Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value

We use cross-sectional regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions.     

企业业绩组合业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择--管理层信息披露的组合动机与信息操作

本文主要考察企业业绩组合、业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择之间的关系以及季报披露时间的信息内涵。实证研究显示,上年年报和一季度季报均为“好消息”,一季度每股收益、净资产收益率和主营业务利润率高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔大;上年年报为“好消息”而一季度季报为“坏消息”,上年年报为“坏消息”而一季度季报为“好消息”,上年年报和一季度季报均为“坏消息”,一季度每股收益比上年度高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔小。这可能是由于一季度季报和上年年报均要求在4月30日之前披露的特殊性,上市公司管理层在信息披露的过程中可能存在组合动机与信息操作行为,一季度季报披露的时间选择可能关键取决于上年年报和一季度季报披露的“好消息”或“坏消息”带来的积极影响或消极影响的组合与权衡。     

Corporate Disclosure,Market Valuation,and Firm Performance

In this paper, I study the relationship between the Association for Investment Management and Research disclosure rankings and several corporate performance measures. I find a positive relationship between these rankings and stock returns. Furthermore, disclosure rankings are highly correlated with firm value. Specifically, Qs of firms ranked at the top of disclosure rankings are 35% higher than those of firms ranked at the bottom. I also find positive associations between disclosure rankings and future net profit margins, sales growth, and research and development intensity. Finally, I document a positive correlation between changes in disclosure rankings and future earnings surprises.     

Labor Rights,Venture Capital,and Firm Performance

We investigate the role of labor unions in the performance of venture capital (VC)‐backed firms. Using a large sample of initial public offering firms from 1983 to 2013, we find that VC‐backed firms in highly unionized industries have lower Tobin's Q and are less likely to survive. This effect is robust to endogeneity concerns and to controlling for industry and firm characteristics. The findings suggest that strong labor rights impede innovative firms’ performance and survival, thereby adversely affecting innovation, economic growth, and employment.     

研发投入、冗余资源与企业绩效的关系研究

采用创业板企业2010～2014年数据为研究对象,实证分析研发投入与企业绩效的关系,探讨冗余资源对于二者关系的调节效应.结果表明,我国创业板企业研发投入强度与当期绩效显著负相关,而与滞后一至三期企业绩效显著正相关.考虑企业冗余资源的影响,进一步研究发现,沉淀性冗余资源和非沉淀性冗余资源对研发投入强度与企业绩效的关系分别具有负向和正向的调节效应,说明沉淀性冗余资源不利于企业研发绩效的提升,而非沉淀性冗余资源则可以有效促进企业进行创新研发,提高研发效率,最终提升企业绩效.     

董事会结构、股权结构与中小企业绩效

以中小企业板2004～2009年数据为基础,分析了中小上市企业董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明,中小上市企业的董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的内生性特征不显著。董事会规模对Tobin’Q具有负向影响,对总资产收益率无显著影响。CEO双重性对Tobin’Q和总资产收益率分别具有负向影响和正向影响。董事会独立性对总资产收益率具有负向影响,对Tobin’Q无显著影响,表明独立董事在中小上市企业中并未起到有效的监督作用。Tobin’Q和股权集中度之间呈现显著的倒W形关系,但总资产收益率和股权集中度之间无显著相关性。Tobin’Q和总资产收益率与管理层持股之间均呈现显著的N形关系。     

董事会结构、战略决策参与程度与公司绩效

通过对中国101家上市公司的实证研究发现:独立董事的数量与董事会战略决策参与程度不相关,董事长与总经理两职分任比两职兼任更有利于提高董事会战略决策参与程度,董事会规模与战略决策参与程度负相关,董事会战略决策参与程度与公司财务业绩正相关.研究发现独立董事功能的发挥还很不明显,仍然需要加大改革的力度.     

Trust,Owner Rights,Employee Rights and Firm Performance

This is a study of variations in trust relationships according to institutional setting. A wide body of comparative institutional literature within economics and finance engages with trust. However, as most of this literature uses macro‐level data and/or stylistic ideal types, it normally neglects intra‐firm trust. This paper redresses this lacuna by using both macro‐level data and comparative firm‐level evidence. We found that both country trust and firm trust increase firm performance, but that there is a trade‐off between the two as high levels of both reduce performance. Finally, both employee rights and investor rights are negatively correlated with country trust.     

Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.     

Partial Privatization and Firm Performance

Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non‐controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market. Since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact. This perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner. Using data on Indian state‐owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment.     

Director Quality and Firm Performance

Many financial economists argue that the board of directors' efficacy in the monitoring of managerial behavior depends upon the quality of the directors. Assuming that there is a link between the stock performance of target firms and the quality of their directors, we empirically categorize directors receiving additional directorships following a takeover as “above average” and “below average.” We then follow the stock performance of firms hiring new directors for three years after their hiring. We match the two categories of directors with the performance of hiring firms after a director's appointment. Accounting for other contemporaneous effects, we regress the hiring firms' post‐performance on director quality and other attributes. The results indicate that directors of “above average” quality are related to hiring firms with “above average” post‐performance.     

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.     

政府控制、高管更换与公司业绩

本文以我国1997-2008年300家政府控制的上市公司为例,考察了高管更换与公司业绩的关系以及更换前后公司业绩的变化。研究发现,在政府控制的情况下,高管升迁与公司业绩无关,高管非升迁与公司业绩确实存在负相关关系,但是这种负相关关系只是在经济业绩比较低时才显著。此外,高管更换并没有给公司带来积极的财务业绩改进。这表明,在政府控制下,高管更换无论从过程还是从结果上看,都偏离了经济目标。     

Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance

Abstract:   The board of directors is generally seen as an important internal governance structure. However, the empirical evidence on the board‐performance relationship is not conclusive. On the other hand, a growing literature suggests that different control mechanisms, either internal or external to the firm, can interact with each other and affect performance. One such important factor is product market competition. The objective of the study is to investigate further the board‐performance relationship taking into consideration the potential effect of market competition. More precisely, the study analyzes the combined effect of boards of directors' characteristics, and market discipline on firm performance. Overall, the results suggest that competition has a positive and significant impact on firm profitability and productivity. Moreover, this determinant factor creates the conditions for which the board‐performance relationship is supported. In other words, for boards to be effective, firms should be exposed to a competitive environment.     

股权分置改革、股权层级与企业绩效

针对股权分置改革这一我国资本市场影响深远的事件,基于经济后果的视角,本文利用2001~2010年上市公司数据,考察了股权分置改革前后公司股权层级的变化及对经营绩效的影响。论文研究发现,股权分置改革后随着控股股东与其他小股东间代理冲突的减轻,公司股权层级显著减少。进一步的分析显示,由于代理成本的下降及对管理层监督的加强,股权分置改革后公司业绩因股权层级的降低而上升。最后,我们的考察表明,股权分置改革对公司股权层级及经营绩效的影响在非国有公司中更显著。     

Corporate Governance Ratings and Firm Performance

We examine the corporate governance ratings provided by three premier US rating agencies and find that summary scores are generally poor predictors of primary and secondary measures of future firm performance. However, some component sub-ratings that focus on the eight key dimensions of dynamic governance structures provide more positive and reliable evidence of their information content in predicting the multiple dimensions of firm performance. These results reflect the recent observations by academic researchers and money managers that it is extremely difficult to distill all of the complex governance mechanisms into a single integrated, yet informative overall score.     

Short Selling and Firm Operating Performance

While it is well known that short selling predicts future negative stock price performance, it has not been established whether short selling predicts future negative operating performance. We find that firms in the top decile of increases in short interest (an increase of about four percentage points) experience a 21% subsequent decline in operating performance relative to matched control firms. The greater the increase in short interest, the larger the decline in operating performance. The results are robust to alternative performance measures and to sample splits based on firm size. These results suggest that short interest may reflect private information about firm fundamentals rather than other factors that may drive stock price changes.     

财务独立董事的公司绩效研究

本文系统回顾了国外关于财务专家与公司绩效之间关系的研究成果，并以我国上市公司2004～2006年的经验数据为样本，在对财务独立董事分类评分的基础上，分析了不同类型的财务独立董事与公司绩效之间的关系。结果表明：会计专家型财务独立董事和金融型财务独立董事能够显著地促进公司绩效，而会计型财务独立董事和监管型财务独立董事与公司绩效并无相关性。