Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

Does the budget process matter for infrastructure spending? Capital budgeting in local government

Investment in long-term capital projects plays an increasingly important role in improving the quality of many public services, as well as promoting economic development. Using data on capital spending and capital budget structures in county governments in Georgia, USA, this paper explains how a separate capital budget protects infrastructure spending in times of fiscal distress. The author found little evidence that county governments with a separate capital budget spent more than those without a capital budget.     

Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

Leadership development: perk or priority?

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. It must have been a mistake. Without funding there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. But it wasn't a mistake. Not that Palmer was against bold initiatives, but, as he patiently told Barton, sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." Barton bristled: "Don't you see that my department is connected to all the others? Every division benefits from the HR budget." But she knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? Four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice in this fictional case study.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

Nationalised industries: Accounting for inflation

The Secretary of State wants local authorities to cut both manpower and spending. But it is local authority budget makers who face the harsh choices posed by cash limits on the one hand and national wage settlements on the other. That they have come much closer in respect of manpower than spending to what the Secretary of State wants, reflects the trade‐offs facing them in the labour market. New information reveals how brutally these bear on some sections of the workforce rather than others, and how they affect costs both to authorities and to ratepayers.     

Management Control Systems in NPOs: An Italian Survey

This paper tries to point out the role and the characteristics of management control systems (MCS) in organisations whose main goal is not for profit (NPO). Are MCS a necessary or (at least) a useful tool to manage these organisations? How have they to fit the typical nature of NPOs? Are the traditional control processes (planning, programming, budgeting, reporting) effective in NPOs? What kind of information do they use? What is the 'state of the art' and the degree of sophistication of MCS in NPOs? To address these issues, a survey has been conducted among 76 Italian NPO top managers, and the results are reported in this paper.     

The alternative workplace: changing where and how people work

Today many organizations, including AT&T and IBM, are pioneering the alternative workplace--the combination of nontraditional work practices, settings, and locations that is beginning to supplement traditional offices. This is not a fad. Although estimates vary widely, it is safe to say that some 30 million to 40 million people in the United States are now either telecommuters or home-based workers. What motivates managers to examine how people spend their time at the office and where else they might do their work? Among the potential benefits for companies are reduced costs, increased productivity, and an edge in vying for and keeping talented employees. They can also capture government incentives and avoid costly sanctions. But at the same time, alternative workplace programs are not for everyone. Indeed, such programs can be difficult to adopt, even for those organizations that seem to be most suited to them. Ingrained behaviors and practical hurdles are hard to overcome. And the challenges of managing both the cultural changes and systems improvements required by an alternative workplace initiative are substantial. How should senior managers think about alternative workplace programs? What are the criteria for determining whether the alternative workplace is right for a given organization? What are the most common pitfalls in implementing alternative workplace programs? The author provides the answers to these questions in his examination of this new frontier of where and how people work.     

If private equity sized up your business

As the dust settles on the recent frenzy of private equity deals (including transactions topping $20 billion), what lessons can companies glean? Directors and executives of public companies may now be slightly less fearful of imminent takeover, yet the pressure remains: They face shareholders who wonder why they aren't getting private-equity-level returns. Rather than dismiss the value private equity has created as manipulated or aberrant, public company leaders should recognize the disciplined management that often underlies it. Pozen, a longtime leader in the financial services industry, finds that in the aftermath of buyouts, companies undergo five major thrusts of reform. These translate into five key questions that directors should pose to senior management: Have we left too much cash on our balance sheet instead of raising our cash dividends or buying back shares? Do we have the optimal capital structure, with the lowest weighted after-tax cost of total capital, including debt and equity? Do we have an operating plan that will significantly increase shareholder value, with specific metrics to monitor performance? Are the compensation rewards for our top executives tied closely enough to increases in shareholder value, with real penalties for nonperformance? Finally, does our board have enough industry experts who have made the time commitments and been given the financial incentives necessary to maximize shareholder value? The era of private equity is far from over - the top funds have become very large and are likely to play an influential role in future market cycles. Boards that ask these questions, and act on them, won't just beat the takeover artists to the punch. They will build stronger businesses.     

