ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF WORKERS’ RETIREMENT DECISIONS

The landscape for older workers has changed dramatically in recent decades. Governments have made cuts to public pension programs, private pensions have shifted from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, equity and housing markets have been unusually volatile, and workers have experienced declining morbidity and mortality. At the same time, the labor force participation rate for older men and women has been rising over the past two decades, implying later retirement. Are these phenomena related? This paper reviews the large and growing body of literature exploring the economic determinants of workers’ retirement decisions, including public and private pensions, wealth and savings, health and health insurance, and labor demand.     

Health care and retirement costs in North America spiralling uncontrollably: what are employers to do?

This article addresses some of the issues related to the rising costs of employee benefits in the United States and Canada in terms of the cost of retirement pensions and employer-provided health insurance for employees and retirees. We examine various factors that affect the cost of these services for organizations as well as how these might affect the choices employers might be forced to make. We elaborate on how various factors might compel employers to shift the cost of benefits to employees. Specifically, we elaborate on various legislative, economic, and demographic constraints on these employee benefits and examine in detail two employer practices of concern, namely cash balance retirement plans and consumer-directed healthcare plans.     

HOW TO CLEAR UP THE PENSIONS MESS

All three pillars of the British pensions system are crumbling. The basic state pension is unsustainable in its present form. Defined benefit occupational pension schemes are fast disappearing, and with them the retirement hopes of millions of workers. A further 3 million low-income earners are not saving enough for their retirement. And uncertainty about pensions choices is widespread. In each case the primary cause of the problem is governmental or regulatory failure. The paper makes eight general and four specific proposals for restoring the system.     

Individual Differences in Attractiveness of Jobs Based on Compensation Package Components

The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of salary level, amount of leave per year, the extent of cost-sharing for health care insurance coverage, and type of retirement plan on individuals’ job choice within a United States employment context. Salary, amount of vacation time, cost of health insurance, and type of retirement plan predicted the likelihood that individuals would apply for a position as well as accept the position if it were offered to them. While the type of retirement plan had an effect, there was virtually no difference based on whether the retirement plan was a defined benefit pension plan, a 401 K plan, or a company stock plan. There were no interactions between compensation plan components suggesting recruits do not consider salary as a substitute for benefits. Marital status, benefit history, attitudes towards earnings, and risk propensity predicted the relative importance placed on salary and specific benefits in the compensation package.     

WHITHER UK PENSIONS POLICY?

While the UK may be facing much less serious pension difficulties over the next 50 years than other countries, the issue should not be ignored. Increasing the retirement age would be possible, but funded pensions are also an important option. The UK government has used marketing to encourage funded pensions, but policy changes would also help. Ultimately, the basic state pension could become funded.     

Using simulation as a tool in selecting a retirement age under defined benefit pension plans

This paper examines how simulation modeling can be used to select a retirement age under defined benefit pension plans. This approach construes the variables affecting pension benefits as probabilistic variables. Simulations are then run to generate probabilistic values for the real value of pension benefits for alternative retirement ages. By construing variables affecting pension benefits as probability distributions, this approach reflects the uncertainty facing individuals contemplating retirement. By generating estimates of retirement benefits as probability distributions rather than as single deterministic values, the model provides individuals with a more realistic and complete frame of reference for making the retirement decision. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee and Joachim Zietz. JEF editor, for helpful comments.     

Determinants of government underfunded public pension liabilities in the OECD

Underfunded government liabilities for public pensions constitutes a major expenditure in the management of social programmes in many countries, but to date has not attracted much attention from accountants as it does not easily fit within an accrual-based accounting system. This paper discusses major measurement problems associated with this liability and then examines determinants of variations in projected flow-based funding patterns among OECD governments. Alternative ‘behavioural persistence’ and ‘regression to the mean’ hypotheses about the determinants of underfunding practices are formulated and tested using an OECD data set describing the financial and socio-economic characteristics of government-sponsored public pension systems in these countries. Consistent with the behavioural persistence hypothesis, cross-sectional variations are found to be associated with the funding ratio and the rate of taxation required to keep government debt constant. Variations in underfunding practices across the sample are also sensitive to cultural differences in attitude towards public pension accountability between continental European and Anglo-American countries.     

