Bribery in International Business in Post-Soviet Union Countries

Data from 1996 to 2016 on perceived levels of bribe taking in 15 post-Soviet Union countries indicate three distinct groups—Russia and seven contiguous countries are most prone to bribe taking, a set of four countries in the southwest less so, and the three Baltic nations are the least corrupt. Public officials in countries that have high economic freedom and human development, are democracies, and proactively adhere to global anti-bribery treaties are less likely to take bribes. The findings show that despite a common recent history, the countries have evolved differently following the breakup. Implications for international businesses are discussed.     

Bribery in International Business Transactions

Globalization leads to cross-border business transactions between societies with very different norms and regulations regarding bribery. Bribery in international business transactions can be seen as a function of not only the demand for such bribes in different countries, but the supply, or willingness to provide bribes by multinational firms and their representatives. This study addresses the propensity of firms from 30 different countries to engage in international bribery. The study incorporates both domestic (economic development, culture, and domestic corruption in the supplying country) and international factors (those countries’ patterns of trade and involvement in international accords) in explaining the willingness to bribe abroad. The propensity to provide bribes was the lowest when corruption was not tolerated in the multinational firms’ home countries, when the firms’ countries were signatories of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention, and when those countries traded heavily with wealthier nations. Further, these findings are maintained when controlling for levels of economic development and cultural values in the supplying country. In terms of culture, firms from high power distance countries showed a somewhat greater propensity for providing bribes in transactions with less-developed nations.     

Determinants of Bribery in Asian Firms: Evidence from the World Business Environment Survey

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes.     

The Effects of Attitudes,Subjective Norms,Attributions, and Individualism–Collectivism on Managers’ Responses to Bribery in Organizations: Evidence from a Developing Nation

The goal of this study was to introduce a model explaining how managers’ attitudes, subjective norms, attributions, and the individualism–collectivism cultural dimension affect the way managers’ deal with employee bribery in organizations. Twenty-six internal and external attributions related to bribery were identified through a series of structured interviews with 65 subject matter experts. These attributions, together with the other variables in the model, were evaluated by 354 (n = 354) Ecuadorian managers. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that attitudes and external attributions significantly predicted managers’ intentions to discipline employees who accepted a bribe. In addition, external attributions mediated the relationship between individualism–collectivism and intent to discipline corrupt employees. Implications for the management of bribery in Latin American organizations are discussed.     

Recognizing and Justifying Private Corruption

While public (or government) corruption has attracted a lot of attention, private (or business) corruption has been relatively under-addressed. A specific form of corruption, namely, paying a bribe to a public official, is easily identifiable as unethical and possibly illegal, but this is not clear in a private business context. Yet private bribery also has serious organizational consequences. This exploratory study suggests that individuals have difficulty in recognizing the ethical connotations of potential bribery, and draws attention to the need to build skills in this regard. C. Gopinath is a professor in the Management Department, Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University and is a visiting professor at the Institut D’Administration des Entreprises, Aix en Provence. His research, teaching and consulting interests span strategic management and international business. His current work is titled ‹Globalization: A multidisciplinary system’ (Sage, forthcoming).     

Perception of Business Bribery in China: the Impact of Moral Philosophy

This paper examines the impact of Chinese business managers’ moral philosophies on the perception of corrupt payments such as bribery, kickbacks and gift giving. Business managers from Mainland China were selected as target respondents. As hypothesized the survey results generally indicate that moral relativism is a significant predictor of Chinese business managers’ favorable perception of bribery and kickbacks. In examining the attitude toward gift giving, the survey showed that an individual’s attitude toward gift giving was neither affected by their moral relativism nor by their moral idealism, which implies that gift giving is widely accepted as legal practice in business in Chinese cultural society. Part of the paper was presented at the conference of World Business Ethics Forum, Nov. 1–3, 2006 in Hongkong and Macau.     

Determinants of bribery in international business

Levels of perceived bribe taking in 54 countries in two time periods were analyzed with respect to two independent variables—their level of human development measuring education, wealth, and health (Human Development Index) and the level of economic freedom measuring the extent to which a nation's economy is open to market forces. The results indicate that lower levels of bribe taking are associated with high human development and greater economic freedom. Developed countries that have shown improvements on the two variables over a five‐year period also show a reduction in their perceived levels of bribe taking. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

International Bribery: Does a Written Code of Ethics Make a Difference in Perceptions of Business Professionals