What working for a Japanese company taught me

In the late 1970s, John E. Rehfeld read everything he could on Japanese business. Most of the discussions focused on interest rates, the education system, and the culture--all very interesting but not very useful. What did these things have to do with day-to-day management? Since then, by working for Japanese companies, he has discovered more than ten Japanese management techniques that have everything to do with running a business. As vice president and general manager of Toshiba's U.S. computer business for nine years and president of Seiko Instruments USA for two, he has seen firsthand how the Japanese manage, and he has applied those techniques in the United States. Using six-month budget cycles, quantifying intangibles, and looking back to see what you could have done better are among the seemingly insignificant practices that combine to have big impact. For example, the author first saw budgeting for 6 months instead of 12 as twice as much work. But he came to appreciate the benefits: managers work harder because they have two deadlines a year, and planning and control improve because managers can adjust their targets to changing conditions more quickly. The author had another change of heart when he was asked to specify how many PCs would sell as the result of a demo program, a task he first thought ridiculous. Though he still thinks such numbers are shaky, he values the discipline of the thought process. These and other techniques, he says, explain much of Japanese companies' success and are tools that managers anywhere can use.     

Corporate Portfolio Management Roundtable

The dean of a top ten business school, the chair of a large investment management firm, two corporate M&A leaders, a CFO, a leading M&A investment banker, and a corporate finance advisor discuss the following questions:

• ? What are today's best practices in corporate portfolio management? What roles should be played by boards, senior managers, and business unit leaders?
• ? What are the typical barriers to successful implementation and how can they be overcome?
• ? Should portfolio management be linked to financial policies such as decisions on capital structure, dividends, and share repurchase?
• ? How should all of the above be disclosed to the investor community?

After acknowledging the considerable challenges to optimal portfolio management in public companies, the panelists offer suggestions that include:

• ? Companies should establish an independent group that functions like a “SWAT team” to support portfolio management. Such groups would be given access to (or produce themselves) business‐unit level data on economic returns and capital employed, and develop an “outside‐in” view of each business's standalone valuation.
• ? Boards should consider using their annual strategy “off‐sites” to explore all possible alternatives for driving share‐holder value, including organic growth, divestitures and acquisitions, as well as changes in dividends, share repurchases, and capital structure.
• ? Performance measurement and compensation frameworks need to be revamped to encourage line managers to think more like investors, not only seeking value‐creating growth but also making divestitures at the right time. CEOs and CFOs should take the lead in developing a shared value creation model that clearly articulates how capital will be allocated.

     

Tailored logistics: the next advantage

How many top executives have ever visited with managers who move materials from the factory to the store? How many still reduce the costs of logistics to the rent of warehouses and the fees charged by common carriers? To judge by hours of senior management attention, logistics problems do not rank high. But logistics have the potential to become the next governing element of strategy. Whether they know it or not, senior managers of every retail store and diversified manufacturing company compete in logistically distinct businesses. Customer needs vary, and companies can tailor their logistics systems to serve their customers better and more profitably. Companies do not create value for customers and sustainable advantage for themselves merely by offering varieties of goods. Rather, they offer goods in distinct ways. A particular can of Coca-Cola, for example, might be a can of Coca-Cola going to a vending machine, or a can of Coca-Cola that comes with billing services. There is a fortune buried in this distinction. The goal of logistics strategy is building distinct approaches to distinct groups of customers. The first step is organizing a cross-functional team to proceed through the following steps: segmenting customers according to purchase criteria, establishing different standards of service for different customer segments, tailoring logistics pipelines to support each segment, and creating economics of scale to determine which assets can be shared among various pipelines. The goal of establishing logistically distinct businesses is familiar: improved knowledge of customers and improved means of satisfying them.     