The effect of disability pension incentives on early retirement decisions

I investigate the incentive effects of disability pensions on disability retirement entry as a special type of early retirement. The implicit tax rate on further work is included as a forward looking incentive measure. A substantial change of the disability pension legislation caused exogenous variation in disability benefits in Germany in 2001 and is used to obtain estimates of individual's responses to financial incentives. Benefit levels appear to have no effect on the labour market behaviour. At the same time, there is a sizable and significant disincentive effect of implicit taxes on labour market income, indicating that alleviating such disincentives would likely increase labour force participation. Since the response to financial incentives occurs mainly among those in good health, such a policy might on the other hand imperil the aim of providing insurance against a health‐induced loss of one's working capacity.     

Pensions, non-discrimination policies, and the employment of older workers

This paper analyzes firms' decisions to hire older workers. We model, the role of pensions in back-loading pay for specifically trained workers. We then evaluate the effects, of imposing age discrimination rules and non-discriminatory fringe benefit rules, and analyze the consequences for the firm's decision to hire older versus younger individuals. The model predicts that defined benefit pension plans deter the hiring of older workers, but only if hired for entry level position. The reason is f hat the wages of this group cannot be lowered enough to pay for the benefits. Data from a new survey of employers are used to test this hypothesis. The findings show that a more generous defined benefit pension plan reduces employment prospects for older, entry level workers. Employers offering defined benefit pension, plans employ older workers, but tend not to hire them into entry level jobs.     

The public–private pension mix in OECD countries

This article provides a survey of selected aspects of the relationship between public and private pension provision in European countries in the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development and compares this with other regions of the OECD. Population ageing has led many OECD countries to undertake a wide range of pension reforms. The overall effect of these reforms has in many cases been to significantly reduce public pension promises. This, in turn, has increased the interest in the role of private pensions, which has expanded significantly in a number of OECD countries. The article discusses the extent to which a number of countries will need to further increase private provision in order to guarantee adequate future retirement incomes.     

FLEXIBLE RETIREMENT

Flexible retirement – that is, the opportunity to choose one's own personal retirement age – is a hedge against pension risk and provides insurance to workers facing health or productivity shocks. Flexible retirement and flexible pension schemes are in practice closely linked because of imperfect capital markets and institutional restrictions. I discuss three necessary conditions to provide insurance through flexible retirement. First, it should be possible to adjust the pension starting date at limited cost. This condition is gradually being fulfilled, as many countries are moving toward more actuarially neutral pension schemes. Second, individuals should be willing to adjust their labor supply in case of a wealth shock. This condition seems largely fulfilled, although the available empirical evidence suggests that the ‘standard retirement age’ is at least as important as the income effect. Third, the labor market should be able to deal with flexible individual retirement decisions. This condition is gaining importance, but has not yet received much attention in the literature. Institutions often hamper employment past the ‘standard retirement age’. Moreover, the hiring rates of older workers are low and their unemployment duration is high. Institutional reforms facilitating flexible retirement opportunities are desirable from an insurance perspective.     

SAVINGS IN TIMES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE

Pension reforms in many developed countries make individuals shoulder a bigger share of longevity and income risks. The desired response is that individuals accumulate private assets for retirement. Whether this actually takes place, is of paramount relevance for scientists and policy makers. We take Germany as an example: Twenty years of pension reform have transformed the monolithic German pension system into a multipillar system. Formerly generous public pension benefits are gradually being reduced, whereas substantial incentives are granted to occupational and private saving schemes. Has this transition worked out? We survey the reform steps and households’ reactions: How did individuals adjust their labor market behavior? How did private and occupational pension plans take off? How do behavioral adjustments vary in the population? Most Germans adapted to the new situation. Both actual and expected retirement decisions changed and the share of households without supplementary pensions decreased from 73% to 39% in little more than a decade. This is a remarkable success. Nonetheless, households with low education, low income and less financial education did neither adjust their retirement behavior nor pick up supplementary pension plans and are thus likely to face difficulties in bridging the gap arising in future pension income.     

Fiscal cost of demographic transition in Japan

This paper quantifies the fiscal cost of demographic transition that Japan is projected to experience over the next several decades, in a life-cycle model with endogenous saving, consumption, and labor supply in both intensive and extensive margins. Retirement waves of baby-boom generations, combined with a rise in longevity and low fertility rates, raise the old-age dependency ratio to 85% by 2050, the highest among major developed countries, and generate a significant budget imbalance, as the government faces rising costs of public pension and health and long-term care insurance. Preserving the current level of the transfers will require a major increase in taxation. Using consumption taxes to balance the government budget, the tax rate reaches the maximal value of 48% in late 2070s. A pension reform to reduce benefits by 20% results in a peak tax rate of 37%, which can be reduced further to 28% if the retirement age is also gradually raised by 5 years.     

