The liquidity effects associated with addition of a stock to the S&P 500 index: evidence from bid/ask spreads

This study examines changes in stock liquidity, as measured by the bid/ask spread, when a stock is added to the S&P 500 Index. The paper presents evidence of a significant decrease in the bid/ask spread upon S&P 500 addition, however, this effect is limited to only those stocks that were not trading listed options. Further, the decrease in the bid/ask spread for nonoptioned stocks is accompanied by a significant and permanent increase in share price and trading volume. While optioned stocks experience a permanent increase in trading volume, they experience only a temporary increase in share price. The findings for optioned stocks support the hypothesis that the price and volume effects associated with S&P 500 addition derive from temporary price pressure. Findings pertaining to the nonoptioned stocks indicate that the price and volume effects associated with S&P addition reflect enhanced stock liquidity. The decrease in the bid/ask spread for nonoptioned stocks is attributed to informational efficiencies achieved via index arbitrage trading, and it is argued that this effect is mitigated for optioned stocks due to the pre-existence of arbitrage trading between the option and the underlying stock.     

Comment on ‘earnings management around UK open offers’

This note discusses the result of Iqbal, A., S. Espenlaub, and N. Strong. 2008 Iqbal, A., Espenlaub, S. and Strong, N. 2008. Earnings management around UK open offers. European Journal of Finance, this issue [Google Scholar]. Earnings management around UK open offers. European Journal of Finance, this issue, regarding long-run abnormal returns following open offers and announcement abnormal returns, compared with differing results in two previous studies based on similar samples. A survivorship bias explains some of the differences in the reported long-run abnormal returns. The difference in the announcement abnormal returns could be due to use of different data sources.     

The Effect of Option Trading on the Structure of Equity Bid/Ask Spreads

This paper investigates empirically the direct effect of option trading on the structure of costs that comprise the underlying equity bid-ask spread. Our results show that the spread declines over a 30-day period following initiation of option trading, but the decline vanishes when price, volume, and volatility effects are considered. Changes in the composition of the spread reflect primarily a reduction in adverse information costs. Additionally, consistent with previous research, we find significant transaction-type clustering in our intraday data.     

Takeover defenses,golden parachutes,and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optimal contracting

We incorporate managerial risk aversion and stochasticity of takeover synergy gains into Harris’ (Harris, E.G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. Rand Journal of Economics 21, no. 4: 614–25. bargaining model for the coexistence of antitakeover defenses and golden parachutes in corporate charters. We show that: (i) it is not always optimal that the target-firm shareholders adopt antitakeover defenses, (ii) the size of the golden parachute is proportional to the riskiness of the synergistic gains, and (iii) the target-firm shareholders are unequivocally better-off with golden parachutes than takeover-contingent stock options.     

Specialists,Limit‐Order Traders,and the Components of the Bid‐Ask Spread

This study compares the components of the bid‐ask spread estimated from quotes that reflect the trading interest of specialists with those estimated from limit‐order quotes and all available quotes for a sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks. The results show that the adverse selection component of the spread estimated from specialist quotes is significantly smaller than the corresponding figures from limit‐order quotes and entire quotes. We interpret this as evidence that NYSE specialists transfer at least a part of adverse selection costs to outsiders through the discretionary use of limit orders. Our results show that the estimation/interpretation of the components of the spread using quote data that include both specialist and limit‐order interests is problematic.     

Estimating liquidity premia in the Spanish government securities market

This paper investigates the presence of liquidity premia in the relative pricing of assets traded on the Spanish government securities market. First, a classification of bonds into four different categories based on their degree of liquidity is proposed. Second, liquidity premia are estimated introducing liquidity parameters in the estimation of the zero-coupon yield curve. Results suggest the existence of a liquidity premium for post-benchmark bonds (both strippable and non-strippable). The size of this premium is relatively small. In the case of pre-benchmark bonds, the lack of liquidity does not seem to be priced. It is also shown that these pricing discrepancies are robust to the impact of taxes on bonds.     

Discounts in Placing Pre-renounced Shares in Rights Issues

Abstract:  The paper presents evidence from UK rights issues on the discounts at which large blocks of new shares plus rights are sold. The shares are renounced by the shareholders entitled to them and placed with passive investors at substantial discounts of around 8% to the expected ex-rights midpoint price of the existing shares. Tests indicate that the discounts arise because of uncertainty about issuer value and inelastic demand for the shares rather than because the issuing companies are overvalued. The finding that selling renounced shares is costly removes an apparent advantage of rights issues compared with open offers and private placings.     

An Examination of Initial Shareholdings in Tender Offer Bids

We examine the initial shareholdings taken by bidders prior to making tender offer bids ("toeholds") in order to test predictions of selected models of tender offers. Our data suggest a significantly negative relationship between first bidder premia and toeholds, which is consistent with the models of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), but inconsistent with the models of Harrington and Prokop (1993), Chowdhry and Jagadeesh (1994), and Burkart (1995).     

Determinants of Institutional Responses to Self–Tender Offers

I examine how institutional investors respond to self–tender offers for common shares. I find that institutions sell more shares in larger offers and with higher proration factors. Institutions also sell more shares when officer and director holdings are not at risk in the offers. Banks, investment advisors, and other managers respond similarly, selling more shares in larger offers. Although institutions as a group do not respond differently by offer type, insurance companies and investment advisors sell more shares in fixed–price offers. Mutual funds, which differ from other types of institutions, sell more shares for firms with greater increases in leverage.