To diversify or not to diversify

One of the most challenging decisions a company can confront is whether to diversify. The rewards and risks are extraordinary. Success stories such as General Electric, Disney, and 3M abound, but so do stories of failure-consider Quaker Oats' entry into the fruit juice business with Snapple. What makes diversification such an unpredictable, high-stakes game? First, companies usually face the decision in an atmosphere that is not conducive to thoughtful deliberation. For example, an attractive company comes into play, and a competitor is interested in buying it. Or the board of directors urges expanding into new markets. Suddenly, senior managers must synthesize mountains of data under intense time pressure. To complicate matters, diversification as a corporate strategy regularly goes in and out of vogue. In short, there is little conventional wisdom to guide managers as they consider a move that could greatly increase shareholder value or seriously damage it. But diversification doesn't need to be quite such a roll of the dice, argues the author. His research suggests that if managers consider six questions, they can reduce the gamble of diversification. Answering the questions will not lead to an easy go-no-go decision, but by helping managers weigh risks and opportunities, it can help them assess the likelihood of success. The issues that the questions raise, and the discussion they provoke, are meant to be coupled with the detailed financial analysis usually conducted before a diversification decision is made. Together, these tools can turn a complex and often pressured decision into a more structured and well-reasoned one.     

Manage marketing by the customer equity test

Managers have recently begun to think of good marketing as good conversation, as a process of drawing customers into progressively more satisfying relationships with a company. And just as the art of conversation follows two steps--first striking up a conversation with a likely partner and then maintaining the flow--so the new marketing naturally divides itself into the work of customer acquisition and the work of customer retention. But how can managers determine the optimal balance between spending on acquisition and spending on retention? Robert Blattberg and John Deighton use decision calculus to help managers answer that question. That is, they ask managers to approach the large, complex problem through several smaller, more manageable questions on the same topic. Then they use a formal model to turn those smaller judgments into an answer to the larger question. The ultimate goal, the authors say, is to grow the company's customer equity the sum of all the conversations-to its fullest potential. Recognizing that managers must constantly reassess the spending points determined by the decision-calculus model, the authors also provide a series of guidelines and suggestions to help frame the issues that affect acquisition, retention, and customer equity. When managers strive to grow customer equity rather than a brand's sales or profits, they put a primary indicator of the health of the business at the fore front of their strategic thinking: the quality of customer relationships.     

Who's bringing you hot ideas and how are you responding?

There's an unsung hero in your organization. It's the person who's bringing in new ideas from the outside about how to manage better. These aren't your product and service innovators--those people are celebrated loudly and often. This is the manager who, for instance, first uttered the phrase "balance scorecard" in your hallways, or "real options," or "intellectual capital." Managerial innovation is an increasingly important source of competitive advantage--especially given the speed with which product innovations are copied--but it doesn't happen automatically. It takes a certain kind of person to welcome new management ideas and usher them into an organization. The authors recently studied 100 such people to find out how they translate new ideas into action in their organizations. They discovered that they are a distinct type of practitioner; that is to say, they resemble their counterparts in other organizations more than they resemble their own colleagues, and they share a common way of working. "Idea practitioners," as the authors call them, begin by scouting for ideas. All of them are avid readers of management literature and enthusiastic participants in business conferences; many are friendly with business gurus. Once they've identified an idea that seems to hold promise, they tailor it to fit their organizations' specific needs. Next, they actively sell the idea--to senior executives, to the rank and file, to middle managers. And finally, they get the ball rolling by participating in small-scale experiments. But when those take off, they get out of the way and let others execute. In this article, the authors identify the characteristics of idea practitioners and offer strategies for managing them wisely.     

A SENIOR MANAGER'S GUIDE TO INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT

This paper provides an overview of corporate risk management for senior managers. The author discusses the integrated risk management framework, emphasizing that a company can implement its risk management objectives in three fundamental ways: modifying its operations, using targeted financial instruments, or adjusting its capital structure. "Integration" refers both to the aggregation of all risks faced by the firm into a net exposure and to the coordinated use of these three risk management techniques. The author provides a functional analysis of integrated risk management using a wide-ranging set of case illustrations to show how the risk management process influences, and is influenced by, a company's overall strategy and business activities. Based on such analysis, the article concludes by sketching a framework intended to help managers design a value-maximizing, enterprise-wide corporate risk management system.     