延长退休年龄能降低个人账户养老金的财政补助吗？

本文运用精算模型发现,当女性退休年龄延长至60岁,2039年及以前个人账户养老金的财政补助较现行政策下降0.3%至9.83%,但2040年及以后上升0.44%至4.67%;当男女退休年龄延长至65岁和60岁,2037年及以前财政补助较现行政策有所降低,但2038年及以后不断提高;当男女退休年龄均延长至65岁,2040年及以前财政补助较现行政策有所减少,但2041年及以后不断增加;即使改变任一参数设置,类似情况仍会出现。所以,延长退休年龄只能减少25至28年个人账户养老金的财政补助,之后政府负担逐年加重。     

PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF THE PENSIONS ACT 2004

The UK's 2004 Pensions Act is a far-reaching piece of legislation, with significant implications for the occupational pensions marketplace. The Act is intended to improve the governance of pension schemes and increase the security of the members' accrued benefits. However, our research suggests that it will have serious and adverse unintended consequences. The most significant of these will be to undermine occupational pension provision by placing an increased burden on sponsoring employers, whose involvement in pension provision is on a voluntary basis.     

An evaluation of the life cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare and retirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is a threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Property values and pension underfunding in the local public sector

This paper reexamines the empirical implication of the C. Tiebout (J. Pol. Econ.64, 416–424 (1956)) hypothesis, taking account of the fact that many municipal pensions are grossly underfunded. OLS results show that underfunding has no impact on local property values. The motives for incomplete funding of pensions are also examined and are built into a simultaneous equation model. The OLS results are confirmed and some light is shed on factors leading to the underfunding of pensions.     

Una applicazione dell'approccio multistato ai fondi pensione

La modellistica multistato ha avuto recentemente significative applicazioni nelle assicurazioni di persone ed è stata impiegata anche nello studio di problemi connessi a schemi previdenziali (per questi ultimi si vedano ad esempio i lavori di Amsler, Wilkie, Linnemann). In questa nota si propone una applicazione di tale approccio all'assicurazione di invalidità — vecchiaia — superstiti nel tempo continuo, sia nel caso in cui si lavori con cause di eliminazione permanente che temporanea.

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Summary Recently the mathematics of multistate models has significantly been applied to the insurance of persons and has also been employed in the study of problems connected with pension schemes (e.g. papers written by Amsler, Wilkie, Linnemann). In this paper we suggest a time-continuous application of this approach to a pension scheme providing retirement, disability and death pensions, considering causes of permanent as well as temporary decrement and assuming the probabilistic structure is that of a time-inhomogeneous Markov process. Moreover, the paper presents the formulae of the expected present value of contributions and of benefits. In this regard, some approximate formulae are proposed for the above mentioned values.

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Ricerca finanziata con fondi 60% MURST. L'intero lavoro è frutto di una collaborazione che riguarda ogni parte del medesimo. I contributi personali di R. Pelessoni riguardano i paragrafi 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, quelli di M. Zecchin riguardano i paragrafi 1, 2.1, 2.3.     

Can social security be welfare improving when there is demographic uncertainty?

This paper studies the welfare implications of a PAYG pension system in an overlapping generations (OLG) model with demographic uncertainty and incomplete markets. In the absence of public pensions, small cohorts tend to be favoured by the changes in relative prices implied by demographic shocks. PAYG defined-benefit systems can help to share the financial risks created by this type of demographic uncertainty across generations. Our careful quantitative analysis test this possibility with unfavourable results: the overall welfare impact of the public pensions is negative, due to the prominence of the crowding-out effect over the insurance effect.     

Income Level and the Value of Non-Wage Employee Benefits

With continuing increases in the cost of medical insurance and other “fringe” benefits, payroll cost for monetary and non-monetary aspects of compensation is a significant factor for most organizations. While this is not a new phenomenon, relatively few studies in the empirical literature have examined the role of fringe benefits in employee compensation plans. Especially in under researched areas, it is imperative that researchers utilize ideas and theories from other disciplines to further our knowledge. Accordingly, this paper borrows the concept of elasticity from the economic literature to help explain and understand employee perceptions of two of the most common, costly, and important benefits—medical insurance and retirement plans. Specifically, the relationship between the current income of employees is analyzed in relation to employee perceptions of the value and importance of benefits. Results suggest that employees do not value medical insurance and retirement plans in the same manner. This result is interpreted in terms of the change in the marginal utility of the specific benefit.