The association between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in the presence of severe agency conflicts

Agency conflicts between different types of investors are particularly severe in the presence of high family and block-holder ownership. By focusing on a setting characterised by high ownership concentration, we study the role of independent directors in promoting transparency through increased disclosure. In our tests, we use a sample of Spanish firms and, consistent with prior work, show that the presence of these directors is strongly associated with increased voluntary disclosure. Additionally, we find that when an executive director takes on Chair responsibilities the level of voluntary information is reduced, creating potential conflicts with the role of independent directors. Our results suggest that a strong legal framework holds firm-level clashes of interest in check. We conclude that this regulatory environment can create sufficient incentives to bring together the interests of minority and majority shareholders and guarantee an efficient monitoring role of independent directors. However, results suggest that other mechanisms should be reinforced in order to improve the role of governance control on agency relationships, particularly in the case of the concentration of Chair and executive responsibilities.     

Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality

The effectiveness of control exercised over executive remuneration and the quality of information disclosed in financial statements have given rise to concern and have led to proposals for the reform of corporate governance. A model of the optimal disclosure decision is presented in terms of managerial incentives and the impact of corporate governance structures. An investigation into the quality of share option disclosure in financial statements is used as the basis for testing hypotheses derived from the model and for assessing alternative policy options. The results support the need for guidance on the duties and responsibilities of audit committees and non-executive directors but fall short of providing a basis for deciding whether regulatory action is required. The evidence also supports the view that a threat to monitoring quality exists where the roles of chief executive and chairman are combined.     

Quality of Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity in Brazil

Common sense suggests that the adoption of better corporate governance practices, which enable greater transparency, more protection against capital expropriation, and greater rights for investors, should have the effect of reducing the risk perceived by shareholders and so lead to lower required returns. This article investigates the existence of an inverse relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the cost of equity capital for Brazilian companies. The authors begin by constructing a broad index of corporate governance quality that combines four key aspects of corporate governance: (1) transparency and disclosure; (2) structure of the board of directors; (3) ownership and control structure; and (4) shareholder rights. To estimate the cost of equity, the CAPM was applied by using ex ante market premiums calculated with a simple discounted‐dividend method. On the basis of a sample of 67 Brazilian companies traded at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) during the period 1998–2008, the study concludes that there is a significant inverse relationship between the cost of equity and a number of proxies for effective governance, particularly those representing transparency and disclosure. Closer inspection of the reductions in cost of capital associated with improvements in the specific governance quality index components suggests that companies would benefit the most from prompt submission of information to regulators and full disclosure of executive pay.     

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.     

Non‐compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: the Brazilian Experience

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security‐related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm‐specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security‐related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid‐ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.     

Components of CEO Remuneration and Non‐GAAP Disclosure

This paper provides evidence of the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration on decisions to disclose voluntary non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) financial measures. We investigate profit announcements that focus on the most emphasised part, which includes mandatorily identified information (results for the announcement to the market) and the least emphasised part, which incorporates other sections. By reading the profit announcements and manually collecting non‐GAAP financial measures (NGFM) data, there is no reliance on keyword search strings and as such we uncover the pervasiveness of the use of NGFM. Results show that the base component of CEOs’ remuneration plays a significant role in reporting NGFM in the most emphasised part of the profit announcement. Conversely, all three (base, short‐term and long‐term incentives) components of the remuneration package have a significant relationship with the reporting decisions in the least emphasised part of the statement. We find that, depending on the regulatory imposition and the emphasis assigned to the section of the profit announcement, the motive for voluntary disclosure of NGFM can be explained as altruistic (informative) or opportunistic (misleading). We contribute evidence on ‘pay–action’ rather than ‘pay–performance’ by incorporating all three components simultaneously into the framework to maintain the assumption of correspondence and internal consistency among those components.     

Flying under the radar: The effects of short-sale disclosure rules on investor behavior and stock prices

We study how disclosure requirements for large short positions affect investor behavior and security prices. Short positions accumulate just below the applicable disclosure threshold as certain investors never disclose any of their positions. Further tests suggest that this secrecy is part of investors’ general policy of avoiding disclosure to protect their unique, profitable investment strategies against reverse engineering by competitors. No evidence supports the notion that short sellers avoid disclosure because of potential adverse effects on securities' lending fees, risk of recall, or short squeezes. Finally, the evasive behavior by short sellers in response to transparency regulations hampers price discovery.     

Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong networks and hence busy boards the directors' monitoring effectiveness is reduced which leads to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Our results suggest that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we observe that his or her compensation is then significantly higher. We also find that hiring remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation especially for larger firms.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation

This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance‐related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.     

On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation

In this paper we study when it is advantageous to improve corporate transparency by allowing shareholders direct access to corporate information and when it is preferable to rely on a reporting system in which shareholders only gain access to information that management chooses to disclose. We show that in an agency model that allows for contract renegotiation, the desirability of a fully transparent reporting regime hinges on the stewardship properties of the information in question. Specifically, information that is mainly useful for predicting future events and of little use for evaluating past actions should only be made available to the public through management's self‐interested disclosures. Only if the information is useful for making inference about managerial actions can it be optimal to have full corporate transparency, so that outsiders have independent access to the same information as management.     

Outside Directors,Litigation Environment,and Management Earnings Forecasts

This study examines whether outside directors factor in litigation costs for the firm while monitoring optimal disclosure policy. It investigates the association of management earnings forecast disclosure and the proportion of outside directors across two regimes with unequal litigation costs, the United States and Canada. I find that the positive association between forecast frequency/ precision and the proportion of outside directors is stronger in Canada. This suggests that outside directors are more likely to encourage disclosure in less litigious Canada. I also find that firm‐level governance mechanisms such as outside directors and country‐level litigation environment act as governance substitutes in determining unbiased forecasts. Specifically, the negative association between forecast bias and the proportion of outside directors is stronger in Canada. I also revisit the effect of legal regime on forecast disclosure in a non‐U.S. context. Recent legislation has increased the likelihood of class‐action lawsuits in Canada. The passage of these laws has decreased the precision in forecasts by Canadian firms.     

Say on Pay: Is It Needed? Does It Work?

A leading compensation practitioner reviews “Say on Pay” rules, those corporate practices giving shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. The assumption behind “Say on Pay” is that managers may be overpaid because directors fail to provide adequate oversight. O'Byrne questions this underlying assumption. He provides substantial evidence that directors do a poor job overseeing executive pay and that directors have weak incentives to pursue shareholder interests in executive pay. He also finds that “Say on Pay voting is sensitive to differences in pay for performance, but so forgiving that extraordinary pay premiums are required to elicit a majority ‘no’ vote”; and “that three quarters of institutional investors have lower SOP voting quality… than the average investor and almost all have a short‐term focus, with much greater vote sensitivity to current year grant date pay premiums than to long‐term pay alignment and cost.” The common corporate practice of providing competitive target compensation regardless of past performance leads to low alignment of pay and performance. Unfortunately, directors have little incentive to protect shareholder interests “because they are paid labor providers, just like management, not stewards of substantial personal capital.”     

Developments in Remuneration Policy

In this article, the former chairman of the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) begins by summarizing the guidelines on "Executive Remuneration" that were published by the ICGN in July 2002. Among other changes, the guidelines called for independent remuneration committees, full disclosure of remuneration packages in an annual report, reduced reliance on stock options, elimination of executive loans and CEO bonuses for making acquisitions, better-informed and more active institutional investors, and a "clear mechanism by which shareholders are given the opportunity—possibly through an advisory vote at the annual shareholder meeting—to review and influence remuneration proposals."
Thanks in part to the efforts of the ICGN and growing investor activism, U.K. companies have made "a reasonably swift transition to a position where the majority of their boards are totally independent of management, and free of other potential conflicts of interest." U.S. boards, by contrast, remain "dominated by the imperial CEO" and "have failed to rein in the ambitions and appetites of their CEOs in such circumstances." What's more, U.S. institutional investment managers have failed to hold boards accountable for escalating remuneration. The solution to this problem lies, as suggested above, in "greater transparency, better analysis, and more shareholder monitoring."     