Through the organizational looking glass: you can't plan tomorrow's organizations with today's assumptions

It's hard to imagine what our industrial society would be like if, for instance, there were no factories. How would things get produced, how would business survive? But are we, in fact, an industrial society? Are factories going to be the prime production place for a society that is conserving energy and doesn't need to travel to work because the silicon chip makes it more efficient to work at home? Who knows what the impact of energy conservation and women in the work force will be on future organizations? One thing we can be sure of, this author writes, is that whatever tomorrow brings, today's assumptions probably cannot account for it. We are, he asserts, entering a period of discontinuous change where the assumptions we have been working with as a society and in organizations are no longer necessarily true. He discusses three assumptions he sees fading--what causes efficiency, what work is, and what value organizational hierarchy has--and then gives some clues as to what our new assumptions might be. Regardless of what our assumptions actually are, however, our organizations and society will require leaders willing to take enormous risks and try unproved ways to cope with them.     

Turn public problems to private account

Many managers face increasing calls to invest corporate resources in charitable causes. How should executives balance a firm's very real economic imperative to maximize profitability with its hypothetical moral imperative to improve society? To provide one answer, the author draws on his experience as president of an economic-development company, IBEC. Viewing profit as "an essential discipline and measure of economic success" but not "the sole corporate goal," the company actively invested in social programs that met four criteria: they served a need of the local population; they required innovative approaches; they made sense on economic grounds; and they respected the social norms of the community. Such civic-minded efforts, the author argues in this prescient 1971 article, not only improve people's lives but also create the foundation for more affluent and dynamic markets--markets that ultimately produce greater profits for business. For example, one of IBEC's earliest ventures was directed toward solving Venezuela's problems in retail food marketing. Many important items were unavailable at the small stores where people shopped. So in 1949, working with local partners, IBEC opened a supermarket. Supermarkets soon changed the food-buying habits of the nation, and the initiative helped alter patterns of food distribution and created the reliable demand needed to establish a host of local suppliers. Return on IBEC's investment, and that of its local partners, was most satisfactory, the author reports. The road to meeting a public need-especially a major one--is rarely easy, the author says. But if management sizes up the need well, there is a good chance its new venture will survive under adversity.     

Reasons for management control systems adoption: Insights from product development systems choice by early-stage entrepreneurial companies

Recent theoretical and empirical work indicates that management control systems (MCS) are an important element in enhancing innovation. We extend this research thrust examining the adoption of MCS in product development, arguably one of the business processes where innovation plays a major role. Using a sample of 69 early-stage entrepreneurial companies, data are collected from questionnaires and interviews with each of the CEO, financial officer, and business development managers pertaining to product development MCS. We examine seven different systems: project milestones, reports comparing actual progress to plan, budget for development projects, project selection process, product portfolio roadmap, product concept testing process, and project team composition guidelines. We address three distinct questions: (1) What are the reasons-for-adoption of these systems? The nature of our sample allows us to trace back to the adoption point and develop a set of reasons-for-adoption from the analysis of the data. While MCS fulfill certain roles as described in the literature, these reasons-for-adoption are distinct from these roles. Results indicate that certain events lead managers to adopt these systems and address the challenges that they face. They include contracting and legitimizing the process with external parties and internal reasons-for-adoption such as managers’ background, learning by doing, need to focus the organization, or reaction to problems. (2) Are these reasons-for-adoption associated with differences across companies in the time from their founding date until these systems are adopted (time-to-adoption)? Prior research has looked at the covariance of various organizational variables with this timing; this study goes a step further by looking at the effect of different reasons-for-adoption on this timing. Our evidence finds an association between these two variables. (3) Are these reasons-for-adoption relevant to performance? We find that the reason-for-adoption is associated with the on-time dimension of product development performance.