First Mortgages,Second Mortgages,and Their Default

Using 35,437 pairs of first and second mortgages matched from within a much larger set of subprime mortgages, this paper tracks and describes the tendency for either one of the mortgages to enter default, as well as the tendency for either the one or the other mortgage to ever return to being current, all this in a possibly repeated manner. Thus, the entire, interconnected default history of pairs of first and second mortgages is explored, as well as compared to theoretical predictions.     

Determinants of Student Attitudes toward Team Exams

Abstract

We examine how student attitudes toward their group, learning method, and perceived development of professional skills are initially shaped and subsequently evolve through multiple uses of team exams. Using a Tobit regression model to analyse a sequence of 10 team quizzes given in a graduate-level tax accounting course, we show that there is an anchoring effect, in that in later rounds satisfaction on all dimensions rests on the foundation laid in the initial round. Subsequently, however, self-perceptions and the perception of others may influence satisfaction on a particular dimension. We also find that the satisfaction with one's group tends to increase when students make more correct switches but decreases when there is greater disagreement among the group. Furthermore, satisfaction with team exams tends to lessen, and to an increasing extent over time, as the number of errors a student has committed on the most recent quiz increases.     

The Determinants of Default on Insured Conventional Residential Mortgage Loans

This paper presents empirical evidence on the determinants of default for insured residential mortgages. A multinomial logit model is specified and estimated for regional aggregates constructed from cross sectional and time series data. The results document the independent statistical significance of contemporaneous payment/income and loan/ value ratios and unemployment rates as well as more commonly studied determinants of default such as age and the original loan/value ratio.     

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.     

The Economic Effects of Legal Restrictions on High-Cost Mortgages

We analyze the effects of state predatory mortgage lending laws, which have been a model for recent changes in the United States federal legislation enacted to regulate the mortgage contract terms common in higher-risk mortgage market segments. Using the Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to model credit markets under asymmetric information, legal restrictions are shown to reduce the use and attractiveness of mortgage credit. Consistent with model predictions, empirical results indicate that originations of regulated high-cost mortgages were significantly less than predicted in states with more restrictive laws. The differences between predicted and actual originations of high-cost mortgages in states with less restrictive laws were not significant. These differences were also not significant for non-high-cost originations across all states. Thus, credit regulation was differentially associated with reduction in originations of high-cost mortgages, and non-high-cost lending did not consistently expand in areas where high-cost mortgages were restricted.     

Collateral Value and Strategic Default: Evidence from Auto Loans

Journal of Financial Services Research - I study the impact of changes to collateral value on borrowers’ default decisions on auto loans using two natural experiments in Sri Lanka. Changes in...     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.     

Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

Determinants of the Dollar Value of Default Risk: A Put Option Perspective

This study uses the option valuation framework to identify andinvestigate the factors affecting the cross-sectional difference inindividual corporate bonds' default risk. The dollar value of defaultrisk (DVDR) is measured by subtracting the observed trading price of arisky corporate bond from a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model value of acorresponding pseudo-default-free bond. From an option pricingperspective, DVDR can be modeled as the value of a put option on thefirm's risky assets. The DVDR of an individual investment-grade corporatebond is hypothesized to be related to the bond rating, time to maturity ofthe bond, size of the issuing firm, volatility of firm value, and dividendyield of the issuing firm. In the case of the first four factors, theempirical results are consistent with the predictions from a put optionperspective. There is a mixed relationship between DVDR and dividendyield, however, which provides a weaker support for the prediction of theoption valuation model. Such a mixed relationship documents the importantrole that dividend payments play in signaling a firm's future earnings andreducing overall agency costs. ["In particular, the formula can be usedto derive the discount that should be applied to a corporate bond becauseof the possibility of default." (Black and Scholes (1973), Journal of Political Economy, Abstract, p. 637.)]     

The Relative Termination Experience of Adjustable to Fixed-Rate Mortgages

Our study uses a multinomial logit model to analyze the concurrent termination experience of adjustable-rate and fixed-rate mortgages. A new set of ARM-specific interactive determinants expands the conventional FRM specification to isolate the unique termination behavior of ARMs. We find that expected rate adjustments and large lifetime caps are positively related to ARM termination probabilities while long adjustment frequencies are inversely related. Caps, both periodic and lifetime, have a secondary, inverse effect on termination probabilities when interest-rate movements exceed cap limits. The model also shows that interest-rate expectations affect FRM terminations more strongly than ARM terminations.     

信用评级中的违约率、违约概率研究

信用评级是对个人、经济体与金融工具履行各种经济承诺的能力及可信任程度的综合评价，本文通过对KMV评级模型的研究，指出在信用评级中的关键指标——“违约率和违约概率”在评级中的重要意义。     

Optimal Stopping and Losses on Subprime Mortgages

Lender losses on mortgage loans arise from a two-stage process. In the first stage, the borrower stops making payments if and when default is optimal. The second stage is a lengthy and costly period during which the lender employs legal remedies to obtain possession and execute a sale of the collateral. This research uses data on subprime mortgage losses to explore the role of borrower and collateral characteristics, and local legal requirements, as well as traditional option variables in the decisions of borrowers and lenders. Although subprime borrowers default earlier, which should reduce lender losses, these borrowers, nevertheless, impose greater realized losses on mortgage lenders.     

The Default Risk of Swaps

We characterize the exchange of financial claims from risky swaps. These transfers are among three groups: shareholders, debtholders, and the swap counterparty. From this analysis we derive equilibrium swap rates and relate them to debt market spreads. We then show that equilibrium swaps in perfect markets transfer wealth from shareholders to debtholders. In a simplified case, we obtain closed-form solutions for the value of the default risk in the swap. For interest-rate swaps, we obtain numerical solutions for the equilibrium swap rate, including default risk. We compare these with equilibrium debt market default risk spreads.     

Three Triggers? Negative Equity,Income Shocks and Institutions as Determinants of Mortgage Default

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - In understanding the determinants of mortgage default, the consensus has moved from an ‘option theory’ model to the ‘double...     

住房抵押贷款提前偿付率的宏观影响因素分析

本文从宏观视角,运用多元线性回归模型和半参数模型等对我国个人住房抵押贷款组合提前偿付率的影响因素及其作用机制进行了实证研究。研究发现货币市场中长期贷款利率的提高,会增加借款人再融资成本,从而降低提前偿付率;资本市场作为借款人的收入来源之一与提前偿付率之间存在正相关关系;家庭人均净收入与提前偿付率的关系是非线性的;此外,与国外研究一致,房价和累计提前偿付额也会影响提前偿付率。     

The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrowers' Default Behavior

This paper conducts loan‐level analysis to investigate the influence of expected foreclosure delay on a borrower's default propensity. We include the actual foreclosure times in the analysis to capture the dynamic nature of foreclosure duration. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a statistically and economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior. In the current market condition where many borrowers have negative equity, the increase in delay may make default an optimal choice for more borrowers. The negative effect of increased foreclosure delay may need to be considered when devising policies to aid troubled borrowers.     

劳动投资效率、企业性质与资产收益率

基于中国信用债券市场的近期违约事件,本文研究发现:涉事评级机构不仅没有因为涉及债券违约事件而收紧信用评级标准,反而更加高估企业的信用评级水平,并且涉及的债券违约事件越多,高估信用评级的程度越大。但投资者通过“用脚投票”方式惩罚了涉事评级机构,导致其市场份额相对于非涉事评级机构出现显著下降或者增长较低的态势,同时涉事评级机构的信用评级意见对于降低企业融资成本的作用显著降低。