THE IMPACT OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ON CONSUMER SURPLUS, PROFIT, AND SOCIAL WELFARE

This study estimates the effect of U.S. cigarette advertising on social welfare. Because economists hold different beliefs about the nature of advertising, the analysis uses three different empirical models to test the welfare implication of cigarette advertising. Each model employs estimates of a demand equation and a supply relation to calculate a single point estimate of the impact of advertising on profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus. Bootstrapping generates confidence intervals for each welfare estimate. The results indicate that the cigarette industry is not competitive and that advertising significantly increases market power. Further, advertising significantly reduces consumer surplus if it is either purely persuasive or purely informative but has no significant effect on total surplus.     

Gains and losses from potential bilateral US–China trade retaliation

Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World, and calibrated to a global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary non-neutrals and including China's trade surplus as an endogenous variable.Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis world is much debated. In a US–China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading partners' practices would determine costs for China.Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare improving for the US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with non-retaliatory regions, while China and non-retaliatory regions may be adversely affected. Results in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification, however, suggest that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of imports are high. Costs are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade and adjustment costs at home.     

A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire

We consider the design of a nonlinear social tariff for residential water in Côte d'Ivoire, which is a case of a monopolistic private operator supplying a population of heterogeneous consumers. The proposed optimal tariff includes an initial “social” block with a low unit price, and higher consumption blocks with a monopoly pricing rule. This optimal nonlinear tariff is calibrated using econometric estimates of a panel-data residential water demand equation. Welfare changes associated with moving from the actual tariff to approximations of the optimal pricing system are computed under different tariff scenarios. We find that gains in consumer welfare would outweigh losses in producer surplus in a majority of Ivorian local communities.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Economic cost–benefit analysis of the addictive digital game industry

This study attempts to estimate the economic costs and benefits of the addictive digital game industry. Addiction to digital games induces economic costs such as increase in crime, facilities investments for curbing addiction, increase in counselling costs and other welfare losses. As a case study, we investigate the digital game industry in South Korea which is known to have one of the highest rates of game addiction. According to our calculations, the annual cost of game addiction is estimated to be approximately $3.5B while the annual benefit is approximately $24.3B ($3.7B for addicted user market). The proportion of the total costs to total benefits from the game industry is an alarming 14% (95% for addicted user market). We offer some policy recommendations.     

Dominant carrier market power in US international telephone markets

An econometric model is used to examine market power in US international telephone markets. Lerner index estimates suggest AT&T's collection rate-cost margin was between 12% and 24% during 1991 to 1995. Although Lerner estimates imply deadweight welfare losses of up to US $261 million per annum, such losses are small compared to those from the inefficient pricing of international interconnection. Settlement rate-cost margins on US bilateral markets of approximately 89% translate into a US $4907 million transfer from consumers to carriers in 1995.     

Endogenously chosen travel costs and the travel cost model: an application to mountain biking at Moab,Utah

The travel cost model is frequently used to estimate net willingness to pay for recreation at remote sites by using the visitor's travel costs as a proxy for the price of recreation. However, some concern has been raised over the validity of using the visitor's stated travel costs as a proxy for price. This paper addresses some of these concerns, by examining the possible over-estimation of consumer surplus due to endogenously chosen travel costs. This paper extends past theoretical work for the linear model by developing a correction for endogenously chosen travel costs in more commonly used nonlinear models such as the Poisson or count data model. Also provided is the first empirical test of the presence of endogeneity and an estimate of the magnitude of the error from ignoring endogeneity in travel costs. After applying this test and the correction to data that was gathered for mountain biking at Moab, Utah the estimate of consumer surplus falls from US $153 to US $135, which is a 12% reduction.     

Effects of trade diversion and trade creation of MERCOSUR on US and world apple markets

Apples are the third most valuable fruit in the United States and account for 18% of US fruit exports. Chile is a major competitor to the United States in the MERCOSUR market, since it is one of the leading apple producing countries and enjoys the tariff reductions as a member of MERCOSUR. Consequently, Chilean exports displace US exports in MERCOSUR. In addition, other MERCOSUR members import more from lower-cost Chile, leading to a reduction in production and an increase in consumption in these countries. This study develops a theoretical and an empirical model of world apple market to quantify the trade diversion and trade creation effects of the MERCOSUR free trade agreement and to estimate the welfare impacts.     

基于BARY曲线的基本电价测算模型研究

本文针对目前两部制电价中基本电费按容量计费导致基本电价水平偏低、不能合理配置电力资源的问题,以长期边际成本理论为基础,结合描述电力系统负荷特性同时率与负荷率关系的BARY经验曲线,构建了容量成本在基本电费和电度电费中的分摊模型,并用某市电力局提供的有关数据,依据该模型测算了按电压等级和负荷特性划分的分类用户的基本电价。结果表明,该模型是确定基本电价的一种可行工具。     

US Ethanol Trade Policy: Pollution Reduction or Domestic Protection

To mitigate dependence on fossil fuel and reduce pollution, the US government has undertaken several policies—an import tariff, tax credit, and mandate—to augment domestic ethanol production and increase ethanol in the fuel supply. This study uses a general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of the US ethanol import tariff on welfare by internalizing the externality and incorporating US fuel and ethanol policies and to determine the optimal tariff. The results show that because of the environmental benefits of imported ethanol, the adverse effects of domestic ethanol on the environment, the need for the imported ethanol to boost the blended gasoline production, and the economy‐wide interactions of various markets, the optimal trade policy may call for subsidizing rather than taxing ethanol imports.     

