企业会计政策选择分析

盈余管理是上市公司财务会计的一大难题，会计政策选择是盈余管理的常用手段。本文利用经济学理论中的契约理论和委托-代理理论对会计政策选择进行分析，解释了会计政策选择的必然性，并结合国内外的研究资料，进一步分析我国会计政策选择存在的原因，提出了制定高质量的会计准则、改进监管政策、加强职业判断等规范会计政策选择的建议。     

盈余管理是证券市场会计监管的重点

盈余管理是旨在获取某些私人利益或局部利益，在对某些交易或者事项进行会计确认、计量和披露时，从既定的报表盈余出发，来确定相应的会计选择、会计估计和会计职业判断而形成的会计政策。盈余管理是个中性概念，它包括人为操纵利润的盈余管理和不进行人为操纵利润的盈余管理这两重含义。     

论会计准则对盈余管理的影响

一、会计准则对盈余管理的影响1.会计准则与盈余管理之间的关系。盈余管理是会计政策的选择具有经济后果的一种具体表现。只要企业的管理人员有选择不同会计政策的自由,他们必然会选择使自己的效用最大化或使企业的市场价值最大化的会计政策。盈余管理实际上是企业管理人员通过有目的地控制对外财务报告,以获取某些私人利益的"披露管理"。企业管理人员在会计准则允许的范围之内,为了实现自身效用的最大化或企业价值的最大化而做出会计选择。从众多关于盈余管理的定     

新会计准则对上市公司盈余管理影响探析

盈余管理是企业在享有选择会计政策和变更会计估计的自由时,选择使其效用最大化政策的一种行为.文章从盈余管理与会计准则的关系出发,重点分析了新准则对企业盈余管理的限制及可利用的操纵空间,审视了新会计准则下盈余管理手段的变化,并提出了规范盈余管理的建议.     

会计政策选择:基于盈余信息治理的思考

会计政策的选择是客观存在的,会计准则只能规定会计政策的可选择的空间,而不能限定所有企业使用同一种会计政策。但是众多不规范的会计政策选择行为导致了企业管理当局产生了机会主义的盈余管理,这对于资本市场的完善以及会计信息质量的提高都是极为不利的。本文试从会计政策与盈余管理的关系的角度出发并结合我国目前的具体情况来分析规范会计政策选择的方法,以提高会计信息的质量和资本市场的有效性。     

在新会计准则下规范盈余管理的政策建议

盈余管理行为在我国上市公司中一直普遍存在。会计学家Scott（美）表示，所谓盈余管理指的是一种行为，这种行为以GAAP（公认会计准则）为依据，以会计政策的选择为途径，以达到应经这自身利益或者公司市场价值最大化为目的。所以说，通常，盈余管理的进行应该是与会计准则不相违背的，是会计政策选择具有经济后果的一种表现。在本文中，笔者首先分析了当前上市公司盈余管理的状况，然后提出了相关建议，试图对盈余管理进行规范。     

浅析我国上市公司盈余管理手段

盈余管理是经营者在一系列的会计政策中选择那些使自身效用或公司市场价值最大化的会计政策。盈余管理在西方已有20多年的研究历史。随着证券市场的发展，这个问题也引起了我国会计学术界的关注，笔者在此仅对上市公司盈余管理手段略作探讨。     

论公司的盈余管理

盈余管理一直是理论界进行实证会计研究的重点之一,也是上市公司为了达到特定目的而进行的调节盈余的行为。由于会计盈余数据具有信息含量,因而资本市场的各方参与者都高度重视盈余信息,而企业管理当局又恰好处于内部人位置,从而盈余管理不可避免地产生了。它的产生原因可以归纳为会计信息的不对称性和相关制度的不完善性。一般来说,盈余管理的手段是借助于会计政策的选择来实现的,但又不仅限于会计方法。盈余管理的存在有其特定的背景和条件。因此,盈余管理将会继续存在下去,通过法律、规则和人力是不可能把它完全消除的,只能是采取措施对其进行防范,实现会计提供有用信息的目标。     

新会计准则体系下上市公司会计政策的选择

会计不仅为国家服务,更多的是为广大的投资者、债权人服务。但市场经济条件下,企业作为市场主体拥有了较大的会计政策选择权。企业拥有会计政策选择权的初衷是让企业能真实客观地反映企业财务状况和经营成果,但实际上却构成了管理当局谋取不当利益的手段,加剧了会计信息失真,产生了不良的经济后果。新会计准则遏制了盈余管理,但也给企业通过会计政策选择提供新的盈余管理空间,文章通过分析上市公司会计政策选择的动因,提出从利益相关者视角提高上市公司会计政策选择公允性的对策。     

