民主、投资与经济增长

本文使用166个国家和地区1972—2010年的面板数据检验民主对投资消费比和经济增长的影响。结果表明民主在增加居民消费占比的同时减少了资本积累,降低了经济增长速度,威权在促进投资的情况下更有利于经济增长。但当人均收入较低时,由于人们的收入仅能维持生存,投资消费比会维持在一个较低的水平,威权和民主体制对投资消费比都没有显著的影响。因此,在增长的初期,当人均收入达到一定水平之后,威权比民主更能促进投资。     

Democracy and Economic Growth: Optimal Level and Transmission Channels

After evening out all the benefits and costs, the overall optimal level of democracy is about 3.2, on a scale of 1 to 7. On average, fully dictatorial countries have a conditioned growth rate of –1.113 percent, fully democratic countries have a conditioned growth rate of 1.146 while countries with the optimal level of democracy/autocracy have a conditioned growth rate of 2.665. In the case of a fully dictatorial country, moving one unit towards democracy can raise the GDP growth rate by about 1.725 points; while for a fully democratic country, moving towards autocracy by one unit can raise the growth rate by about 0.885 points. This study provides useful information for many developing countries which are experiencing substantial pressures to restructure their political system.     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

Economic Growth and (Re-)Distributive Policies in a Non-cooperative World

Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing (“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively high growth.     

Aid, Growth and Democracy

To the extent that aid is justified by the benefits to the recipient, rather than to the donor, it might be reasonably judged on two criteria: growth and poverty-alleviation. We study the first of these criteria. We find that the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country. Aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with an institutionalized check on governmental power; that is, in more democratic countries. The data suggest, however, that if this is not the case, aid will be used to satisfy the government's own non-productive goals. We also find that aid on average is not channeled to more democratic countries, even though there are large cross-country differences between major donors.     

国外人力资本与经济增长关系研究述评

文章综述了国外人力资本与经济增长关系研究的文献,指出人力资本与经济增长关系的研究经历了三个阶段,人力资本理论建立之处的草创阶段,新增长理论阶段,和后新增长理论阶段。草创阶段发现了人力资本(教育)在经济增长中具有重要的作用,新增长理论阶段,着重研究人力资本和研发(创新)在经济增长中的作用机制,并建立了内生增长模型;后新增长理论阶段,主要是对新增长理论的检验和修订,并试图建立新的增长模型。最后,对人力资本与经济增长关系的研究进展作了评价。     

Monetary Policy Reaction in an Interdependent Instrument Setting

Policy reaction equations are fitted for the statutory reserve deposit (SRD) and open-market instruments (OMO). The interest rate is treated exogenously. The policy regime envisaged accommodates interdependencies between the instruments. The study is based on quarterly data over the period 1961-74. The results demonstrate a marked difference in the form of the policy response for the two instruments: the SRD instrument responds strongly to the domestic targets, inflation and, unemployment; but shows little response to external factors. The OMO instrument reacts to external influences, but not to the domestic targets, a result consistent with the policymaker's desire to sterilize exogenous influences on the cash-base of the economy. The OMO instrument has a strong association with the interest rate reflecting its market orientation and the political costs of adjusting it. The interest rate proxy is not significant in the SRD equation. There is some evidence for a harmonious association between the SRD and OMO instruments. Finally, the form of the response in each case varies according to the policy intent: contraction and expansion. This reflects a change in the weights attaching to the policy targets as the policy-intention alters.     

Characterizing Pareto Improvements in an Interdependent Demand System

Interdependent preferences generally imply Pareto inefficiency. For a general demand system, we provide a characterization of Pareto improvements. For a prominent parametric specification, the Linear Expenditure System, we characterize in detail the welfare loss associated with interdependent preferences. Using an estimated empirical model of this kind, we calculate the compensating variation corresponding to the welfare loss.     

Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches

This article focuses on two previously unexamined aspects of the relationship between economic growth and democracy. First, the growth experiences of countries that experience significant changes in democracy are examined directly. Countries that democratize are found to grow faster than a priori similar countries, while countries that become less democratic grow more slowly than comparable countries. These differences do not seem to be due to differences in education or investment levels. Second, regression tree analysis suggests that democracy, along with initial income and literacy, contributes to the identification of regimes of countries facing similar aggregate production functions.     

Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance

Sah (1991) conjectured that more centralized societies should have more volatile economic performances than less centralized ones. We show in this paper that this is true both for cross–country and within–country variability in growth rates. It is also true for some measures of policies. Finally, we show that both the best and worst performers in terms of growth rates are more likely to be autocracies. We argue that the evidence in the paper is consistent with the theoretical implications in Sah and Stiglitz (1991) and Rodrik (1999a).     

Mutual Enmity: Deposit Insurance and Economic Democracy

“Symbolic consumption” is formally unrelated to “second-order preferences”, but the ability to symbolically consume and the ability to have preferences about one's preferences are each uniquely human characteristics. The major question addressed in this paper is this: are symbolic preferences more or less likely than other preferences to be “unpreferred” by the agent experiencing and acting upon them? In previous writings on second-order preferences, I demonstrated the propensity of market forces to overproduce preferences that are judged to be worse than what they replace and underproduce preferences that are judged to be better. In this paper, I offer reasons for believing that the market inefficiency in preference production suggests a decline in symbolic consumption.     

中国货币化率与经济增长

近年来,中国高货币化率问题愈发严重,学者们专注于寻找其背后的原因,却忽略了对货币化率与经济增长关系的研究.为此,在对货币化率影响经济增长相关理论进行总结归纳基础上,提出货币化率与经济增长之间呈现倒U型关系的理论假设,并且选择全球72个主要国家1996—2018年面板数据,对货币化率与经济增长之间关系进行实证检验.结果表明:在全样本和发达国家子样本中,货币化率与经济增长之间呈现倒U型关系,目前我国货币化率水平小于全样本数据拐点值,大于发达国家子样本数据拐点值.发展中国家子样本数据则显示,货币化率与经济增长呈现正U型关系,适当提高货币化率可以促进经济增长.最后,根据上述结论,提出中国货币化率最优路径图.     

A World of Contrasted but Interdependent Inequality Regimes: The Latin America Paradox

The previous issue of this journal published an explanation of three contemporary paradoxes: dramatically increased inequalities in China despite economic development reducing poverty; the excessively large costs incurred by the state following a surge of inequality in the finance-led growth regime of the United States (US); and, within Europe, some social democratic countries continue to exhibit a complementarity between and extended welfare system, more moderate inequalities and a dynamic innovation and production system. This analysis concluded that the US, Chinese and European inequality regimes are different but they express complementary growth patterns. Applying the same socio-economic approach, based upon the concept of inequality regimes, this article addresses another contemporary paradox. Latin America, previously the continent with the highest inequality, has reversed the former dynamics to exhibit a growth pattern based upon inequality reduction, while still relying heavily upon a strong international demand for commodities. This analysis investigates the durability and likelihood of the Latin American U-turn and concludes that there is a possible alternative to the hypothesis of an irreversible globalization of inequality because China, North America, Europe and Latin America do not follow the same trajectory, having developed contrasting regimes of inequality that co-evolve and are largely complementary at the global level. Consequently the future of more inclusive Latin American (and other) economies depends on the interaction between new domestic democratic advances and the reconfiguration of the international economy.     

经济增长理论演进与经济增长模型浅析

古典经济增长理论十分强调物质资本的作用,这种对资本积累作用的强调,形成了经济增长理论中的“资本决定论”;新古典经济增长强调了技术因素对经济增长的关键作用,相对于单纯强调资本作用的“唯资本论”来说,这是一次巨大的进步;新经济增长理论认为,经济增长就是一个以知识积累为基础,技术进步、人力资本积累、劳动分工演进和制度变迁等诸因素共同作用的社会过程,并分别从技术变化、人力资本积累、制度变迁、分工演进的角度,提出了新的经济增长模型,使经济增长理论研究的侧重点和方向发生了转移。