An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization On Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers*

This paper analyzes the effects of tariff reductions on horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly in a two-country world. It is shown that for mergers between two domestic firms and for cross-border mergers which supply both markets from a foreign plant, unilateral tariff reduction encourages mergers which concentrate market power at the expense of mergers which reduce cost, while bilateral tariff reductions have the opposite effect, encouraging mergers which significantly reduce cost. Cross-border mergers which continue to supply each market from a local plant are discouraged by both unilateral and bilateral tariff reduction.     

Technology Transfer and Merger Activities with Trade and Tariffs

In order to better understand the effects of globalization on merger incentives this paper considers a set of commonly observed mergers whereby a restructured target (with improved managerial or technical capability) continues to supply the market. In contrast to the market‐concentrating merger literature it finds that trade barriers tend to encourage mergers, including potentially welfare‐reducing, tariff‐jumping mergers. Multilateral trade liberalization, however, encourages welfare‐improving mergers. Hence, and despite the skepticism of regulatory authorities towards the existence of cost synergies as a consequence of mergers, this paper suggests that in order to assess the impact of trade liberalization under the WTO on merger incentives, and consequently on prices, quantities, and welfare, accurate information on ex ante cost differences and the transferability of managerial and technical techniques is required.     

Dynamics of economic efficiency in tariff and trade

When the efficiency losses or gains as a result of an ad valorem import tariff are accounted for, the exisiting literature compares the equilibrium states before and after the tariff. However, after the imposition of an ad valorem tariff, the cost of the foreign producer to sell in the domestic market jumps upwards by the extent of the ad valorem tariff. This affects the quantity of imports, and the market is no longer in the initial equilibrium. The market then adjusts and after some efficiency loss, a new equilibrium state is arrived at. The mechanism of price adjustment has a basis of lack of coordination among buyers and sellers at the exisiting prices. The economic efficiency loss when the market is out of equilibrium is not taken into consideration in the literature, while deriving an optimal ad valorem tariff rate. In this article, an optimal ad valorem tariff schedule has been derived. From optimality, it should be construed that the economic efficiency losses get minimised when the market is adjusting and also during the equilibrium. A revenue constraint has to be met in addition.     

Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products; and under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power.     

中国劳动力市场结构与 农村剩余劳动力转移

中国劳动力市场的特殊结构对农村剩余劳动力转移有重要影响。本文通过吸收二元制劳动力市场分割理论的基本假设和对制度变量的讨论,建立了中国农村剩余劳动力转移的“二元市场与二元劳动力”模型,并用以解释中国农村剩余劳动力转移的特点。本文认为,政府的强制性制度障碍导致“S型的人力资本投资曲线”的产生,从而使城市居民在主要劳动力市场具有政策和人力资本优势;作为对福利制度缺失的替代,“隐形补贴”等诱致性制度创新导致农村剩余劳动力在次要劳动力市场具有成本优势。这一模型对于我国农村剩余劳动力迁移中的特殊现象有较好的解释力,对于我国城市化战略和我国一元劳动力市场的形成有重要的理论意义。     

Restrictive or expansive selection: the uneven role of tariff structure in improving market access

We estimate the effect of tariff reforms on market access from the Doha Round until the Great Recession. Gravity estimates yield significant effects of the variation in tariff structure. The change in the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index reveals that the change in tariff dispersion reflects a restrictive selection counteracting the effect of average tariff reductions. Restrictiveness is concentrated in East Asia and Pacific while, in Latin America and Caribbean, selection is expansive. We illustrate reforms in China, finding strong restrictive selection. Simulations highlight reforms with unchanged dispersion for their larger improvement in market access and a simultaneous improvement in welfare.     

中国通货膨胀的福利成本研究

通货膨胀一直以来都是衡量一国宏观经济运行是否稳定和健康的重要指标。本文对国内外关于通货膨胀福利成本的研究发展进行了较为完整的综述,并在此基础之上运用消费者剩余方法和新古典宏观经济学一般均衡模型对中国通货膨胀的福利成本进行了计算和比较。实证结果说明,在中国高通货膨胀会带来较高的福利损失,因此将通胀率保持在较低的水平对提高中国的经济福利水平是有利的。     

Macroeconomic costs to large scale disruptions of food production: The case of foot- and-mouth disease in the United States

We forecast the economic consequences of a widespread contamination of the food system based on a hypothetical outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Since the immediate effect on the livestock sector could affect the entire supply chain and US livestock, meat and dairy exports, we measure these impacts using GTAP, a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global economy. The immediate “shocks” to the US livestock, raw milk and other animal products sectors indirectly affect all sectors of the economy, as well as international markets and trade. We decompose these effects due to each component of the initial shocks, and estimate the importance of these shocks to the national food system for the Mid-Atlantic Region using IMPLAN. Our GTAP results indicate that losses to the USA economy would be about $11.7 billion, and with the ripple effect throughout the rest of the world including beneficiary nations (Argentina, Brazil, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand) and losers (Canada, Mexico, European Union) would be 14.1 billion. We estimate the proportion of the domestic impact affecting the Mid-Atlantic Region. Based on a regional input–output model of that region, we estimate that total losses in value added are nearly $800 million; losses in labor income total about $565 million; and there are job losses of just over 12 thousand.     

Tariff induced licensing contracts,consumers’ surplus and welfare

We construct a duopolistic trade model with technology transfer and consider two-part tariff licensing contracts. We show that a tariff on foreign products can influence the licensing strategy of the foreign firm. There is a trade-off between a tariff and a royalty license in affecting the product price. We show in particular that a tariff can be chosen so as to induce fee licensing and maximize both consumers’ surplus and domestic welfare. This resolves the so-called conflict between these two objectives in respect of the choice of a tariff. The paper provides a number of testable hypothesis.