浅谈我国的盈余管理

盈余管理是指企业管理者以获取一定的私人利益为目的,迫于相关利益集团对其盈余预期的压力,在公认会计原则的约束下选择最有力的会计政策或控制应计项目,以使报告盈余达到期望水平。从本质上讲,盈余管理显然是一种利润操纵行为,从一个足够长的时段来看,盈余管理并不增加或减少企业实际的盈余,但会改变企业实际盈余在不同会计期间的反映和分布。换句话说,盈余管理影响的是会计数据尤其是会计中的报告盈余,而不是企业的实际盈余。     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

亏损上市公司利用八项计提进行盈余管理的实证分析

在具有盈余管理动机的上市公司中,亏损公司盈余管理动机最为强烈.文章采用抽样技术对2003-2005年度部分亏损公司资产减值的八项计提进行了分项检验,发现被主要用于盈余管理的项目是坏账准备、短期投资跌价准备、存货跌价准备、固定资产减值准备等.其中固定资产与无形资产属于长期资产,2007年开始将不允许转回,但存货跌价准备、坏账准备、短期投资跌价准备等仍然可以转回,新会计准则并没有堵住这些通道.     

上市公司利润操控与内部公司治理关系研究——基于我国制造业的分析

公司治理结构对管理者通过会计政策选择操纵应计利润产生影响.文章通过研究内部公司治理因素与利润操纵的关系,发现这样一些问题:操纵利润和公司治理因素存在显著的相关性;上市公司的规模、负债、上年非标准审计意见及上年净资产收益率,对利润操纵均有影响,国有控股、第一大股东持股比例与操纵性应计利润负相关.     

我国上市公司过度盈余管理行为分析

盈余管理问题在西方由来已久,被称为“市场参与者的游戏”,近年来也日益受到我国会计学界的关注。本文拟对我国上市公司过度盈余管理行为的动机进行探析,并提出对上市公司过度盈余管理行为的防范措施。     

The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non-Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.     

Accounting Policy Disclosures and Analysts' Forecasts

Using an international sample, I investigate whether the extent of firms' disclosure of their accounting policies in the annual report is associated with properties of analysts' earnings forecasts. Controlling for firm‐ and country‐level variables, I find that the level of accounting policy disclosure is significantly negatively related to forecast dispersion and forecast error. In particular, I find that accounting policy disclosures are incrementally useful to analysts over and above all other annual report disclosures. These findings suggest that accounting policy disclosures reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. I find univariate but not multivariate support for the hypothesis that accounting policy disclosures are especially helpful to analysts in environments where firms can choose among a larger set of accounting methods.     

《企业会计制度》与会计职业判断

《企业会计制度》的颁布,赋予了企业更大的自主权,客观上给会计人员提供较大的职业判断空间。本文着重分析了《制度》中会计职业判断的在会计核算、会计政策等方面的具体体现,并对实务中如何引导会计人员合理运用会计职业判断提出了自己的看法。     

Financial Statement Complexity and Meeting Analysts’ Expectations

We examine whether firms with greater financial statement complexity are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations. We proxy for financial statement complexity using the firm's industry and year adjusted accounting policy disclosure length. Firms with more complex financial statements are more likely to just beat expectations than just miss expectations. Firms with complex financial statements appear to use expectations management to beat expectations, but do not use earnings management. Corroborating these findings, we find analysts rely more on management guidance for more complex firms. Firms with complex financial statements are also more likely to have analysts exclude items from actual “street earnings,” but tests suggest this strategy is not specifically used by complex firms to beat expectations. The effect we document is specific to analyst forecasts and not to other alternative benchmarks.     

新会计准则下公司盈余管理研究

盈余管理是企业的管理者为实现自身利益或企业的市场价值最大化目标,在会计准则允许的范围内,主要通过会计政策的选择,来调节企业盈余的行为。本文介绍了公司盈余管理的原因,剖析了新会计准则对公司盈余的限制和新会计准则下盈余管理的可能途径,并提出相关对策建议。     

A review of earnings management in China and its implications

This paper discusses the motivations behind the earnings management of listed firms in China and provides evidence on earnings management using various accounting measures. The literature shows that earnings management occurs most often before the issue of securities or when a firm is facing the risk of being delisted. While non‐core income was widely used to measure earnings management in China, as it is easily detected, researchers are now focusing on accrual‐based models. We explore the underlying causes of earnings management in China, and conclude that the two main causes are the concentrated ownership structure and the strong political and economic connections between government and the listed companies. We review the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and government supervision on earnings management in China.