The determinants of director remuneration,executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms

This paper examines the impact of board governance mechanisms, namely board size, independence ratio, opacity of earnings disclosure, and ratio of genuinely independent nonexecutive directors to total board size on director remuneration, executive tenure and likelihood of individual executive salary disclosure in a unique and comprehensive sample of 69 North African IPO firms. I find evidence of the enhanced governance role of true independent nonexecutives in family as opposed to non-family firms in improving disclosure of individual salaries and moderating lengths of executive tenure. However while their role is only significant in the context of family firms the evidence suggests that their presence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. The evidence also ascribes a greater role for business angel as opposed to more formal private equity financing which is more applicable within the highly social networked economy of the Maghreb region.     

EXECUTIVE PAY AND THE DISCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT: CANADIAN EVIDENCE

We examine the economic consequences of the Ontario Securities Commission's requirement that firms disclose details of executive pay in proxy statements. Before 1993, Canadian firms only reported executive compensation in the aggregate. We predict the increased availability of compensation information will force boards of directors to compete in the managerial labor market by offering higher pay. We also predict public pressure on boards of directors to justify the level of executive pay will result in increased weight on incentive pay. The data support these hypotheses. We also document that pay‐performance sensitivity has increased. JEL classification: G30     

The Evolution of Executive Pay Policy at General Motors, 1918–2008

This article documents the gradual movement of General Motors away from the partnership concept that dominated U.S. corporate pay policy in the first half of the 20th century and toward the “competitive pay” concepts that have prevailed since then. The partnership concept was achieved by paying managers bonuses in the form of GM shares, with the amounts paid out of a single company‐wide bonus pool and based on a fixed share of profit (after subtracting a charge for the cost of capital). Thanks to this “EVA‐like” bonus scheme, GM's managers effectively became “partners” with the company's shareholders, sharing the wealth in good times but also the pain in troubled times. What's more, the authors also show that, from the establishment of the program in 1918 through the 1950s, the directors went to great lengths—including several bouts of innovative (and often complex) problem‐solving—to achieve their compensation objectives while maintaining such fixed‐share bonuses. But the sharing philosophy and associated compensation practices were gradually supplanted by competitive pay practices from the 1960s onward. The authors show that by the late 1970s, GM had a board of directors with modest shareholdings, in contrast to the board in the early post‐war period, whose directors had large stakes. As a consequence, directors began acting less like stewards of capital and more like employees whose financial rewards came not from returns on GM's stock but from the fees they received for their services. This fundamental change in board compensation almost certainly contributed to the gradual abandonment of fixed‐profit sharing for GM's managers. In its place, the board implemented competitive pay policies that, while coming to dominate executive pay policy in the U.S. and abroad, have largely divorced executive pay from changes in shareholder wealth. In the case of GM, this growing separation of pay from performance was accompanied by a significant decline in corporate returns on operating capital as well as stock returns over time.     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives

Previous literature documents that executives tend to cash out equity incentives when equity-linked compensation vests. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the unloading of incentives can be limited when the firm adopts a minimum executive shareholding policy. We provide the first evidence of the effectiveness of such policies in that respect. Using data for UK FTSE 350 companies we show that executives whose ownership is below the minimum set by the policy retain more newly vesting equity and the incentives to retain shares weaken when the holdings are above the minimum. We also document economic implications of compliance with the policy and we find higher firm valuations when actual ownership increases relative to the minimum holdings required. Our results have implications for the debate on executive remuneration regulations and practices.     

Large Shareholders,the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell‐offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell‐offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell‐off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share‐ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell‐off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell‐off proceeds. We find that non‐executive directors' and CEO's share‐ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell‐offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell‐off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non‐executive directors' share‐ownership and non‐executive representation in the board.     

金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证

本文通过构建简单的理论模型研究了金字塔所有权结构对上市公司自愿性信息披露的影响,并以2002—2004年我国家族控股上市公司为样本进行了实证检验。研究发现终极控制人为了获取私人利益而倾向于抑制对外披露私人信息,即终极控制人的控制权和现金流权分离度越大、终极控制权比例越高,上市公司自愿性信息披露程度越低,而董事会在一定程度上起到了监督终极控制人行为的积极作用。