Liquid markets and competition

A market is liquid if no individual's actions have a big effect on the prices of goods traded in that market. Perfectly competitive markets are therefore perfectly liquid. It is well known that market liquidity can be achieved by increasing the number of traders so that individual trades are small compared to total trades. We show that even when there are only few traders, market liquidity can be achieved through large short sales in which net trades are small relative to gross trades. In particular, for a natural variant of the market game which permits unlimited short sales, we show that there is always a Nash equilibrium allocation arbitrarily close to a competitive equilibrium allocation. Of course, not all NE are near competitive. Only the large-short-sales NE are nearly liquid and hence close to CE.     

Money creation and credit multipliers ∗

The standard objections against the quantity theory of money, based on the instability of the velocity of money, are insufficient to discard this long-held monetary theory. The principal criticism of the theory rests on the determination of the money supply. The supply of money is a dependent variable, not an independent one. The demand for credit determines the quantity of money, or at the very least bankers and borrowers share the responsibility. Causality is thus reversed. It is necessary to abandon the concept of money multipliers, which are relics of the quantity theory of money. Bankers can, if they so desirerespond without limitto demands for credit. They are not tied by a fixed amount of pre-existing assets. The goal of the article is to outline an explanation of these statements and provide a vision of monetary theory that is different from that usually taught.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Inside and outside fiat money, gains to trade, and IS-LM

Summary. We build a one-period general equilibrium model with money. Equilibrium exists, and fiat money has positive value, as long as the ratio of outside money to inside money is less than the gains to trade available at autarky. We show that the nominal effects of government fiscal and monetary policy can be completely described by a diagram identical in form to the IS-LM curves introduced by Hicks to describe Keynes' general theory. IS-LM analysis is thus not incompatible with full market clearing, multiple commodities, and heterogeneous households. We show that as the government deficit approaches a finite threshold, hyperinflation sets in (prices converge to infinity and real trade collapses). At the other extreme, if the government surplus is too large, the economy enters a liquidity trap in which nominal GNP sinks and monetary policy is ineffectual. Received: January 2, 2002; revised version: April 8, 2002 Correspondence to: P. Dubey     

Private money and bank runs

Abstract This paper studies bank runs in a model with private money. We show that allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank runs. In our model, there exists a unique banking equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of real goods and agents in need of liquidity use private money to finance consumption. With private money, the unique equilibrium not only eliminates bank runs but also improves banking efficiency. The implications of our model are consistent with the evidence from the banking history of the United States.     

When does Strategic Debt-service Matter?

Recent work in corporate finance has suggested that strategic debt-service by equity-holders works to lower debt values and raise yield spreads substantially. We show that this is not quite correct. With optimal cash management, defaults occassioned by deliberate underperformance (strategic defaults) and those forced by inadequate cash (liquidity defaults) work as substitutes: allowing for strategic debt-service leads to a decline in the equilibrium likelihood of liquidity defaults. In some cases, this decline is sufficiently sharp that equilibrium debt values actually increase and yield spreads decline. We provide an intuitive explanation for these results in terms of an interaction of optionalitiesExpanded versions of this paper were presented in conferences and seminars at the Scottish Institute for Research in Finance, European Finance Association, Western Finance Association, Financial Management Association, 10th Derivative Securities Conference, Santa Clara University, Virginia Tech, the Norwegian School of Management, the Norwegian School of Business and Economics, Duke University, and Carnegie-Mellon University. We benefitted greatly from the comments of participants at these seminars and would particularly like to thank Francesca Cornelli, Kose John, Pete Kyle, Sanjay Unni, and Raman Uppal in this context     

ON THE IMPACT OF FUNDAMENTALS,LIQUIDITY, AND COORDINATION ON MARKET STABILITY*

We develop a coordination game to model interactions between fundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets. We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimation of the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specific empirical application is carry trades in the yen–dollar market, including the turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, with low information disparities among agents. We observe occasional episodes of market fragility or turmoil with up by the escalator, down by the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behavior in the econometric model is also confirmed.     

