increase in donation expenditure suggesting that the higher tax credit for larger donations is more effective than the lower tax credit for smaller donations. While the results suggest that the current tax policy is effective, socio-economic characteristics, such as wealth, household income, and university education, appear to have a greater impact on donations.     

It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust

Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust decisions involve multiple agents. Of particular interest is the case when a breach of trust is not profitable if carried out in isolation, but requires an agreement among agents. In such situations the pattern of behaviors is richer than in dyadic games, because even opportunistic trustees who would breach trust when alone may act trustworthily based on what they believe to be the predominant course of action. Anticipating this, trusters may be more inclined to trust. We dub these motivations derived trustworthiness and derived trust. To capture them, we design a “Collective Trust Game” and study it by means of a laboratory experiment. We report that overall levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when derived motivations are present, and this generates also higher levels of trust. In our set-up, the effects of derived trustworthiness are comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.     

茶农生物农药属性偏好及支付意愿研究——基于选择实验的实证分析

利用选择实验方法实证分析了茶农生物农药属性偏好和支付意愿。结果表明:(1)茶农偏好"缩短安全间隔期""不提前使用"和"不产生抗药性"的农药属性,但在"缩短安全间隔期"和"针对防治"上存在偏好异质性;(2)茶农愿为优化3类属性多支付16.974、22.250和11.272元/亩/年;(3)种植面积小、受教育年限长、化学农药危害认知程度高的茶农倾向于选择生物农药;(4)生物农药实际支付高于各属性加总的意愿支付,应关注生物农药外部性。     

Policy innovation through noise in implementation: Best to be grey (or silver) on Friday,in Halifax

When the implementation of regulations requires judgement, there is bound to be noise in the application of the rules, but is there bias in the noise such that policy innovation, in effect, occurs in implementation? We use a recently available large postcode data set on the MOT road safety testing in the UK to answer this question. There is significant bias: the probability of failing varies systematically across postcodes, day of the week and vehicle colour. A national policy is undermined by this variability and we suggest how policy might be adjusted to reduce this unintended policy innovation.