共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Gerhard Sorger 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,118(1):118-129
We study properties of stationary Markov-perfect equilibria in a general model of intertemporal choice under quasi-geometric discounting. The dynamics generated by stationary Markov-perfect equilibria can be very complicated, even if the model satisfies strict convexity and smoothness properties and the decision maker is arbitrarily patient. If there exist multiple stationary Markov-perfect equilibria, then it is in general possible to construct infinitely many non-degenerate stationary sunspot equilibria as well. 相似文献
2.
Suleyman Basak 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):437-462
Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker,
and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price
leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing
a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional
factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking
economy are carried out.
Received: March 29, 1996; revised version October 29, 1996 相似文献
3.
This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless preferences have special, restrictive properties. The externality is internalized by allowing agents to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the spot price or interest rate, over and above contracting on actions and outputs. Then competitive equilibria are equivalent with the appropriate notion of constrained Pareto optimality. Examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals or price-islands, created endogenously in equilibrium. 相似文献
4.
David McAdams 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):729-732
Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. 相似文献
5.
Yves Balasko 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,109(2):333-359
With the exception of existence, not much is known of economies where individual preferences may depend on prices. We show that the main properties of competitive equilibria that fall under the general heading of qualitative comparative statics remain true when preferences are price-dependent, provided that the total resources are allowed to vary in the parameter space. The equilibrium set is a smooth manifold diffeomorphic to a Euclidean space; the natural projection is a smooth proper map, with topological degree one; equilibria always exist, and are locally unique for an open and dense set of economies. 相似文献
6.
George Economides Hyun Park Apostolis Philippopoulos 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2007,109(1):153-175
We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second‐best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second‐best optimal policies. 相似文献
7.
Christophe Chamley 《European Economic Review》2004,48(3):477-501
The general model of social learning with irreversible investment and endogenous timing is analyzed for any distribution of private informations. Strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria appear which are generated solely by information externalities. Different equilibria generate strikingly different amounts of information. The impacts of various assumptions (bounded beliefs, large number of agents, discrete time and short periods) are examined carefully. The properties are robust to the introduction of observation noise with a continuum of agents. 相似文献
8.
Steven Russell 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):111-140
Summary. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study the determination of the exchange rate in an economy with fundamental
uncertainty. The model has steady state equilibria in which the exchange rate is constant. These equilibria may coexist with
“quasi-fundamental” equilibria – nonstationary equilibria in which the exchange rate displays stochastic fluctuations that
are correlated with the fluctuations in fundamental random variables. The quasi-fundamental equilibria are Pareto dominated
by the corresponding constant-exchange-rate steady states. They also converge to these steady states, inevitably or with positive
probability.
Received: October 2, 1999; revised version: March 26, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper began as a joint project with Alex Mourmouras, who has made many helpful comments and suggestions but is
not responsible for any errors or deficiencies. In addition, I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
9.
Aldo Rustichini 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(2):151-171
We study existence of equilibria in large games where players use boundedly rational procedures. The equilibria are different from Nash equilibria; the difference persists even when players use procedures for which the observations gathered in any period are used to evaluate the payoff from different actions. 相似文献
10.
Yaw Nyarko 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):643-655
Summary. Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players
in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute
continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future
of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria.
Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain
convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs,
and not actual play, are subjective equilibria.
Received: March 3, 1995; revised version: February 17, 1997 相似文献
11.
Willemien Kets 《Journal of Economic Theory》2011,146(1):300-325
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris (1998) [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class. 相似文献
12.
Jonathan L. Burke 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):311-329
Summary. We combine and strengthen optimality and robustness theorems for the overlapping-generations model of money. Roughly, we
find a Pareto-optimal monetary equilibrium of a generic stationary economy that is near an optimal monetary equilibrium of
each nearby non-stationary economy. Since the nearby equilibria are monetary, the general problem of macroeconomic stabilization
reduces to maintaining the money supply. And since the nearby equilibria are optimal, stabilization is socially desirable.
Received: October 27, 1997; revised version: March 25, 1998 相似文献
13.
Dynamic common agency 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting. 相似文献
14.
Summary. This paper studies the conditions for aggregation, portfolio separation and effective completeness of competitive allocations
in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets where agents have general preference and endowment distributions. We
show that these properties are distinct. Demands may aggregate yet may fail to exhibit fund separation and conversely. Fund
separation implies effective completeness while aggregation does not. The implications of these properties for the structure
of equilibria are discussed, and generalizations of the CAPM, the consumption CAPM and the CAPM with nonmarketed wealth emerge
from the analysis.
Received: September 12, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1996 相似文献
15.
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit
auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria
in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria
for the uniform price auction.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
16.
An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions. 相似文献
17.
A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predictive power. To produce stronger predictions, one can restrict attention to the set of sequential equilibria, or Markov equilibria, or symmetric equilibria, or pure-strategy equilibria. This paper explores the relationship between equilibrium behavior in a class of monotone games, namely voluntary contribution games, and the behavior of human subjects in an experimental setting. Several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (SMPE) are consistent with the data. To judge how well the SMPE fits the data, we estimate a model of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) [R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for normal form games, Games Econ. Behav. 10 (1995) 6-38; R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games, Exp. Econ. 1 (1998) 9-41] and find that the decision rules of the QRE model are qualitatively very similar to the empirical choice probabilities. 相似文献
18.
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While agents differ in their preferences over alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, differing intensities in preferences, and the option to declare neutrality to avoid disagreement. There is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. Such equilibria invariably display a “tyranny of the minority”: the increased aggression of the minority always outweighs their smaller number, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative. We fully characterize the asymptotic behavior of this model as group size becomes large, and show that all equilibria must converge to one of three possible limit outcomes. 相似文献
19.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):213-223
Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably
many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously
of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a
cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies
may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative
statics exercises.
Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997 相似文献
20.
A two-person game of information transmission 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This process is modeled as a game. Qualitative properties of the equilibria are analyzed. The impact of improving the quality of available information on the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is studied. Better information generally may not improve welfare. We give conditions under which it will. 相似文献