MONETARY ANTICIPATONS AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY SOME UK EVIDENCE*

The Carr-Darby ‘shock-absorber’ hypothesis, that unanticipated changes in the money supply influence the demand for real money balances but anticipated changes do not, is tested on UK data for narrow money, M1. For comparison with earlier studies on US data we take the (real first order) partial adjustment model as one example of a ‘conventional’ demand for money function. However the Carr-Darby hypothesis is also tested taking a more general autoregressive distributed lag model as the ‘conventional’ demand function. For both ‘conventional’ demand for money functions we find that the shock-absorber hypothesis is not supported for M1 using UK data.     

Interbank Relationships and the Credit Channel in Germany

A crucial condition for the existence of a credit channel through bank loansis that monetary policy should be able to change bank loan supply. This papercontributes to the discussion on this issue by presenting empirical evidence fromdynamic panel estimations based on a dataset that comprises individual balancesheet information on all German banks. It shows that the average bank reduces itslending more sharply in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy measure the lowerits ratio of short-term interbank deposits to total assets. A dependence on its size canonly be found if explicitly controlled for this dominating effect. Overall, the evidenceis compatible with the existence of a credit channel but the results indicate that it is weakened by the network structures that exist in the German banking system.     

Liquidity shocks and equilibrium liquidity premia

We study an equilibrium in which agents face surprise liquidity shocks and invest in liquid and illiquid riskless assets. The random holding horizon from liquidity shocks makes the return of the illiquid security risky. The equilibrium premium for such risk depends on the constraint that agents face when borrowing against future income; it is insignificant without borrowing constraint, but can be very high with borrowing constraint. Illiquidity, therefore, can have large effects on asset returns when agents face liquidity shocks and borrowing constraints. This result can help us understand why some securities have high liquidity premia, despite low turnover frequency.     

The role of legal status in influencing bank financing and new firm growth

We provide an empirical assessment of the suggestion, based on Severo (2012), to use a systemic liquidity risk index (SLRI) for estimating liquidity premia that could be charged on large banks as a compensation for the implicit liquidity support obtained from public authorities (Blancher et al., 2013). To this end we compute, over the period January 2004–December 2012, a parsimonious and fully documented SLRI. We also investigate its statistical significance in explaining the level and variability of stock returns for a group of large international banks across the subprime and the Eurozone sovereign debt crises. Main findings are two: our more parsimonious SLRI is close to Severo’s but provides a stronger signal of liquidity stress and recovery episodes; we consistently fail to detect, within and across the two crises, a stable group of banks among the global systemically important ones listed by the Financial Stability Board.     

流动性过剩与中国通货膨胀关系的实证分析

本文首先从理论上分析了流动性过剩的各种度量方法和影响通货膨胀的重要变量,然后采用中国季度数据,在多变量VAR模型的基础上,运用协整分析和ECM等方法发现,在长期内流动性每提高1％,会带来通货膨胀上涨0．79％。脉冲响应函数和方差分解表明流动性过剩和经济过热冲击对我国通胀有持久的正向影响,而国外通胀冲击对我国外溢效应甚微。     

真是过剩流动性引发了中国的通货膨胀吗

2010年7月以来,中国的CPI屡创新高,面临越来越大的通胀压力。社会普遍认为,此次通胀的形成归结于2009年以来中国人民银行流动性的过度投放,故而为控制通胀需紧缩流动性的呼声很高。本文基于1998年1月到2011年4月的月度同比数据,利用SVAR模型分析了中国通货膨胀增长率、国际大宗商品价格和过剩流动性之间的关系。结果表明,流动性过剩对中国通货膨胀增长的冲击非常小,而国际大宗商品价格变动对通胀增长有更大、更持续的正向冲击。国际大宗商品价格变动对中国通胀增长率的影响,远远大于过剩流动性对通胀的影响。     

Liquidity default,liquidity management and smooth dividends policy

Our article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework. By conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm’s optimal investment, financing and dividend policies, our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk. We find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm’s behaviours, including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure. A firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious: it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low, but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough. The dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the ‘smooth dividends policy puzzle’ commonly reported in empirical research.     

LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS IN A MONETARY ECONOMY*

This article presents a microfounded model of money with a consumption and an investment market. We consider an economy in which only part of the investment returns can be pledged. A liquidity constraint arises when the pledgeable part of the returns are not enough to pay for investment costs. We show that when the liquidity constraint is binding, agents may make a cash downpayment and money can perform two roles—as a provider of liquidity services and exchange services. The liquidity constraint constitutes a channel though which underinvestment occurs even at low inflation rates.     

Financial Bubbles: Excess Cash,Momentum, and Incomplete Information

We report on a large number of laboratory market experiments demonstrating that a market bubble can be reduced under the following conditions: 1) a low initial liquidity level, i.e., less total cash than value of total shares, 2) deferred dividends, and 3) a bid-ask book that is open to traders. Conversely, a large bubble arises when the opposite conditions exist. The first part of the article is comprised of twenty-five experiments with varying levels of total cash endowment per share (liquidity level), payment or deferral of dividends and an open or closed bid-ask book. We find that the liquidity level has a very strong influence on the mean and maximum prices during an experiment (P < 1/10,000). These results suggest that within the framework of the classical bubble experiments (dividends distributed after each period and closed book), each dollar per share of additional cash results in a maximum price that is $1 per share higher. There is also limited statistical support for the theory that deferred dividends (which also lower the cash per share during much of the experiment) and an open book lead to a reduced bubble. The three factors taken together show a striking difference in the median magnitude of the bubble ($7.30 versus $0.22 for the maximum deviation from fundamental value). Another set of twelve experiments features a single dividend at the end of fifteen trading periods and establishes a 0.8 correlation between price and liquidity during the early periods of the experiments. As a result, calibration of prices and evolution toward equilibrium price as a function of liquidity are possible.     

Liquidity and investor confidence in the turn-of-the-month regularity

Ogden (1990) offers a compelling explanation for the ubiquitous turn-of-the-month (TOM) seasonality. He hypothesizes and shows that the clustering of payment dates at the end of the month results in a stock return regularity that is related to increased liquidity and monetary policy. This article introduces investor behaviour into Ogden’s TOM liquidity hypothesis where higher TOM returns depend not only on the availability of increased liquidity but also on investors’ willingness to invest new funds. The empirical evidence is consistent with the argument. When confidence is high, investors’ willingness to invest the increased liquidity results in a TOM regularity. But when confidence is low, a TOM regularity is absent as investors park the increased liquidity. This additional measure of investor confidence provides a more complete explanation of Ogden’s liquidity hypothesis.     

Optimal Liquidity Provision Through a Demand Deposit Scheme: The Jacklin Critique Revisited

We derive conditions such that optimal liquidity provisions through a demand deposit scheme can be sustainably implemented in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the assumption that renegade investors have free access to ex post asset markets. As our qualitative main finding we demonstrate that such sustainability is more likely for ‘poor’ than for ‘rich’ scheme participants in terms of future income. By establishing sustainability for low future income populations, our formal analysis therefore offers an important qualification of Jacklin's (1987) influential claim that an optimal demand deposit scheme is not sustainable whenever there exists the possibility of an ex post asset market.     

The cyclicality of bank regulation in a general economic framework

This article utilizes a representative agent model to address how the regulation policies for banks should respond to the general economic condition. With the consideration of a self-fulfilling deposit insurance facility with sufficient bank reserve to meet the expected need of liquidity shock, our model suggests a counter-cyclical capital adequacy requirement in a competitive loan market. The exception might occur when the moral hazard problem becomes very unwieldy and the representative individual is rather risk averse. With regard to the closure policy, we find that it is closely related to the individual’s degree of risk aversion. A counter-cyclical closure policy is recommended when the individual is highly risk averse. Otherwise, a pro-cyclical closure policy is preferred.