This article analyzes the attitudes of United States business professionals toward the issue of international bribery, and in particular, whether or not having a written code of ethics has an effect on these attitudes. A vignette relating to international bribery from a widely used survey instrument was employed in a nationwide survey of business professionals to gather information on ethical attitudes of respondents. Data were also collected on gender of respondents, whether or not respondents were self-employed, whether or not the respondents’ firms had a written code of ethics, and to what extent the respondents’ firms generated revenues from international operations. Attitudes concerning whether or not international bribery is ever acceptable exhibited wide dispersion. Respondents from firms that have a written code of ethics were significantly less likely to find international bribery acceptable. Firms that generate revenues from international operations were significantly more likely to have a written code of ethics than were firms which did not generate revenues from international operations. Implications of the findings for business policy are discussed. Joseph A. McKinney is Ben H. Williams Professor of International Economics at Baylor University. He was previously on the faculty of the University of Virginia, and has served as visiting professor to universities in Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Canada. His research interests include business ethics, international trade policy, and regional economic integration. Carlos W. Moore is the Edwin W. Streetman Professor of Marketing at Baylor University, where he has been on the faculty for more than 30 years. His research interests include business ethics, marketing and advertising evaluation, and small business strategies. He has done consulting on bank marketing and new product development.     

A comparison of Nigerian to American views of bribery and extortion in international commerce

This study investigates the differences in the way bribery and extortion is perceived by two different cultures — American and Nigerian. Two hundred and forty American business students and one hundred and eighty Nigerian business students were presented with three scenarios describing a businessman offering a bribe to a government official and three scenarios describing a businessman being forced to pay a bribe to an official in order to do business. The Reidenbach-Robin instrument was used to measure the ethical reactions of the two samples to these scenarios. Results indicate that ethical reactions to bribery and extortion vary by (a) the nationality of the person offering the bribe, and (b) the country where the bribe is offered. In addition, Nigerians perceived some of the scenarios as being less unethical than did Americans. John Tsalikis is an Assistant Professor of Marketing at Florida International University. His research interests include marketing ethics, international marketing, and direct marketing. His articles have appeared in the Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Business Ethics, Psychology and Marketing, and the Journal of International Consumer Marketing. Osita Nwachukwu is an Assistant Professor of Management at Western Illinois University. His research interests include marketing ethics, and business policy. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Business Ethics, and the Journal of International Consumer Marketing.     

用经济模型分析中国的反腐败问题

在分析腐败问题的数学模型中 ,有四个变量在发挥作用 ,它们是 :可以收到的贿赂金额、受贿后被查处的概率、官员的薪水以及距离退休的时间。在符合“经济人”假定的条件下 ,必须使得官员不受贿时的期望收益大于受贿时的期望收益 ,他们才不会选择受贿。为了有效遏制中国腐败问题 ,需要采取一些措施标本兼治     

Bribery and extortion in international business: Ethical perceptions of Greeks compared to Americans

This study investigates the differences in he way bribery and extortion is perceived by two different cultures — American and Greek. Two hundred and forty American business students and two hundred and four Greek business students were presented with three scenarios describing a businessman offering a bribe to a government official and three scenarios describing a businessman being forced to pay a bribe to an official in order to do business. The Reidenbach-Robin instrument was used to measure the ethical reactions of the two samples to these scenarios. Results indicate that ethical reactions to bribery and extortion vary by (a) the nationality of the person offering the bribe, and (b) the country where the bribe is offered. In addition, Greeks perceived some of the scenarios as being less unethical than did Americans.John Tsalikis is an Associate Professor of Marketing at Florida International University. His research interests include marketing ethics, international marketing, and direct marketing. His articles have appeared in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Business Ethics, Psychology and Marketing, and theJournal of International Consumer Marketing.Michael S. LaTour is an Associate Professor of Marketing at Auburn University. His research interests include marketing ethics, and emotional responses to advertising. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Business Ethics, Psychology and Marketing, Journal of Health Care Marketing, and theJournal of Advertising.The authors contributed equally to this article.     

Values Versus Regulations: How Culture Plays Its Role

This study examines the impact of culture on regulation and corruption. Our empirical results suggest that cultural values have significant effects on countries’ regulatory policies, levels of corruption, and economic development. Contrary to the conclusions drawn by others, this study shows no significant relationship between the regulatory policies of countries and their perceived levels of corruption. Thus, evidence of the “public choice view” toward entry regulation derived in related studies seems to be at least attenuated. Dr. Runtian Jing is a Professor and Vice Dean of the School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. John L. Graham is Professor of International Business, The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine.     

EU enlargement and labour markets in the CEECs

The implications for labour markets are central to any political and economic evaluation of EU Eastern enlargement. The resulting new levels of unemployment and of wages will have direct effects on social welfare in the acceding countries as well as in the present member states of the EU. Furthermore, employment and wages are substantial factors of political stability in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs). The following paper analyses the present situation on the labour markets in the CEECs and discusses the effects of their reintegration into the Western European system and the resulting implications for labour market and wage policy institutions. Helpful comments by participants of the 2nd convention of the CEEISA “Globalisation of International Relations—Implications for Central and Eastern European Countries”, Warsaw, 15–17 June 2000, and of the 4th International IMAD Conference “Institutions in Transition”, Portoroz (Slovenia), 23–24 June 2000, are gratefully acknowledged.     

Crossing the Boundaries of Obligation: Are Corporate Salaries a Form of Bribery?

Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) pay relatively high salaries to local people in host countries. TNCs assume that such employees will accept an employeeÇôemployer relationship similar to that which exists in North America, but the obligations and personal interests that such a relationship create often directly conflict with systems of obligation already established in the host country. When TNCs do business across the boundaries of systems of obligation, corporate salaries can be seen as a form of unethical bribery. In this paper, the core case of business bribery is described consistent with the usual philosophical analysis of bribery, and the grounds for thinking bribery is unethical are made clear. The amount of a bribe is irrelevant to the ethical analysis. Bribery is distinguished from tips and grease on structural grounds. The concept of a system of obligation is defined, and examples given that show the variability of systems of obligation in host countries. Arguments are given to show that salaries paid by TNCs create obligations and personal interests which sometimes conflict with existing systems of obligation, and that such payments have the same structure as more traditional forms of bribery. The ethical issues of corporations crossing the boundaries of systems of obligations are discussed.     

The Impact of Situational Influences on Corruption in Organizations

The literature states that both situational and individual factors contribute to corrupt behavior. This study investigates the influence of rarely empirically investigated situational factors – the size of the bribe, time pressure, and the degree of abstractness of the business code – on the Model of Corrupt Action that describes the subjective decision making process of corrupt actors. To test the effects, I used an experimental simulation design. Only few effects were found. Thus, my results show a certain robustness of corrupt behavior against the examined situational influences. Based on these results, I discuss implications for the prevention of corruption in organizations.     

商业贿赂犯罪概念的界定

刑法语境中的商业贿赂概念可以借鉴经济法层面的商业贿赂,但绝不能受国家工商管理总局《暂行规定》中对商业贿赂概念界定的影响,应该将一切能够揭示商业贿赂本质且大量客观存在的商业贿赂现象都包括进去。应立足于当前治理商业贿赂犯罪的现实需要,以现行的《刑法》规定及司法解释为依据,认为商业贿赂犯罪是指在商业活动中,商事活动参与者为谋取商业利益而给予他人财物,或者与商业活动紧密相关的人利用商事管理职权而索取或者收受他人财物,或者为促成商事活动双方的行贿、受贿而居间介绍,依法应当受到刑罚处罚的行为。     

An Empirical Investigation on Firms’ Proactive and Passive Motivation for Bribery in China

This research investigates firms’ bribery motivations in China. Based on resource dependence theory and anomie theory, we identify resource conditions as firms’ proactive motivation to bribe and firms’ perceived institutional environment as their passive motivation to bribe. We use the data from 2002 World Business Environment Survey, collected by the World Bank, to investigate firms’ bribery in the world’s largest emerging market, China. We employ a multi-level logistic model to test our hypotheses. The results show that unsatisfactory general and task environmental conditions may trigger firms to bribe in order to compete for better resources and opportunities; institutional conditions such as the security expenditure and anomie climate may make firms perceive bribery as a common phenomenon and thus induce firms to bribe. This research provides some insights to understand business bribery behaviors in emerging market. It also discusses some managerial implications and guidelines for policy-making from the findings.     

Ethical Distance in Corrupt Firms: How Do Innocent Bystanders Become Guilty Perpetrators?

This paper develops the concept of the ‘continuum of destructiveness’ in relation to organizational corruption. This notion captures the slippery slope of wrongdoing as actors engage in increasingly dubious practices. We identify four kinds of individuals along this continuum in corrupt organizations, who range from complete innocence to total guilt. They are innocent bystanders, innocent participants, active rationalizers and guilty perpetrators. Traditional explanations of how individuals move from bystander status to guilty perpetrators usually focus on socialization and institutional factors. In addition to these factors, we propose that the very distance between an act and its ethical consequences (ethical distance) may also play a determining role – if not always in the same way – in the transition process. Having developed this conceptual argument, we conclude with a discussion of managerial and research implications. An Earlier version of this paper was presented at the The Twelfth Annual International Conference Promoting Business Ethics, New York, October 2005     

When is a Bribe a Bribe? Teaching a Workable Definition of Bribery

This paper presents an outline forteaching about bribery. The outline is based onthe presumption that a payment, once defined asa ``bribe' is by definition unethical. Inaddition, the paper develops a simple yetworkable definition of bribery based on theprincipal-agent framework. The idea is that anypayment made to a principal, for any purpose,is not by definition a bribe; however, anypayment made to an agent is a bribe if theagent retains the payment.     

The Role of the OECD and EU Conventions in Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials

The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention) obligates signatory nations to make bribery of foreign public officials a criminal act on an extraterritorial basis. The purposes of this article are to describe the nature and consequences of bribery, outline the major provisions of the OECD Convention, and analyze its role in promoting transparency and accountability in international business. While the OECD Convention is not expected to totally eliminate the seeking or taking of bribes, there are hopes that a uniform set of rules will curtail corrupt behavior, as long as those rules are both enforceable and enforced.